Revitalizing Military Recruitment Without Restoring the Draft

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 1973, the advent of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) under the Nixon administration fundamentally altered the nature of the United States military. The switch from a system of conscription to a force comprised solely of volunteers changed the structure and function of Army operations, transforming successful recruitment into a vital determinant of the Army’s continued success. Since the AVF was established nearly 40 years ago, however, the Army’s recruiting procedure and output have proven susceptible to outside economic and political influences. In the mid-2000s, a robust economy and an unpopular war in Iraq War caused a serious recruiting crisis: the number of volunteers declined sharply, leading to a corresponding decrease in overall recruit quality of the Army’s recruits and an increase in ethics violations committed by recruiters. This challenging recruitment environment raised doubts about the long-term viability of the AVF and revealed underlying flaws in the Army’s recruiting programs.

At present, the economic crisis and decreased casualty rate in Iraq have temporarily reversed the Army’s recruiting woes. However, it is crucial that the military and the government take advantage of the opportunity created by this short-term increase in volunteers and recruit quality to address several fundamental inefficiencies in the recruitment process. Reforms implemented by policymakers during this unique moment in the history of the AVF will ensure that the Army remains competitive in the long-term, regardless of economic conditions or foreign policy engagements.

Based on the extensive research of its members, this Princeton University Policy Task Force has identified three main aspects of Army recruitment policy that need attention: recruiting procedure, outreach to potential recruits, and tangible benefits offered to enlistees. Specifically, the Task Force proposes recommendations pertaining to these nine policy areas:
Beyond the role the Army must play in improving its recruiting efforts, there exist important roles for other governmental actors such as Congress and the Department of Defense, in revitalizing Army recruitment. Cooperation between various agencies is necessary to ensure that the fundamental problems with the Army’s recruiting process are fully addressed.

In creating this final report, the Task Force emphasizes four core principles. The Army’s recruiting system should work efficiently and effectively, regardless of the status of the domestic economy or the government’s foreign policy. The Army must fill its enlisted ranks without compromising its high standards of recruit quality. In order to ensure this high quality, the Army should cast its net as wide as possible, by attempting to recruit capable and qualified individuals from diverse parts of the American population, including women and racial minorities. For both moral and practical reasons, Army recruiting must adhere to high standards of ethical conduct.

With these principles in mind, the Task Force presents the following recommendations for revitalizing military recruitment:
RECOMMENDATIONS

Recruiting Procedure

- Improve recruiter selection by using the Warrior Attributes Inventory assessment results and interviews with veteran recruiters to identify qualified soldiers.
- Abandon the “80/20 method” of mission assignment, instead using a social and economic analysis of recruiting districts to assign challenging but achievable missions to recruiting stations.
- Increase the number of female recruiters and facilitate interactions between potential female recruits and women in the military.
- Improve oversight of recruiter improprieties in public high schools with better data collection and monitoring.
- Improve prevention by increasing safeguards and awareness in public high schools.
- Strengthen the policies against sexual harassment in recruiting.
- Mandate timely, ongoing data about appropriate variables to contribute to regular econometric analysis of advertising effectiveness.
- Hire a civilian economist to manage econometric analysis of advertising.
- Improve ethical data mining online on GoArmy.com.
- Allow the current Recruiter Incentive Pay program to expire and conduct test cell-based experiments to develop a new, more effective one.

Outreach to Potential Recruits

- Create blogs for interested parents and youth, using “mom” and soldier bloggers.
- Further utilize SGT Star for virtual recruiting.
- Develop more advertisements in which women are predominantly and centrally featured and stress benefits important to women in these advertisements.
- Encourage the Secretary of Defense to issue clear, frequent, and public calls for increased African-American representation in the officer corps.

Tangible Benefits

- Create stronger controls regarding enlistment bonus allocation, but do not reduce the maximum enlistment bonus benefits.
- Restore the purchasing power of the Army College Fund (ACF).
- Increase the flexibility of the ACF to avoid the “retention paradox.”
- Reduce the gap in expenditures between the enlistment bonus program and the ACF.
- Increase the number of 3-year ROTC scholarships to increase retention between the freshman and sophomore years.
- Maintain the ROTC Critical Language Bonus.
- Increase the size of the US Military Academy Preparatory School.
- Pledge government contributions to the Residential Communities Initiative’s (RCI) new and current private developers.
- Expand the privatized RCI model for permanent party barracks, to replace the Barracks Modernization Program (BMP).
- Initiate recruiting campaigns that highlight new housing installations.
- Improve policies for new mothers in the Army by extending the length of maternity leave and deployment deferrals.
INTRODUCTION

Since the introduction of the All Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973, the United States military has faced grave challenges. The military has had to maintain a strong fighting force and ensure that its enlisted ranks and officer corps are filled with high-caliber individuals, while also preserving an ethical and equitable system of recruitment. The end of the draft under the Nixon administration signaled a transition from military service as a duty to service as an occupation. This transformation altered the role of recruitment, making it the vital determinant of the survival and success of the AVF.

The AVF continues to face a particularly rigorous test in the form of sustained military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recent reports also suggest that the AVF, particularly the National Guard, may play an expanded role in arbitrating the drug war and enforcing border control between the U.S. and Mexico.\(^1\) With the real possibility of combat action looming on the horizon, the military must truly convince potential American soldiers that they will be adequately compensated to fight—and potentially die—for their country.

This task force report focuses specifically on the fate of Army recruitment. Historically, the Army has had the greatest difficulty in maintaining a high quality recruited force. This has occurred in part because of the large size of the Army and its public image as the least desirable branch of the military in which to serve. Over the past decades, patterns in Army recruitment have demonstrated the influence which a number of factors – including the government’s foreign policy choices, economic fluctuations, and perceptions of the Army among potential recruits and the American public more broadly – have on the success or failure of Army recruiting efforts.

The actual Army recruiters who connect interested citizens with the information necessary to

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convince them to enlist are also important to the process. Similarly, “influencers,” a term used to
describe adult role models including parents, teachers, coaches, and religious authorities, play a
role in the decisions that potential recruits make about military service.

Today’s recruiting environment represents one entirely different from the nadir in Army
recruiting in the mid-2000s, a “recruiting crisis” that plagued the military as recently as one year
ago. Until the current economic downturn, the unpopular and particularly deadly nature of the
Iraq War strained Army recruitment for a number of years, contributing to more incidences of
recruiter misconduct and a general reduction in quality standards for recruits. Such strains on the
recruitment process also contributed to a higher number of unethical recruiter improprieties
(RIs); the link between a challenging recruitment environment and RIs is often masked by the
fact that the Department of Defense (DoD) tends to underreport these incidents.\(^2\) In response to
this hostile recruiting environment, the Army relaxed its standards for drug tests and began to
issue waivers to former felons, reaching a high in 2007 of 511 waivers.\(^3\) However, 2009 has so
far proven a promising year for the AVF, as the combination of rising unemployment and
reduced casualty rates in the Middle East has made military service more attractive to many
Americans. The Army has actually been forced to turn away some volunteers, while eliminating
its waivers for felons and approaching the Pentagon’s goal of a military in which 90% of those
serving are high school graduates.\(^4\)

This task force identifies the current recruitment environment as a unique opportunity to
address several underlying problems in the recruitment process, which plagued the Army in
previous years. The report originates from the premise that the current improvements in recruit
quality and quantity, when coupled with the emphasis on fiscal responsibility and budget cuts,

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\(^4\) Ibid.
particularly for recruitment, should not lead Congress or the Army to scale back its budget for or commitment to recruiting. This paper recommends that, instead of relaxing scrutiny of the recruitment process when no short-term recruitment challenges exist, the government and the Army must use this historic moment to examine the system as a whole, in order to address underlying problems with the Army’s method of attracting and retaining soldiers. Despite current recruiting success, the Army has operated for years with many inefficiencies and flawed policies, many of which impeded its recruiting efforts from 2005 to 2008. The goal of policymakers and experts should be to develop a system that emphasizes high-quality recruits and attracts these men and women to military service through ethical and equitable means. Such a system must be strong enough to perform in a more difficult recruiting situation, when the economy has improved and the military service is no longer the only employment option for many Americans. A plan to maintain a high-quality and equitable Army must include an effort to expand the pool of potential recruits to the greatest degree possible; for this reason, some of the policy proposals included in this paper are aimed at expanding the number of female and minority Army recruits.

The following report includes three sets of recommendations to various government agencies and Army departments. These recommendations suggest several ways in which policymakers can overhaul Army recruitment today in order to make it more effective in the future.

**RECRUITING PROCEDURE**

The first set of recommendations deals with the structure of recruiting procedure, from the method of recruiter selection and quota assignment to the enforcement of punishment for ethics violations, improved analysis of the Army’s method of advertising, and the rewards offered to successful recruiters. These policy options, in many cases, involve more long-term
approaches to the improvement of Army recruiting policy. They are aimed at helping the Army and the government identify and correct major problems with how the Army structures, enforces, and evaluates its methods of recruitment.

Recruiting Operations

Statement of the problem: Currently, the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) selects recruiters based on their success in other Army careers, which does not adequately predict a soldier’s success as a recruiter. The current system drains the Army’s financial stores by spending large amounts of money to train ineffective recruiters who often serve for less than two years in this assignment because they are not qualified. This method also removes many promising junior leaders from the Army’s other units. Additionally, the current mission allocation method used by USAREC, the “Brigade 80/20” system, bases new quotas almost entirely on the past production of a recruiting brigade and the past three years’ production for the Department of Defense across all services. This quota assignment plan does not consider any social, economic, or market quality considerations and ends up assigning quotas that are either too difficult or too easy, thereby reducing recruiter efficiency.

Recommendation 1: USAREC should administer the Warrior Attributes Inventory (WAI) assessment, which identifies important personality characteristics in soldiers that would be useful in a recruiting setting, to all new Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs). The Army should use a statistical analysis of the WAI components to identify which most accurately predict successful recruiters. USAREC should also convene monthly panels at which current recruiters in the field conduct interviews of potential recruiters. The purpose of these panels would be to select the most promising interviewees from a group of soldiers with high WAI scores.
Recommendation 2: USAREC should use an economic and social analysis of each recruiting station in order to identify the difficulty of recruitment in the station’s district. Using this information, USAREC should then assign challenging, but attainable, quotas for recruiting stations to maximize recruiter effort and efficiency.

Female Recruiters

Statement of the problem: One of the recommendations of the task force is that the Army increase the proportion of women among its ranks. Currently, only about 14% of Army soldiers are women, a dramatic under-representation of a group that forms over half of the population and has the potential to increase the quality of the force on the whole. The task force asserts that men and women can be recruited quite similarly in a variety of arenas; however some adjustments must be made to improve the Army’s ability to attract women to join. One effective method of doing so is through the use of female recruiters. The most recent available statistic indicates that only 20% of recruiters are female. USAREC currently selects its recruiters from a pool of individuals that includes those who are nominated and those who volunteer. However, some of the eligibility requirements, particularly those that specify that recruiters cannot be pregnant or be single parents, disproportionately preclude women from serving as recruiters. The Task Force believes that an increased number of female recruiters will help reduce incidents of harassment and provide women with greater insight into the life of a female Army soldier.

Recommendation 1: The Army should increase the number of female recruiters and, whenever possible, facilitate interactions between female recruiters and female prospects. On the whole, the Army should set a reasonable goal for an overall percentage of female recruiters. In
order to reach this benchmark, USAREC must encourage the nominations of women and those who volunteer.

**Recommendation 2:** The Army should also consider either revising the prohibitive eligibility requirements or providing waivers to promising female recruiters.

**Ethics Violations in High Schools**

*Statement of the problem:* Although ethics violations during the process of recruiting in public high schools are not widespread—affecting less than 1% of accessions in 2008—simply one incident can mar the reputation of the military with potential recruits and their adult “influencers.” Recruiter improprieties (RIs) tend to be concentrated towards the end of recruiting cycles, immediately before recruiting missions must be met. Currently, there are weak safeguards against RIs at both the local and national levels. At the local level, existing legal safeguards are not monitored or enforced, nor have additional ones been developed. Schools also lack adequate grievance procedures to facilitate data collection on RIs. Additionally, weak supervision at the local level is exemplified by the failure of faculty to advise students on their rights during interactions with recruiters on campus. As a result, minors lack awareness about their rights in relation to recruiters. On the national level, the DoD and Department of Education (ED) have failed to establish a comprehensive framework to coordinate and track the multiple reporting and grievance procedures maintained by USAREC, NGOs, and other government bodies. Similarly, USAREC has failed to unify the different grievance reporting methods between and within the various branches of the military. Overall, these disparate systems hamper Congress’s ability to assess the full extent of RIs and hold perpetrators accountable.
Recommendations: Congress should promote ethical recruiter conduct in high schools by restructuring oversight and preventative measures. A more synchronized approach will help the government report, monitor, and prevent RIs. The government should strengthen oversight through better data collection and monitoring by establishing an Ombudsman for Data Collection; coordinating DoD and ED monitoring; and/or integrating the services’ multiple databases. The government should enhance awareness by strengthening support systems and the No Child Left Behind Act’s “opt-out” policy to withhold student information from Army recruiters and protect student privacy.

Sexual Harassment

Statement of the problem: Cases of sexual harassment during the recruiting process, although not widespread, are a deterrent to women, as they suggest that the Army is an institution antipathetic to women. Independent investigations by Time and the Associated Press reveal that, among the services, incidents of sexual harassment are highest among Army recruiters and that offenders were not adequately punished for their actions. A prominent member of Congress and leaders in the Army have recommended that the Army adopt a strategy of “No One Alone,” which ensures that a third party is always present with a recruiter and female recruit.

Recommendation: The Army should strengthen the policies against sexual harassment in recruiting by establishing better prevention measures and stricter punishments for offenders. The Army’s preliminary decision to enact the “No One Alone” policy is an adequate first step. The installation of surveillance cameras at recruiting stations may also help deter would-be assailants. The Army should ensure that reports of sexual assault are thoroughly investigated, and that those
recruiters found guilty are punished adequately, through the loss of their jobs and/or prosecution in court when appropriate.

**Advertising Analysis**

*Statement of the problem:* Army recruitment advertising (ARA) is not routinely and rigorously assessed, although it will cost taxpayers over a quarter of a billion dollars this fiscal year. Econometric modeling techniques are relatively inexpensive, but are not routinely used to analyze the effectiveness of ARA with the use of sufficient and varied data. Furthermore, the ongoing prohibition of persistent cookies—a technological tool that tracks user activity online to help customize websites—puts the Army at a disadvantage because of its inability to tailor GoArmy.com content to meet user needs.

*Recommendation 1:* Congress or the DoD should ensure or mandate continuous, timely data collection with minimal aggregation on the 46 explanatory variables currently used in the “gold standard” RAND model for ARA analysis, including economic conditions and recruiter presence. Additionally, Congress or the DoD should introduce and/or integrate data collection on additional variables to improve the RAND model (such as segmenting ads by campaign, message, and target audience to determine the effect of particular types of advertising) and adjust spending based on the results. Congress or the DoD should also order timely and continuous ARA analysis to ensure the implementation of fact-driven advertising policies that are responsive to market conditions.

*Recommendation 2:* The Army should establish a post for an economist at USAAC to manage these advanced analytical tools. These recommendations, if implemented, would
contribute to an increased number of higher quality recruits, informed budgetary allocation for advertising, and responsiveness to defined conditions.

**Recommendation 3:** The government should allow the use of persistent cookies on GoArmy.com, solely with registered users’ consent. In this way, users will actively opt into the program, a solution that addresses security concerns about persistent cookies. With the use of cookies, GoArmy.com would be able to ethically conduct data mining online in order to benefit both account users (by creating a personalized website interface) and Army recruitment.

**Recruiter Incentives**

*Statement of the problem:* An important element of the recruitment process is the manner in which the Army rewards its recruiters. The Recruiter Incentive Pay (RIP) program was created in response to the National Defense Authorizations Act of Fiscal Year 2006, which ordered the Secretary of the Army to create additional incentives to increase enlistments. RIP provides cash bonuses to recruiters who exceed their recruiting missions. The transition from symbolic to monetary rewards was intended to mimic the private sector by providing more effective enticements to recruiters. However, there is no evidence that RIP increases the productivity of recruiters. RIP suffers from at least six major flaws. It lacks clear expected outcomes for recruiters, sound basic assumptions, and a well-defined methodology. The program’s complex design makes it difficult to implement. RIP was adopted without a preceding trial period to measure its effectiveness. Additionally, the program does not provide incentives for recruiters who find high-quality recruits, and RIP does not allow cash bonuses to fluctuate with the changing difficulty of the recruiting environment. Finally, the concept of providing cash
incentives for recruiters who exceed their recruit missions has raised concerns in Congress that
the system might counterproductively prompt a larger number of RIs.

Recommendations: The Recruiter Incentive Pay programs should be allowed to expire. A
test cell-based experiment should be established in order to determine the best system of recruiter
rewards that increases the productivity of Army recruiters through cash incentives, without
encouraging unethical behavior.

OUTREACH TO POTENTIAL RECRUITS

Beyond the structure and oversight of its recruiting procedures, the Army can also
improve the ways in which it reaches out to potential recruits. While the previous
recommendations contribute to an efficient and effective recruiting process from Congress’s and
the Army’s point of view, the following recommended policies address Army recruitment from
the standpoint of potential enlistees, and the adults who influence their decisions. To attract as
many high-quality recruits as possible, the Army must promote itself successfully, by generating
interest from eligible candidates and maintaining a positive public image. The recommendations
below suggest several ways in which the Army can enhance its general outreach to potential
recruits, and its efforts to attract women and minorities in particular.

Technology and Recruiting

Statement of the problem: The U.S. Army has always been a leader in utilizing modern
technology for purposes of recruitment. Currently, the Army maintains a sophisticated recruiting
website at GoArmy.com, highlighted by an advanced virtual recruiting guide known as SGT
STAR, as well as pages on popular social networking sites like Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter.
These efforts have increased both the quantity and the quality of potential recruits’ online contacts with the Army. Nevertheless, the Army continues to suffer from a negative public image, and research suggests that the Army’s current recruitment strategy does not account for the increasing importance of the Internet for potential enlistees and their influencers. Compared to the private sector, the Army has not done enough to foster online engagement by interested recruits. Therefore, the Army must enhance its Web-based recruiting efforts.

**Recommendation 1:** The Army should utilize popular social media to target influencers as well as potential recruits. Social media websites and blogs currently represent a major online activity for Americans of all ages; the Army can and should harness the recruiting potential of social media in two ways. First, the Army should create an informal social media platform for interested parents and guardians, through which the parents (especially mothers) of Army soldiers can share and discuss their experiences with parents of recruits. Second, the Army should develop an integrated blogging site for current soldiers, to help active soldiers connect with potential enlistees whom they have met through recruiting support programs. Both blogging platforms can ultimately serve as important and appealing sources of information and support for potential recruits as well as their families.

**Recommendation 2:** The Army should improve the utilization of its SGT STAR program, to provide recruits with vital information and guidance in an efficient and effective manner. First, the Army must improve the interactivity and engagement of SGT STAR, so that the program can better serve human needs. Second, the Army should more heavily advertise SGT STAR online, as a way of highlighting the Army’s technological sophistication and drawing more users to the program as well as GoArmy.com. An enhanced SGT STAR could thus play a major role in the Army’s future recruiting campaigns.
Recruiting Women

Statement of the problem: As discussed above, the dramatic underrepresentation of women in today’s Army represents a significant opportunity cost of qualified and capable female soldiers. Unfortunately, many women view the Army as an inhospitable, male-dominated environment; current advertising campaigns featuring primarily male soldiers only serve to reinforce this image. The Army must change this perception to attract more female soldiers.

Recommendation: To encourage women to enter this predominantly male workforce, the Army should develop more advertisements in which women are prominently and centrally featured. Future advertisements should feature female protagonists and show female soldiers in a wide range of roles; these advertisements should be shown in places where women are most likely to see them. In addition, these ads should emphasize benefits – such as guaranteed medical care and money for education – that have proven particularly important to women, as women often value certain Army benefits differently than do men. Such an ad campaign would likely increase the number of female enlistees, and thus the overall quality of the recruiting pool.

Prioritizing Diversity

Statement of the problem: While the U.S. Army is a remarkably diverse institution, minority soldiers (especially African-Americans) are underrepresented within the officer corps. The relative lack of African-American officers poses moral as well as practical concerns; several four-star generals and Secretaries of Defense have acknowledged the need for the Army to diversify the ranks of the officers who lead it. Because a firm commitment to representation and inclusion in the officer ranks could improve the Army’s public image and attract highly qualified minority recruits, the Army must increase its proportion of African-American officers.
**Recommendation:** The Secretary of Defense should issue clear, frequent, and public calls for greater diversity in the officer corps. Studies of successful corporations indicate that a CEO’s leadership is often instrumental to successful diversification. Therefore, the Secretary of Defense should signal his commitment to diversity by sitting on the Senior Military Diversity Commission and creating “affinity groups,” which represent the interests of particular groups of soldiers. Finally, Congress should help ensure that the Secretary remains committed to diversity.

**TANGIBLE BENEFITS**

This report’s final set of recommendations deals with the tangible benefits which the Army offers enlistees. Without a strong set of tangible benefits to offer recruits, the Army will have trouble meeting its recruiting numbers, regardless of its recruiting procedures and outreach efforts. In fact, the procedural and outreach recommendations outlined above are essentially meant to enhance the Army’s ability to promote and offer these benefits to potential recruits in an effective, ethical, and efficient manner. Tangible benefits for enlistment, therefore, are at the core of Army recruitment. These recommendations describe policies by which the Army can make the tangible benefits it offers more appealing to recruits and cost-effective for the Army.

The Enlistment Bonus

*Statement of the problem:* In recent years, the Army has invested heavily in enlistment bonuses as a means of attracting high-quality recruits. While the bonus has generally been a successful recruitment tool, it has become less effective since 2005: despite a twofold increase in the maximum bonus amount, the number of high-quality Army recruits declined every year until 2008. Furthermore, these bonuses are often given to recruits entering overfilled Army positions;
such unnecessary bonuses constituted 8% of all enlistment bonuses in 2005. This misallocation of the enlistment bonus represents an inefficient use of the Army’s recruiting budget.

Recommendation: The Army should create stronger controls regarding enlistment bonus allocation in order to stop the payment of cash bonuses to soldiers entering overfilled positions. New, stricter guidelines should ensure that these bonuses are paid only to recruits with badly needed skills, maximizing the bonus program’s efficiency. While this recommendation would likely decrease the overall budget for enlistment bonuses, the Army should not reduce the maximum amount of the bonus; evidence suggests that doing so would hamper the Army’s ability to attract high-quality recruits into critical occupational specialties.

The Army College Fund

Statement of the problem: The Army College fund (ACF) offers recruits money for college based on their skills and the length of their enlistment. ACF benefits have proven to be particularly appealing for high-quality, college-bound recruits. However, there are three major problems with the current program. First, ACF benefits have failed to keep pace with the rising costs of higher education: since 1995, public college tuition has risen at over twice the rate of ACF benefits. Second, because soldiers must withdraw from the Army to receive these benefits, the ACF provides recipients with a strong incentive to leave the service; this is known as the ACF’s “retention paradox.” Finally, the ACF comprises a much smaller share of the Army’s recruitment budget than does the enlistment bonus program, despite studies which show that ACF benefits are a significantly more cost-effective tool for attracting high-quality enlistees. The following recommendations seek to address these problems.
**Recommendation 1:** The Army should restore the purchasing power of ACF benefits by linking them to rising college costs. This will make the ACF as attractive financially as it was in the 1980s, when ACF benefits were shown to be most effective as a recruitment incentive.

**Recommendation 2:** The Army should increase the flexibility of the ACF program in order to avoid the “retention paradox.” The Army should explore policies that allow ACF recipients who leave the force for college to return as higher-ranking enlisted soldiers after graduation. Such an “enlisted-college-enlisted” option would improve the retention of ACF recipients and allow the Army to benefit from the enhanced skills of college-trained soldiers.

**Recommendation 3:** The Army should reduce the gap in expenditures between the ACF and the enlistment bonus program. Because ACF benefits are a more cost-effective tool for recruiting high-quality enlistees, shifting money from enlistment bonuses to college benefits should increase the quantity and quality of Army recruits without requiring additional spending.

**Reserve Officers’ Training Corps**

**Statement of the problem:** As the Army looks to expand in the near future, it faces the challenge of training and commissioning nearly 8,000 officers every year. The primary source of Army officers is the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), which trains qualified young men and women in college and commissions them as officers after graduation. In recent years, ROTC commissions have fallen well short of the Army’s goals; as future goals increase, ROTC will need to increase its capacity even more to meet the Army’s greater needs. At the same time, ROTC must maintain its high standards of quality; in fact, the increasing sophistication of the Army and its missions demands officers who are more capable than ever before. ROTC must therefore improve both the quantity and quality of the officers it produces.
Recommendation 1: The Army should increase the number of three-year scholarships it awards to non-scholarship cadets after their first year in college. More than half of all ROTC cadets do not receive scholarship money from the Army, but nearly two-thirds of these cadets drop out of the program after one year (before they must commit to joining the Army). By offering more three-year scholarships, ROTC can improve the retention of its cadets and increase the number of cadets who commit to serving as Army officers. Three-year scholarships are especially appealing from the Army’s point of view because they are cheaper than four-year scholarships but would likely do much more to improve retention than would two-year offers.

Recommendation 2: The Department of Defense should expand the Critical Languages Incentive Program (CLIP). This program, which pays cadets monthly stipends to study key strategic languages and cultures, encourages cadets to develop language skills essential to the Army’s future operations, and thus represents a major attempt to improve the quality of the Army’s officer corps. In order to fund the expansion of this vital initiative, the Army can reduce the monthly stipends paid to every ROTC cadet, as research suggests that such a reduction would have minimal impact on student interest in ROTC. In fact, paying smaller monthly stipends might further incent ROTC cadets to study languages critical to the future of the Army.

Statement of the problem: As discussed above, African-American soldiers are currently underrepresented in the Army’s officer ranks. This lack of diversity is especially pronounced at the United States Military Academy (West Point), which commissions over 1,000 officers every year: only 6% of West Point’s students are African-American. Directors at West Point attribute the underrepresentation of African-American cadets to a lack of qualified applicants. West Point
sends many promising but under-qualified minority applicants to a one-year preparatory program – the US Military Academy Prep School (USMAPS) – before they reapply, but this program has proven insufficient to address the underrepresentation of African-American cadets at West Point.

Recommendation: The Army should increase the size of USMAPS, so that more African-American youth will be given the training to enroll successfully at West Point. Graduates of the one-year preparatory program – 30-40% of whom are African-American – are highly successful in reapplying to West Point; by increasing USMAPS class sizes from 250 to 350, the Army can effectively prepare more African-American youth for the process of becoming Army officers. The ongoing construction of a new USMAPS campus presents an ideal opportunity for the Army to increase the school’s size, and thus to improve the eventual diversity of the Army’s officers.

Housing and Family Policy

Statement of the problem: The adults who influence recruits’ enlistment decisions have an increasingly negative perception of soldiers’ well-being, which makes it harder for the Army to recruit successfully. Because the quality of Army housing is a key determinant of influencers’ beliefs about military life, Congress has initiated a massive overhaul of Army housing through the Residential Communities Initiative (RCI), the Army-specific Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI), and the Government-funded Barracks Modernization Program (BMP), which seek to improve the housing stock for soldiers with families as well as unaccompanied personnel. While these efforts have so far transformed substandard living conditions into award-winning housing developments, the current recession places the completion of both projects in jeopardy. The U.S. Government must therefore provide the financial wherewithal to ensure the completion
and maintenance of these housing programs in a cost-effective and sustainable way. In addition, the Army must reverse influencers’ current negative perceptions of Army housing.

Recommendation 1: Congress and the Army must pledge government contributions to RCI’s private developers, who may need additional financial support in an unfavorable economic environment. The government should assist these developers in raising necessary capital and refinancing debt to guarantee the completion, cost-efficiency, and sustainability of RCI housing.

Recommendation 2: Because RCI is cheaper than BMP, the Army should expand the privatized RCI model for permanent party barracks to all housing for unaccompanied personnel with ranks E-6 and above. Accordingly, the Army should limit BMP to the construction of training barracks, housing for unaccompanied soldiers of ranks E-1 to E-5, and permanent party barracks not viable for privatization. To reduce costs and ensure timely maintenance, the Army must receive its Sustainment, Restoration, and Maintenance funds at the start of each fiscal year.

Recommendation 3: Because housing quality is so important to recruits and influencers alike, the Army should initiate recruiting campaigns that highlight the new, award-winning RCI and BMP installations. These campaigns should transform influencers’ perceptions of soldiers’ housing and overall well-being, thereby contributing to more favorable attitudes by potential recruits and influencers towards Army life.

Maternity Leave and Deployment Deferment

Statement of the problem: Research suggests that the Army is a less-than-ideal workplace for women with children. Family commitments greatly impact many women’s decisions to serve, and the unusually short maternity leave and deployment deferments which the Army offers make it very difficult for mothers to stay in the Army or join in the first place. Although
the length of the Army’s deployment deferment has recently been extended, it still falls far short of comparable policies in other branches of the military, other NATO countries, and most private-sector professions. The likely result of these policies is a lack of qualified and otherwise-interested women entering the Army.

Recommendation: The Army should improve benefits for its new mothers by extending both the length of maternity leave and the deployment deferment option. Mothers need more than a few months at home with new babies, and the Army should ensure that mothers receive this important time. To attract as many qualified and capable female soldiers as possible, the Army should extend its maternity leave and deployment deferment policies to 12 weeks and 8 months, respectively, in order to reflect those of the other military branches and compete with the private sector for high-quality female enlistees. This recommendation should enhance women’s desire to serve in the Army, increasing both the quantity of Army recruits and the quality of the enlisted ranks.

CONCLUSION

Fortunately, the recruiting crisis which the U.S. Army faced one year ago has passed. A weak economy has sent recruiting numbers up dramatically in the past nine months, to the point at which the Army has actually started to turn away qualified enlistees. In such a climate, it would be easy to conclude that the Army’s recruiting problems have been solved, and that the Army should turn its attention elsewhere. Such a conclusion, however, would be both dangerous and unwarranted. This report identifies a number of serious problems with Army recruitment, which plagued the Army from 2005 to 2008 and may emerge again once the nation’s economy improves. To ignore these fundamental problems simply because they have been temporarily
alleviated would be foolish indeed, especially if a future turn for the worse in Iraq or Afghanistan makes recruiting more difficult than it is today.

In fact, the current recession provides the Army with a unique opportunity to improve its recruiting efforts. Unlike the first part of this decade, the Army no longer has to rely on quick fixes, such as the enlistment bonus, to meet its quarterly recruiting goals. Instead, the presently strong recruiting climate offers the Army valuable time to develop, test, and implement policies that will strengthen the recruiting process, regardless of the state of the economy. Without having to worry about filling the ranks from month to month, the Army can turn its attention to long-term reforms that make its recruitment efforts more ethical, efficient, and effective.

The recommendations above describe a number of policies which Congress, the DoD, and the Army itself might use to improve Army recruiting. These policies do not address every aspect of Army recruitment, nor do they attempt to solve every problem. In addition, as the current recruiting situation makes abundantly clear, these and any other proposals do not operate in a vacuum, but are ultimately affected by factors beyond the Army’s control, such as the nation’s foreign policy and the state of the domestic economy.

Nevertheless, this report’s recommendations provide Congress and the Army with a number of ways to move forward in revitalizing military recruitment. From the ethical and operational procedures the Army employs, to the ways it reaches out to different groups of recruits, to the tangible benefits that it offers to soldiers and families, this report highlights areas of improvement for Army recruiting and suggests several concrete changes that the Army can and should make. Given the opportunity which current the recruiting climate presents, the Army should strengthen its recruiting procedures, its outreach to potential recruits, and the tangible benefits it offers, to ensure that the all-volunteer Army remains strong for decades to come.
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Revitalizing Military Recruitment without Instituting the Draft

Improving Recruiter Selection and Mission Allocation

Samuel S. Gulland

5/5/2009

I pledge my honor that this paper represents my own work in accordance with University Regulations.
Samuel S. Gulland
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Executive Summary

The task of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) is to provide the best possible corps of field recruiters and to give those recruiters the best opportunity to succeed. USAREC affects this process with recruiter selection, recruiter training, and recruiter management.

In two of these dimensions, recruiter selection and recruiter management, USAREC could seriously improve its efficiency by using expert research on the subject.

I. Recruiter Selection

Problems:
A) USAREC selects potential recruiters based on these soldiers’ success in other Army dimensions, but success in other Army branches does not predict future success as a recruiter.
B) The current system compromises USAREC’s effectiveness by spending money on the training of ineffective recruiters who frequently are replaced in less than two years.
C) The current system depletes the Army’s corps of junior leaders who are among the best in their military specialty.

Recommendations:
A) USAREC should immediately administer the WAI (the Warrior Skills Inventory, a test that identifies certain attributes important for positions in recruiting and other parts of the Army) to all new NCOs. It should use a statistical analysis of the WAI components to most identify potential recruiters. Research has shown that such an analysis can better predict recruiter success than the Army’s current method.
B) USAREC should convene monthly panels of current field recruiters to interview potential recruiters. These panels will pick the best interviewees from a group of high WAI scorers and would identify people skills and charisma.

II. Mission Allocation

Problem:
The Army’s current mission allocation plan assigns quotas based on the past performance of brigades. This puts certain recruiting districts on a cycle of inefficiency with quotas that are too hard or too easy and do not maximize recruiter effort at the station level.

Recommendation:
USAREC should use an economic and social analysis of each recruiting station to identify the difficulty of recruiting in that district, and then assign difficult but reachable quotas for that recruiting station. Doing this will maximize recruiter effort and USAREC efficiency.

While the monthly panels of field recruiters and the new mission allocation plan will cost USAREC a few million dollars, ultimately these recommendations would reduce the number of
field recruiters needed, and will save USAREC dozens of millions of dollars while allowing more NCOs to remain in their occupational specialties.

The path of the U.S. Army’s recruiting effort during the past thirty years has been rather cyclical: it has thrived during bad economic times—when young Americans saw the military as a rare supplier of steady jobs—but struggled when the economy boomed and youth had many other employment options.

The Army has responded to each recruiting crisis by making the product more attractive to the consumer. It has poured money into joining incentives, like the Enlistment Bonus and the Army College Fund.

The Army has also been willing to pay top dollar to internationally-renowned experts for advertising. The most recent campaign, whose motto is “Army Strong,” was designed by Universal McCann in 2006 to help improve recruiting in the wake of recruiting problems linked to the Iraq War. The five-year campaign was given a total of $1.35 billion for the design and for advertising spots. McCann was chosen instead of several other agencies for its ability to produce an attractive campaign, and its work was deemed a good replacement of the unpopular “Army of One” campaign. The advertising example shows the importance the Army places in its outreach programs.

Unfortunately, the Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) has not applied the same rigorous approach towards the Command’s inner workings, the methods and procedures by which the Army selects, trains, and uses its field recruiters and the officers who command them. As a result, it has operated for years with glaring inefficiencies. The procedural changes that have been attempted lack creativity and fail to maximize efficiency: in 2005, the Army’s response to the growing numbers of failing field recruiters was to add more of them. By failing

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5 (Elliot)
6 (Horgen) 1.
to use internally the same resources as it does for outreach programs, by failing to look within Recruiting Command with the same scrutiny it uses outside of it, USAREC has failed to get the most for its efforts.

USAREC should consider internal changes because they are likely to significantly increase recruiting productivity, and do so cheaply. Instead of throwing money at the problem, USAREC might be able to increase productivity by operating more intelligently. In particular, USAREC should change two of its current practices: 1) recruiter selection, and 2) the allocation recruiting missions to the recruiting brigades (a process known in the recruiting community as “missioning”). With regards to recruiter selection, USAREC should consider the unique attributes of recruiters and pick people who have them. Specifically, it should use the Warrior Attributes Inventory (WAI), a written test that measures the characteristics needed for recruiting. As for the missioning question, USAREC should develop a scale that measures the difficulty of the recruiting districts, and then directly consider this difficulty when assigning missions. Ultimately, each recruiter should be assigned a difficult but attainable task, and the difficulty scale will help provide it. This report will explain these recommendations, and how they will increase efficiency for little cost.

I. Introduction

The actual task of Army recruiting is handled by the Army’s 7000 field recruiters. These people are experienced enlisted men who have served several years in non-recruiting roles. Because recruiting duty tends not to be popular among soldiers, the majority of Army recruiters

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7 (Horgen) 1.
are selected and then assigned to recruiting duty, as opposed to volunteering for it. USAREC selects them based on success in their previous Army jobs; recruiters, therefore, are known as some of the Army’s “best soldiers.” The objective of USAREC is simple: to provide this corps of field recruiters and to put them in the best possible position to succeed. USAREC has at its disposal several devices by which it can affect the performance of this corps: recruiter selection, recruiter training, and recruiter management. The success or failure of Army recruiting is in large part determined by the success or failure of USAREC to properly choose, train, and manage the field recruiters.

How does USAREC currently do these things? In large part, USAREC structures its operations to imitate procedures and practices from the rest of the Army. Following selection, recruiters go through the U.S. Army Recruiter and Retention School, a month-long training program that, like other Army schools, is led by professional instructors and puts students through hands-on training. USAREC also has a military composition: its command structure is modeled after a traditional military division, a large unit of about 15,000 people that is capable of independent operations and is commanded by a General Officer. USAREC oversees five recruiting brigades, each of which is commanded by a Colonel. Traditionally, a brigade consists of about 5000 soldiers, but a recruiting units consist of only the managerial staff. Each brigade is based in a smaller region (usually part of a state). Forty-one battalions, each commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel, fall under the command of the brigades. The role of the brigades and battalions is to prepare their subordinates for the task of recruiting and to supervise them. They often visit subordinate units to assess their work. The goal of the brigade and battalion is to make

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8 (Dertouzos, Human Resource Management and Army Recruiting) 31. In 2000 two thirds of recruiters had been selected as opposed to having volunteered.
9 (Horgen) 1.
10 (Lane) 20 – 22.
11 (U.S. Army Recruiting Command: Enlisted Boundaries for 1Q08)
sure the recruiting resources are in the long-term being used in an effective and efficient way, and to set policies that govern the behavior of the units below them.\textsuperscript{12}

Below the battalion fall the two locally-focused levels of command. 250 recruiting companies command nearly 2000 recruiting stations.\textsuperscript{13} These units deal with the actual task of recruiting.

Recruiting units resemble the rest of the Army in not just command structure, but also in method. In particular, recruiting stations and companies complete a structured analysis of their communities that is modeled after a combat unit’s battlefield reconnaissance. At both company and station level, the recruiting personnel complete IPB, or the intelligence preparation of the battlefield.\textsuperscript{14} IPB views potential enlistees as the target, and analyze the economy, age demographics and job market as hints as to how to reach them.\textsuperscript{15}

Despite the similarities, field recruiters have distinctly different jobs than other soldiers. Recruiters, who are usually high-ranking enlisted men, must live off-base and constantly work with civilians.

The driving force of recruiter activity is each individual recruiter’s monthly, quarterly, and yearly expectations, known as his recruiting mission. The determination of these recruiting missions is a very important part of the Army recruiting structure. The Department of the Army determines the needed number of recruits, and then assigns them to the USAREC, which in turn breaks the numbers into monthly goals for each brigade.\textsuperscript{16} The missions are then passed down to companies, and finally to recruiting stations. Each recruiting station gets a mission that dictates not only the quantity, but also the quality, of recruits that it must provide.

\textsuperscript{12} USAREC Manual 3-03 1-2.  
\textsuperscript{13} (U.S. Army Recruiting Command: Enlisted Boundaries for 1Q08)  
\textsuperscript{14} USAREC Manual 3-02 3-2  
\textsuperscript{15} USAREC Manual 3-02 3-3  
\textsuperscript{16} USAREC Regulation 601-73
To encourage good recruiter performance, the Army uses team-based incentives for the recruiting station. A series of stars and badges reward recruiters for success. The distinctions appeal to the recruiters’ desire to do their job well, and they marked by uniform modifications. These rewards are only available to recruiters if the entire Recruiting Station meets its mission, and recruiters are only eligible to receive the awards if they have enlisted one person for the given month, two for the given quarter, or nine for the given year. Brigades and battalions are also encouraged to establish local rewards programs, which give “trophies and similar devices” to recruiters for good performance. With its incentives and rewards system, the Army seeks to play to the recruiters’ sense of duty and desire to succeed.

Recruiting doctrine calls on recruiters to plan their recruiting activity. In particular, recruiters are supposed to identify “hot zones,” or places where they are likely to obtain leads. These can be Recruiting stations put a great deal of effort into identifying all the events that might provide the recruiter an opportunity to approach individuals. It encourages recruiters to use the “Army Interview,” a conversation with the prospect in which the recruiter identifies the recruiters goals and points out how the Army can help him reach them. Recruiter strategy aims to create the situation where the recruiter can approach prospects, and then counsel them about the advantages of enlistment.

II. Recruiter Selection

Statistics have shown that there exists a performance gap between field recruiters. Put more simply, in a group of recruiters with the exact same training, some will succeed at their

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17 USAREC Regulation 672 – 10, pp. 8-9.
18 USAREC Regulation 672 – 10 pp. 10.
19 USAREC Manual 3-02 8-3.
20 USAREC Manual 3-02 13-2
jobs and some will fail. During the first year of recruiting, roughly 10% of recruiters are relieved because of poor recruiting performance.\textsuperscript{21} And there is good reason to believe that this failure is not random; among the takers of the WAI, the bottom 5% are three times more likely to be relieved than the rest.\textsuperscript{22} Rawer data too shows the performance gap: for instance, young male recruiters from traditional Army jobs (technical and combat rather than administrative) are more likely to succeed as recruiters.\textsuperscript{23} The relationships are complex, but these statistics strongly suggest that there are certain attributes that make for good recruiters. Therefore, it is worthwhile to identify these attributes, and to improve recruiter selection by picking soldiers who have these attributes. The following section of this report will explain how USAREC can complete that task.

Any expert who attempts to improve recruiter selection must start by identifying the necessary attributes of a successful recruiter. The Army has always maintained strict standards for performance evaluation, and has defined its own eight “behavioral dimensions” for recruiters.\textsuperscript{24} The dimensions make up the ability to find prospects and supply them with information, build trust with these prospects and other members of the community, managing time and resources effectively, and contributing to the combined efforts of his recruiting station. Many of these behaviors do not seem to be associated with personality traits, but rather with the tasks that recruiters perform. These dimensions are designed for officers who evaluate their recruiters and need criteria that are easy to understand. But for us to understand the traits of an effective recruiter we must break down these dimensions into personality attributes.

\textsuperscript{21} (Horgen) 29.
\textsuperscript{22} (Horgen) 29.
\textsuperscript{23} (Dertouzos, Human Resource Management and Army Recruiting) 21.
\textsuperscript{24} (1) Locating and Contacting Qualified Prospects; (2) Gaining and Maintaining Rapport; (3) Obtaining Information from Prospects and Making Good Person-Army Fits; (4) Salesmanship Skills; (5) Delayed Entry Program (DEP)/Delayed Training Program (DTP) Maintenance; (6) Establishing and Maintaining Good Relationships in the Community; (7) Organizing Skills/Time Management; and (8) Supporting Other Recruiters and USAREC. (Horgen) 15.
The skills needed to locate prospects and present with accurate information to them comprise a data retention and analysis attribute. A good recruiter must evaluate the community to determine good recruiting locations, and must know all of the relevant information about enlistment and benefits. A second attribute involves persuading the prospect that the Army can help him meet his life goals, and selling the Army to him. Third, the recruiter must be an attractive figure and represent the Army well. Prospects should enjoy interacting with him and ideally aspire to be like him. While the ability to work on a team is also an important attribute for recruiters, it seems that field recruiters, who all have spent years as enlisted men in traditional Army roles, have sufficient experience as team members.

And so, we are left with three special attributes that soldiers must have to: the ability to retain and analyze information, salesmanship, and charisma. This report will now evaluate the Army’s current method, and the feasible options for change. We must remember, however, that the goal of recruiter selection must be to pick individuals who have these characteristics.

The Problem

As explained before, the Army chooses its recruiters based on their past performance in their Army assignments. Personnel Command, a branch of USAREC in charge of recruiter selection, chooses recruiters from the top 10% of the NCOs in each different specialty in the Army. It does not systematically pick the most highly-ranked NCOs, but examines the files of individual candidates from the top tenth and considers whether they seem well-suited for recruiting duty. The selection method is not transparent; Personnel Command volunteers only the information that they choose “the best soldiers in each career field.” Following selection, NCOs go before their commanding officers, who are required to approve them. This method relies on the assumption that NCOs who succeed in regular Army roles will succeed in...
recruiting. It also depends on commanding officers to make the only personal contact in the recruiter selection process, serving as judges of personality, social skills, and other factors that are likely to be absent in the file read by a Personnel Command worker.

For two reasons, this is poor way to choose recruiters. First, a good NCO will not necessarily make a good recruiter. He excels at a job in which rank gives him authority, and in which persuasiveness is not required. He works with soldiers full-time, and does not have to persuade them to listen to him. Recruiters, on the other hand, must make sales pitches to civilian strangers. Colonel John Halstead, a former West Point professor who has researched the topic, points out that “whether [the NCOs’] leadership was used in combat, combat support, or combat service support roles, few relied upon their sales skills for their success.26 The Army should attempt to isolate the characteristics needed for recruiting, rather than selecting from a pool of generally good soldiers.

The second flaw is the interview with the commanding officer (CO), a captain with several years of service who is probably not the best judge of recruiting attributes. He is unlikely to have recruiting experience and almost certainly has never been a field recruiter, (a task left to enlisted soldiers). The CO therefore will struggle to know which soldiers to approve for recruiting duty. One must also consider the fact that the CO does not have anything personally invested in the recruiting effort, and that this duty may seem like an annoyance to an officer who already has a lot of responsibility. In fact, a member of the USAREC Initiatives Group conceded that many of the COs do not take this role seriously, and sign off on the selected recruiter without seriously interviewing him.27

26 (Halstead)
27 Email to the Author on 2 May 2009.
Both selection methods seem flawed. Choosing recruiters based on performance at traditional Army jobs ignores the unique characteristics of recruiting. And the interview, though potentially valuable, is not done properly or by the right person.

The recruiter selection dilemma is especially important for the Army because recruiters are taken away from other important jobs. While an ineffective recruiter obviously reduces the efficiency of the recruiting operation, it also deprives the Army of essential junior leadership in the combat and support specialties. NCOs are commonly referred to as the backbone of the Army, the leaders that connect enlisted men and officers. It can also ruin careers: for NCOs who are accustomed to success in their Army careers, a failed stint as a recruiter can impair the NCO’s self-esteem and motivation. The inaccurate selection of recruiters hurts not only the recruiting sector, but the entire Army.

Existing Research

Specialists in and outside the Government have explored potential improvements in recruiter selection. The recommendations have centered on two methods: 1) having qualified people interview the potential recruiters, and 2) having the recruiters take a written test that evaluates their potential for recruiting duty.

In 1998, the Government Accounting Office pointed out that the recruiter selection process lacked “any measurable standards regarding the prospective recruiters’ communication or interpersonal skills.” It saw the CO interview as ineffective because the CO only approved or disapproved the recruiter, rather than evaluating or ranking him. The GAO recommended that the Army use experienced field recruiters to evaluate incoming recruiters, arguing that those with

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28 Halstead 5.
29 Halstead 5.
30 (Office) 16.
recruiting experience would better evaluate potential newcomers.\textsuperscript{31} In response to the report, the Department of Defense argued that this recommendation was “not economically feasible,” and that matching up an experienced recruiter to interview every candidate would be too expensive.\textsuperscript{32}

The last few years has seen considerable development in the other method: a written test that measures recruiter attributes. In 2004 Adolfo Gorrorian, a retired Army major, tested a group of Army recruiters for different emotional characteristics. While all of the recruiters had been successful before their recruiting assignment, Gorrorian’s study showed that the successful recruiters tended to have certain kinds of emotional intelligence: intrapersonal intelligence, a self-awareness that allows one to predict individuals’ feelings; assertiveness, the recruiter’s tendency to take useful action not expressly requested of them; and the ability to cope with stress.\textsuperscript{33} Gorrorian’s work, while not immediately implementable, began to show that a written test could define recruiter attributes.

Today, the Army has a serviceable test to predict recruiter success. It dates back to 2001, when Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera oversaw several new recruiting initiatives.\textsuperscript{34} One of these was the development of the Warrior Attributes Inventory, a survey that was designed to test NCOs for certain leadership attributes.\textsuperscript{35} Caldera contracted the creation of this test to a private sector company, the Personnel Development Research Institute, a well known body in the field of psychological research.\textsuperscript{36} The test lasts ninety minutes and consists of three parts. The first is a 125-item questionnaire that calls on the test-taker to report information about his past behavior and reactions to specific life events in order to test for “leadership, interpersonal skills, and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} (Office), 21.
\item \textsuperscript{32} (Office) 50.
\item \textsuperscript{33} (Gorrorian)
\item \textsuperscript{34} (Halstead) 1.
\item \textsuperscript{35} (Halstead) 1.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Halstead 2.
\end{itemize}
integrity.” Part Two asks 34 multiple choice questions of the candidate to determine his suitability to military duty. Each question gives four different behaviors, asking the test-taker to pick one to describe his habits. And finally, the third section asks similar questions regarding the workplace in order to see if the test-taker has the skills and personality needed for recruiting duty. While recruiter selection was an important focus of the test, it was designed with other uses in mind, including the selection of drill sergeants. As a result, it was not written specifically for recruiter attributes. With regards to the WAI’s use for recruiting selection, it went through a validation phase starting in 2002, during which recruiters would take the test before entering recruiting school but not as a screening method. It tracked the relationship between the recruiter’s Gross Write Rate (the total contracts that a recruiter obtains in a single year), and his score on the WAI. Unlike Gorrorian’s study, which tracked several different scores without a clear way to combine them, the WAI provided a single score that the Army could use.

A 2006 study by PDRI commented on the findings of this test period. It showed that the WAI scores indeed were correlated with recruiter ability, but only modestly so. The analysis showed that 30% bottom five percent of WAI scorers had been relieved of recruiting duty because of poor performance while only 10% of the other 95% were. But it seemed that the raw score of the WAI could only be used as a screening instrument, not as a predictor. The study’s main conclusion was that “the validation data supports an initial use of the WAI for screening a small percentage (e.g.5%) of Soldiers who are a poor fit for recruiting duty.” While this is useful to know, it provides little guidance in the selection of recruiters. This shows the limitation of using only the final WAI score in determining suitability for recruiting duty. One researcher,

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37 (Horgen) 9.
38 (Horgen) 9.
39 Halstead 1.
40 (Horgen) vi.
John Halstead, has broken the WAI scores into their components to analyze how each section in the WAI relates to recruiter suitability. He has used the same method to isolate the characteristics necessary for picking drill sergeants, the NCOs who meet new enlistees, introduce them to military tasks and customs, and train them. The specialized work of Halstead shows the need to refine WAI scores in order to use them to pick people for specific jobs. A description of his work with recruiter attributes follows.

Halstead used two different categories of information: the component scores of the WAI, and relevant biographical data. Halstead used the “Random Forest” technique of data analysis, which combines several regressions in order to establish the relationship between them. Using that, Halstead looked at all the components of the WAI and the biographical information of the recruiters. Halstead has developed a program that considers these factors and plots a predicted gross writ rate for the recruiters based on his combined analysis of all the factors. The program then assigns recruiters to an Order of Merit List which distinguishes the best recruiters (rather than merely screening out the poor ones. Halstead’s work is extremely valuable because his model can more efficiently select recruiters than Personnel Command can.

USAREC has made taking the WAI optional for all new NCOs, but has not officially incorporated it into the selection process. It also has not changed the recruiter selection system; Personnel Command still selects NCOs based on performance in prior roles, and only considers the WAI score as another factor.

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41 Halstead and his colleagues cannot reveal information about the WAI, its component parts, or the biographical data he used, but does show the relationship that he discovered.

43 Dertouzos, James. Email to the Author, 28 April.
Recommendations

As we consider recommendations, it is important to return to our three recruiter attributes: the ability to retain and analyze information, salesmanship, and charisma. Halstead’s evidence has shown that using his Order of Merit List will select recruiters more successfully than Personnel Command, and the Army should immediately adopt the WAI as one of two main criteria for choosing recruiters. In order to do this, it should also begin giving the test to all new NCOs at the NCO Education System, a program that every new NCO attends to develop the skills he will need to be a junior leader. Because all of the NCOs already attend this course, the costs of implementation will be extremely low. USAREC will need only to have the NCO Educational System allot two extra hours, and provide a classroom for the test to be taken. This can be done by adding a negligible amount of funding to the costs of the NCO Educational System.

It is unclear why Halstead’s analysis does not provide a perfect prediction of recruiter ability. But it seems likely that its main shortcoming is the lack of the human element. Certain attributes cannot be measured by a written test and charisma—crucial for an effective recruiter—is one of these attributes. The recruiting process should include a personal interview, but not with the busy commanding officer of the candidate. The interviewer should be directly invested in the recruiting effort and who knows what the job requires. USAREC should, in accordance with the GAO’s 1998 recommendation, establish a process by which panels of field recruiters interview potential recruiter candidates and rank them. The WAI Order of Merit List should select twice the number of needed recruiters, and the interview panel should then choose the best half of these candidates, based on simple rating scale. The panels should judge what the written test
cannot: the ability to make a good impression and to represent the ideals of the Army to young people interested in the Army.

This recommendation will require recruiters to convene regularly in order to judge new candidates. Each month, a small panel of 4 – 5 field recruiters in each recruiting company should be assigned to interview all of that district’s candidates. Emphasis should be placed on using experienced recruiters for this job.

Implementing this recommendation will be more expensive and complex than the one regarding WAI use. For each recruiting company in the U.S. (of which there are about 250) to provide a small panel to interview about fifteen candidates each in a day’s work, USAREC would each year have to use roughly two million dollars in terms of the recruiters’ time and salaries. It should not literally compensate the recruiters; this would give the interviewers the wrong conception of the duty. USAREC should instead justify the policy by referencing the importance of selecting good recruiters and referring to this task as an important part of the recruiters’ duty. USAREC should realize, however, that it will lose a day of work from these recruiters, and that they can expect a slight decline in their production for that month. It can expect, however, that the interview system will compensate for this loss after the next cycle of selected recruiters begin their duty. It will also have to set aside funds for the use of a room for interviewing the candidates, and transportation for the candidates. While this recommendation has moderate expenses, USAREC must consider the high number of NCOs that have been selected for recruiting but have failed. Given recruiter training and the jobs from which recruiters are taken away, this should be seen as a problem that needs to be addressed immediately. Using the WAI, and recruiter-candidate interviews will help recruiter selection and will be worthwhile in the long-term.
While the interviews may seem costly, they will contribute to improved recruiter selection. Within a few years, these recommendations should allow USAREC to reduce its corps of recruiters by several hundred people.\textsuperscript{44} This will save USAREC over $20 million and, as importantly, allow more NCOs to stay in their job specialties.\textsuperscript{45}

### III. Mission Allocation

For recruiters, the recruiting mission—the monthly, quarterly, or yearly goals assigned to them—is the predominant measure of success. They are the “performance standards used to define success or failure in the recruiting business.”\textsuperscript{46} Despite their importance, there is no established penalty for a station that fails to meet its quota; in fact, it is not uncommon for over half of recruiting stations to fail to meet it.\textsuperscript{47}

Determining these quotas, therefore, is extremely important in governing how recruiters act. USAREC should know the difficulty of the missions it assigns. If it has a skewed conception of mission difficulty, it will likewise have a skewed conception of recruiter quality and won’t be able to accurately determine who should remain in recruiting detail and who should be transferred out of it.

We must begin with an understanding of the role of quotas in order to properly set them. It is important to consider that setting missions does not in itself encourage youth to enlist. Recruiting missions exist solely to motivate recruiters and drive their effort. The goal of assigning missions, therefore, must be to maximize recruiter effort, to encourage them to work diligently and intelligently.

\textsuperscript{44} (Halstead) 42 – 43. Halstead estimates that the use of WAI alone could cut down on over 1000 recruiters. The estimate given in this study is more conservative.
\textsuperscript{45} Saving 600 Staff Sergeant Salaries saves $18 million without calculating the saved training costs.
\textsuperscript{46} (Dertouzos, Human Resource Management and Army Recruiting) 31.
\textsuperscript{47} (Dertouzos, Human Resource Management and Army Recruiting) 33.
Furthermore, business-related reports have shown that the difficulty of an assigned quota (or mission, in this case) can dramatically affect the level of effort that the worker gives. One study in particular ran an experiment to test the hypothesis that “expenditure of effort is highest when sales quotas are of intermediate levels of difficulty.” In this experiment, 113 business school students were assigned quotas for additional work they had volunteered for, which involved making negotiations with businesses. The actual negotiations were not with real businesses, but instead with computer programs that simulated business negotiations and acted identically towards each test subject. The study measured effort as the mean of three components: total number of contract offers and counter-offers made, total amount of time spent working on each contract, and the final price of each contract. The quotas were of five different difficulty levels; the study showed that the effort put forth increased very slowly at first, but then dramatically from the third quota level to the forth. At this point, the quotas seriously challenged the business students. When the bar was raised to the highest quota, however, the effort level of the students declined.

Figure 1: Graph of Employees’ Effort in One Session

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48 (Chowdbury) 31.
49 (Chowdbury) 34-35.
50 (Chowdbury) 33.
51 (Chowdbury), 36.
52 (Chowdbury), 36.
53 (Chowdbury) 36.
Figure 1 shows some of the results that validated the hypothesis. The lines show that employees’ effort increases until the quota becomes unfeasibly difficult, at which point it begins to drop off. The theory behind the conclusion is that quotas directly affect the workers’ expectancy of success, their confidence in their ability to meet the quota and their beliefs that it is important. This helps us define Chowdbury’s vague use of “intermediate”: recruiters should have quotas that challenge them without seriously causing them to think they will not meet them. It is by this standard that we should view USAREC’s efforts to set quotas.

The Problem

James Dertouzos and Steven Garber, RAND Corporation researchers who have addressed this topic, point out flaws in the Army’s approach. As shown, setting the correct quotas means maximizing effort without eroding the recruiter’s confidence in his ability to succeed. This, in turn, requires a thorough understanding of the market in which the field recruiters work, which Dertouzos and Garber refer to as “market quality.”\textsuperscript{54} But USAREC’s missioning system does not adequately consider market quality. It addresses it indirectly by considering the past performance of recruiting units. But this is problematic because a system that relies only on past performance fails to correct itself, and might cause a cycle of inaccurate mission assignments that does not maximize recruiter effort. An analysis of USAREC’s current missioning system will show this.

Today’s missioning system, which was also in use from 1999 – 2001, is called “Brigade 80/20.”\textsuperscript{55} This system considered the production of the recruiting brigade in assigning that brigade a quarterly mission. But it mostly considers the past three years’ production of the entire Department of Defense (which includes all the services).\textsuperscript{56} One flaw in this approach is that it

\textsuperscript{54} (Dertouzos, Performance Evaluation and Army Recruiting) xll.
\textsuperscript{55} (Dertouzos, Human Resource Management and Army Recruiting), 90.
\textsuperscript{56} (Dertouzos, Human Resource Management and Army Recruiting), 90.
ignores the differences in market quality for the different services: a particular town might have an especially strong tradition in naval service. The most glaring error, however, is that it makes no serious effort to judge the economic or social situation of the recruiting district and predict how this will affect the quality of the recruiting market. Past Army and DOD recruitment in the district is probably correlated with the market quality; districts that have historically yielded few enlistments are probably tougher recruiting districts. But the problem is clear: this method accepts as the standard whatever level of performance was most recently given. And for stations giving low levels of effort, this is unacceptable because it tends to perpetuate this cycle.

Dertouzos and Garber mention that many recruiting stations adopt the adage “make mission, go fishin,” meaning that they meet easy mission goals and then stop their work. On the other hand, they also recognize that there are many recruiting stations that have not made mission in several months, and that some recruiters identify certain stations as being subject to impossible mission levels. It seems that each kind of these missions—too hard and too easy—places the recruiting unit to one side of the peak of effort given in Chowdbury’s graph and don’t maximize effort. Each of these cases suggests that USAREC is not getting the most of its recruiters and that it could extract a greater effort from them by more intelligently assigning their missions.

**Existing Research**

USAREC recently employed a missioning process that directly considered economic factors, but stopped using that process in favor of returning to the Brigade 80/20 model.

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57 (Dertouzos, Human Resource Management and Army Recruiting), 91.
58 (Dertouzos, Human Resource Management and Army Recruiting), 91.
59 (Dertouzos, Human Resource Management and Army Recruiting), 62.
60 (Dertouzos, Human Resource Management and Army Recruiting) 62.
61 The actual Recruiting Station data that Dertouzos and Garber used was not released by USAREC.
62 Dertouzos, James. Email to the Author on 1 May 2009.
In 2001, USAREC implemented a new process called the Recruiter Allocation Model (RAM). That model directly considered economic and social factors, such as the 17 – 21 year old population and an estimate of the brigade’s potential contracts. However, the model also relied heavily on past production as well, heavily considering past DoD production. Ultimately, the model was abandoned for the old 80/20 model because it was not transparent and was not well understood by many of the people in USAREC. It is significant, though, because it shows that USAREC was able to perform calculations that estimated market quality, even if it did so in an “opaque manner.”

Dertouzos and Garber have developed a series of formulas for estimating market quality for recruiting stations. They analyze fifty-six variables, and the effect of each on military recruiting. They consider the following factors:

- Number of recruiters working at a station
- Whether the recruiting station must also recruit reserve forces
- The time of year and region of the country
- Unemployment, wages, and other economic factors
- Ethnic, social, and religious information about the district
- The presence of veterans of different age groups

Each of these factors was rigorously researched with existing recruiting data. Dertouzos and Garber took this information for over 1600 stations and for thirty months. They analyzed each of the factors on a grand scale and determined how these factors affected the production of high-quality contracts and making mission for each recruiting station. In their later study, they statistically analyze the Army’s current performance measures, and find that they are weakly

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63 (Dertouzos, Human Resource Management and Army Recruiting) 90-91.
64 (Dertouzos, Human Resource Management and Army Recruiting), 91.
correlated with their own performance measures (which adjust completely for the differences in market quality). This comparison proves that adjusting for market quality enhances the recruiting effort.

However, the authors do not recommend an immediate shift to their policy. They worry about the complexity of their method, and that it will place a heavy burden on USAREC. Ultimately, they recommend only that USAREC take into account their findings and attempt to balance the distribution of missions. While their method of missioning is actually more equitable, they worry that its complexity will cause recruiters to view it as unfair, or arbitrary.

On the surface, the current system, which makes relatively similar expectations of each recruiting station. They make the fair point that “perceptions are sometimes more important than reality.”

**Recommendation**

USAREC is a large bureaucracy, and Dertouzos and Garber are wise to approach changing it with caution. But there is, in fact, more room for change, for two reasons: 1) field recruiters work within their recruiting station and are unlikely to concern themselves with exactly how their missions were assigned, and 2) the chain of command, which puts three levels of authority between USAREC and the recruiting stations, could actually help the Army make its policy changes in measured ways without harming morale.

USAREC should use Dertouzos and Garber’s research to establish a simplified scale that ranks the market quality of the district of each recruiting station. An example of this would be to create a 30-point scale that considers these factors, with point value representing market quality. Following this, the Army could create four or five categories of difficulty for recruiting stations,

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66 (Dertouzos, Performance Evaluation and Army Recruiting) xiv.
67 (Dertouzos, Performance Evaluation and Army Recruiting) xvi.
68 (Dertouzos, Performance Evaluation and Army Recruiting) xvi.
and attach to these categories general expectations of performance. These performance categories would be a main determiner of missioning. The simplified rating system is attractive because it does not place a significant burden on USAREC.

USAREC should announce a two-year transition period, after which it will start using the actual categories of difficulty, and the goals that fall into a reasonable range for these categories. Until then, USAREC should assess the market quality of each recruiting station with its point system, and share the information with the recruiting brigades. It should encourage them to gradually change missions to reflect the new system. What is useful about the chain of command in this case is that each level could explain to the level below it exactly what the policy change meant for that unit. While field recruiters may not understand the broad scale of USAREC, they would also be briefed by company level leadership that worked on a smaller scale and would explain exactly how the approach applied to that company, explaining it in terms of actual recruiting districts and their market qualities.

As mentioned above, Dertouzos and Garber were very concerned about how such a system might be perceived. One of their biggest concerns is that their system “will not be transparent and intuitive to the field.” The system proposed above, however, reduces this risk. Instead of have to understand the dozens of factors analyzed by USAREC, field recruiters and other recruiting station workers would have to understand only the final result of that ranking—the number on the difficulty scale. While the authors’ calculations and work is based on complex research, field recruiters would easily be able to understand the ranking system. A “1” would denote the toughest and most barren recruiting district, and this would also explain their lower missions. Meanwhile, a recruiter working in a station on the other end of the spectrum—perhaps a “7,” would know that his recruiting district was especially fertile and that more was expected.

69 (Dertouzos, Performance Evaluation and Army Recruiting) xvii.
of him for a reason. While most recruiters would probably accept their district’s ranking and not consider how it was reached, USAREC should also make public the formula for coming to this rank in order to make the process as transparent as possible.

In making these changes, USAREC should make special effort to explain the system. Changes in policy tend to come under criticism from those who understand them—especially from the losers, those who do not benefit from the changes. If USAREC buys into this new missioning program and makes significant efforts to justify it, many more of the field recruiters who supply the Army’s strength will support the change and view it as fair. On top of a high-priority memo from the USAREC commander, visits from the higher units to present the new method and explain why its fairness and potential effectiveness will prevent drop-offs in recruiter morale.

As with the recruiter selection recommendation, this one might seem to impose a short-term burden on USAREC. It will have to complete the analysis of each recruiting district. Ultimately, though, it will help reduce the number of field recruiters that USAREC must use in order to meet its goals.

**IV. Conclusion**

USAREC structures its recruiting efforts to resemble the practices of the regular Army. The chain of command involves four levels of command below USAREC which are modeled after regular Army units. Each of these levels exercises authority over the units below them, which is especially important in the allocation of missions. And the process of recruiter selection resembles the selection for other elite training and opportunities in that it selects the best all-around NCOs based on their prior performance.
USAREC is correct to bring military standards and customs to the recruiting process. Doing so uses structures and methods with which soldiers are familiar, and prevents the drop in morale a soldier might experience if put in an entirely new position. A field recruiter might feel comfortable about having a company commander who overlooks his station and makes sure that his pay and hours are all in order.

But with regards to a few procedural issues, USAREC needs to acknowledge that recruiting is unlike the work of the regular Army, and it should be treated as such. Unlike other assignments, recruiting duty emphasizes social skills, charisma, and initiative, and it puts the recruiter off-base with relatively little interaction with his superiors.

With these differences in mind, USAREC should use the best research of the day to make two reforms. It should use an analysis-based selection method developed by John Halstead--because recruiting work takes a particular type of person who should not be chosen in the traditional Army way, which emphasizes overall merit. And given the fact that recruiters are rarely in contact with superiors who can motivate them or oversee their performance, USAREC should use an analysis-based method of assigning recruiting missions that is inspired by the work of Dertouzos and Garber.

In short, USAREC must acknowledge that recruiting duty is the exception and not the rule. While the Army normally allows lower-level leadership a large role in managing the force, in this case USAREC should assert authority to make these changes.

It is important to observe that USAREC has done this for its outreach programs. For its advertising work, it has commissioned work from international corporations. And for incentivizing enlistment, it has poured money into the Enlistment Bonus and Army College Fund programs. Now, it is necessary for USAREC to put this same focus and importance into its
internal operations. By using outside expertise to reform recruiter selection and mission allocation, USAREC will be able to cut its costs while increasing productivity.

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Professor Zelizer

**Recruiting Women for the Army**

Allison Kuncik

May 5, 2009

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Student Honor Code Pledge:

This paper represents my own work in accordance with University regulations.

Allison L. Kuncik
The Problem: Although women make up over 50% of the U.S. population, they make up only about 14% of the Army. Women’s participation in the Army has been integral to the success of the All-Volunteer Force, and women have proven themselves to be effective soldiers, even if not directly engaged in combat. The current recruitment system, however, does not attract women as effectively as possible. And yet, when the economy is strong or the country is at war, the Army struggles to recruit enough soldiers. The Army should therefore consider how to better reach out to women.

The Findings: In this paper, I explore how the Army can make efforts to increase the number of female recruits by dealing with gender-specific challenges. First, the literature suggests that advertising affects society’s perception of the military. Because most of the current ads predominantly feature and seem to be designed for men, they buttress the male-dominated culture of the Army. Some argue this masculine image is what attracts male recruits. Yet, to create the perception that an Army career is also appropriate for women, the Army must better consider the representation of women in these ads.

Second, the Army should consider the factors and benefits that influence females’ decisions to enlist. Studies on propensity to serve reveal that men and women consider many similar factors when deciding to enlist. However, benefits proven to be more important to women include money for education, the chance to be part of a team and make friends, prestige, and medical benefits. In addition to publicizing these benefits, the Army should also improve a benefit for women: maternity leave. Evidence reveals that family obligations greatly impact a women’s decision to serve and that the Army is a less than ideal career for mothers, especially new mothers. Many women thus leave the Army to have children. Most notably, the Army offers only six weeks of maternity leave and the option to defer deployment for six months. This policy is worse than that in other branches, other countries, and other professions. Due to the Army’s long deployments and for the newborns’ health, leaders have argued women need more time home.
Finally, recruitment efforts are plagued by the serious problem of recruiters harassing female prospects. For example, an investigation found that military recruiters sexually assaulted over 100 women in 2005. Various solutions have been proposed, including a policy that no recruiters can be alone with female prospects, surveillance cameras in recruiting stations, and stricter punishments for offenders. Also, increasing the number of female recruiters would hopefully prevent some of these instances of abuse.

**Recommendations:** I thus recommend the following changes to deal with these issues:

1) **To encourage women to enter this predominantly male workforce, create more advertisements in which women are prominently and centrally featured.**

2) **In advertisements targeted towards women and when interacting with female prospects, emphasize benefits that have been proven especially important to women.**

3) **Improve policies for new mothers in the Army by extending both the length of maternity leave and the length of the deployment deferment option.**

4) **Strengthen the policies against harassment in recruiting by establishing better prevention measures and stricter punishments for offenders.**

5) **Increase the number of female recruiters and whenever possible, facilitate interactions between female recruiters and female prospects.**
INTRODUCTION

In a country with over 150 million women, more than about 57,000 should serve their country in the Army. As of 2008, female soldiers only make up approximately 14% of the force. And yet, when the economy is doing well or the country is at war, the US Army struggles to reach recruitment numbers. A good way to overcome this challenge is to “aim to reach a larger pool of qualified applicants,” as the purpose of recruitment is to “attract the largest possible pool.” However, because the current recruitment system does not attract women very well, the Army seems to neglect a large pool. Ultimately, the Army could do a much better job appealing to women.

Nonetheless, it could be the case that the Army does not neglect to recruit many women, but rather chooses not to recruit many women. Perhaps they believe women weaken the force or want to uphold the Army’s tradition as a male-dominated force. Even if that is so, however, the Army still needs to reach out to women for two reasons. First, historically, the Army has not always wanted to include certain groups yet ultimately had to overcome their biases. For example, the Army appeared reluctant to fully include African Americans, but eventually had to eliminate policies supporting segregation, and the country benefited from that decision. Thus, for moral reasons, it is does not always matter what the Army wants. Second, since the Army often has trouble reaching recruitment numbers, it seems simply impractical to ignore over half the population. With the end of the draft, the Army had to turn to women in order to fill the force. Because of their support of and roles in the Army, RAND fellow Bernard

Rostker claims, “arguably the single group most responsible for the success of the all-volunteer force has been women.”76 Women have in turn proven themselves to be effective soldiers in the various positions they have filled. For example, a report on Operation Desert Storm claimed, “women who served in the Gulf performed their duties magnificently. They served in hundreds of different [skilled positions] on land, at sea, and in the air.”77 So, if the U.S. wants an all-volunteer force, the Army needs to care about including women.

Thus, in this paper, I will explain how the Army can make efforts to increase the number of female recruits by dealing with challenges that are gender specific. First, given the historically male-dominated culture of the military, I will address how the Army could improve its advertising to better target women. Second, I will consider benefits that particularly affect a woman’s decision to enlist. I will explore both current benefits the Army should stress in advertisements and recruitment efforts and a benefit that needs to be amended to better attract women. Finally, I will investigate the issue of recruiters sexually harassing female prospects. Since such incidents hurt the Army’s image and recruitment, I will consider how to stop this problem. Throughout the paper, I will provide recommendations related to each of these gender-specific challenges.

ISSUE # 1: ATTRACTING WOMEN THROUGH ADVERTISING

The Role of Women in a Male-Dominated Profession

Women have played an important role in the U.S. military throughout its history, but always in the shadow of men. For example, women disguised as men even took part in the Revolutionary War. By the end of WWII, 2% of the military was women. Then, when the draft ended in 1973, women suddenly became much more needed to fill the force. Yet by 1980, only 8.4% of the military was female, and

77 Jehn, 1991b, p. 806, cited in Rostker, 571.
nearly 20 years later that number had only risen to about 15%. Clearly, men have always dominated the military. 78

Thus, even today, women are much less likely to consider a career in the military than men. 79 According to a recent study, females have “less knowledge of the Military, less military-related self-efficacy, and lower favorability toward the Military.” 80 Plus, females tend to believe that “important people in their life would be less supportive of their decision to join the military.” 81 Although women have proven that they do belong in the Army, 82 it seems that many people still perceive the Army as not a place for women.

In part, this feeling likely emerges because of a crucial limitation in the positions women can fill in the Army. The number of positions open to women rose from 52 in 1983 to 70 by 2003. Although they are now able to work in 70% of Army positions, 83 one big exception remains: According to the 1994 policy, women in the Army can “serve in any officer or enlisted specialty or position except in those specialties, positions, or units (battalion size or smaller) which are assigned a routine mission to engage in direct combat or which collocate routinely with units assigned a direct combat mission.” 84 RAND questions whether this combat exclusion policy should remain. 85 The policy is both confusing and may not “conform...to the nature of warfare today.” 86 It also seems to buttress the Army’s traditional image as a place for men, not women. However, others question whether women are physically capable of

79 DoD, JAMRS, Youth Poll December 2007, 3-3.
81 Ibid., 2-11.
82 Rostker, I Want You!, 559.
84 Margaret C. Harrell et al., Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), xii.
85 Ibid., xv.
86 Ibid., xx.
engaging in combat and argue that changing the policy may weaken the military.\textsuperscript{87} So, since changes would be controversial and difficult, I will not focus on the combat exclusion policy in this paper. All the same, we must understand how it reinforces the Army’s male-dominated culture.

Moreover, it is not just that only men fight in direct combat. This reality is also constantly shown in the media. In her paper on the role of gender in recruitment, Melissa Brown explains that the “the bonds between military service and masculinity are deep and strong.”\textsuperscript{88} She admits that women’s exclusion from combat and registration for the Selective Service largely drives this masculine image, but also notes how it is intensified in advertising. While it is realistic for advertisements to show men in combat, extensive images of this sort remind women that the Army is a man’s world.\textsuperscript{89}

Of course, strength and toughness are crucial to the Army’s persona. After all, “aggressive masculinity has a proven record in combat – and may be what pulls many young men into the military.”\textsuperscript{90} The Wall Street Journal clearly states the trade-off: “if the military becomes gender-neutral and more politically correct, could it attract the 140,000 young American males needed every year to fill out its ranks?”\textsuperscript{91} So, how can the Army maintain this masculine image that attracts so many men but also better appeal to women? Ultimately, the Army needs to keep those men in mind, but it could “reach a larger pool of qualified applicants”\textsuperscript{92} by improving its advertising campaign.

Women in Advertisements

Before investigating how advertising must change, we must consider what impact advertisements even have on recruitment. The evidence is not completely convincing that advertising always works. A seminal study by RAND performed a cost-benefit analysis to determine how well

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{88} Melissa T. Brown, “Gender, Military Recruiting and the Iraq War,” American Political Science Association, August 2008, 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 3-4.
  \item \textsuperscript{90} \textit{Wall Street Journal}, July 15 2007, A20.
  \item \textsuperscript{91} Ibid., A20.
  \item \textsuperscript{92} Johnson, “Chapter 3A,” 3A-5.
\end{itemize}
advertising increases the number of recruits, and concluded, “in comparison with other alternatives, advertising appears to have great potential as a recruiting tool.” Yet, it seems quality studies like this one are fairly few and far apart, suggesting the need for more evidence to prove advertising is continually effective.

In an in-depth analysis of military advertising, Beth Bailey also investigates this issue. She explains that regardless of how effective it is in actually convincing more people to enlist, advertising is still critical in how it affects society’s general image and perception of the Army. For example, at the start of the Iraq War, touching commercials were not just meant to attract recruits, but also to gain societal support for the war.

Another analysis on military marketing also explains that advertising affects recruitment because it has “an impact on a potential recruit’s perception, knowledge, and understanding of the job and the attributes of the organization.” This document put out by NATO also explains how many advertisements are designed for “low involvement” to simply increase people’s awareness of the military and encourage them to seek more information. After all, NATO cites a study that suggests, “Mere exposure to a company can increase its attractiveness to consumers.” So, if women do not often see females in these advertisements, they may not often think of the Army as a career option.

Numbers support this claim. The unaided propensity of a group of young women studied, that is how many mentioned the military as part of their future plans without being prompted to do so, was only 1.4%. In another study, few women aged 16-24 were able to recall an Active Service advertisement. The difference between the genders was significant, with 36% of males aged able to

94 Ibid., xi.
97 Ibid., 3A-2.
recall an ad and only 26% of females able to do so.\textsuperscript{100} Maybe women would better remember the ads if they were more visible. All in all, if the Army is perceived as too male-dominated, women may less often consider it.

Melissa Brown explains how currently military advertising does seem to create that perception. In the past, many ads were specifically targeted towards women. For example, 1970s ads assured women them they could retain their femininity as soldiers. Some even advertised unique promotion opportunities.\textsuperscript{101} However, Brown claims today, the Army does not seem especially concerned with attracting women, and most ads are designed for men. Yet, whether they want to or not, the Army \textit{should} try to attract more women. The question thus becomes, how should Army advertisements portray women so as to best attract them? Brown explains that current ads portray women in various ways. Some assure females that they can still be feminine, while others promise experiences “typically associated with masculinity, like adventure, independence, and challenge.”\textsuperscript{102}

Yet, a study by Maura Mollet indicates uncertainty as to which type of ad would better appeal to women. Mollet explores how ads can best convince college women to pursue a military career. She considers the interaction between gender and advertising in general. She explains that men tend to respond better to ads that show their “self-or justice-oriented” side, while women tend to be more attracted to those that show them as “personal, cooperative, and altruistic.”\textsuperscript{103} For example, a man might be shown performing a task alone, while a woman might be shown in a family scene.\textsuperscript{104} Mollet explores whether this generalization works in military advertising by studying how women respond to military ads in which they are shown in conventional gender roles. For example, one ad showed a female soldier making s’mores with children. She found no significant relationship between how likely women

\textsuperscript{100} Defense Manpower Data Center. \textit{Youth Attitude Tracking Study 1999 Propensity and Advertising Report}, 5-3.
\textsuperscript{101} Bailey, “Recruiting an All-Volunteer Military Force,” 66.
\textsuperscript{102} Brown, “Gender, Military Recruiting and the Iraq War,” 9.
\textsuperscript{104} Brunel and Nelson cited in Mollet, “Recruitment Advertising,” 17.
were to consider enlistment and whether they saw these ads. She considers whether military ads showing women in traditional roles may be less effective since these women choose non-traditional careers. Mollet thus implies we cannot be sure how women should be portrayed in military advertisements.

Unfortunately, Mollet’s inconclusive study is one of very few done on women in military advertising. Thus, it is difficult to advise the Army on how to best portray women to attract the greatest number. Yet, regardless of how they are shown, Brown suggests that perhaps the best thing the Army can do is just show more women. In recent ads, men are shown more often and in more central roles, while women are often shown in groups and in “secondary” roles. Brown explains that of the branches, the Army “is the most likely to present women as normal, unexceptional members.” For example, in a 2006 ad from the “Army Strong” campaign, “A few women are included in the montage, standing with other soldiers in formation or climbing a rope net. The vast majority of the soldiers, and all of them pictured in combat contexts or with their rifles, are men.” In a commercial I viewed, I only identified two women, one of whom cared for a child. Also, the commercial claims the Army creates a “band of brothers,” seemingly ignoring the sisters. Plus, of the Army’s eight current print ads I viewed, none include women. Thus, advertising affirms the Army’s masculine image.

**Recommendation 1**

To encourage women to enter this predominantly male workforce, create more advertisements in which women are prominently and centrally featured.

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107 Ibid., 11.
108 Ibid., 20.
So, my first recommendation is that the Army should better advertise to women. Although the evidence does not conclusively prove that advertisements always yield more recruits, it still seems that they could help change people’s perception of the Army as a career mainly just for men. Hence, a portion of the advertising budget should be devoted towards creating new advertisements that better target women. First, as Brown observes, in widespread commercials and ads with both men and women, women should be shown more prominently and more often. For example, instead of just showing a women helping a child in a commercial, she could be shown as an officer being saluted.

Second, more advertisements should feature female protagonists. For example, a commercial could be about a female’s decision to enlist or her experience in the Army. Also, the Army should create more print ads that show women where men are currently shown. For example, a current print ad shows a male soldier talking to his parents.112 Another just like it could be created, but with a woman in the man’s place. Since the evidence is unclear as to how to portray these women, the best solution seems to be to show them as realistically as possible. This portrayal will also most accurately depict an Army career. These advertisements created specifically for women should be circulated where women will most likely see them. For example, they could be printed in women’s magazines or shown during television programs popular among women.

These targeted advertisements will hopefully not deter men from enlisting. In some commercials, surely fewer men will have to be shown to show more women, but the men can still be shown in adventurous combat scenes. Also, ads showcasing women need not suggest anything different about a man’s experience. Ultimately, disintegration of the Army’s masculine image seems unlikely. Still, the Army should better incorporate women into advertising campaigns to make them feel more included and wanted.

ISSUE #2: GENDER-SPECIFIC BENEFITS

A Woman’s Propensity to Serve

Women may also consider the Army a more reasonable career for females if the benefits offered and advertised appealed to their needs and desires. In order to figure out what benefits matter to women, we need to more closely examine propensity to serve.

In 1999, the Youth Attitude Tracking Study (YATS) was conducted for the Department of Defense to investigate young men and women’s propensity to serve. 6,075 males and 3,979 females aged 16-24 were surveyed and interviewed about their likelihood to serve and their main reasons why they would or would not want to join the military. The study then found correlations between these answers and various attributes, including gender. YATS found that the propensity of women was lower than that of men. However many similar patterns emerged for both men and women. For both genders, propensity declined with increased age, education status, employment status, employment odds, and parental education level. Also, race affected both sexes relatively similarly: Black and Hispanic males and females were more likely to be willing to serve.\(^\text{113}\)

Although this study is somewhat dated, a more recent Department of Defense study from December 2007 confirms its findings. The Joint Advertising, Market Research and Studies (JAMRS) also polled 3,176 young adults aged 16-21 on their propensity to serve. They too found the propensity of females to be lower than that of males. Slightly less than 5% of the females said they would enlist when directly asked. JAMRS also found similar propensity patterns to those YATS found. They concluded that for males and females, propensity declined with increased age, education, and employment prospects.

\(^{113}\) YATS 1999, iii-vi, 2-1, 3-4 – 3-11.
and was highest among Hispanics. Thus, both YATS and JAMRS suggest that many similar factors affect both men’s and women’s decisions to enlist.\textsuperscript{114}

\textbf{Publicizing Gender-Specific Benefits}

In order to understand how to attract women specifically, however, it is useful to focus on how men and women differ in their decisions. YATS, for example, found that women tend to weigh money for education somewhat more heavily than men in their decision to enlist.\textsuperscript{115} In addition, another study specifically investigated which benefits matter more to women. Marshall and Brown recommend that the military account for gender variations among benefits and rewards desired in its marketing campaigns. Their study questioned a group of randomly selected young adults aged 18-24 throughout the U.S. about their interest in serving in the military. Specifically, Marshall and Brown provided participants with thirteen benefits offered by the military and asked them to rank the importance of each one. They studied significant differences among rankings by gender.\textsuperscript{116} The study found the following benefits to be statistically more significant for women as opposed to men: “training in the job I choose,” “belong to a team,” “to make life-long friendships,” “VA home loan benefits,” “guaranteed medical care,” “selecting the place that I would serve,” “travel opportunities,” and “social respect and prestige.”\textsuperscript{117} There was great consensus among women regarding the importance of rewards related to friendship, finances and location. Above all, women ranked guaranteed medical care as the most important benefit of the thirteen. Thus, Marshall and Brown conclude that “the systematically greater

\textsuperscript{114} DoD, JAMRS, \textit{Youth Poll December 2007}, 1-3, 3-3, 3-14-3-15, 3-25.
\textsuperscript{115} \textit{YATS 1999}, 4-2.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 81.
importance assigned by women to these factors means they should be stressed in campaigns specifically targeting women.”\textsuperscript{118}

\begin{quote}
**Recommendation 2**

In advertisements targeted towards women and when interacting with female prospects, emphasize benefits that have been proven especially important to women.

So, my second recommendation is to take Marshall and Brown’s advice and publicize these benefits to women. First, in those commercials and print advertisements designed especially for women, the Army should highlight those benefits that YATS and Marshall and Brown found women care a lot about, including educational, financial, medical, and social benefits. For example, a commercial could show a women making valuable relationships in the Army and rising in social prestige by becoming an officer. Or a commercial could show a female soldier going onto college after serving. Or a print ad could discuss the medical benefits a woman receives. The options are nearly infinite. Second, when females interested in serving reach out to recruiters, recruiters should bring up and emphasize these benefits.

**Improving Gender-Specific Benefits**

In addition to advertising benefits already provided, the Army may need to change certain benefits to better attract women. In particular, improvements could be made for Army mothers since the evidence indicates that the Army is a less than ideal career for a mother. As I will now investigate, data regarding propensity to serve and Army demographics suggest the need for upgraded benefits.

YATS also found females’ propensity to serve differs from males’ regarding marriage and family. Although men and women generally refer to similar reasons for why not to serve, “women are somewhat more likely to mention reasons related to perceived military lifestyle, and much more likely

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 83.
to mention family obligations.”119 Plus, “the active composite propensity for married women is one third that of married men.”120

Demographics of women currently serving in the Army reinforce these findings. As of 2005, about 44.7% of women in the active-duty Army were married. However, 55.5% of male soldiers were married.121 Perhaps this discrepancy emerges because married women want children, and it may be difficult to have them in the Army. Also, more female soldiers are single parents: 13.8% of women, 5.7% of men.122

Demographics regarding the age of Army women also suggest the need to improve the experience of military moms to encourage the recruitment and retention of women. Over 50% of the women enlisted in the military are younger than age 25 and most fall in the 20-24-age bracket. Women in the military are younger than women in the civilian workforce. Moreover, female soldiers tend to be younger than male soldiers, and men tend to stay in the military until older ages than women.123 The Army should consider how to keep these women in longer, as they would have to recruit fewer people if each person stayed in longer. Like the discrepancy in marital status, the discrepancy in age between males and females may also be related to a woman’s desire to raise a family.

Finally, a study by the Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services actually investigated why women are more likely than men to leave the military after five to eight years of service. They found that women leave to begin families. As the chairwoman of the Committee explained, “They don’t want to have a 2-week-old (baby) and have to be deployed.”124 The Committee concluded that when military woman must choose between their families and careers, they often

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119 YATS 1999, 4-10.
120 Ibid., 3-11.
121 Maxfield, “Army Profile: FY05,” 5.
122 Ibid., 5.
choose their families. Ultimately, women can only have children for so long which seems to conflict with the Army’s “up or out” system. Because soldiers must get promoted or leave, if a women misses too much time to have children, she may not get promoted. However, unlike other benefits, the Army cannot simply stress its policies for mothers in marketing to handle this problem and attract women. Rather, a fundamental change must be made.

Maternity Leave

The specific benefit in need of change concerns new mothers in the Army. Although military men with children face many of the same issues as women with children, women face the unique issue of pregnancy. Senator Ben Nelson explained on a NPR show, “New mothers are facing a continuing, difficult decision between motherhood and their service to their country.” NPR reports that one in ten women become pregnant in the Army each year. They are given the opportunity to leave the Army when they became pregnant, yet are often conflicted what to do. For example, an NPR spokesperson explains, “Army Medic Amy Shaw says the choice is wrenching.”

Women would not have to face such a difficult decision if they were guaranteed more time at home after giving birth. Until last year, the Army only gave a mother six weeks before she had go back to her job and four months before she could be deployed. Senators Nelson, Baucus, Tester, Lincoln, and Snowe challenged the Army’s policy in a letter to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in February 2008, asking for a longer leave and arguing that it is unhealthy for babies to be separated from their mothers so soon after birth. Senator McCaskill also asked Gates to create “single, equitable [maternity leave]

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127 Smith, “Committee Examines Issue.”
policy” across the branches of the military “that makes medical, including psychological, considerations of the mother and the newborn child the first priority of the policy.”

Some progress was consequently made toward a better policy. As of August 2008, Army women now have the option to defer deployment six months instead of four after having a child. This change is definitely a step in the right direction. However, the policy could still be improved. Deputy Army Surgeon General, Maj. Gen Gale Pollock, argues that a woman really needs at least eight months home with her baby, preferably twelve. She claims women need the time to connect with and breast-feed their children. Plus, the Army has the longest deployments of all the branches with 15 months in the war zone along with a 12-month dwell time. If a woman in the Army plans to get pregnant, therefore, she must do so as soon as she gets home to give birth within the year. Finally, although the deployment policy has improved, the actual length of maternity leave before returning to one’s job, a mere six weeks, is still extremely and unacceptably short.

This maternity leave policy is much worse than those in the militaries of other NATO countries. The United States gives new mothers the shortest amount of time off. Some countries give mothers up to two, six, even eight years. Plus, the second shortest maternity leave (Spain – 4 months) is still much longer than the US’s six-week leave. However, it is important to note that the US’s maternity policies are generally poor compared to other countries, not just in the military.

Nonetheless, by law, American women in other professions have more time home with their babies. While this discrepancy is understandable given the unique demands of the Army, it may factor into a woman’s decision to choose a career other than the Army. According to the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, private sector companies with 50 or more employees must give women twelve weeks

134 Committee on Women in the NATO Forces, “Maternity/paternity leave,” 2006.
of (unpaid) maternity leave.\textsuperscript{136} This leave is twice that which the Army provides. One could potentially imagine why an educated, married woman may choose to enter the private sector instead of the Army.

So, there is no concrete evidence that if the Army had a longer maternity leave more women would enlist or not drop out. Yet all the above evidence suggests that if Army women could rest assured that they would have a substantial amount of time with their newborns, they may be more willing to enlist and stay enlisted longer. Also, official time-off may ease the tension between motherhood and the promotion system if the policy takes into account that women who have been away may not move up as quickly. Major Pollock sums up why we need to improve this policy: “Without women we would not make our volunteer numbers, so if we destroy the interest of women to volunteer it puts us in a particularly bad place, because the nation does not want a draft.”\textsuperscript{137}

\textbf{Recommendation 3}

\textit{Improve benefits for new mothers in the Army by extending both the length of maternity leave and the length of the deployment deferment option.}

Therefore, my third recommendation is that the Army should give new mothers more time at home with their newborns. The Army should extend the length of the actual maternity leave before a mother goes back to her job. If the Army wants to encourage some women to join the Army instead of the private sector, it should offer comparable benefits. Optimally, the Army should also allow the option of twelve weeks at home.\textsuperscript{138} However, at the very least, the Army should allow more than six weeks.

Second, more time should pass before a new mother can be deployed. The policy certainly improved when deployment deferment was extended from four months to six.\textsuperscript{139} The Army’s policy is now more in line with other branches of the military, such as the Navy and Marine Corps, which allow


\textsuperscript{138} United States General Accounting Office.

\textsuperscript{139} “Army Parents Get More Baby Time,” \textit{Armed News Service}.  

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six to twelve months. However, the Army is still the worst branch for new mothers due to its long deployments. Thus, the Army should either make those deployments shorter or extend the deferment option. Ultimately, I believe that the Army should listen to medical experts like General Pollock who argue that mothers need at least eight, preferably twelve months with their babies.\textsuperscript{140} I thus recommend that the Army extend this deferment option to eight months.

Of course, policy changes of this type may prove difficult to implement, especially since an improvement was so recently approved. Problems emerge, like who will fill the mothers’ positions while they are gone? One proposal is to send in a Reserve to do the job, but the longer a woman is away, the more difficult that could become.\textsuperscript{141} Also, giving women time off presents issues with the promotion system and to which rank they return post-maternity leave.\textsuperscript{142} Hopefully missing just twelve weeks will not put a woman at risk of not getting promoted, but the Army may need to amend the “up or out” system or make exceptions to account for this missed time. Above all, as difficult as these issues may be to resolve, it is more important that the Army improve its maternity leave benefits. As Pollock explained, we cannot “destroy women’s desire to serve,”\textsuperscript{143} but rather this recommendation will hopefully enhance women’s desire to serve.

\textbf{ISSUE \#3: ELIMINATING SEXUAL HARASSMENT}

Harassment in Army Recruiting

The final issue I want to consider is a very troubling problem: sexual harassment of female prospects by recruiters. Although not extremely prevalent, cases of harassment and assault in recruiting have plagued the Army. The fact that women are harassed even before enlisting does not at all convey a

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{140} Washington Post, February 18, 2008, A01.
\textsuperscript{142} Steven Donald Smith, “Committee Examines Issue of Women Separating From Military.”
\textsuperscript{143} Pollock, quoted in \textit{Washington Post}, February 18, 2008, A01.
\end{footnotesize}
sense of inclusion and respect for females. If the press reports even a few instances, it is logical to assume fewer women will want to join.

A 2006 Associated Press investigation drew attention to more than just a few cases. The investigation found that military recruiters had sexually assaulted over 100 women over the past year. Of the 80 recruiters who were punished across the branches, the greatest number came from the Army (35). Even worse, since 1996, 722 Army recruiters were accused of rape or sexual misconduct.\textsuperscript{144} An early investigation by TIME in the late-90s discussed specific incidents. For example, one recruiter took female prospects out drinking and even got one pregnant. Others inappropriately groped woman while measuring and weighing them. A 16-year-old freshmen girl was grabbed and harassed by an Army recruiter; she was so traumatized that she failed out of a class.\textsuperscript{145}

\textbf{Punishment for Offenders}

And yet, while the Army claims they “take such allegations very seriously, and we investigate them thoroughly,”\textsuperscript{146} TIME suggests otherwise. They argue that “the Army seems to manage the problem by moving it around,” and “investigations were flimsy, perpetrators received light punishment or were shifted to other locations or quietly eased out.”\textsuperscript{147} By 2006, enforcement had improved little. The AP investigation also found punishment to be inadequate. Offenders usually lost pay or went down in rank, but were very rarely prosecuted. Thus, it is unsurprising that there were twice as many incidents of sexual misconduct in 2006 as there were in 2005.\textsuperscript{148} While the Army has detailed instructions for reporting sexual abuse,\textsuperscript{149} the action taken seems insufficient.

\textbf{Possible Solutions}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{144}CBS/AP, August 20, 2006.
\item \textsuperscript{145}Mark Thompson, “Offensive Maneuvers,” \textit{Time}, May 5, 1997.
\item \textsuperscript{146}Major Lester Felton quoted in Thompson.
\item \textsuperscript{147}Thompson, “Offensive Maneuvers.”
\item \textsuperscript{148}The \textit{Boston Globe}, March 19, 2007.
\item \textsuperscript{149}“U.S. Army Sexual Assault Prevention & Response Program,” U.S. Army, http://www-sexualassault.army.mil/content/faqs/cfm.
\end{itemize}
Congressman Skelton has spoken out on this issue calling the abuses “absolutely unacceptable.”\textsuperscript{150} He advocates harsher punishment for recruiters who commit these breaches. He supports the Army adopting a “No One Alone” policy, like that adopted by the National Guard. This policy would assure that no recruiters are ever alone with females.\textsuperscript{151}

The Indiana National Guard adopted the “No One Alone” policy in 2005 after repeated recruiter violations. The deputy undersecretary of defense for personnel and military readiness, Michael L. Dominguez, claims the policy works as the National Guard, “saw an increase in the number of recruiter irregularities reported,” so that “over time, the number of violations stabilized and ultimately decreased.”\textsuperscript{152} A local Indiana news station admits that the policy has not ended all sexual harassment, but it has “curbed behavior.”\textsuperscript{153} Thus, the US Army Recruiting Command’s Major General Thomas Bostick called for the Army to adopt a similar policy – a “buddy system” whereby whenever a recruiter and prospect meet “there will be at least one qualifying person present.”\textsuperscript{154}

The Pentagon has also called for surveillance cameras in recruitment stations. Dominguez hopes these cameras would help stop the abuses.\textsuperscript{155} Clearly, as shown by these proposals, military leaders understand the seriousness of this issue. After all, misconduct can severely damage the Army’s image and women’s attraction to the Army.

\textit{Recommendation 4}

\textit{Strengthen the policies against sexual harassment in recruiting by establishing better prevention measures and stricter punishments for offenders.}

My fourth recommendation thus concerns prevention of this harassment. First, I suggest that the Army go through with its planned measures. If the “No One Alone” policy seems to work in the

\textsuperscript{150} Skelton quoted in CBS/AP, August 20, 2006.
\textsuperscript{151} CBS/AP, August, 20, 2006.
\textsuperscript{154} \textit{The Boston Globe}, March 19, 2007.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
National Guard, the Army’s decision to try it makes sense. It seems the Army has begun implementing this policy, so I recommend the Army continue with it. A possible objection is that females may feel even more different from males if the policy applies just to them. So, I recommend that this policy be implemented as proposed by the Army: no recruits, male or female, should be alone with a recruiter of the other sex.\textsuperscript{156} Although this policy demands more recruiters in each situation, hopefully, if incidents of harassment decline, it can eventually be phased out. Second, surveillance cameras would likely be very effective in discouraging possible offenders and assuring harassment does not go unnoticed or uninvestigated. Hard evidence like video footage cannot easily be ignored, so cameras should be installed in stations.\textsuperscript{157}

Ultimately, once reported, investigations of assault must be thorough, and if found guilty, recruiters need to be punished more severely.\textsuperscript{158} Mere decrease in pay or rank is not enough. Recruiters should lose their jobs if they sexually assault women. Also, anyone suspected of rape, should be prosecuted in court. Stricter punishment, along with the other measures, will hopefully deter recruiters from harassing female recruits.

\textit{Recommendation 5}

\textit{Increase the number of female recruiters and whenever possible, facilitate interactions between female recruiters and female prospects.}

Finally, I suggest that as often as possible, female recruiters deal with female prospects both to prevent harassment and to better attract women. Female recruiters should approach female prospects and be directed to those interested whenever possible. These interactions will occur more easily if there are more female recruiters. According to the most recent statistic I could find, 20\% of recruiters were

\textsuperscript{156} The Boston Globe, March 19, 2007
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{158} CBS/AP, August 20, 2006.
female. Although this number may have since changed, the Army should set as high a goal as is 
realistically possible for a percentage of female recruiters and gradually try to reach that goal by a 
certain date. Currently, the U.S. Recruiting Command chooses recruiters by either selecting among those 
nominated from each branch or from among those who volunteer. Thus, the Army should encourage 
the nomination of female soldiers and encourage more women to volunteer. Then, they should try to 
select female recruiters whenever possible and retain them as long as possible. Yet, the lengthy list of 
“eligibility requirements” for recruiters may pose obstacles to females. Such requirements include that 
recruiters must have served for at least four years (women drop out of Army earlier than men do), 
cannot be pregnant when selected or before participating in the recruiter training, cannot not be a sole 
parent (women are more likely to be single parents), and cannot have too many dependents. If 
possible, the Army should consider loosening those requirements or granting more waivers to better 
accommodate female recruiters.

This policy has multiple advantages. First of all, this policy will hopefully eliminate some of the 
sexual harassment and abuse because to the best of my knowledge, all the offenses committed so far 
have been by male recruiters. In addition, female recruiters can give female prospects a better sense of 
a women’s experience in the Army. Also, they hopefully will better understand what matters to a female 
as she makes her decision and can stress important benefits. Above all, when a female prospect 
interacts with a woman in uniform encouraging her to join, she will hopefully understand that women 
are not only included, but are needed and wanted in this traditionally male career.

CONCLUSION

159 Thomson, “Offensive Maneuvers.”
160 “Army Special Duty Assignments – Recruiter Duty,” Army Professional Development Center, Military.com, 
http://www.military.com/MilitaryCareers/Content/0,14556,MPDC _Options_SDA_RD_Army_Enlisted,00.html; Segal & Segal; Maxfield.
Ultimately, all of my recommendations are intended to make the Army a more appealing choice for women. To review, I recommend that the Army continue to recruit men and women in generally the same way. Literature on propensity to serve suggests that males and females consider many similar factors when deciding to enlist.\textsuperscript{161} However, I recommend the following changes to more effectively recruit females:

1) \textit{To encourage women to enter this predominantly male workforce, create more advertisements in which women are prominently and centrally featured.}

2) \textit{In advertisements targeted towards women and when interacting with female prospects, emphasize benefits that have been proven especially important to women.}

3) \textit{Improve policies for new mothers in the Army by extending both the length of maternity leave and the length of the deployment deferment option.}

4) \textit{Strengthen the policies against harassment in recruiting by establishing better prevention measures and stricter punishments for offenders.}

5) \textit{Increase the number of female recruiters and whenever possible, facilitate interactions between female recruiters and female prospects.}

In conclusion, although the Army may easily reach its recruitment goals currently given the bad economy,\textsuperscript{162} the economy will improve. And when it does, the Army should be in the best position possible to keep recruiting quality soldiers. Many of those quality soldiers can be found among the half of our population that the Army currently fails to effectively recruit. I believe that with my recommendations, the Army can better utilize that valuable “pool of qualified applicants.”\textsuperscript{163}

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\textsuperscript{162} \textit{The Boston Globe}, March 1, 2009.
\textsuperscript{163} Johnson, “Chapter 3A,” 3A-5.

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Ethical Military Recruiting in Schools: Strengthening Oversight and Safeguards

Bridget Bartlett
5 May 2009

*WWS 402 – Revitalizing Military Recruitment*
Task Force Commissioner: Professor Julian Zelizer
Unethical military recruitment towards youth carries critical ethical and practical implications for the All-Volunteer Force. Although recruiting improprieties (RIs) are not widespread, accounting for only 1% of accessions in 2008, just one incident of recruiter misconduct can undermine recruiting goals by damaging recruiters’ relationships with potential enlistees and their “influencers,” including parents, coaches, and teachers. The unjust treatment of youth is also wrong and unethical. A series of recruiting scandals in 2005 had a devastating impact on the Army’s reputation and exposed recruiters sexually harassing, misleading, and threatening youth with jail time in order to secure enlistments.

The pressure to meet enlistment goals with a shrinking pool of applicants could drive recruiter misconduct and could also temper the rigor of the Army’s accountability measures. Ongoing recruitment practices violate the terms of international law as recruiters regularly target youth under 17 for recruitment purposes and use coercive tactics that render recruitment “involuntary.” Recruiter misconduct in high schools raise questions about the integrity of the Army’s self-regulation on ethics and recruiting practices.

Strengthening the accountability and oversight of the recruiting force in their interactions with students and influencers is critical to ensure the highest standard of ethical conduct. Ethical recruitment will help maintain the military’s continued access to schools and strengthen the support of educational institutions in presenting military opportunities favorably to students.

This report identifies the weak policy response to recruiter misconduct at both the local and national level, addressing the 1) inadequate safeguards in secondary schools and the 2) weak oversight framework.

Key Findings – Weak Safeguards at Local Level

1. **Weak Safeguards:** In schools, the weak policy response to recruiter misconduct emerges from the failure to monitor and enforce compliance with existing legal safeguards and the failure to develop additional safeguards, including well-publicized and accessible grievance procedures and support systems.

2. **Data Collection – Inadequate Grievance Procedures:** Schools have failed to institute accessible and well-publicized grievance procedures to report RIs.

3. **Monitoring—Weak Supervision at Local Level:** The widespread failure to designate faculty to advise and support students in their interactions with recruiters has also led to weak monitoring and supervision of recruiter activities within schools.

4. **Prevention – Lack of Awareness:** Many students do not understand their rights in relation to military recruiters and the existing safeguards available to them.
Key Findings – Weak Oversight at National Level

1. **Weak Oversight**: The DoD and ED have not established a comprehensive oversight framework to provide greater accountability to the Services’ internal monitoring system and to coordinate the multiple reporting and grievance procedures maintained by the USAREC, NGOs, and government bodies.

2. **Data Collection—Weak Coordination**: The Services’ internal data system does not fully capture and integrate data on recruiter misconduct. The DoD has failed to unify the disparate reporting and grievance procedures into one centralized framework.

3. **Monitoring—Weak Accountability**: Overall, the lack of accountability and coordination of the current oversight system limits Congress’ ability to gauge the full extent to which RIs occur and thus cannot effectively determine where corrective action and better oversight are needed.

Recommendations

Congress should promote ethical military recruitment in high schools through revamping 1) oversight and 2) preventative measures. These proposals will encourage a more accountable and synchronized approach to reporting, monitoring, and preventing RIs at the local and system-wide level. Congress should take advantage of the current positive recruiting environment to reform the local safeguards and national oversight of military recruitment before greater pressures reemerge with a lower number of recruits.

1. **Proposal 1: Strengthen Oversight through Better Data and Monitoring**
   a. Long-Term Option: Establish an Ombudsman for Data Collection
   b. Medium-Term Option: Coordinate DoD and ED Monitoring
   c. Short-Term Option: Integrate Services’ Multiple Databases

2. **Proposal 2: Prevention through Enhancing Awareness**
   a. Medium-Term Option: Strengthen Support Systems and “Opt-Out” Policy to Safeguard Student Privacy
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1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Unethical military recruitment of high school students is a persistent problem that has been poorly addressed at both the local and national level with 1) inadequate safeguards developed within schools and 2) a weak oversight framework maintained by the Department of Defense (DoD) to report and monitor allegations of recruiting improprieties (RIs). Recruiter misconduct carries critical moral and practical repercussions for the US Army’s All-Volunteer Force. Although RIs are not widespread, accounting for 1% of Army accessions in 2008, just one incident of misconduct can undermine recruiting goals by eroding public confidence in the military and damaging recruiters’ relationships with potential enlistees and their “influencers,” including parents and teachers. Unjust treatment of minors is also wrong and unethical.

This report recommends for Congress to strengthen local preventative measures and revamp the national oversight framework to ensure ethical recruitment in high schools. In the short and medium-term, the DoD and the Department of Education (ED) should act in closer partnership with schools to institute accessible and well-publicized grievance procedures and support systems in schools, while also enforcing and enhancing awareness of existing legal safeguards. In the long-term, the establishment of an independent oversight body would provide greater accountability to the Services’ internal monitoring system and would unify the disparate data collection processes into one centralized framework.

1.1 Statement of the Problem: Recruiter Misconduct in High Schools

Operating in a challenging recruiting environment, about 2% of Army recruiters have resorted to inappropriate and coercive tactics in high schools to secure enlistments (Table 1). Recruiting improprieties are acts that wrongfully facilitate the recruiting process for a potential applicant. Thus, recruiter misconduct can range from acts of sexual and physical abuse to falsification of eligibility requirements of a recruit, resulting in the enlistment of an unqualified person.

Due to the low number of RIs captured in annual data (Table 1), the DoD does not routinely prioritize the issue of recruiter misconduct, even though existing data underestimates the true number of RIs.

165 USAREC 601-45, “Recruiting Improprieties Policies and Procedures”
and the large impact of just a few improprieties. Recruiting scandals attract high levels of media and congressional attention and heighten the need for a more consistent and proactive stance towards preventing RIs and large-scale reputational damages. A congressional hearing in 2005 highlighted two high-profile cases where audio recordings exposed recruiters advising students on how to obtain fake high school diplomas and tamper with drug test results in Colorado, while in Texas, recruiters threatened jail time against a student who canceled a meeting with a recruiter. David Moser, the Defense Director at the Government Accountability Office (GAO), indicated that these scandals had a “devastating, unquantifiable impact on the Army’s reputation” and demonstrates that recruiter misconduct is a crucial problem that cannot be readily dismissed nor addressed on an infrequent and ad hoc basis.

Table 1: Army Recruiter Improprieties for Fiscal Years 2004-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Total Claims</th>
<th>Substantiated Claims</th>
<th>Substantiated Claims as % of Recruiters</th>
<th>Substantiated Claims as % of Accessions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>0.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,738</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,833</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2004-2005 Data from GAO-06-846; 2006-2007 Data from DoD Army Recruiter Improprieties

*Note: The DoD did not maintain data on RIs before 2006. The 2004-2005 is based on GAO calculations.

1.2 Origins of the Problem: Pressure to Meet Recruiting Goals

While the weak civilian job market has recently boosted military recruitment, a number of challenges within the recruiting environment could quickly induce recruiter misconduct. Data from the Military Entrance Processing Command in Chicago (Figure 1) indicates a strong correlation between heightened stress on recruiters and instances of recruiter misconduct as RIs increase sharply at the end of the monthly recruiting cycle when recruiters face immense pressure to meet monthly enlistment goals. Before greater pressure reemerges with a more robust economy and lower number of recruits, Congress should take advantage of the current positive recruiting environment to reform the ethics process.

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Three key factors lowering youths’ propensity to enlist have intensified the pressure placed on recruiters and could induce unethical practices to sign recruits. First, ongoing hostilities in Iraq and the lack of qualified applicants, with only 25% of America’s youth eligible to join the military and meet service entry standards, have made it increasingly difficult for recruiters to achieve monthly goals. Second, the DoD’s “Influencer Poll” demonstrate that fewer influencers—especially parents exerting heavy influence over youths’ decisions to enlist—are promoting military service. Lastly, the state of the economy is the single most important factor affecting the recruiting environment. Although the high unemployment rate has led to recent recruiting success, recruiting scandals can quickly come back once the economy improves and military commitments in Afghanistan increase. Now is the time to set up stronger local safeguards and national oversight before RIs escalate with the greater pressures of a weak recruiting environment.

2. INADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS IN HIGH SCHOOLS

The weakness of the policy response to recruiter misconduct in schools emerges from 1) the failure to monitor and enforce existing legal safeguards and 2) to develop additional safeguards, including accessible grievance procedures and support systems in schools. Serving as prime recruiting terrain for the military, high schools require strong protections for students against invasive military recruiting practices. However, the boundary between appropriate and inappropriate recruiting activities remains poorly defined in federal law

and inadequately enforced in schools. Ongoing recruitment practices towards students present serious violations to the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) and the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, the chief international law providing youth protection from involuntary and coercive recruitment.

2.1 Evaluation of the Optional Protocol

The Optional Protocol was adopted in 2002 after the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child demonstrated the need for special protections for minors against direct participation in hostilities and forced or compulsory military recruitment. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), which included the conscription of children under the age of 15 as a war crime, served as the precedent and impetus for the Optional Protocol, but the Protocol sought to further promote and strengthen international cooperation in protecting the rights of children. The Protocol, thus, set binding obligations for each State Party to report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) within two years of ratifying the Protocol on their development, implementation, and enforcement of safeguards against the enlistment and involuntary recruitment of minors.

After quickly ratifying the Protocol in 2002, the US reported on its full compliance with the Optional Protocol. The US set the minimum age for “voluntary recruitment” at 17, well above the international average of 15 years old, and developed safeguards to ensure that the recruitment of minors is “genuinely voluntary.” These measures include fully informing youth of the duties involved in military service and obtaining parental consent before recruiting and signing youth under 18 years old.

However, contrary to the DoD’s assertion that the “military operates well within the bounds of the Optional Protocol,” the Services regularly target children under 17 for recruitment purposes and employ coercive tactics, which both violate the Protocol. These violations often go unchecked in the absence of a policy on implementing the Protocol in schools and in the local arena. The DoD has not set forth any formal

174 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. Vol. CRC/OP/AC/1., October 2001
175 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. Vol. CRC/OP/AC/1., October 2001
176 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. Vol. CRC/OP/AC/1., October 2001
177 American Civil Liberties Union.
178 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. Vol. CRC/OP/AC/1., October 2001
179 Optional Protocol, supra note 1, at. Art. 3(3)(b). and Id, art 3(3)(c)
180 Interview, John Drosh, Department of Defense, Accessions Policy Office, March 13, 2009
guidelines governing the implementation of the Protocol,\textsuperscript{181} while the ED has similarly failed to create a transparent, system-wide policy to ensure proper implementation and enforcement of the Protocol across school districts.\textsuperscript{182} Without direction from the DoD and the ED, the USAREC recruiting policies and practices towards students, defined in the “School Recruiting Program” (SRP), do not recognize or comply with the terms of the Protocol. The SRP is the Army’s highly structured recruiting program, designed to create maximal awareness and interest in Army programs among students, parents, and educators in public high schools, but contains no mention of the Optional Protocol.\textsuperscript{183}

\textbf{2.1.1 Violation: Targeting Youth Under 17 in the “School Reporting Program”}

Without incorporating the Protocol into USAREC regulations, the SRP handbook, explicitly instructs recruiters to target students before they are high school seniors, and thus, before the age of 17: “Remember, first to contact, first to contract. That doesn’t just mean seniors or grads. If you wait until they’re seniors, it’s probably too late.”\textsuperscript{184} This targeting of youth under the age of 17 for recruiting purposes violates the clear intent of the Protocol.

However, the USAREC justify their compliance with the Protocol by arguing that recruiters “expose” and “plant awareness of the Army in the minds of youth” rather than explicitly “recruiting” youth under 17.\textsuperscript{185} Yet, this distinction between “exposing” and “recruiting” is only nominal. Both terms are used interchangeably in the SRP Handbook to define the recruiters’ highly structured efforts to obtain enlistments.\textsuperscript{186} Rather than limiting recruitment activities to students above 17, as prescribed by the Protocol, the SRP advises recruiters to target \textit{all} members of the student body by “effectively penetrating the school market” and gaining “total school ownership.”\textsuperscript{187} However, the SRP’s violations of the Optional Protocol have not yet been tried in court due, in part, to the lack of awareness and consensus over the direct application of the Protocol in schools.\textsuperscript{188}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{181} Rawcliffe, John T. "Child Soldiers: Legal Obligations and U.S. Implementation." \textit{Army Lawyer} (2007)
\item \textsuperscript{182} ACLU. "Soldiers of Misfortune" 2008
\item \textsuperscript{184} USAREC 350-13, 1-4 (c), “Student Recruiting Program”
\item \textsuperscript{185} Captain Kurtis. Interview. February 16, 2009
\item \textsuperscript{186} USAREC 350-13, “Student Recruiting Program”
\item \textsuperscript{187} USAREC 350-13, “Student Recruiting Program”
\item \textsuperscript{188} Dennis Drogo. Interview. April 13, 2009.
\end{itemize}
2.1.2 Violation: Involuntary and Coercive Recruitment

Media and congressional reports provide strong evidence that the military has also failed to ensure “voluntary” recruitment of minors in compliance with the Protocol. The Optional Protocol narrowly defines recruitment as “genuinely voluntary” if recruiters 1) fully and accurately inform youth of the duties involved in military service and 2) obtain informed parental consent. First, although the USAREC Regulations require recruiters to fully inform applicants of the realities of military life and Active Duty, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) found several instances where recruiters knowingly misled prospects about the size of enlistment bonuses and the likelihood of engaging in active combat.

The ACLU addressed the US violations of the Optional Protocol in a report to the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in May 2008. The comprehensive investigation exposed the United States’ failure to observe minimum safeguards for the recruitment of youth under 18 as required by the Protocol, including protection against heavy-handed and deceptive recruiting tactics. After reviewing the ACLU report, the CRC responded in the 48th session of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, expressing “regrets that the training of military personnel does not cover the provisions of the Protocol and is concerned over reported misconduct and coercive recruiting measures.”

Second, the ACLU and the CRC highlighted recruiters’ failure to recognize and implement the “parental consent” provision of the Optional Protocol in recruiting youth under 18 into the Armed Services. The USAREC regulations contain no specific instruction to obtain parental consent for recruiting activities, except for requiring parental signatures on enlistment contracts. Furthermore, the NCLB Act violates the

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194 USAREC 601-45 “Recruiting Improprieties Policies and Procedures”
terms of the Protocol by providing recruiters with access to schools and student directory information without parental consent, which further weakens recruiters’ compliance with the Protocol.

The DoD and ED have failed to further clarify and enforce the terms of “voluntary recruitment” beyond the provision of 1) full and accurate information and 2) parental consent. Thus, this narrow definition of “voluntary recruitment” does not safeguard youth from other documented forms of misconduct, including coercion, deception and sexual abuse that similarly nullify the voluntariness of recruitment, but are not explicitly punishable under the existing terms of the Optional Protocol. The DoD, however, argued that these clear forms of coercion fall broadly under the category of “involuntary recruitment” and do not need to be explicitly spelt out to constitute a violation of the Protocol. However, the US can amend the vague terms of involuntary recruitment and submit it for approval of the Secretary-General of the UN in order to more clearly specify and raise awareness of common forms of recruiter misconduct, while also expanding the reach of the Protocol.

The use of threats against youth who wish to withdraw from the Future Soldiers Training Program (FTSP) is one of the most common forms of recruiter misconduct in high schools and amounts to involuntary recruitment, although not explicitly recognized as “involuntary” in the Protocol. The FTSP, formerly known as the Delayed Entry Program (DEP), is the “bottom line of recruiting efforts” and allows 17-year-olds to join the military’s inactive reserves with an agreement to report to active duty at a specified future date. The USAREC Recruiting Regulations state that youth can exit out of the FTSP contract at any point without penalties and there is no obligation to report to Active Duty.

However, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), a well-established NGO with a counter-military recruitment division, has recorded over 200 cases over the past year in which recruiters have threatened youth with jail time, dishonorable discharge, and debarment from other employment opportunities upon withdrawing from the FTSP. While counter-recruitment organizations primarily emerged in

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196 Interview, ACLU, March 17, 2009
199 USAREC 601-45 “Recruiting Impropieties Policies and Procedures”
200 Interviews ACLU, NYCLU, YA-YA Network, American Services Committee, March 17-19, 2009
opposition to the intrusive presence of recruiters in schools, encouraged by the NCLB Act of 2001, these organizations also lead the effort in assisting and informing students of their rights in the FSTP. The AFSC has partnered with several counter-military recruitment organizations to receive grievances:

We received reports where students were told that if they changed their minds, they would be considered deserters in wartime and could be found and shot. Another was told that if she didn’t go through with enlistment, her family would be deported.201

These glaring violations of the “voluntary recruitment” provision in the Optional Protocol and USAREC’s failure to properly document, investigate, and resolve all allegations of recruiter misconduct raise concerns about the integrity of the Army’s self-regulation on ethics and recruiting practices. The experience of the AFSC and its partner organizations in reporting complaints to a local recruiter, who threatened jail time if they successfully filed the grievances, highlights the weak accountability of existing complaint mechanisms maintained by the USAREC.202 The Army’s weak accountability underscores the need for better independent oversight mechanisms as well as the strengthening of the Optional Protocol in preventing prevalent forms of coercion, including the use of threats in the FSTP.

2.2 Evaluation of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001

The military recruitment provision, referred to as the “Hutchinson Amendment,” of the NCLB Act provides recruiters with unprecedented access to public high schools and student directory information without obtaining prior parental consent.203 The DoD and the ED jointly monitor and enforce schools’ compliance with the NCLB Act. The law denies states access to crucial federal funds if even one school or district does not provide recruiters with student information and equal access to students as given to job and college recruiters.204

Initially, this military provision gained bipartisan support in the Senate and in Congress as Senator Hutchinson introduced this amendment in October 2001 in response to the military readiness efforts after September 11.205 Recognizing the challenges facing military recruiters, Rod Paige, Secretary of Education, and

201 Interview Ya-Ya Network, March 18, 2009
202 Interview Ya-Ya Network, March 18, 2009
203 Holm, Kate Dittmeier. “No Child Left Behind and Military Recruitment in High Schools:” 2007
204 NYCLU, We Want You(Th)!, 2007
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, promoted the NCLB provision as a critical measure to ease the task of recruiters and “sustain the heritage of the All-Volunteer Force.” Early proponents, such as Bill Carr, the deputy undersecretary of defense for military personnel, further argued that the Hutchinson Amendment for secondary schools was needed to complement the Solomon Amendment, introduced earlier by in 1994, which provided military personnel the same opportunities to inform postsecondary students of military options as available to other employers.

However, debate over the appropriateness of the NCLB provision only recently emerged in 2007 after a New York Civil Liberties Union (NYLCU) investigation underscored the provision’s infringement of student privacy rights, while the CRC responded to the ACLU report by urging the U.S. to “amend the NCLB Act in order to ensure that it does not violate the right to privacy or the rights of parents.” Accordingly, Congress will debate the role of military recruiters in high schools in June 2009 to determine whether Congress should reauthorize the NCLB act. Opposing Rep. Duncan Hunter’s (R-Calif.) bill to maintain the provision, Rep. Mike Honda (D-Calif.) will introduce a bill that requires parental consent before releasing student information to military recruiters, which would replace the weakly implemented “opt out” policy that requires parents to proactively ask for their child’s information to be withheld. This report supports the NCLB act in providing recruiters’ continued access to high schools, but advocates the improvement of safeguards to protect students against poor privacy and invasive military recruiting practices.

2.2.1 Weak “Opt Out” Policy to Protect Student Privacy

The ED and DoD maintain no meaningful enforcement mechanisms to ensure that parents and students are informed of their right to withhold personal information from the military. This “opt out” safeguard rests entirely on the efforts of local school officials, resulting in weak and incongruous implementation across schools districts. Several schools do not effectively distribute opt-out forms, but instead notify opt-out rights in student newsletters or lengthy handbooks that are often overlooked. Other schools use special forms where students can only opt out of military recruitment if their information is

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206 Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, “Access by Military Recruiters,” December 10, 2002
207 USAREC 350-13, “Student Recruiting Program”
similarly withheld from colleges and other employers.\textsuperscript{211} As a result, a NYCLU survey of 1,000 students found that 2 in 5 respondents did not receive a military “opt out” form during the past academic year, while 1 in 3 respondents were unsure if opt-out forms were distributed.\textsuperscript{212}

\textbf{2.2.2 No Safeguards against Invasive Recruitment}

Although NCLB grants military, job, and college recruiters \textit{equal} access to public high schools, the ED and DoD have not established safeguards against invasive practices that give military recruiters \textit{preferential} access to schools. To monitor schools’ compliance with NCLB, the DoD and ED maintain a national high school database to ensure schools open their doors to military recruiters.\textsuperscript{213} However, this database does not monitor the prevalent invasive recruiting practices in schools, like at North Hunderton High where recruiters removed students from class to smoke marijuana, which compromises the students’ safety and the academic integrity of the school.\textsuperscript{214} Thus, while it is crucial to enforce recruiters’ access to schools, the DoD and ED should apply the same vigor towards monitoring and preventing intrusive recruitment practices that also violate NCLB’s “equal access” provision.

\textbf{2.3 Overall Problem at Local Level: Inadequate Safeguards in Schools}

The failure to enhance awareness of safeguards, collect reliable data through accessible grievance procedures, and institute school-level supervision of recruiter conduct undercut the overall policy response at the local level as well as weaken national monitoring.

\textbf{2.3.1 Prevention: Lack of Awareness of Safeguards and Student Rights}

Policies and safeguards governing students’ rights in relation to military recruiters are not well publicized within schools. Without understanding what constitutes a violation of the Optional Protocol and NCLB, schools cannot monitor or enforce recruiters’ compliance with these safeguards, and thus, unknowingly allow recruiter misconduct to continue unchecked. Since the enforcement of safeguards is determined on a school-by-school basis, policies towards military recruitment vary significant across schools. This highly decentralized and uncoordinated approach makes it extremely difficult for school boards and state

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{211} Hardy, Lawrence. "A Girl Sues the Military Over Recruiter Tricks." (2005)
\item \textsuperscript{212} NYCLU, We Want You(Th)!, 2007
\end{itemize}
and local departments of education to ensure that faculty and students are fully informed of their particular school policies towards military recruitment. Accordingly, in a NYCLU survey of 1,000 students and teachers in selected schools, all with policies prohibiting recruiters’ use of class time, more than 1 in 4 respondents reported that military recruiters have used class time to make presentations, while 1 in 3 respondents reported that they did not know if recruiters were allowed to use class time.215

2.3.2 Data Collection: Inadequate Grievance Procedures in Schools

With greater information made available to identify RIs, schools must institute accessible and well-publicized grievance procedures, so that students, parents, and faculty members can report instances of recruiter misconduct. Currently, there are no standard guidelines governing where and how to report recruiter misconduct in schools. Students, faculty, and parents most often direct their complaints to the school principal or guidance counselors, which are then forwarded to the local and state departments of education.216

However, the ED’s inability to accommodate or redress grievances in a systematic way could provide an important disincentive for individuals and groups to report violations.

Unlike the DoD, the ED has not established a database to compile and track reports of recruiter irregularities and these complaints are rarely channeled to the DoD given the weak state of inter-departmental partnership and coordination.217 Thus, the DoD’s annual report on RIs does not capture complaints that remain at the school level or with the ED. The ED’s Family Policy Compliance Office, however, could begin to record the occurrence of RIs in schools through utilizing the already established database the ED maintains with the DoD that monitors schools’ compliance with the NCLB Act. While there are higher costs associated with adding private information, such as RIs, to the data system, using the existing database would not only cut operating and IT costs, but would also allow the DoD and ED to gauge the extent of recruiter misconduct in schools in order to apply corrective action.

215 NYCLU, We Want You(Th)!, 2007
216 Interview, Family Policy Compliance Office, March 16, 2009
217 Interview, Family Policy Compliance Office, March 16, 2009
2.3.3 Monitoring: Weak Local Supervision

Lastly, the widespread failure to designate staff members to advise and support students in their interactions with recruiters has also lead to weak monitoring and supervision of recruiter activities within several schools. Army institutions, including the Offices of the Army Recruiting Command, the Army Inspector General, and the Staff Judge Advocate, serve as the primary monitoring and enforcement bodies for recruiter activities.218

However, through documenting several violations of the USAREC Recruiting Regulations, this report has demonstrated that additional oversight instruments are required to complement the Army’s internal monitoring. The recruiters’ pressure to meet enlistment goals present a disincentive, or at least a weaker incentive, for the Army to maintain rigorous measures in monitoring RIs that have assisted in meeting enlistment quotas.

Guidance counselors should help monitor and enforce recruiters’ compliance with the Optional Protocol and the NCLB, while the national oversight framework should be revamped to better coordinate efforts in holding recruiters and the Army’s monitoring bodies more directly accountable. The Seattle Public School system serves as a model for a strong military recruitment policy and full participation of faculty members in monitoring and regulating recruiting activities on school grounds. Guidance counselors from each school are required to keep an auditable log of recruiter visits and compliance with the schools’ guidelines governing recruiter access, including limits on recruiter locations and materials distributed within schools.219 Guidance counselors are required to submit this information monthly to the office of the superintendent of public instruction and counselors are encouraged to regularly update the schools’ recruitment policies maintained on the Seattle Public Schools website.220 By directly including faculty members in the design of the schools’ recruiting policies, this system helps hold staff more accountable in tracking recruiters’ compliance with school policies.

218 USAREC Pamphlet 27-65 “Legal Services: Procedural Guide for the USAREC Investigating Officer”
220 Ibid.
3. **WEAK OVERSIGHT AT NATIONAL LEVEL**

The DoD and ED have not established a comprehensive, national oversight framework to provide greater accountability to the Services’ internal monitoring system and to integrate the multiple reporting and grievance procedures maintained by the USAREC, NGOs, and DoD and ED. While there have been no specific proposals to establish an oversight framework, the DoD followed the GAO’s order in 2005 to compile data on RIs to report to Congress as the DoD maintained no data on RIs before 2006.221 The GAO did not establish an annual reporting requirement but the DoD must report on RIs on request.222

While the DoD argued, “we do not need more oversight given the extremely small number of RIs reported,” the DoD’s official report likely underestimates the true number of recruiter improprieties due to the weak and disjointed data collection and monitoring processes in place. Accordingly, a 2005 internal DOD survey reported that 20% of active duty recruiters believe that irregularities occur frequently.223 With the weak oversight framework, the DoD cannot inform Congress and the general public of the full extent of recruiter misconduct.

### 3.1 Data Collection: Weak Coordination

Currently, the reporting and grievance procedures are not integrated within institutions, as the Army maintains three separate databases and has no standardized criteria for characterizing RIs, while there is also a lack of coordination between institutions in consolidating complaints of RIs received by the USAREC and multiple governmental and non-governmental institutions. Since the DoD’s annual report to Congress draws solely from the faculty databases maintained by the Services, many serious incidents of wrongdoing are never captured in DoD reports and thus cannot be effectively dealt with in Congress.

The Services cannot readily produce a comprehensive report on RIs for the DoD due to their 1) lack of standardized criteria to identify and record RIs and 2) lack of an integrated, centralized database to compile all allegations of recruiter misconduct.224 Thus, the Services’ internal data system and processes do not fully capture and integrate data on RIs.

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223  *Department of Defense, 2005 Recruiter Quality of Life Survey, February 2006*  
First, the failure to establish standard criteria for the Services to define RIs makes it difficult for the DoD and Congress to make valid comparisons between the Services and analyze recruiter trends. USAREC has similarly not developed standardized procedures for recording data but instead, relies on a decentralized process to identify and track allegations of recruiter misconduct. The USAREC identifies an incident of recruiter misconduct in a number of ways including 1) input from hotlines maintained by the Army Enlistment Standards Division (ESD) and Inspector General (IG) 2) internal inspections by the Army IG 3) congressional inquiries and 4) data collected at the Military Entrance Processing Command and basic training. The decentralized system of identifying and collecting data on RIs often leads to poor management and loss of data as well as a less focused resolution of the problem. The GAO, for example, documented officials at the Military Processing Command stating that they forwarded all records of RIs that surfaced during the screening process to USAREC. However, GAO found that the USAREC database did not show any records of the RIs received from the Military Entrance Processing Command.

Second, US Recruiting Command uses three separate data systems that are not integrated and use different formats for maintaining data. Information about RI allegations can be archived in any of the three databases, maintained separately by the 1) USAREC Enlistment Standards Division, 2) the Army Inspector General and the 3) Judge Advocate. Furthermore, since the Judge Advocate houses RIs in hard-copy paper files that are incompatible with the ESD and IG’s electronic databases, the Army cannot readily compile the data into a comprehensive report for the DoD and Congress to analyze and monitor.

Without a centralized oversight framework, the DoD has failed to unify the disparate reporting and grievance procedures maintained by the USAREC, federal and local governmental bodies, and counter-recruitment organizations. Although multiple NGOs and school officials receive complaints regarding recruiter misconduct, the DoD’s annual report on RIs only draws complaints housed in the Army Recruiting Command’s database. Thus, the DoD’s report to Congress fails to account for several critical allegations and incidents of recruiter misconduct, particularly those that occur within schools, and thus, renders the

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226 Ibid. p. 15
227 Ibid p. 16
228 USAREC Pamphlet 27-65 “Legal Services: Procedural Guide for the USAREC Investigating Officer”
complaint mechanisms outside of the USAREC virtually ineffective.

3.2 Monitoring: Weak Accountability and Inter-Departmental Cooperation

This report has identified the ongoing recruitment activities in schools that violate the USAREC Recruiting Regulations and question the Army’s accountability in effectively self-monitoring military recruitment. The pressure to meet enlistment goals with a shrinking applicant pool not only drives recruiter misconduct, but also tempers the rigor of the Army’s accountability measure. The failure of the USAREC, IG, and Staff Judge Advocate to adequately monitor recruitment practices in schools has presented a greater need for strong, independent monitoring, detached from the Army’s pressure to meet enlistment goals. Additionally, while the ED and DoD share responsibility in monitoring schools’ compliance with NCLB, the partnership between these departments in reporting and monitoring efforts remains weak. Better coordination between the DoD and ED could encourage more effective monitoring of recruitment practices down to the local level of the school.

4. POLICY PROPOSALS

Congress should take a dual approach to promoting ethical military recruitment in high schools through revamping 1) oversight and 2) preventive measures. Congress should take advantage of the current positive recruiting environment to reform local safeguards and set up national oversight before greater recruiting pressures reemerge.

4.1 Proposal 1: Strengthen Oversight through Better Data and Monitoring

Congress must strengthen the existing oversight framework to provide a more accountable and coordinated approach to reporting and monitoring RIs. Identified as a key barrier to policy action, the lack of accessible and integrated complaint mechanisms and the lack of accurate data on RIs have limited Congress’ ability to determine the full extent and nature of the problem of recruiter improprieties. Since Congress depends on this data to take action against recruiter misconduct, the strengthening of the data collection and monitoring processes is imperative to ensure more ethical and just military recruitment of children. Improved oversight can take three forms, requiring varying levels of congressional involvement, including: 1) the designation of an Ombudsman, an independent and impartial oversight body, 2) the strengthening of the
partnership between the DoD and ED and 3) the establishment of coherent USAREC data collection processes.

4.1.1 Evaluation of Option 1: Establish an Ombudsman

Aim and Implementation – The overall objective of this policy is to designate an Ombudsman to centralize and unify the disparate data collection and monitoring process within the Service and across governmental departments into one centralized oversight body. An Ombudsman is a fully independent and impartial governmental office that receives and investigates complaints, in this case, of recruiter misconduct. The Army Ombudsman for Wounded-Warriors in-Transition and the Navy Family Ombudsman serve as models for establishing an ombudsman for the military that would act as a liaison between the public and military recruiters, while still maintaining its independence and impartiality.\(^{230}\) Legislation should consistently establish the authority and enforcement power of the Ombudsman as the principal complaint mechanism and investigatory arm operating at a national and local level through partnering with local recruiting stations.

Costs – Establishing an Ombudsman requires a high level of congressional commitment of time and resources. Charles Henning of the Congressional Research Service indicated that the costs of operating a central Ombudsman office with a staff of 15 to 20 professionals and a website and hotline to receive complaints would run around $5-10 million per year, based on calculations of the initial start-up costs of comparable ombudsman offices, the Army Ombudsman for Wounded-Warriors in-Transition and the Navy Family Ombudsman.\(^{231}\)

Additionally, to mitigate the costs of a large-scale, centralized publicity effort, the Ombudsman could advertise locally through recruiting command stations’ contacts with school principals and faculty maintained in their databases. The Ombudsman could utilize this contact information to issue statements to school leadership that clearly spells out the role of the Ombudsman as a resource for students, teachers, and school personnel to access with complaints and/or concerns regarding military recruitment. Ideally, the Ombudsman office would direct this local publicity effort; however, this large-scale project may require the cooperation of


recruiters in publicizing the Ombudsman in schools. The key issue here would be to hold the recruiters accountable in presenting the Ombudsman as a mechanism for redress.

**Benefits** – Replacing the disparate grievance procedures and reporting bodies with one centralized body will improve the integrity of data and the ability for Congress, ED, and the DoD to analyze trends regarding RIs in schools. While establishing an Ombudsman is certainly very capital and time-intensive, this report recommends for Congress to pursue this option as a more long-term, coherent strategy. The establishment of an independent oversight body would create a more transparent and accountable system to collect data, monitor, and investigate claims of recruiter misconduct. The independent nature of the ombudsman could help contain the Army’s self-interest in not fully implementing safeguards and monitoring measures. Furthermore, the annual reporting requirement would help consistently reinforce the importance of monitoring and addressing recruiter misconduct against youth and would help direct Congress to take more meaningful action against RIs with better data to identify the problem.

### 4.1.2 Evaluation of Option 2: Coordinate DoD and ED Monitoring Activities

**Aim and Implementation** – The primary goal is to develop a more meaningful partnership between the DoD and ED in monitoring schools and recruiters’ compliance with the NCLB and Optional Protocol, while also integrating complaint mechanisms. Congress could encourage this inter-departmental cooperation through issuing a directive that requires the ED and DoD to work in closer partnership to produce the annual report on RIs together. This would allow the ED to submit allegations and incidents of recruiter misconduct into the report, and thus, DoD and Congress could better identify and monitor the key ethical problems with military recruitment in schools.

Congress could also clarify and enforce the terms of the NCLB Act that requires the Accession Policy Office (DoD) and the Family Policy Compliance Office (FPCO) to act jointly in monitoring schools and recruiters’ compliance with the military provisions under NCLB. This would provide a bigger push for the ED and DoD to work together. The NCLB could specify guidelines for integrating and compiling data on RIs into a joint database managed by the DoD and ED. Since the DoD and ED already maintain a database tracking schools’ compliance with NCLB in providing access to military recruiters, this database could also be
used to report and monitor allegations of RIs. The DoD and the ED would present this data to Congress on an annual basis.

**Costs** – From a feasibility standpoint, Mike Higgins, Professional Staff Member of the US House Armed Services Committee, argued that there has been a historically low level of cooperation between the ED and the DoD on the matters of military recruitment; thus, creating a voluntary partnership between these departments would be “very challenging,” while suggesting that such a partnership could be strengthened if it was mandated by law. Furthermore, there would be monetary costs associated with incorporating private data, such as RIs and social security numbers, into the databases maintained by the DoD and the ED. However, the cost of establishing a completely new database for the ED to house complaints of RIs would be much greater than working with the existing databases.

**Benefits** – Better coordination between the DoD and ED through a shared database on RIs would enhance Congresses’ visibility over recruiter improprieties, especially those occurring in schools and reported to the ED. Under the current oversight framework, the complaints received by local departments of education and the FPCO are not integrated into the DoD report to Congress. Therefore, by integrating the complaint mechanisms and data maintained by the ED and the DoD, Congress could better understand the full extent of RIs in secondary schools and evaluate which safeguards need to be developed or better enforced in order to protect the rights of high school students.

### 4.1.3 Evaluation of Option 3: Integrate Services’ Database

**Aim and Implementation** – This option aims to improve the coherence of the Services’ internal data and monitoring systems. To implement this proposal, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness could direct the Services to set criteria and common definitions for characterizing recruiter improprieties. Secondly, the Army could integrate and compile the complaints housed in the three separate databases into one central database with all RIs maintained in the same, compatible format under USAREC.

**Cost** – This is a very low cost proposal, but it would require cooperation and commitment of time and money for the USAREC, Inspector General, and Staff Judge Advocate to consolidate and integrate all complaints regarding recruiter irregularities. The most time-intensive task will be to change the Judge
Advocate’s paper files into an electronic Normally, the USAREC may not be willing to engage in this time-intensive process under pressure to meet enlistment goals, but the current strong recruiting environment presents an opportunity for the three Army branches to synchronize the database.

**Benefit** – Through integrating the data collection systems and establishing a more centralized monitoring process, the Services can better capture data on RIs. The integrity of the data will also enhance the validity of DoD’s report to Congress. By creating standard definitions and an integrated database for recruiting improprieties, the Services can produce a comprehensive and consolidated report on recruiter irregularities and Congress can more easily analyze trends of RIs across the Services. Relying on this data, Congress can better determine where to apply corrective action to reform the ethical recruitment of youths.

4.3 Proposal 2: Prevention through Enhancing Awareness

4.3.1 Medium-Term Option: Strengthen “Opt-Out” Policy and Support Systems

**Aim and Implementation** – The goal of this medium-term proposal is to better enforce safeguards within schools in order to inform students, parents, and faculty members of their rights in relation to military recruiters. Primarily, to more effectively safeguard student privacy, the ED should require schools to provide a meaningful, user-friendly way for students and their parents to withhold a student’s information from the military. Based on the model of the Seattle Public School system, single-sheet opt out forms should be mailed out to both parents and 9th-12th grade students at the beginning of the academic year with clear, multi-lingual instructions. There should be no deadline for returning the opt-out forms and these forms should not be buried in lengthy student handbooks or in a format that is not readily accessible.

During orientation week, all high school students should be given time in homeroom to read and fill out, if desired, the opt-form and also meet the guidance counselor designated to assist students with recruitment issues. Guidance counselors should present opt-out forms and information regarding military recruitment each semester both through brief homeroom presentations to garner the attention of students and also through after-school sessions to target parents and faculty members. Only one opt out form needs to be filled out to withdraw personal information from recruiters for the duration of high school; however, conducting in-class sessions each semester will help consistently reinforce the schools’ policy on recruitment
and the resources the guidance counselor can provide students in evaluating their postsecondary options. The
guidance counselor should be responsible for presenting information in homeroom about military
recruitment policies, opt-out forms, existing legal and administrative safeguards, the Future Soldiers Training
Program, and where to file complaints of recruiter misconduct.

**Cost –** There are relatively low monetary costs associated with training school leadership, especially
guidance counselors, on the rules and regulations of recruitment activities and preparing opt-out forms and
presentations for students, parents, and faculty. However, since the opt-out policy and guidance counselors
can only be implemented on a local, district level, there will likely be large disparities between the school
districts’ adherence to these policies with differing levels of resources, parental involvement, and activism.
NYCLU’s repeated appeals to the NYC Department of Education to strengthen the opt-out policy
demonstrates the difficulty in effecting large-scale reform for a non-prioritized issue.

**Benefits –** If fully implemented, the provision of fuller and more accurate information is one of the
best preventative tools against coercive, deceptive, and abusive recruiting practices. With full awareness about
the obligations of Service and the right to “genuinely voluntary” recruitment, students will be better equipped
to resist coercive recruiting tactics, make more informed choices about enlisting, and to identify and report
incidents of recruiter misconduct in order to hold recruiters more accountable in schools. Improved
awareness and transparency promotes a higher standard of ethical conduct among recruiters and thus, could
also encourage staff members to look on recruiting efforts more favorably and present enlistment as a more
viable post-secondary option for students.

Furthermore, strengthening the “opt out” policy under NCLB will help inform students of their right
to privacy in their interactions with recruiters, while a more accessible and transparent “opt out” policy would
also help recruiters more effectively channel their activities towards more willing applicants to achieve
enlistment goals.
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WWS402: Restoring Military Recruitment without Restoring the Draft

Professor Julian Zelizer

Improving the Use of Technology in U.S. Army Recruitment

Lingzi Gui

May-05-09

I pledge my honor that this paper represents my own work.
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Briefing Memo: Improving the Use of Technology in U.S. Army Recruitment

Introduction: There is great need for constant innovation and improvement in the Army’s use of technology for recruitment. Even though the Army has been a leader in using new technologies in its recruiting campaigns, facing new problems in today’s recruiting environment, the Army could enhance its technology use in social media, virtual recruiting, and online data collection.

Key Problems:

1. U.S. Army suffers from a negative image among influencers: Recent polls suggest that the majority of the influencers, defined as parents and non-parents who directly influence the youth, hold negative opinions of the Army.

2. The new generation of U.S. youth prefers new mediums of communications and has a wider range of choices in careers and education: The American youth that grew up in the current tech-rich environment are more used to new means of communication, which makes the traditional Army outreach methods appear outdated.

3. The limited recruitment budgets make obtaining high quality recruits challenging: Diminishing growth in military budgets in recent years adds to the Army’s difficulty in obtaining high quality recruits. The Army’s percentage of high school graduate recruits has been relatively low in the past decades, and the situation is likely to persist in the long run.

Recommendations:

1. Utilize popular social media to target influencers as well as potential recruits
   A. Create an informal social media platform for interested parents and guardians

   Given that today’s influencers’ are increasingly active on social media, the Army should consider promoting parent bloggers, especially mom bloggers to engage interested parents and revitalize its image in the influencers’ community.
B. Create an integrated blogging site for soldiers in recruiting support programs

As today’s youth find the Internet to be the primary medium of communication, the Army should create an integrated blogging platform for soldiers participating in recruiting support programs in order to maintain their influence in communities in an effective, inexpensive, and secure manner.

2. Improve the utilization of SGT STAR: As visitors are spending more time on GoArmy.com, the Army could benefit from a greater utilization of SGT STAR. The contracted IT developers should prioritize improving the interactivity and engagement of SGT STAR rather than its appearance. The Army should also consider launching online campaigns on social media to increase the public’s interests on SGT STAR through ethical advertising.

3. Allow for the use of persistent cookies on GoArmy.com under registered users’ consent: The ongoing prohibition of persistent cookies on government websites limits the effect of online data collection through GoArmy.com. Given its ability to let users register to create online accounts, GoArmy.com should be allowed to analyze registered users’ activities on site in order to fully take advantage of ethical online data collection that will benefit both the account users and the Army recruitment.
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INTRODUCTION

For many decades, the U.S. Army has combined efforts with innovations to meet the challenges it has faced around the world. Today, the home front mission of successful sustained recruitment remains yet another challenge which the Army must continue to address. Amid mixed public opinion and constrained recruitment budgets, the use of technology has great potential to enhance the Army’s recruiting efforts. This paper seeks to address how the Army can follow the path of successful and cost effective private sector innovations to most effectively utilize technology in order to maximize both the quality and quantity of future soldiers. As the Army has made significant accomplishments in this field, this paper first surveys the current use of technology in Army recruiting. It then analyzes several key problems for Army recruiting in today’s environment, and finally the paper offers recommendations in three areas to enhance recruitment efforts through the technologies utilized in social media, virtual recruiting, and online data collection.

CURRENT TECHNOLOGY USE IN ARMY RECRUITING

The U.S. Army has been a forerunner in using cutting-edge technology in recruiting. In recent years, its accomplishments with new technology both online and offline have made significant positive impacts on Army recruitment.

Recruiting Websites

The Army’s official recruiting site, GoArmy.com, is the major information authority for people interested in joining the Army. Rich in both traditional content and multimedia materials, the website has been successful at producing seriously interested applicants for 14 years (Browning, 2002). With over 15,000 pages of discrete Army-related information, it claims to be one of the most sophisticated U.S. government websites (PR Newswire, 2007). Utilizing new
technology, the website includes, among other features, numerous videos, games & downloads, podcasts & RSS feeds, career exploration tools, a discussion board, and easy access to request information and ask questions through emails and online chat. Visitors are also encouraged to create a user account, which automatically generates a “My GoArmy Homepage” with the contact information of the local recruiter, featured videos, and easy access to the Cyber chat room. Users can easily adjust the gadgets displayed on this homepage based on language and content preference. With a registered account, the user can also directly apply online for positions and search for available job openings, though whether applying online or not, candidates still need to go through mandatory meetings with local recruiters to continue the enlistment process.232

Among the most innovative and well-known features of the Army recruiting website is its virtual recruiting guide, SGT STAR. Designed to look like a 27 year-old male soldier, SGT STAR was created in 2006 and has since been helping visitors to navigate the massive amount of pages on GoArmy.com to find information in an efficient and accurate way. The technology behind SGT STAR is ActiveAgent, a pioneer software program powered by Next IT Corporation, which enables the virtual guide to use conversational language to answer questions and provide informative details about the Army (NextIT, 2007). Next IT has also created similar programs for private clients, such as Jenn, a virtual representative for Alaska Airlines that assists customers in booking flights online (Next IT). Compared to typical Internet search engines, SGT STAR not only has a unique personality and a sense of humor in his tone but also was programmed to ask follow-up questions in certain subjects to gather data in order to provide most accurate answers.

232 Descriptions based on navigation through the content and features of www.goarmy.com
In addition, the software program also acts like a data collector, as it effectively gathers statistics and can be easily updated based on the users’ interaction with SGT STAR. Based on the user’s behavior and interest focus, the Army could use the record generated by SGT STAR to improve both its recruiting websites and the recruiting policies in a timely manner (NextIT, 2007).

The virtual guide was created to reduce the costs associated with having to increase staff for live online chat, which was said to be growing too quickly to be supported in the long run, especially since roughly 60 percent of the questions asked were always the same ones (Jackson, 2007). In addition to the economic benefits, SGT STAR has brought the Army many other advantages. A major positive outcome is the growth in traffic and visitor retention in GoArmy.com, as studies found that, following the implementation of SGT STAR, the average site visits rose from 4 minutes to 16 minutes, and questions asked climbed from an average of 6 to 13 (NextIT, 2007). As the Army claims that the subjective media coverage of recent Army operations has made the American public overlook the military’s benefits and opportunities (Sean Marsh, 2006), an increased level of time spent by visitors on GoArmy.com, could help the public be more informed about the Army and thus assist the Army in shedding its negative stereotypes in the long run.

In addition to the official recruiting site, the Army also created various other websites to assist the overall recruiting campaign both directly and indirectly. GoArmy.com provides links to external websites such as MyOneGoodReason.com, in which soldiers explain through both writing and videos their one most important patriotic reason to enlist in the Army. An example of a more implicit online recruiting tool is March2Success.com, a free, no obligation program that provides online courses and practice questions for standard tests and high school preparation.
The online program does not directly teach or promote the ASVAB\textsuperscript{233} Test, but the Army has created the materials in the High School Preparation section of the website in a way that has been helpful to individuals seeking to study for the ASVAB (Pete Gernen, 2008).

**Social Media**

With social media being an increasingly integral part of the student’s lives these days, the Army has quickly followed the trend and established its presence on all major social media websites. Social media is commonly defined as the umbrella term that uses “wisdom of crowds” to connect information in a collaborative manner. Through mediums like blogs, photo sharing, social networking, and podcasts, social media enables users to create, share, and organize content on the Internet and has thus become an important marketing tool for public relations professionals (Council, 2008).

The Army has been active on social media. Its official page can now be found on Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, Youtube, and LinkedIn,\textsuperscript{234} all of which are popular social networking sites where today’s youth as well as adults spend significant portions of their time online. As these websites vary in function and audience, the role of the Army’s page differs accordingly from site to site. For example, the Army’s MySpace homepage provides links to the Army’s video games, SGT STAR, discussion board, and some of the most visually impressive features of the recruiting website. In comparison, U.S. Army’s homepage on Twitter.com, a fast growing microblogging website, functions as a newsfeed provider, with the majority of the material focusing on the everyday conduct of Army life and new Army policies. Given the different natures of these websites, the amounts of attention they attract also varies, although the

\textsuperscript{233} The Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) is a required examination for enlisting in U.S. Armed Forces.

\textsuperscript{234} http://www.facebook.com/home.php?#!/pages/The-US-Army/44053938557
http://www.myspace.com/army; http://twitter.com/USArmy
http://www.youtube.com/user/soldiersmediacenter; http://www.linkedin.com/companies/us-army

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real interest level and marketing effect is hard to compare. U.S. Army’s personal page has
around 90,000 virtual “friends” on MySpace, and its homepage on Twitter has attracted 4,000
users that receive the Army’s news updates regularly with the user number growing at a rapid
speed.\footnote{“U.S. ARMY has 88257 friends” on MySpace. Recorded at 2:41pm, March 27th 2009. US Army has 4056 followers on
Twitter. Recorded at 11:25pm, April 19th 2009}

Data Collection and Data Mining

The Army’s expertise in technology also extends to the daily operations of its
recruitment. In order to manage the vast amount of data that come in on any given day, the Army
has made successful contracts with market leaders that provide efficient and innovative products
to assist the recruiting process. An important innovation is the Army Recruiting Information
Support System, powered by Electronic Data Systems Corps, which was controlled by the Army
to help the U.S. Army Recruiting Command transform to a paperless operation (Grimes). The
traditional, manual accession process typically involves 240,000 or more printed documents
moving through the process at any given time and about 6 million new printed documents
entering the process each year (EMC Corporation, 2005). With the new system’s electronic
operations, the Recruiting Command has improved its document efficiency by at least 40 percent
(Grimes).

In addition to enlisted personnel, the Army also maintains records of millions of civilian
American youth under the Department of Defense’s Joint Advertising Market Research &
Studies (JAMRS) Database in order to enhance the effectiveness of recruiting programs
(Defense, 2007). However, even though the collected information certainly serves as an
important indication of interests to enlist, there are many variables that affect an individual’s
enlistment decision, so the basic data gathered by JAMRS may not be the best tool promoting recruitment (Bishop, 2009).

KEY PROBLEMS IN ARMY RECRUITING

While these technological innovations have assisted Army recruitment in the past, today’s environment has posed new problems that directly impact the overall effectiveness of the Army’s recruiting campaigns. This paper summarizes three key problems that can be solved or reduced by further utilization of technologies.

I. The U.S. Army Suffers from a Negative Image among Influencers.

In the discussions of the Army’s outreach efforts to potential recruits, many studies have focused on the role of the influencers. The term “influencer”, as defined by the JAMRS, refers to “parents and non-parents ages 22-85 who reported directly influencing youth ages 12-21”, and their roles range from “coaches and clergy to mothers and guidance counselors” (Sean Marsh, 2006). As young people’s decisions, beliefs and values are especially subject to change through interactions with people in their environment (Lent, 2000), JAMRS recognizes that influencers play a crucial role because of the impact they have on youngsters’ attitudes and norms. The influencers therefore have direct effects on youths’ “educational goals, scholastic achievement, and appraisal of their self-efficacy” (Sean Marsh, 2006).

Given the tremendous impact that influencers have on a potential recruit’s decision to enlist, it is extremely problematic that the overwhelming majority of the influencers surveyed in the JAMRS studies hold negative opinions of the Army. In the June 2006 Influencer Poll, only 10% of parents and 15% of non-parents mentioned that they would recommend military service (Sean Marsh, 2006). Moreover, the percentage of influencers who are “Very Unlikely to Recommend the Army” has grown steadily since 2003, and was selected more than all other
choices in the 2005 survey. When asked about the specific military branch, the influencers indicated in recent years that their likelihood to recommend the Army is consistently lower than the majority of other military divisions, only second to the Marine Corps from 2004 to 2006 (Department of Defense, 2006).

In addition, another JAMRS study suggests that adults and youth alike are uninformed about the various opportunities and benefits of Army life and the many positive experiences gained from Army service as a result of negative and incomplete media coverage (Matt Boehmer, 2004, p. v), which in turn increases the effect that influencers could have on potential recruits. If the influencers continue to promote negative opinions of the Army in their surroundings, both the number and the quality of the recruits will likely suffer in the long run regardless of the prevailing economic conditions. As the ongoing economic crisis will eventually end, and the stability in Iraq and Afghanistan remain tenuous, recruiting problems may increase in the coming years. Given these uncertainties, the U.S. Army faces great urgency in reinventing its image among influencers and the public as a whole.

II. **The New Generation of U.S. Youth Prefers New Mediums of Communications and Has a Wider Range of Choice in Careers and Education.**

Marketing professionals and educators alike have focused on the new demographic characteristics of the so-called “Generation Y” or “Net Generation”, which commonly refer to the children of the baby boomers that grow up in the increasingly tech-rich environment. Studies found that children age six or younger now spend an average of two hours each day using screen media (TV, videos, computers, video games) and among youngsters 4 to 6 years old, 27 percent spend over an hour a day at the keyboard (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2003). For older students, the Internet has become a way of life, as 93% of teens and 87% of 18 to 32 year olds use the
Internet on a regular basis, 64% of young adults now get information about jobs online and 67% frequently use social networking sites (Jones, 2009). Given that student socialization now takes place primarily on the Internet, schools and educators are actively seeking to build community for their students through technology, as they increasingly realize that traditional activities like “ice cream socials in the residence hall lobby” will no longer be sufficient to bring students together and that websites like Facebook.com should be their new focus (Shier, 2005, p. 83).

The youth’s dependence on the Internet poses the Army recruiting with two direct challenges. First, the Army’s research results show that young people growing up using the Internet and new technology tend to distrust authority figures, and unlike the previous generations who are comfortable talking to mentors to learn about a career, today’s students start with a Google search and go on to blogs and social networking sites to inform themselves (Beizer, 2008). As a result, traditionally dominant recruiting methods, such as talking to recruiters in person, may have become less effective, as studies show that today’s youth feel less comfortable with a face-to-face meeting unless they have already embarked upon the recruiting process (Bishop, 2009). Secondly, as the Internet offers quick access to a vast amount of information, today’s youth can easily browse and compare all kinds of careers and education opportunities. Websites and agencies have made the job search process more convenient by compiling opportunities together under online databases that are searchable and tailored to personal interests. As a result, the Army now faces competition with the thousands of other educational and career choices that are reaching out to recruit young Americans. Competing against the private sector, the Army needs to continuously innovate its outreach strategies amidst the information-rich environment presented by the Internet.
III. The Limited Recruitment Budget Makes Obtaining High Quality Recruits Challenging.

Diminishing growth in military budgets adds to the Army’s difficulty in obtaining high quality recruits. Comparing the past three fiscal years, the Army’s budget requests for Operation and Maintenance, which support the recruiting and training for the “All Volunteer Force” saw a year on year growth of 16 percent in fiscal year 2008, and the growth rate dropped to 6.6 percent in fiscal year 2009 (Comptroller, 2008, p. 12). At the same time, the percentage of recruits with high school diplomas has shown a declining trend in recent years. From 2003 to 2007, the number dropped from 91% to 79%. Even though the year 2008 showed a slight increase of recruit quality with the percentage of high school graduates going back to 83%, the figure is one of the smallest in the past two decades and significantly smaller than that of other branches of the military in 2008 (Defense, 2008). As today’s Army faces the dual challenges of cost and quality, it needs to seek cost-effective outreach strategies to target the right audience, and improved utilization of the Internet can help the Army in accomplishing this task.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to solve the key problems listed above, this paper proposes the following recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of technology use in U.S. Army recruiting.

I. Utilize Popular Social Media to Target Influencers as well as Potential Recruits.

Since the use of the Internet became public in the early 1990s, user activities online have evolved significantly. In 2008 social networking and blogging sites for the first time surpassed email to become the fourth most popular online activity. The time people spent on these networks rose by 63% to 45 billion minutes of use in 2008, while in the same period the total amount of time spent online increased by only 18% globally (The Nielsen Company, 2009, pp. 2,
Interestingly, this trend is primarily driven by the participation of older audiences. An example is Facebook, where the greatest growth came from people aged 35-49 years old, and it has added almost twice as many 50-64 year olds visitors than users under 19 years old (The Nielsen Company, 2009, p. 4).

Given the American population’s growing activity on social media, this paper suggests the creation of two blogging platforms to assist Army recruitment by engaging two critical audience groups: the parents of potential recruits and the youths themselves.

A. Create an informal social media platform for interested parents and guardians

The Army should create an online blogosphere for interested parents and guardians to connect to the current Army parents who are proud to share their experience on blogs. Because parents, especially female adult users, are greatly underrepresented among the overall user population on GoArmy.com (Alexa.com), the Army faces pressing needs to engage these influencers, who are often the most fervent opponents of the Army.

The current “For Parents” section in the Army’s recruiting website takes on a rather traditional design in communicating with interested parents. The web pages consist of a “Message to Parents”, a list of commonly asked questions with their answers, and a “Real Life Stories” section including stories and videos from 11 Army families (GoArmy.com, 2009). In order to find out further information, visitors need to participate in the live chat room during its operating times to ask specific questions to a recruiter. While the Army’s current approach provides parents with a reasonable amount of information, it has not taken advantage of the available technologies commonly used by the private sector to engage its audience.

Marketing professionals have long realized the importance of social media in influencing parents. Given adults’ dramatically increased presence on popular social media websites,
companies have been targeting parents, especially mothers, in their online marketing campaigns because studies have found that moms do not only rely on corporate sites but more so on other moms on the Internet when they seek out information (Gordon, 2009). As moms play a powerful role in both their households and communities, outreach to mom bloggers who have influence on other moms has become a powerful marketing tool. Recent examples include McDonald’s Moms’ Quality Correspondents Program and Walmart’s ElevenMoms project, which gathered successful mom bloggers to build a money saving community and promote the Walmart brand at the same time (Walmart, 2009). The social media manager for Graco Children’s Products has been using Twitter.com for the company, but she emphasizes the importance of presenting herself primarily as a mom in order to foster connection with other mom users (Gordon, 2009). Similarly, US Navy has also established a sophisticated Web2.0 platform, NavyforMoms.com, to facilitate connection among parents (U.S. Navy, 2009). Given adults’ participation on social media websites today, the Army should similarly consider using parent bloggers, especially mom bloggers to revitalize its image in the influencers’ community. As the JAMRS’s study shows that female influencers consistently act less supportive in an individual’s decision to join the military, the use of mom bloggers should be a strategy actively pursued by the Army for recruitment purposes (Sean Marsh, 2006).

In creating a blog platform, the Army should promote a small group of interested and qualified Army parents to discuss their experience of having a son or daughter in the Army. The platform will consist of a main page and individual blogger’s homepages. In order to achieve the desired results, the selected bloggers should ideally already enjoy a certain degree of experience online and be drawn from a variety of backgrounds, so that they are familiar with blogging techniques and could easily connect to visitors of various racial and socioeconomic backgrounds.
Despite their role in recruiting, the bloggers should differentiate themselves from official recruiters. It should be clarified that the bloggers represent their own authentic opinions in communicating with the online audience and other bloggers in order to create the desired environment for engagement. At the same time, the bloggers should follow a specific code of conduct compiled by the Recruiting Command based on experience of past ethical disputes and concerns. To maximize the parent bloggers’ presence on the Internet, the Army should encourage bloggers to maintain profiles on other forms of popular social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, and provide technical assistance as needed.

A potential problem facing both private and public sectors in using social media is that the creators lose control over the discourse as the site’s visitors can often dominate the discussion (Silverpop Systema Inc, 2009). However, as creating engagement is currently a primary goal for public relations specialists in the U.S. Army, the Recruiting Command should not be afraid to open itself up for constructive criticism as a result of using blogs, especially since other government and military sectors have seen positive outcome in using social media and website improvements based on criticism (Kyzer, 2009). In order to create honest, engaging discussions, the Army should avoid strict control of the discussions, although family friendliness and relevancy of subject matter should remain in the guidelines for visitors’ posts, as is standard in many other blogs (Kyzer, 2009).

B. Create an integrated blogging site for soldiers in recruiting support programs.

The Army has been employing a series of programs that support the efforts of recruiters. The Special Recruiter Assistance Program enables Soldiers who have served in Iraq or Afghanistan to share their deployment experiences in their hometowns or other communities to assist the local recruiters while receiving temporary duty payments and travel reimbursement.
(Support Army Recruiting). The popular $2K Referral Bonus Program awards soldiers and other qualified individuals $2,000 for referring their acquaintances to the Army and Army Reserve recruiters, provided that the referrals lead to enlistments (Support Army Recruiting). The creation of these programs is partially based on the experience summarized by recruiters that they could better “develop trust and credibility with their prospects by sharing their Army story and the recruiter’s personal experience” (Hasenauer, 2006). Similarly, the Recruiting Command noticed the trend that interaction with a current soldier has tremendous impact in encouraging enlistment (Command, 2005). As soldiers in the recruiting support programs normally go on missions for less than 14 days, social media such as blogging could help soldiers maintain the valuable connections they make on their trips and enhance the effectiveness of the recruiting programs.

The Army’s policy on soldier blogging has been a topic of debate in the past years. The major critics are concerned about the safety of the U.S. Army. The perceived danger posed by blogging includes external threats from foreign governments, intelligence services, and terrorist networks (Division, 2007). While the safety concerns over blogging are important, the Army has shown confidence that soldiers are well trained and could easily abide by certain security standards in blogging to protect the Army’s operations as they already do in daily communications such as email and phone calls (Kyzer, 2009). The U.S. Government Operations Security should establish a set of regulations to minimize the potential danger associated with blogging, so that soldiers in this way could maintain active involvement in their communities after leaving for the Army.

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236 These personnel include USMA Cadets, ROTC Contracted Cadets, members of the Future Soldier Training Program, Army component retirees, and Department of the Army Civilian employees.
Therefore, this paper suggests the creation of an aggregated blog site where soldiers with recruiting responsibilities could publish blogs. The bloggers should actively encourage their existing connections to follow the updates of their blog entries, which should be genuine, personal stories that could help reduce many readers’ negative opinions about the Army. By limiting the bloggers of this site specifically to recruiting support program participants and placing individual blogs into an integrated website, the Army could easily oversee the activities of bloggers to ensure the security of critical information in the Army.

In addition, the blogs may serve as important resources for an inclined individual to explore the real Army life on his own before talking to a local recruiter, which may seem like a much more daunting experience. The creation of an integrated blog platform could make blogs searchable based on variables such as gender, age, region, education, and job functions to facilitate the self informing processes preferred by today’s youth. In this way, social media surpasses other recruiting tactics in enabling targeted specialization in Army recruitment, as the blog site could gather the visitors’ information through several basic questions and quickly match them to the bloggers that may well act as the best influencers.

II. Improve the Utilization of SGT STAR

A previous section of this paper has addressed the success of SGT STAR in assisting the Army recruitment, but under a closer analysis it is clear that the Army has great potential to further improve the utilization of SGT STAR for two major reasons.

First, given the sharp increase in unemployment due to the ongoing economic recession, the Army can reasonably expect a growing interest in enlisting among young people facing a difficult job market and as well as older individuals who have lost their job or seek a more stable career. The Internet traffic in the past six month showed a clear and steady increase in the time
spent on GoArmy.com, an indication of increased interests in the Army. With the time spent on site rising by 8% from February to April 2009 and more than 10% of the website visitors asking or viewing questions on the official discussion board(Alexa.com), the Army may find the capacity of its Cyber Recruiting center, located in Fort Knox, KY with about 40 recruiters answering questions both live and on the discussion board, falling short of the market demand (US Fed News Service, 2009). Given the potential costs of adding personnel, it is more economical to have visitors obtain the information available via SGT STAR before they seek information from an online recruiter.

Secondly, even though SGT STAR has drawn much media coverage since its invention in 2006 in both the blogosphere and traditional press, the Army has not launched official marketing campaigns for this virtual guide (Bishop, 2009). As Next IT pointed out that the guide has helped change the perception of the U.S. Army “from that of an old-fashioned institution slow to embrace change, to a leader in innovative technology”, further promotion of SGT STAR could continue to extend the “cool factor” surrounding him to the overall image of the Army (NextIT, 2007), especially since the recent emergence of social media advertising could help reduce the ethical concerns in recruitment advertising.

In order to further enhance its performance, the Army should promote the wider use of SGT STAR in two ways. In the technological realm, the Army needs to improve the interactivity and engagement of SGT STAR. Even though its software program has been consistently updated based on collected data of its performance, the virtual guide is not yet fully interactive (Bishop, 2009), therefore lacking the ability most valued in the new generation of web applications. The idea of Web 3.0 was introduced in 2008, and it is now commonly accepted that human interactivity is the focal point of the concept, as devices will become more intelligent and
contextually aware in order to serve human needs (Juan M. Silva, 2008). Therefore, new technology devices under Web 3.0 require primarily the ability to adapt naturally through highly cognitive user interfaces.

The Army has been actively conducting research to upgrade the technology of SGT STAR since its initial launch, and the current project includes letting SGT STAR “out of his box to move through an animated 3-D world (Jackson, 2007). As SGT STAR currently operates only in a flat Q&A format, the Army Accession Command has partnered with research organizations to elevate him “to a new level of realism”, so that “his chest moves with each breadth, his eyebrows arch to certain questions’”(Technologies, 2009). However, given corporate websites’ growing awareness to adopt the Web 3.0 concept and technology, the Army should put priority on developing SGT STAR’s ability to be contextually aware in its conversation with visitors, whereas the realism of its appearance should be a secondary concern given the limited development budget. By using technology to intentionally analyze users’ chatting behavior, SGT STAR should in the future be able to generate personalized responses, active recommendations, and sustain dialogues between questions. In order to maximize the effectiveness of the conversations, SGT STAR should also learn to avoid asking repeated questions in one chat session and should direct users to specific pages for information and resources rather than to the overview pages on GoArmy.com.\textsuperscript{237} By shifting the focus of further development from appearance to content, the Army could improve the use of SGT STAR without pouring in additional resources.

In order to make the best use of this high technology investment that has already been developed, the Army should also consider launching online advertising campaigns to increase the public’s interest in SGT STAR. As the constrained recruiting budgets limit the Army’s

\textsuperscript{237} Analysis based on navigation through the content and features of SGT STAR on www.goarmy.com
advertising strategies, online marketing campaigns, especially on popular social media, serve as an economical and effective alternative. A clear advantage of social media advertising is the ability for the advertiser to choose its own audience group based on age and location, so the Army could avoid advertising online to minors and foreigners, which prevents both unethical advertisement and wasted expense. In addition, by promoting SGT STAR and its associated technologies, the Army could take advantage of the “coolness” already associated with SGT STAR (NextIT, 2007) and reduce the public’s negative perception of the Army and its recruiting campaigns. As SGT STAR “lives” on the Internet, online publicity could also impress and inform today’s tech-savvy Americans about the Army’s leading position in the technological realm and easily draw traffic to the recruiting website that is simply one click away.

III. Allow for the Use of Persistent Cookies on GoArmy.com under Registered Users’ Consent

In meeting its recruiting needs, the Army has been extremely data-centric in recent decades. Given access to youth information through the No Child Left Behind program, the Department of Defense’s JAMR database contains basic information of roughly 95% of U.S youth (Bishop, 2009). The Army has been using information such as zip code and high school to roughly predict an individual’s likelihood to enlist based on patterns shown in its databases such as the National Priority Project Database (Project, 2009). However, the predictions are based on very basic variables and do not include factors such as health, grades, and contact with influencers which can greatly affect propensity to enlist, and thus impede the accuracy of this traditional data mining (Bishop, 2009). While the Army’s traditional outreach programs which mail information packages to a vast number of potential recruits appears outdated and costly in today’s environment, the Internet has appeared as the next major realm of targeted data
collection. By studying users’ behavior on the recruiting site, GoArmy.com, the Army could use the Internet to gather crucial information that will give instant feedback and guidance on improving the Army’s recruitment strategies in the future.

However, an important issue currently poses a barrier in the area of the Army’s online data collection for recruiting. Under the Privacy Policies on Federal Web Sites issued in 1999 and the E-Government Act on 2002, government and agencies are prohibited from using persistent cookies or similar means to monitor visitors’ activity on the Internet except for certain “compelling needs” (Lew, 1999) (Bolten, 2003).

A cookie is defined as the data that “a Web server causes to be placed on a user’s hard drive (or equivalent) that can be read by a Web server” (Officer, 2001). Session cookies are only intended to be used in the browser session in which it is created, and it expires as soon as the browser is closed. Persistent cookies, on the other hand, are intended to maintain information until they reach the expiration date programmed in the cookies. A user could easily check the status of the cookies that his or her browser receives through the privacy section of their web browser and delete any undesired cookies.

In contrast to their prohibition on government websites, persistent cookies are now a standard feature of private sector website browsing and widely used in building effective business to consumer relations (Bishop, 2009). These cookies enable the “recommendations” features commonly used by E-commerce websites such as Amazon.com by analyzing browsing and purchase histories to generate tailored recommendations to returning consumers (Cranor, 2003). Consumers on these websites also have the option to edit the list of items and keywords that the website uses to form recommendations.
Therefore, in order to allow the Internet to better serve the Army’s recruiting purpose, this paper suggests that the Army’s recruiting website, GoArmy.com, should be considered an exception of the Privacy Policies and allowed to use persistent cookies with registered users under their consent.

An important distinction should be made on the level of interaction and privacy between registered users and visitors. GoArmy.com provides people with the choice to voluntarily create a personal account on the website or to remain anonymous when browsing. This choice serves as the basic foundation for this policy recommendation. As users need to agree to certain terms of agreement in setting up accounts on the website, GoArmy.com could effectively inform users of their use of cookies and obtain users’ consent before collecting data.

Permitting the use of persistent cookies for registered users could benefit the Army recruiting in three major ways. First, persistent cookies will enhance returning users’ browsing experience on GoArmy.com (Cavin, 2001). Even though the current design of GoArmy.com allows the visitor to deliberately save web pages into a personal folder, an automatic personalization process will greatly increase the user’s efficiency in browsing through the 15,000 pages of content on the website. By logging in to his or her account, a returning user could easily access recommended materials, view browsing history, differentiate between read and unread content, and carry on from their last conversations with SGT STAR. This increased level of convenience will, in turn, attract more returning users to the website. Secondly, persistent cookies allow the Army to identify users that demonstrate apparent interests in enlistment based on their browsing activities on GoArmy.com, and the resulting data should serve as a more accurate indicator of enlistment likelihood than traditional determinants such as zipcodes. Thirdly, persistent cookies will provide the Army’s recruiting personnel with valuable
information on the public’s attitude in a timely manner. By analyzing the activities of users, especially returning users, on GoArmy.com, the Army could quickly adjust the focus of current policies to best cater the needs of today’s youth (Cavin, 2001).

The debate on the usage of persistent cookies started in the late 1990s and has mainly focused on privacy concerns (Bishop, 2009). In response to potential critiques, this paper emphasizes that the use of persistent cookies should be allowed only with binding conditions. The policy could only apply to registered users who have given their consent in registration. Users that do not choose to permit the Army to use persistent cookies should not be prevented from registering on GoArmy.com and applying for Army positions online. Visitors without user accounts should obviously be excluded from the use of persistent cookies. Secondly, the Army should publish a clear guideline to ensure the public that the data collected from persistent cookies can only be used internally and that they should not in any case track the user’s activities on other websites or expose the data to third parties. The U.S. Government Accountability Office, which has been monitoring the implementation of the Privacy Policies (Koontz, 2000), should oversee the Recruiting Command’s usage of the data collected through persistent cookies.

Various other sectors in the government have also advocated for similar change in the past years. In December 2008, Federal Web Managers Council, an organization that provides resources to U.S. government website managers, advocated for the revision of the cookie policy in a whitepaper that outlined the current barriers and solutions to implementing social media and Web 2.0 in U.S. government based on their experience with federal websites (Webcontent.gov, 2009). Similar to the position of this paper, the Council asks for new guidelines that allow for the use of persistent cookies, not tracking cookies, to take advantage of the sophisticated web services and analytic tools that rely on cookies (Council, 2008). Because GoArmy.com possesses
the advantage of having the account registration option, a feature not common in federal websites, it is in a unique position to provide users with higher levels of privacy protection by differentiating between registered and unregistered users. In this way, GoArmy.com will not only become a more useful tool for the Army recruitment but also set up a valuable model in ethical online data collection for the Army’s counterparts in the private sector.

Overall, the Army has made considerable progress in its utilization of technology in order to enhance its recruitment efforts. With an understanding of today’s youth and a strong commitment to innovation and improvement in its technological focus and capacities, the U.S. Army will be better prepared to meet recruiting challenges for years to come.
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Army Recruitment Advertising (ARA): Recommendations for Fact-Based Policies for Today’s Market

Data ➔ Analysis ➔ Policy Formulation

Christine Prifti

May 5, 2009

I certify that this paper is my own work in accordance with University regulations.
Statement of the Problem

The effects of Army recruitment advertising (ARA) are not routinely and rigorously assessed, and the program will cost taxpayers $287.7 million this fiscal year. Inexpensive econometric modeling techniques that closely approximate ARA’s effectiveness are available, but are not routinely utilized despite such high expenditures and the importance of successful recruiting to national security. Given the availability and easy implementation of rigorous analytical techniques, Congress or the DoD should take action to ensure advertising policy is driven by fact-based information derived from timely, continual econometric modeling of ARA effectiveness.

Summary of Findings

Prior analysis of ARA indicates that recruitment advertising does increase the number and quality of Army recruits—and that given proper funding, timing and media mix, advertising can be more effective than recruiters or enlistment bonuses in attracting quality soldiers. The current, quarterly analysis undertaken jointly by the Army and McCann Worldgroup, its ad agency, is inadequate because it does not control for other variables that influence recruitment, such as the state of the economy or recruiter presence. Analytical methods that do account for these other variables do exist, but are limited by infrequent use, insufficient data collection on required variables, and the lack of an economist on staff at U.S. Army Accessions Command (USAAC) to manage routine data collection and analysis.

Policy Recommendations

- Congress or DoD should ensure or mandate…
  - Continuous, timely data collection with minimal aggregation on the 46 explanatory variables currently used in the “gold standard” RAND model (ex. economic conditions and recruiter presence).
  - Introduction and/or integration data collection on additional variables to improve the RAND model, such as segmenting ads by campaign, message, and target audience to determine the effect of particular forms of advertising, and adjust spending based on the results.
  - Timely and continuous analysis of ARA to ensure the implementation of fact-driven advertising policies responsive to market conditions.
- Army should establish a position for an economist at USAAC to continually manage, update, and monitor analytical tools

Expected Outcomes of Recommendations, if Implemented

- Increased number and quality of recruits
- Fact-based advertising policies responsive to market conditions
- Informed dollar allocation

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238 Monroe, interview email message. (Note: given recent budget cuts, $250 million may be more accurate.)
239 Dertouzos, interview.
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***images provided for context and discussed in sections I.1 and III.2.

240 AAF Great Brands: http://www.aaf.org/default.asp?id=191
241 “Strategic Outreach Directorate.”
Acknowledgements:

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I: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND: DOES ARA WORK?

No general would say he or she fully understands exactly how Army recruitment advertising (ARA) manages to attract quality recruits, but all would agree some type of widespread ad campaign is a necessary feature of an efficacious recruiting environment.\(^{242}\) Although the Coca-Cola image shown in the table of contents pokes fun at our advertising-saturated culture by reminding us of advertising’s great influence on consumer behavior, in many ways, advertising remains an—expensive—“murky science.” However, though aspects of ARA remain elusive, econometric modeling techniques that closely approximate its real-world effectiveness are available. Currently underutilized, the expansion of these techniques would further informed, fact-based ARA, resulting in more effective Army recruitment ad campaigns and increases in the number and quality of Army recruits.

Robust, time-sensitive analysis of the efficacy of ARA will also affect the level and allocation of costly and little-understood expenditures. The Army will spend a projected $287.7 million on recruitment advertising this fiscal year\(^{243}\), an increase of roughly 150 percent over 1999 fiscal year totals in constant dollars.\(^{244}\) Particularly when considering the recent economic downturn and ensuing budgetary pressures, improved analysis would allow US Army Accessions Command (USAAC) to either cut spending, or channel its funds into its most effective programs.

If properly utilized, available econometric modeling techniques could not only provide detailed reports on advertising efficacy but also inform the crucial policy decisions that drive ARA. Prior analysis of ARA indicates that recruitment advertising does increase the number and quality of Army recruits—and that given proper funding, timing and media mix, advertising can be more effective than recruiters or enlistment bonuses in attracting quality soldiers.\(^{245}\) Both because of its potential to procure quality contracts and its major challenges (such as high costs, and constant changes in the recruiting environment), ARA must undergo continual, systematic and rigorous analysis. Presently, the quarterly analysis undertaken jointly by the Army and McCann Worldgroup, its ad agency, is inadequate and represents much more of an “art” than a

\(^{242}\) Higgins
\(^{243}\) Monroe, email interview (Note: this number is likely now $250 million, due to budget cuts.)
\(^{245}\) Dertouzos, interview
“science” because it does not control for other significant variables that influence recruitment such as the state of the economy, or recruiter presence. The implementation of sophisticated analytical techniques would allow the Army to implement fact-based advertising policies that are continually responsive to the current recruiting environment.

Such techniques are currently only utilized every five to ten years in studies conducted by RAND and face significant data limitations that prevent them from realizing their full potential. For example, issues as ordinary as poorly formatted and inconsistent data collection hinder the RAND model’s explanatory power and policy relevance; a RAND study commissioned on 2000-2004 data was not published until 2009 due to necessary, time-consuming data reformatting, and did not include essential information on Internet and in-person event advertising because the data was unavailable. These limitations prevent rigorous econometric analysis of advertising’s efficacy from informing the real-time policy decisions of a costly program vitally important to national security.

To make use of available assessment mechanisms, and ensure that fact-based policies drive advertising efforts, Congress or DoD should ensure, or mandate, timely, continuous data collection on appropriate variables pertaining to enlistment contracts, including information on the recruiting environment, influencer attitudes, and propensity to enlist. Congress or DoD should also mandate timely, continuous analysis of ARA effectiveness using econometric modeling techniques. Finally, to enact these recommendations, the Army should create a position for an economist at USAAC to oversee data collection and engage in ongoing, timely analysis of ad campaigns. Rethinking procedures in each of these areas, and enacting certain changes, will help the Army determine which advertising programs are currently cost effective, and which require alteration or discontinuation, thereby improving and further establishing the effectiveness of ARA.

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246 “GAO-03-1005 Military Recruiting: DOD Needs to Establish Objectives and Measures to Better Evaluate Advertising’s Effectiveness.”
247 National Research Council (U.S.), Evaluating Military Advertising and Recruiting
248 Dertouzos, The effects of military advertising; Drogo, “OSD Perspective on Army Recruitment Advertising”; Dertouzos, interview
II: THE GOAL OF ARA

USAAC aims to improve the number and quality of recruits through several methods: educational benefits, enlistment bonuses, recruiter contact, and advertising.²⁴⁹

ARA advances this goal by increasing youth “propensity to enlist” using the Theory of Planned Behavior (TBP) model shown in Table II.1. Since propensity levels predict population enlistment behavior quite accurately,²⁵⁰ increasing these levels is the primary goal of ARA. TBP informs advertising goals and messages by explaining precisely how propensity is formed in young Americans. In particular, advertising focuses on altering self-efficacy, youth attitudes, and communication frequency, which have been shown to most strongly predict propensity.²⁵¹ Proper analysis of ARA efficacy, therefore, should link to the goals of recruitment ad campaigns (i.e. propensity level), which is not routinely considered under current analytical procedures.

ARA also has two secondary goals: informing and improving perceptions of the Army within the general public, and prompting influencers (parents, teachers, and other influential adults) to suggest or support military service as a viable and valuable career option for their mentees. These secondary goals reinforce the primary goal of ARA by creating an environment in which decisions to enlist are supported. Given all three goals, Army officials, therefore, describe advertising as a mechanism for “softening” the market that allows recruiters to operate successfully.²⁵²

A good Army recruitment ad campaign thus accomplishes several things: it forms positive impressions of the military among viewers who may later serve as soldiers or influencers, motivates

²⁴⁹ Drogo, “OSD Perspective on Army Recruitment Advertising.”
²⁵⁰ National Research Council (U.S.), Evaluating Military Advertising and Recruiting, 20.
²⁵¹ “Examination of the Increase in Youth Propensity Between December 2007 and December 2008: White paper prepared by the JAMRS Program (4/09).”
²⁵² Korb, interview; Higgins
individuals to enlist, and prompts influencers to encourage military service. It also improves awareness of the military in general, informs the public of the opportunities and benefits the Army provides, and alters public perceptions by invoking patriotism and presenting military service as a viable and worthwhile option that gives soldiers transformative benefits unavailable in the private sector.253

Econometric analysis can measure and assist the success of Army recruitment in accomplishing these goals by teasing out the effect of advertising on enlistments, propensity to enlist, and influencer attitudes. As argued in this paper, better data collection on existing variables, initiating data collection on new variables, and improving analytical methods will result in a data set significantly large, diverse, and disaggregated enough to enable examination and tracking of advertising’s effects. Analysis of this data set will help the Army set more quantifiable goals tied to improving number and quality of enlistments, propensity rates, and influencer attitudes via ARA, in addition to using advertising funding more appropriately.

III: ARA EVALUATION METHODS CALL FOR IMPROVEMENT

To achieve its goals, ARA employs a variety of media, including newspapers, magazines, billboards, radio, television, internet, and event sponsorship or recruiter attendance.254 The amount of each type of media utilized in a particular campaign comprises the advertising “mix.” As can be determined by the econometric (RAND) model later described in detail, different mixes of advertising become optimal at different levels of funding (for example, television, the most expensive media outlet, is only optimal at high levels of funding).255

To its credit, the Army is currently moving toward conducting more regular rigorous analyses of ad efficacy.256 However, further improvements are necessary to ensure that the Army achieves the most robust, time-sensitive, and systematic evaluation of its ad campaigns possible.

III.1: What Is and Is Not Working in ARA

A comprehensive look at ARA reveals the existence of sophisticated methodologies to survey and understand the eligible youth population but significant areas for improvement in the analysis of advertising’s

253 Bailey, Beth. Interview.
254 “United States Army Recruiting Command.”
255 Dertouzos and Garber, “Effectiveness of advertising in different media the case of U.S. Army recruiting.”
256 Monroe, interview
effectiveness. The following “big picture” analysis explains this paper’s focus on determining program efficacy.

**TABLE III.1**

**What is working…**

Understanding the target (17-24 year-old) population

- Army specific and contracted-civilian assessments provide information on youth population growth, obesity, and crime rates down to the zip code level. Estimates of population growth extend to 2020.257
- All-service Joint Advertising Market and Research Studies (JAMRS) and Army-specific surveys also examine youth and influencer propensity levels and what inform them, where youth obtain information, how much they trust those sources, and what influences youth decision making processes.258

Segmenting the target population for appropriate, targeted messages

- Data from Claritas, a civilian ‘target marketing solutions’ firm, provides the Army with demographic information on the households of the 18 target groups that provide the highest numbers of prospective recruits.259 Such information includes magazines read by and education levels of household members.

The Army Strong campaign and the currently contracted agency

- The current Army Strong Campaign (seen in the table of contents) is faring well in the market and among military brass260
- The contracted agency, McCann Worldgroup, is state of the art. Ads are designed using available survey data and interviews with current soldiers, and pre-tested using relevant focus groups before they enter the market.

Movement to involve new techniques based on market information

- The Army has placed an increased and needed emphasis on online job postings, online advertising, social networking sites, blogs, and recruiter event attendance and sponsorship to attract quality recruits in a changed market.

**What needs improvement…**

Robust, timely, ongoing data collection and analysis

- The most comprehensive analytical tools to assess the efficacy of ARA are utilized only once every five to ten years, and “holes” in data collection limit the utility of these tools.261 This is especially problematic given the high cost of ads.

Evaluating what specifically about messages is or is not working

- Even the most robust analytical model cannot distinguish the effects of particular ad themes, messages, or targeting to particular groups. That capability would allow the Army to leverage the power of its market research and determine if attempts to target specific groups are working

In summary, the Army appears to be effectively generating target messages and identifying the most amenable targets. However, insufficient use of sophisticated analytical techniques prevents true confirmation of these strengths. Recommendations therefore focus on initiating more routine, robust, timely and frequent

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257 Ibid.
258 Jessup and Gorak, “Joint Accession Research Symposium Update: Data Reconciliation Working Group.”
259 “Target Marketing and Marketing Research | Nielsen Claritas”; BArdorfer, “TARGET PRACTICE.”
260 Bailey, Beth. Interview.
261 Dertouzos, interview
data collection and analysis of recruitment advertising to leverage the strengths of market research. With better data collection and more routine analysis, USAAC could better evaluate what specifically about its advertising messages is or is not working, such as the effect of ad theme, message, media type, target group or timing, and isolate the influence of advertisements from that of recruiter contact or the enlistment bonus on enlistments and propensity rates.

After achieving a more consistent, clear and confident understanding of what is and is not working in the current market, USAAC will be able to tailor its messages to the most responsive channels and leverage the sophistication of existing market research. Such work will also enable future policy papers to advocate for more specific changes in advertising policy through use of the data made available by improved analytical procedures.

III.2: Rationale for Continuous, Timely Evaluation of ARA

Three factors explain the rationale for continuous, timely evaluation of ARA: the need for effective ad campaigns, advertising’s high cost, and the needless underutilization of available tools that likely leads to wasted or misallocated spending.

First, the Army cannot rely on economic downturns to produce adequate numbers of high quality recruits. Econometric analysis that routinely examines the effect of advertising in a rigorous manner will allow the Army to channel funding into its most effective programs, and provide assurance of successful recruiting in years when USAAC cannot rely on economic pressures to make Army service more attractive to potential recruits. Second, the Army spends a baseline of $250 million dollars annually on advertising, and it is important to ensure that such a large expenditure of tax payer dollars has quantifiable results. Moreover, as $250 million is a baseline dollar amount, as seen in Table III.2, advertising expenditures often exceed this sum. Third, as discussed in the recommendations of this paper, tools to make advertising more of a “science” than an “art” are available, but are limited by

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<td>2009</td>
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262 Monroe, interview
inadequate data collection and coordination. Given the current “murkiness” of ARA’s effects, tools to eliminate as much uncertainty as possible should be employed.

Two further comments are needed on cost—particularly the 150% increase in advertising spending since FY1999 and the likely temptation to cut advertising spending in the current high-yield recruiting environment. First, nearly all of the sharp increase in spending is directly attributable to rises in the prices of airtime and print space relative to the consumer price index. This spike in the cost of advertising, across all types of media, almost totally accounts for the 150% spending increase (in constant dollars) on recruitment advertising since 1999. Additionally, evidence for a “swing cycle” in ARA cautions against cutting the advertising budget because the recruiting climate is good and recruits are plentiful at present. “Swing cycle” refers to when ARA funding is decreased due to a good recruiting environment, resulting in a reduction in “awareness” and “propensity” levels. When the recruiting environment sours, to compensate for decreased propensity due to a lack of advertising, advertising funds are restored, often to even higher levels to make up of the decline in propensity. Therefore, this paper cautions against cutting spending without first examining rigorous econometric analysis and instead advocates for improving analytical procedures during this period relatively easy recruiting. Implementing better analytical procedures will instead allow policymakers to determine when budget cuts or reallocations are warranted in the future with some degree of accuracy.

III.3: Overview of Current Evaluation Procedures and the Need for Improvement

Aware of certain flaws in its current analytical procedures, the Army is currently attempting to improve them. In-progress improvements are described in the AI (Artificial Intelligence) model section, followed by the AI model’s weaknesses and possible further enhancements. Currently, however, systematic evaluation procedures are in-house quarterly reviews of ARA using ad agency and Army data. These analyses, however, do not supply sufficient analytical rigor given available tools and the high cost of ARA.

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National Research Council (U.S.), *Evaluating Military Advertising and Recruiting*, 12-13
Monroe, interview
At present, McCann WorldGroup, the Army’s advertising agency summarizes its weekly and monthly reports on advertising expenditures and resultant projected leads on a quarterly basis. Using that information, the Army then adds its own data to determine how “actionable,” or enlistment producing, the leads reported by the agency were. The combination of this data then allows USAAC and McCann WorldGroup to recommend changes to the current advertising program four times throughout the year. However, although these reports do project how many enlistments ads in each media type caused, there are several flaws in the current approach. First, information is only given for each quarter, and does not take into account the effects of past advertisements, even if they are only one quarter removed. This is problematic because advertisements have a lagged effect, and often need to be played in the market for some time before producing measurable results. Second, the methods used to derive the quarterly reports do not have the ability to control for other factors that might influence enlistments, such as recruiter presence, the state of the economy, and local employment and educational opportunities, in addition to other factors.

The usage of this kind of tool to assess advertising’s effectiveness makes current analysis more of an “art” than “science,” an unnecessary and unacceptable deficiency given the analytical tools available to evaluate advertising’s efficacy.

III.4: Rationale for Tackling this Issue Now

The two major reasons to tackle this issue now are the renewed interest in military service due to the current economic situation that has taken much of the pressure off of meeting number and quality standards, and expectations that the recruiting pool will shrink in the future, prompting a need to cement processes that ensure effective targeting of qualified individuals.

First, propensity increased 57% from 2007 to 2008, from nine to 13% of the eligible population, and the current recruiting environment is quite good. As evidence, the Army is rejecting would-be recruits it might have accepted in the past and is making or exceeding recruitment quotas. Without the need to pour every available resource into making numbers, the Army has the flexibility to make systematic changes to

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266 “Plan Performance Summary: Informational 1QFY09.”
267 “Examination of the Increase in Youth Propensity Between December 2007 and December 2008: White paper prepared by the JAMRS Program (4/09).”
assure ARA can respond to future market changes with relevant, fact-based policies. As the Army cannot rely on a stagnated economy to make mission, it must use this more relaxed time to create analytical procedures that ensure fact-based policies for the future of recruitment advertising.

Second, the continued rise in obesity rates within the American youth population threatens to challenge recruiting success in the future. Although the eligible recruit population will grow slightly by 2015, the number qualified for military service will decline, primarily due to health and fitness issues,\textsuperscript{268} overwhelmingly obesity. Given the impending decline in eligible population size, great care must be taken to ensure ARA policies are well functioning and effective in order to meet the future recruiting challenges of an economic rebound and a decrease in the eligible population size.

**IV: ARA IN TODAY’S MARKET**

To understand where ARA needs to go from here, we need to establish a few definitions and explore the challenges specific to the analysis of advertising effectiveness, both in general and for the Army in particular. These challenges make analyzing ARA’s effectiveness difficult.

The classical definition of advertising is a “paid form of non-personal communication about an organization, product, service, or idea by an identified sponsor.”\textsuperscript{269} However, the Army, like much of industry has moved to utilizing an Integrated Marketing Campaign (IMC) in recent years, which includes advertising, personal selling, direct-marketing, sales promotion, interactive/internet, and publicity/public relations\textsuperscript{270} but is still termed “advertising,” even within the field. Despite this change, IMC and traditional advertising face nearly identical challenges and can be analyzed in the same way, so long as information on all aspects of the IMC is collected and included in analytical regressions that tease out the effects of advertising by including information on other factors.

\textsuperscript{268} Gilroy, “Fourth Annual Joint Accessions Research and Best Practices Symposium.”
\textsuperscript{269} Belch, Advertising and Promotion, GL1
\textsuperscript{270} Belch, Advertising and Promotion
IV.1: A “Murky Science”: Advertising Challenges Similar to Industry

Advertising is, by nature, a “murky science” wherever it occurs. In fact, by creating ways to rigorously analyze the effectiveness of ARA, the Army, in some sense, is “inventing the wheel;”271 even industry has yet to figure out how to best assess its advertising expenditures. Many businesses follow the mantra “we don’t know what advertising does, but we’re afraid of what will happen if we don’t”272 and spend advertising money without a clear understanding of the effect those funds have in market. The lack of clarity is derived from the huge variety of factors that influence consumer decisions and make it difficult to singularly isolate the effects of advertising alone on choice.

One of the challenging aspects of advertising is remaining relevant to continually changing market conditions without wasting money on trends that do not catch on.273 Advertising executives must continually ask: what types of messages work for our target populations; in what media; how often; and at what point in the decision-making process? The source, message, channel, receipt and context of messages influence their impact on recipients, and the targeted individual must be exposed, pay attention to, comprehend, accept, retain and recall the messages274 in order for advertising to work. Considering the competition of a variety of stimuli as one watches TV, reads a magazine on the train, or browses the internet, advertising’s task is a difficult one.

Additionally, advertising has time-lagged effects that are not easily understood or quantifiable. Ad campaigns viewed over a decade ago may, or may not, continue to influence decision making, and advertisements viewed in childhood or other critical development periods may form persistent impressions and biases. This, in addition to tasking advertising with building both long-term reputation and short-term sales, makes it a challenging field, even for experienced marketers.

Increased market segmentation due to increases in the use of cable TV, TiVo and channel surfing also pose challenges to both Army and industry advertising. These tools and trends, coupled with the existence of a wide variety of websites and print media, have increased market fragmentation in recent years,

271 Drogo.
272 Higgins
273 Monroe, interview
274 Belch, Advertising and Promotion, 38
and made it more difficult to reach populations intent on filtering out messages. As audience fragmentation has made evaluation difficult, is also provides a greater incentive to update evaluation methods to better capture market conditions.

In addition, the increased tendency of consumers to distrust information coming through traditional advertising channels, and to prefer their own (often internet) research, poses new a challenge to ad agencies. Consumers also are utilizing a drastically different media mix than they did ten years ago, which has called on advertising agencies to rapidly revise attention-getting tactics within a relatively short period of time. For example, from 2000 to 2006 U.S. consumer internet use increased by 88 percent (more so for the Army’s target population), cable by 30 percent and magazine, newspaper and broadcast TV use all decreased by 10 to 15 percent. As advertising expenditures have typically centered around broadcast TV, radio, and print media, industry is struggling to adapt to market changes and the ability of any individual to publish information on Youtube, Twitter, Facebook, or some other social media site and reinforce or damage the work of an ad agency within hours.

IV.2: Challenges Specific to ARA

Unlike the majority of advertising, which typically promotes product purchase, ARA promotes a certain major life decision. In selecting military service, soldiers are asked to accept the possibility of risking life and limb for their country. This alone is the major distinguishing factor between Army recruitment and industry advertising.

Additional influences and challenges specific to ARA include recruiter presence and mission, opinions of influencers, the state of the economy, educational or employment opportunities, attraction to the enlistment bonus or educational benefits, world events, media and movie portrayals of the Army, the opinions of friends, and the inherent complexities and serendipities of the human decision-making process, especially when considering something as important and complicated as chosen life path.

Recruiter presence and mission and the opinions of influencers may counteract or reinforce advertising messages, depending on how the potential recruit experiences each. Additionally, a surging

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275 Drogo, “OSD Perspective on Army Recruitment Advertising.”
276 Dertouzos, Polich, and et al, “Recruiting effects of army advertising.”
economy (as evidenced by today’s environment, the state of the economy is one of the most significant influences on recruitment contract numbers) or availability of employment or educational opportunities may dissuade potential recruits from Army service to the point where even the best advertising will make no difference. Attraction to the enlistment bonus or educational benefits also influences the decision to enlist and must be controlled for to every possible extent in the analysis of advertising’s effects. World events, such as the threat or presence of war, may dissuade individuals from joining and the media (such as newscasts and comments made during presidential campaigns) and Hollywood also effectively advertise for and against Army enlistment. For example, after the movie *Top Gun* was released in 1986, the number of uniformed personnel increased by more than 20,000 across all services—almost a one percent increase in enlistments attributable to the movie’s release. Additionally, attitudes towards the military also became more positive after a favorable Hollywood depiction.277 By contrast, the release of the MTV movie “Stop Loss” last March, which portrayed prolonged overseas deployment, had the opposite effect.278 The opinions of friends also impact the decision making process, particularly for a young person concerned about the attitudes of peers, in addition to all of the factors described in the TPB model.

Recruitment advertising also affects recruiter performance in a way that complicates econometric modeling. Due to the system of quotas utilized by USAREC, recruiters are discouraged from exceeding their monthly recruitment goals. Doing so automatically translates into an increased target number for the following month. Thus when advertising campaigns work well and make the recruiter’s job easier, recruiters will naturally respond by working less hard to find interested, eligible individuals. This significantly affects enlistment numbers and data, and contributes to the error in existing models used to determine the effectiveness of advertising.

Despite these drawbacks, thankfully, ARA is easier to study than most industry ads because of the excellent tracking of “purchase data.” USAAC records all “touch points” individuals have with the recruitment process using codes for the specific ad or event that individual experienced. The codes identify what ads were playing in the individual’s hometown at particular times, or what event the individual

277 DParker, “The Armed Forces Need Another Top Gun.”
278 Jessup and Gorak, “Joint Accession Research Symposium Update: Data Reconciliation Working Group.”
completed a contact card at. Coupling this ad data with information on actual enlistments makes routine analysis of ARA possible through compiling both data sets and linking them through econometric analysis.

**V: OPTIONS FOR EVALUATING THE EFFICACY OF ARA**

There are several options for evaluating the effectiveness of ARA in the field. These include field tests, lab testing, and econometric modeling.\(^\text{279}\)

A field test plays different ads in “similar” areas of the country and then compares enlistment rates in each of the areas. Sometimes, a third area with no advertising is used as a control. However, it is impossible to exactly match markets for this kind of experiment, since economic conditions, recruiter effort, regional preferences and other variables will fluctuate in each. This inherently biases results and makes analysis using this technique difficult or impossible. The second option, lab tests, in which experiment participants are exposed to a commercial or a control and then surveyed, often results in testing bias due to the lack of realism of the laboratory setting and consequent over-analysis of the advertisements. This testing procedure results in a bias that skews the results, and both lab and field tests are very expensive.

The third option for evaluating the effectiveness of advertising is econometric analysis of the effects of ads that have already been released into the market as part of the ad agency’s normal promotion plan. Econometric analysis quantifies the value of advertising expenditures by controlling for other influences on enlistments such as recruiter presence and mission, the local economic situation, and educational and job prospects. It does so by coordinating a vast data set of variables that influence recruiting into a mathematical model. Because the model contains so much information on the recruiting environment’s most influential factors, it is possible to tease out the effects of a singular variable, such as advertising, on enlistments or propensity levels. Of the three options, econometric analysis is the most cost effective, and most feasible, given the data and funding already available to the military to contribute to these purposes. USAAC currently receives about three million dollars in research money per year,\(^\text{280}\) a portion of which would be more than enough to cover the cost of econometric analysis, especially once additional data collection mechanisms are set up become part of everyday proceedings. Since econometric modeling analyzes ads already being played in

\(^{279}\) Belch, *Advertising and Promotion*, 40

\(^{280}\) Monroe, interview
market, the only costs are adequate data collection and the salary of the individual managing the data. Compared to advertising’s total budget, these costs are minimal and will likely more than pay for themselves by increasing ARA effectiveness.

VI: WHAT ARA EVALUATION CURRENTLY LOOKS LIKE

As described in the previous “overview” section, current analytical techniques utilized by the Army do not control for factors that influence enlistments other than advertising. This section begins by describing the best econometric model constructed to date and its limitations, and then addresses current Army and DoD efforts at improving analytical procedures.

VI.1: The Most Robust Analysis: The RAND Model and its Limitations

The econometric model designed by James Dertouzos at RAND in the 1980s assesses the efficacy of all-service recruitment advertising by looking at the effects of advertising on enlistments while controlling for other variables (46 total). These variables include (among others) recruiter presence and disincentive to exceed mission, ad media type, local economic conditions broken down to the zip code level, size of recruiting station, month of the year, region of the country, the presence of troops or veterans who might serve as influencers, the unemployment rate, the percent of youth in college, and job prospects for potential recruits in a variety of fields. Dertouzos uses an S-curve model that, like advertising, shows a threshold limit (A) under which advertising spending has no effect because the messages are not present enough to achieve market penetration. Next advertising’s effect increases exponentially (B) before reaching a saturation point (C) over which increases in spending have diminishing returns. An S-curve is a logistic function that examines enlistments as a binary choice—either an individual enlists or does not. This model, therefore, allows an economist to determine the appropriate spending level and media mix (point on the

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curve) necessary to achieve a certain level of enlistments. Additionally, the model can be used to determine what affect a given level of advertising spending, such as the current budget, has on producing enlistments, and report the average cost of advertising per enlistment procurement. Both OSD and USAAC cite this model as the most robust available, and it is validated by economists on the National Research Council as econometrically sound, valid, and reliable.282

The RAND model has been in periodic use (every 5 to 10 years, essentially whenever DoD or the Army commissions Dertouzos to do a study) since the 1980s and generates relatively consistent results.283 Though exact values differ with each analytical time period, they do consistently report that advertising is effective and demonstrate consistent information on the optimal composition media “mixes” (radio and print at low levels of spending, and television at high). In the most recent study, published in 2009, Dertouzos found that at 2002-2003 levels, the marginal advertising cost of an Army enlistment contract was $10,000, while the cost from was $15,000 and the cost from bonuses was $90,000. Advertising accounted for 13,000 Army contracts per year during this period and by increasing the advertising budget the military could have attracted 12,000 more.284 In the 2003-2004 period, the marginal cost of a contract due to advertising was only $8,000 and generated an extra 14,000 enlistments.285 Despite these promising results, the model is limited by infrequent use and the utilization of what is often half-decade old data. This is partly because data collection is not always in a format that can be immediately lent to statistical analyses i.e. compiled with requisite information on the monthly and regional variation.286 These limitations could be remedied by running this type analysis more often, and improving data collection to ensure consistent reporting and the lowest possible levels of aggregation.

Beyond this, flaws inherent in the model could be dissipated by collecting data on additional variables that influence advertising efficacy. For example, the model does not segment the effect of ads by particular campaign, message, or target audience, nor include information on recruiter experience, which tends to peak

282 National Research Council (U.S.), Evaluating Military Advertising and Recruiting
283 Dertouzos, interview
284 Dertouzos, Polich, and et al, “Recruiting effects of army advertising,” 30
286 Dertouzos, interview
at the one year mark of a two year tour, and diminish at points before and after.\textsuperscript{287} Inclusion of both of these items could enhance analysis. Competition from reserve advertising is also not included, in spite of indications that it may influence enlistment rates.\textsuperscript{288} Information on internet and event advertising, which has become increasingly more important in recent years, is also not included in the current model because of poor data collection on these variables. If data was collected on the missing variables mentioned here, and integrated into the model, these flaws would be removed.\textsuperscript{289}

Additionally, available information on attitudes and propensity is not included in the data set, but if it was, advertising’s influence on increasing propensity could be tracked in the same way the current RAND model reports on ARA’s effect on the number of enlistments. Finally, the current model cannot track the long term effects of advertising, such as commercials seen in childhood, because the S-curve is binary and can only examine influences on a single decision point, not multiple ones. Analyzing long term effects of advertising is also possible if data on each contact an individual has with the recruiting system is collected. The army is currently compiling a database that includes this, which will allow economists to construct a more flexible model that follows an individual’s interaction with the recruiting system through time, and can pinpoint the interactions (be they from recruiters or ads) most responsible for enlistment behavior.\textsuperscript{290}

\textbf{VI.2: Current Army Efforts at Improvement: The AI Model and its Limitations}

The Army is currently using the existing RAND model to construct an AI (Artificial Intelligence) model to enable more robust examinations of advertising’s effectiveness on a quarterly basis. Computer based, the program will be fed data and adapt the model automatically, using AI computer software, to current market conditions when run. The Army is also adding new variables to the RAND model for inclusion in this AI system to eliminate some of the limitations of the current RAND model. For example, the AI model will use data newly added to the Army Data Warehouse that tracks recruits on an individual level from first contact to contract or exit from the recruiting process. This will enable an analysis of the long-term effects of advertising. The AI model will also take into account online and event advertising, in

\textsuperscript{287} National Research Council (U.S.), \textit{Evaluating Military Advertising and Recruiting}; Monroe, interview
\textsuperscript{288} Dertouzos, interview; National Research Council (U.S.), \textit{Evaluating Military Advertising and Recruiting}
\textsuperscript{289} Dertouzos, interview; Monroe, interview
\textsuperscript{290} Lord, Graham. Interview.
addition to all of the variables included in the current RAND model, with the exception of competing advertising from other services.

Beyond not including information on propensity, recruiter experience, and segmenting by particular ads, there are two major flaws in the improved AI model. One, it will not include competition from reserve or other service advertising, which has been shown to harm Army enlistments. The second flaw of the AI model is that implementation plans do not include having an employee at USAAC examine it on more than a quarterly basis. The current plan is to run the model four times a year to enhance the current quarterly review process, and the problems with this are two-fold. First, quarterly reviews may not occur often enough to make appropriate adjustments to expenditure levels. Second, coding errors in the data will not be realized until it comes time to run the model. Each event and advertisement is given a different code that analysts can use to differentiate between their effects. However, if codes are not recorded correctly, and are continually mis-entered, it will take a significant amount of time to find and fix the errors, and if they are never found, analytical results will not be accurate.

VI.3: Current DOD Efforts at Improvement: The Working Group

In response to a 2003 GAO report titled “Military Recruiting: DoD needs to establish objectives and measures to better evaluate advertising’s effectiveness,” which advocated for assurance of changes like those suggested in this paper, DoD has established a working group constituted of advertising experts and planners from all the services to examine best practices for examining the effectiveness of advertising dollars. A report from the working group is due on 1 October, but whether or not this will result in mandates or enforcement is unclear, and not expected. In addition to the working group, the services also meet annually at the Joint Accessions Research and Best Practices Symposium to discuss accessions policy, which includes recruitment advertising. However, despite these efforts, OSD has confessed that “little progress” has been made since the publication of the GAO report and its reluctance to infringe on the independence of the services by mandating more rigorous study of expenditures.

292 Monroe, interview
293 Drogo, “OSD Perspective on Army Recruitment Advertising.”
VII: RECOMMENDATIONS

Initiating ongoing, timely data collection and analysis will ensure fact-based ARA policies and ad campaigns that are responsive to constantly changing market conditions. This will allow policy makers to determine what is and is not working through nearly-real-time econometric analysis, and adjust funding accordingly. Channeling money into the most effective programs will increase the number and quality of recruits, an important factor given future challenges of economic upswing and increases in obesity rates.

VII.1: Ongoing, Timely Data Collection with Minimal Aggregation

DoD or Congress should ensure, or mandate, timely, ongoing data collection with minimal aggregation to enable effective ARA analysis. As explained in previous sections, the current “gold standard” RAND model is too often hindered missing, improperly coded or too aggregated data. To the extent it is possible, data collection should be made a requirement of the Army’s 1.35 billion (over five years) agency ad contract, and appropriate data collection on the 46 existing RAND variables by the Army should be ensured, or mandated, by Congress or the DoD so analysts can make use of the existing RAND model.

VII.2: Introduce Data Collection on Other Variables to Improve Model

To build off of the first recommendation, the current RAND model and its AI derivative is limited by their inability to segment advertising by particular campaign, particular message or target audience, not accounting for recruiter experience, failing to take into account joint advertising or, in the case of the AI model, the ads of the other services and the reserves, and not examining changes in propensity in potential recruits and influencers in addition to enlistment rates. With additional data collection, including all of these items in the model becomes possible. To account for long term effects, the Army should continue collecting data in its single-person tracking system and feed it to the AI model after its construction is complete.

VII.3: Mandate Timely and Ongoing Analysis of ARA

Congress or DoD should mandate timely and ongoing analysis of ARA. This will enable USAAC to better predict of advertising’s capabilities, set targets and goals, and channel money into the most effective recruitment programs. Doing so will also be relatively inexpensive, once data collection is made part of
routine procedures. The studies done by RAND cost an estimated $200,000—such a low expenditure makes not doing such studies of a $400 million-plus programs inexcusable.

VI: IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES FOR RECOMMENDATIONS

- Mandates remove a degree of flexibility, which is often necessary to conduct advertising campaigns responsive to market changes
- Civil liberties advocates may view efforts to improve advertising, particularly advertising targeted at certain groups of individuals, as unethical, and claim the government is collecting too much information or too strongly influencing the minds of the young
- There are benefits to having an independent voice, such as RAND to do the analysis of advertising efficacy, particularly when such large sums of money are involved. Independent analysis presumably gives a less biased, more independent and analytic view of current programs
- Though relatively minimal, improved and increased data collection will not come without cost. Software systems will need to be upgraded, and small additions to recruiter and oversight training will be required to ensure data is properly collected
- Within the advertising field, there is a need for healthy competition and autonomy. It is important to not have too much oversight and give each of the services flexibility to initiate individual programs.

Monroe, interview. Note: this is a GUESS, not an exact figure.
“Mandates” could remove this flexibility, and may explain, at least partly, who DoD has not already done this. If DoD believes this issue to be significant, it is possible to remove the word “mandate” from this policy paper and direct their recommendations for the Army alone, to be employed as they see fit.
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Closing the Gap:

How to reduce the racial disparity between the Army enlisted ranks and the officer corps

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I pledge my honour that I have not violated the Honor Code during the writing of this paper.
The Army is committed to the ideals of diversity. Several four star generals and former Defense Secretaries have acknowledged the need for the American Army not only to protect but also represent America in terms of its racial and ethnic diversity. While diversity has been achieved in the enlisted ranks, the officer corps has yet to reach this goal. Currently 13.5 percent of the American population is African-American, 21.8 percent of all enlisted personal are African-American and 12.3 percent of the officer corps is black. African-Americans within the officer corps are slightly underrepresented in comparison to both the general population and especially to the enlisted ranks.

This gap is cause for concern. During Vietnam the underrepresentation of African-Americans in the officer corps reduced morale and resulted in tension within the Army. The anger and hostility generated from the perceived racial persecution of African-Americans almost tore the Army apart during Vietnam.

Recruitment and promotion are essential to closing the gap. The following recommendations will help ensure that the Army ends the disparity between the enlisted ranks and the officer corps:

1) *Have the Secretary of Defense lead the diversity effort*: The Secretary of Defense must issue clear, frequent, public calls for increased diversity amongst the officer corps.

2) *Establish computer programs to find and aid qualified African American enlisted soldiers in applying for the Army ROTC Green to Gold program*: Green to Gold provides qualified enlisted soldiers the opportunity to go to college and obtain an officer commission through ROTC. A computer program should be created that scans through minority enlisted soldiers' personnel files and identifies candidates who meet eligibility requirements. The Army should then encourage these soldiers to apply.

3) *Increase the size of West Point’s preparatory school*: Forty percent of all African-Americans at West Point are graduates of the United States Military Academy Prep School (USMAPS). USMAPS class size should be enlarged so that more African-American youth will be given the training needed to successfully enroll at West Point.

4) *Establish a mentoring program*: Retention of junior African American officers is necessary if the diversity of the senior ranks is ever to increase. The Army must establish an online mentoring database that will allow young officers to find and connect with older officers who want to mentor.
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The Benefits of a More Diverse Officer Corps

Currently, officers lead the Army but they do not represent the Army. Instead, they are a distinct group with a different racial composition than that of the enlisted ranks. African-Americans make up 21.9 percent of the enlisted ranks, compared to only 12.3 percent of the officer corps.\(^{295}\) Nothing is gained by having a racial imbalance between the two, and much is lost. Although the Army has striven hard to correct racial imbalances that existed within the enlisted ranks, it has yet to solve the diversity gap between the officer corps and the enlisted ranks. Some might argue that the number of African-American officers (12.3 percent) closely reflects the general population (13.5 percent) and as a result there is no problem. But this is the wrong point of comparison. The officer corps should reflect those it leads, and presently it does not. The Army has an obligation to ensure there is racial parity and it must labor to correct the imbalance.

In addition to a moral argument for improving officer diversity there is a practical one too. In 2003, "29 former military and civilian leaders of the DOD-including several retired four star generals, chairmen of the Joint Chief of Staff, and secretaries of defense" filed a brief in the case of *Grutter v Bollinger* urging the Supreme court to uphold the University of Michigan's affirmative action process.\(^{296}\) These former leaders argued that a diverse leadership was essential for the US military to successfully complete its mission of protecting the United States.

Their arguments were based not on ethical motives but on practicality. Citing the case of Vietnam, they argued that a lack of minority officers in relation to the enlisted ranks had been disastrous.


for the military and had reduced its effectiveness of the military in carrying out its operations in Vietnam.

While there are differences between the Vietnam era and the present, there are also similarities. At the end of the Vietnam War, 18 percent of all soldiers were African-American, but only 3 percent of the officer corps was. Today 21.9 percent of all enlisted men are African-American but only 12.3 percent of the officer corps is.297 Within the highest ranks of the Army officer corps (those holding the rank of one star general or greater) only 8.5 percent of the officer corps is African-American.298

Now is the time to fix this imbalance. Given the economic climate, record numbers of individuals are enlisting in the Army. Before the Army needed to focus on meeting quotas, now long-term structural problems such as officer diversity can be addressed. With such a large pool of applicants to choose from high quality African-American individuals can be selected and enlisted into the officer corps.

Congress has recognized the need for a more diverse officer corps and is taking steps to rectify the imbalance. On May 15, 2008, the House Armed Services Committee approved an amendment to the defense authorization bill which called for increased diversity within the senior officer corps.299 This effort to improve the diversity of the officer corps will enhance the ability of the Army to protect America in a number of ways. First, morale will improve for minority troops. Additionally, the armed services will expand the pool of talented candidates from which it draws officers. Lastly, the officer corps is a highly visible component of the U.S. army. By increasing the number of African-American officers the Army will be showing its commitment to inclusion and understanding. This image could help with future recruiting efforts as talented minorities may come to view the Army as a place where they can succeed.

Given the economic climate, many talented African-Americans are looking for work. The Army should

298 Ibid.
capitalize on this and define itself as an institution where highly skilled African-Americans cannot only find a stable job but an organization where they are actively wanted and needed.

The Army is also experiencing a shortage of military officers. With the end of the Cold War, the United States reduced the number of officers it commissioned. \(^{300}\) Combat in Iraq and Afghanistan centers around company sized forces (roughly 60 to 190 soldiers) instead of brigade (3,000 to 5,000) and divisions (10,000 to 15,000) which means more officers are needed. \(^{301}\) The Army needs many mid-level officers (such as majors) but has none to draw on. This has led the Army to predict an annual shortfall of 3,000 officers until the 2013 fiscal year. Therefore, efforts and policies designed to increase the diversity of the officer corps will not only accomplish this goal but cold also fill the shortfall.

**How to Proceed**

There are two potential ways to fill this gap in the number of officers and increase the diversity of the officer corps: promotion and recruitment. Currently there are three paths to becoming an officer: graduate from college and enter Officer Candidate School (OCS), Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), and West Point. OCS takes college undergraduates and places them in a 12 week intensive training course. At the end of the 12 weeks graduates enter into the army as commissioned officers. ROTC happens in conjunction with a person's undergraduate education at any college campus in the US that has a ROTC program. West Point is the United States military academy; as part of the curriculum all students are given the training needed to become commissioned officers.

**Recommendations**

While it will take a long time to attain racial parity between the officer corps and the enlisted ranks the current recruiting climate presents the perfect opportunity to begin. To help achieve this goal the following four recommendations are presented:

\(^{300}\) GAO. (2007). *Strategic plan needed to address Army’s emerging officer accession and retention challenges.*

\(^{301}\) Active duty Army officer, personal communication, March 26, 2009.
1) **Have the Secretary of Defense lead the diversity effort:** The Secretary of Defense must issue clear, frequent, public calls for increased diversity amongst the officer corps.

2) **Establish computer programs to find and aid qualified African American enlisted soldiers in applying for the Army ROTC Green to Gold program:** Green to Gold provides qualified enlisted soldiers the opportunity to go to college and obtain an officer commission through ROTC. A computer program should be created that scans through minority enlisted soldiers’ personnel files and identifies candidates who meet eligibility requirements. The Army should then encourage these soldiers to apply.

3) **Increase the size of West Point’s preparatory school:** Forty percent of all African-Americans at West Point are graduates of the United States Military Academy Prep School (USMAPS). USMAPS class size should be enlarged so that more African-American youth will be given the training needed to successfully enroll at West Point.

4) **Establish a mentoring program:** Retention of junior African American officers is necessary if the diversity of the senior ranks is ever to increase. The Army must establish an online mentoring database that will allow young officers to find and connect with older officers who want to mentor.

**Recommendation One**

*Have the Secretary of Defense lead the diversity effort: The Secretary of Defense must issue clear, frequent, public calls for increased diversity amongst the officer corps.*

In March 2004, the Defense Business Board released a report on how to increase diversity in the general ranks of the U.S. armed forces. It was tasked with analyzing business practices to determine what programs had been used by large businesses and corporations to successfully diversify their

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302 The general ranks are sometimes also called the flag ranks. It corresponds to pay grades O7 to O10, which is first through four star generals.
management and organizations. Various personnel from private organizations and companies repeated the same message during the course of the study: for a company to truly diversify direct, active, frequent private and public calls for diversity had to be made by the CEO. The Defense Business Board did not collect any quantitative data but an independent RAND report supported these results. Both studies came to the conclusion that the Secretary of Defense must head the diversity effort. Indeed, both reports, listed the personal involvement of the Secretary of Defense as the most important step to diversifying the officer corps.

Both reports found that unless the CEO makes it clear to their organization that diversity is a chief priority little to no real change will occur. While some might argue diversity is an issue for Human Resource boards both studies found that HR boards lack the weight and leverage to influence other management within an organization to change their behaviors and hiring policies. For diversity to occur, the change has to be top-down, not bottom up, and it has to come from the CEO’s office. Pressure from above signals to lower levels of management that if they wish to succeed or receive favorable evaluations they must make clear efforts to promote diversity. Furthermore, enthusiastic support by the head of an organization fosters a climate that supports the implementation of different initiatives aimed to promote diversity.

For the Army, the effective CEO is the Secretary of Defense. Drawing lessons from private industry, the Secretary of Defense should make a concentrated effort to show his or her dedication to diversity. While the Army is in many ways fundamentally different from the private sector these differences actually work in favor of this recommendation. One of the main differences between the two is the Army’s dedication to the chain-of-command. The chain-of-command requires that orders issued by a superior officer must be followed, even if the orders issued are not ones the receiving party

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wishes to carry out. Because the Secretary of Defense sits at the head of the chain-of-command, all
Army personnel must carry out his or her pronouncements in relation to diversity.

However, more than talk is required, action is also needed on the part of the Secretary of
Defense. In May 15, 2008, an amendment was passed that established the Senior Military Diversity
Commission. Congress mandated that the commission review policies and practices that could
increase the number of minorities serving in officer positions in the Armed Forces. To show commitment
to the cause of diversity, the Secretary of Defense should sit on this panel. By personally involving
themselves with the Senior Military Diversity Commission the Secretary of Defense will signal to the rest of the
Armed Forces that diversity is a chief priority and thus encourage members of the Armed Forces to work
to increase diversity.

The Secretary of Defense in addition to sitting on the Senior Military Diversity Commission
should call for the creation of "affinity groups". Within the business world, companies with strong
diversity often have what are called "affinity groups." These groups serve as special interest groups and
are usually created around specific races of genders. The role of these groups is to look after the
interests of their particular group. Affinity groups are only successful if they have a path of
communication to upper-level management with whom they can express their concerns and needs.

By connecting the group to senior management these groups are able to offer their unique insights and
experiences, which can then be used to help recruitment of members of their groups and also how to
run the organization in a more inclusive and accepting manner. Once affinity groups are established
they should be given direct access to the Secretary of Defense through the Senior Military Commission.
This clearly signals to the Army that diversity is a top concern. Furthermore, these specific focus groups

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commission; increases junior reserve officer training corps units.
310 Ibid.
311 Ibid.
will allow the Army to gain insight into how it can best serve and recruit members of the different minority communities.

A question that naturally emerges from this recommendation is how does one ensure that the Secretary of Defense will remain committed to increasing diversity amongst the officer corps? Boosting the number of African-American officers is a long term program and as such will require sustained effort over a long period of time. The Secretary of Defense however is an appointed position and as such is prone to changing. Each Secretary will have different priorities and subsequently diversity efforts could be forgotten with the changing of officials.

To ensure that the Secretary of Defense remains committed to diversity, the Defense subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations should be mandated by Congress to actively monitor the military's diversity efforts. While the Secretary does have substantial autonomy, he or she must get their budget approved by Congress every year. The Defense subcommittee currently monitors military spending, and if they conclude that efforts to diversify the Officer Corps are not occurring, they could enforce budget restrictions. This threat of budget reductions would incentivize the Secretary to remain committed to diversity.

For this oversight to function effectively, it is necessary that there be frequent and rigorous communication between Defense subcommittee members and the Secretary of Defense and other top army personnel connected to diversity efforts. Studies have shown that communication between members and agency personnel (in this case the agency is the Army) greatly aides the effectiveness of committee oversight but that this occurs infrequently. 312 Instead more often staffers, and not members themselves, communicated with the agency.

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312 Aberbach, J.D. (1990), Keeping a watchful eye: the politics of congressional oversight.
Recommendation Two

Establish computer programs to find and aid qualified African American enlisted soldiers in applying for the Army ROTC Green to Gold program: Green to Gold provides qualified enlisted soldiers the opportunity to go to college and obtain an officer commission through ROTC. A computer program should be created that scans through minority enlisted soldiers' personnel files and identifies candidates who meet eligibility requirements. The Army should then encourage these soldiers to apply.

The enlisted ranks are too often overlooked in the search for new officers. Military officials focus on high school students instead of turning to enlistees who have already shown dedication and commitment to their country by joining the Army. A major barrier that prevents many enlisted from becoming officers is a lack of a college degree. To become an officer one must have an undergraduate degree from a university and direct promotion from the enlisted rank to the officer ranks is therefore impossible for many soldiers.

While the requirement of a degree may seem an arbitrary barrier many within the military feel it is essential. By obtaining a degree, potential officers show their commitment, improve their analytical skills, and develop their writing abilities, which are essential to being an officer. This requirement of a degree does not mean that enlisted who lack one should be overlooked; instead it suggests junior enlisted personnel should be screened to find high-quality recruits. Those with potential should then be pushed to apply for university.

The Army already has a program, Green to Gold, that helps enlisted soldiers enter college, but it must be augmented. Green to Gold currently offers enlisted soldiers the opportunity to enter into college under the ROTC program, but it does not seek them out. Instead, the program relies on talented enlisted soldiers hearing about the program and then applying. This passive component of the program should be changed. The Army should design a computer program that scans through all African–

American enlisted persons Enlisted Records Brief’s (ERB) and identifies qualified candidates. The Army should then encourage eligible enlisted soldiers to apply.

One of the main criteria for entering into Green to Gold is a General Technical (GT) score of 110 or greater out of 130. The GT is a combination of the Verbal Expression (ER) and Arithmetic Reasoning (AR) scores which are part of the Armed Service Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), a standardized test that all military applicants must take before being accepted into the armed forces. A computer program that was designed to scan for GT scores could identify potential candidates. While there are other criteria that enlisted soldiers must fulfill before winning a Green to Gold scholarship such as the Army’s fitness test these are often able to be changed while the ASVAB cannot be retaken once one has entered into the Army.

To win a Green to Gold scholarship, an applicant must also possess a letter of acceptance from a school that offers Army ROTC. Entering into college has become extremely difficult; not only must a person possess strong ACT or SAT scores they must have well-written personal essays and letters of recommendation. All the steps in applying for college can be rather daunting and must not stop African-American enlisted soldiers from winning Green to Gold scholarships. 314

To overcome these barriers the Army should provide the following help:

SAT/ACT Testing: Enlistees’ planning on applying could have one hour set aside each day for SAT or ACT preparation. On top of providing them with time to study the military could supply the enlistee with a prep book for the exam. 315

Application Essays: Writing the right essay is very important to being accepted into college. The army could train officers in the army to serve as writing aids. These officers would be given the skills to help enlistedees develop their essay and aid them with basic essay composition and editing. While this could seem like a burden on the officers, the Army gains two things by training an officer to do this. First, the

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Army saves money by not hiring a professional writing aid. Second, the interactions these meetings would facilitate between enlistees and officers could create personal bonds between the enlistee and officer ranks. These connections could help reduce any animosity that exists between the two.

**Letter of Recommendation:** The Army could create an info briefing to be given to each applicant. This brief could contain advice on who an enlistee might wish to contact and ask for a letter of recommendation.

**Recommendation Three**

*Increase the size of West Point’s preparatory school: Forty percent of all African-Americans at West Point are graduates of the United States Military Academy Prep School (USMAPS). USMAPS class size should be enlarged so that more African-American youth will be given the training needed to successfully enroll at West Point.*

There are three main paths to becoming an army officer: ROTC, OCS and West Point. West Point Military Academy is a highly selective university where all graduates become commissioned officers. As a result, West Point is crucially important in providing officers to the US Army and is the “primary training grounds for the nation's top military officers.” Generals such as Eisenhower, Patton and Petraeus are among the graduates of West Point. In the Army’s objective to increase Black officers, especially those in higher ranks, West Point stands as a viable option. However, the number of African-Americans at West Point is limited; in 2007 only six percent of the student body was African-American whereas 12 percent of all ROTC cadets were African-American. This large disparity between the number of African-Americans in ROTC and West Point is cause for concern. If the Army is ever to increase the diversity of the officer corps, West Point, OCS and ROTC must all produce more African-American officers, and West Point is falling behind. Furthermore, in comparison to other high ranking

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317 United States Military Academy. "About the Academy." [http://www.usma.edu/about.asp](http://www.usma.edu/about.asp)

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liberal arts colleges West Point is lacking in student diversity. While it is ranked 14th overall in liberal arts colleges, it is ranked 48th in terms of racial diversity.319

Directors at West Point have noticed that the number of minority students is low but have decided not to use a policy of Affirmative Action. They insist that the low numbers of African-Americans is due to a failing in the education system to produce qualified African-American individuals.320 To rectify this problem, West Point refers talented minority applicants (who fail to get in directly) to their prep school (United States Military Prep School, USMAPS), where they spend a year in intensive study and then apply again.321 USMAPS helps students boost their SAT scores, pass the physical requirements for West Point and also connects them with mentors to help guide them through the school and military process.322 While graduates from USMAPS are not guaranteed entrance into West Point, the program is effective. Roughly 85 percent of USMAPS graduates gain entrance into West Point.323 This ability to help talented minorities successfully reapply has been essential for increasing West Point's racial diversity.

USMAPS is currently located in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, but in 2011 it is set to reopen a new campus located near West Point. While it is not strictly for minorities, on average 30 to 40 percent of the student body is African-American and other minority groups such as Hispanics are also greatly represented.324 USMAPS does not use a quota system, but the school employs an affirmative action policy that helps minorities gain entrance into the school.325 Instead of a quota system, USMAPS considers the background of the applicants. USMAPS notes that many minorities come from disadvantaged backgrounds. Thus the lower test scores of certain minority applicants are not necessarily regarded as evident of a lesser ability but instead a lack of access to the preparation needed to succeed.

323 Staff member at USMAPS, personal communication, May 2, 2009.
324 Ibid.
325 Ibid.
USMAPS has been incredibly successful at preparing its students to succeed at West Point. Since, 1951 11 percent of West Point’s student body has come from USMAPS. However, this 11 percent has held 25 percent of the senior leadership positions.\textsuperscript{326} In light of these facts, the prep school program should be expanded so that more students are able to enter into its ranks and more minorities will have the opportunity of gaining entrance into the military academy.

The average size of a USMAPS class should be increased from 250 to 350 students. The construction of a new campus for USMAPS presents the ideal opportunity for this to occur. However, when Congress authorized the funds for the new campus it did not also mandate an increase in the size of the student body.\textsuperscript{327} As a result, the new facility is being designed to house and educate the same number of students. Congress should instead request that the school be expanded and allocate more money to cover the increased construction costs that will come with expanding the facilities.

USMAPS’s affirmative action policies upset some within the military. Many argue that the military must be the ultimate meritocracy and that the preferential treatment created by USMAPS’s affirmative-action admissions goes against this important military principle. Recently some high-ranking Air Force officials have proposed that the US military prep schools (there are preps for the Navy and Air force as well) change their system of Affirmative Action. If this policy were to go into effect it is most likely that the number of minorities enrolled at the militaries prep schools would decrease.\textsuperscript{328}

While a policy of merit-based promotion is an important part of the military that must be upheld, USMAPS should be exempt. USMAPS is different from the military in that it is not directly part of the Army. Instead it is a feeder program designed to increase the pool of applicants who can gain entrance into the officer ranks. Entrance into USMAPS does not guarantee entrance into West Point, but it does give minorities a chance. Many historical socio-economic and racist trends in the United States

\textsuperscript{326} United States Military Academy Preparatory School. "History." http://www.usma.edu/USMAPS/
\textsuperscript{327} Staff member at USMAPS, personal communication, May 2, 2009
\textsuperscript{328} Pentagon may end affirmative action admissions at the preparatory schools of the U.S. military academies. (2007).
have contributed to the marginalization of many African-Americans. USMAPS’s admissions process takes this into account when looking at applicants and seeks to rectify the difference. By helping bring minority applicants up to speed with others from more fortunate backgrounds, USMAPS is in fact doing the Army a great service. Furthermore, USMAPS’s acceptance policy is within the Army tradition of merit first. Youth who gain entrance into the school have all demonstrated great potential given the circumstances of their backgrounds. USMAPS’s recognizes these circumstances and provides the support necessary so that these already qualified students can truly show their ability.

Many in the Army desire a more diverse officer corps, and insist that only with a diverse officer corps will it be equipped to fight the battles of tomorrow. However, currently the pool of minorities with the skills to gain entrance into the officer corps is limited and is in fact shrinking. According to Col. Michael Jones, director of admissions at West Point, in 2006 only 616 black youths nationwide had the qualifications necessary to gain entrance into West Point. Consequently, programs such as USMAPS must exist to rectify the situation. Without its preferred admissions policy, the Army will face even greater challenges in creating an officer corps reflective of the enlisted ranks.

**Recommendation Four**

*Establish a mentoring program:* Retention of junior African American officers is necessary if the diversity of the senior ranks is ever to increase. The Army must establish an online mentoring database that will allow young officers to find and connect with older officers who want to mentor.

There is a long tradition of minority mentoring in the United States Army. For instance, Colin Powell ascribes his success and promotion to the knowledge and aid he received from his close relationship with Frank Carlucci (a former Secretary of Defense). However, these relationships often occur by chance and only a limited number of minorities are receiving the benefits that mentoring has to offer.

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330 Ibid.

The Army is a difficult organization to advance in. Studies have found that mentoring is vital for personnel development and can help minorities rise in the ranks. Mentors are able to serve as career counselors and direct their protégés towards beneficial assignments and away from negative ones. Certain career paths facilitate access to the higher ranks (such as entering into the combat arms branch) and mentors can direct their students to these fields. Mentors are also able to ensure their protégés receive fair reviews at selection and promotion boards by talking to colleagues and ensuring racist stereotypes do not affect young minority candidates' reviews. While the fear of racism might seem like a non-issue, many black officers complain that they are often evaluated unfavorably in comparison to their white counterparts. As General Short (a three star African-American general) noted when he served on review boards he frequently found himself having to argue in favor of African-American officers who had been unfavorably evaluated. While he did not want to contribute their low scores only to "bigotry and prejudice...certainly a large part of those situations was in fact due to those kinds of feelings." In addition to helping protégés choose certain career paths and receive fair evaluations, mentoring can increase junior officer retention. Many junior minority officers become discouraged and leave the Army because they feel there is no chance for advancement. Mentors could encourage them to remain in the armed forces as they could show their protégé how they can rise through the ranks.

The Marine Corps is seeking to improve its overall effectiveness, and to do so it plans to employ mentoring. In 2005, the Marines began the Marine Corps Mentoring Program (MCMP). Although many within the Marines felt that a culture of mentorship existed, the MCMP formalized mentoring and

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332 Ibid.
335 Ibid.
336 Ibid.
337 Ibid.
338 Ibid.
required that every marine, be it the highest officer or the newest soldier, have a mentor. Mentors are assigned based off of the chain-of-command; the next highest ranking officer serves as mentor to those below them. Mentors and mentees are required to meet at least once a month in addition to any time major decisions or events occur in the life of the mentee (for example, family death, marriage, deployment). During these meetings, the mentor and mentee discuss career goals and how both the mentor and the mentee can more effectively serve the unit. The MCMP also has a "buddy" component. Each marine is responsible for a marine of the same rank and is required to look after them. The goal of the MCMP is to ensure that all Marines are looked after and none falls through the cracks. It is also designed to improve garrison life by helping create a sense of community.

The Army should follow the path of the Marine Corps and seek to institutionalize mentoring programs. While the Army has an informal cultural of mentoring, it lacks a formal program to help match minorities with senior officers. Consequently 41 percent of black officers feel they never had a mentor. The Marines MCMP is a model the Army should build off of-- but certain parts should be changed. The forced aspect of the program is one that should be avoided. The mentor-protégé relationship should not be mandatory, but under MCMP it is. Basing the program directly off the chain-of-command prevents protégés and mentors from finding each other, instead they are assigned. This forcing of the relationship is detrimental. While this should be changed, the buddy part of the program is something the Army should adopt to ensure that all enlisted soldiers and officers always have someone who is looking out for them.

Instead of basing a mentoring program off the chain-of-command the Army should create an online database and encourage officers to register. This database would consist of a list of profiles of

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342 Ibid.
343 Ibid.

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middle and high-ranking officers who wish to aid minority officers in their career progression. Junior officers could access the database, review the profiles of the different officers and contact an officer with whom they wish to communicate. Conversely, junior officers seeking mentors could also post their profiles and senior officers looking to be mentors could contact the junior officer. With today’s widespread social networks, the creation of such a system would be fairly straightforward and could greatly facilitate the creation of mentor, protégé relationships. For the program to work participation must be voluntary. The special bond that is required for mentoring to work cannot be forced and any such program would have to acknowledge this fact.\textsuperscript{346}

While some might feel incentives should be put into place to encourage high-ranking officers' involvement, this must not occur. The mentor/protégé relationship is one that must arise organically if benefits are to be maximized and incentives could skew the reasons for entering. Incentives could result in participants who are not fully committed to the program but are only involved for the perks it provides, which could have disastrous effects. Mentors might not put their heart and soul into the effort, and as a result, protégés could receive sub-par mentoring. Furthermore, protégés might become skeptical as to their mentors motives. Instead of feeling the mentor is involved because they care about the protégé, the protégé might conclude their mentor is only involved for the incentives offered.

Conclusion

Increased diversity is both a moral problem and a practical one. The officer corps should reflect the soldiers it leads and currently it does not. Furthermore, as Vietnam showed, racial imbalances between the enlisted ranks and officer corps can have detrimental effects on the Army's ability to carry out its mission of protecting America. The final goal for the Army should be to have the enlisted ranks and officer corps mirror each other in terms of racial composition. To achieve this objective of parity, certain benchmarks should be set along the way to enable evaluation to occur on whether the Army is

\textsuperscript{346} Amparan, C. J. (1996). \textit{Universal mentoring: Expanding opportunity across the officer ranks.}
making progress and whether initiatives to increase diversity are working. As an initial benchmark, the Army should aim to increase the percentage of African-American officers from 12.3 percent to 15 percent by 2015 and finally 20 percent by 2020. Due to the current shortage of officers, now is the perfect time to achieve this goal as the Army is in dire need of new officers. Talented African-Americans should be some of the first to help fill this gap. Because officer training is a lengthy process if the goal of 15 percent by 2015 is to be achieved quick and decisive action must occur.

To achieve this goal, a number of steps should be taken. First, Congress, in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense, must show their commitment to increasing diversity. The Army follows the orders it is given due to the chain-of-command and congress and the Secretary of Defense must ensure that top Army generals and officials begin working to promote diversity. Second, Congress should change its stance on USMAPS and mandate that the school increase its student body from 250 to 350 students. The new USMAPS facilities are beginning construction, so Congress must move quickly as expansion of facilities will be easier now then later after students have moved into the buildings. Last, the Army must begin to actively recruit and recommend talented enlisted men and support and encourage their entrance into college so that they can become commissioned officers.
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Rethinking Priorities in the Army’s Recruitment Budget: An Appraisal of Three Recruitment Incentives in the Military Compensation System

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This paper represents my own work in accordance with University regulations.

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Rethinking Priorities in the Army’s Recruitment Budget – Briefing Memo
Gustavo A. Silva Cano

The Issue:

In recent years, more money for some recruitment incentives has not translated into increased numbers of high-quality personnel in the US Army. The effects that the War in Iraq are the main cause for this phenomenon. Therefore, the question is whether the Army can allocate funds in a more cost-effective fashion among the different special pays directly linked to recruitment in order to improve the volume and the quality of enlistments in the long term. Three of these incentives are analyzed here: 1) the enlistment bonus, a monetary benefit, 2) the Army College Fund, an educational benefit, and 3) the Recruiter Incentive Pay, an experimental scheme that provides bonus pay to recruiters who go beyond the call of duty.

Summary of Findings:

The Army has dramatically expanded the budget for the enlistment bonus program in the past decade, while funding for the Army College Fund has decreased significantly in real terms. However, experts have shown that the Army College Fund is a more cost-effective way of attracting greater numbers of high-quality enlistees into the Army. Furthermore, the enlistment bonus program has wasted resources by providing enlistment bonuses to servicemembers in overfilled occupational specialties.

The data also show that increases in Army College Fund benefits have not kept up with increases in the costs of higher education. Moreover, the design of the Army College Fund hurts the retention of high quality recruits by encouraging them to leave the service.

The design of the Recruiter Incentive Pay has at least six major flaws and it needs overhaul. Even though the program in itself represents a clear change in mentality regarding
recruiter rewards, there is no evidence that RIP serves the purpose of increasing the productivity of recruiters.

**Policy Recommendations:**

1) The Army should seek reform of the enlistment bonus program in order to reduce the number of occupational specialties that receive enlistment bonuses. The Army must draft stricter guidelines in order to stop the payment of cash bonuses to members in occupations that are overfilled.

2) Congress should restore the purchase power of the Army College Fund by closing the gap between benefits and increases in the price indexes of higher education. The Army College Fund also needs to be made flexible, so that veterans who receive ACF benefits have greater options to return to active service as enlistees after college. Moreover, there should be a transfer of budget resources from the enlistment bonus program into the Army College Fund since it is more cost-effective.

3) The Recruiter Incentive Pay programs should be allowed to expire. A test cell based experiment should be put in place in order to determine what is the best way to increase the productivity of Army recruiters through cash incentives.

**Expected Outcomes:**

If these recommendations are enacted, the main expected outcome is an increase in the proportion of high-quality recruits in the Army. The changes would produce positive outcomes even in economic boom times when recruiting is more difficult, or during controversial wars. A decreased emphasis on cash incentives, such as the enlistment bonus, and more funding for educational benefits are also expected outcomes.
INTRODUCTION
Since 1973, when compulsory military service ended in the United States, the Department of Defense has successfully used recruitment incentives to attract and retain sufficient numbers of high quality personnel. Whenever the services have difficulty meeting their recruitment goals, the Pentagon and Congress have relied on the compensation system, to increase the number and the quality of recruits. The assumption behind this logic seems to be that more money can produce a greater volume of recruits and higher quality enlistments.

Nonetheless, more money for incentives has not automatically translated into better recruitment statistics in recent years. The controversial nature of the War in Iraq affected enlistments and reduced the effectiveness of enlistment incentives. Furthermore, in today’s fiscally constrained environment, Congress and the Pentagon need to find more cost-effective ways of allocating resources without hindering the Army’s long-term capacity of attracting adequate numbers of high quality enlistees. The aim of this paper is to suggest some ways in which this could be achieved.

With this in mind, this paper examines how the Army could modify the use of three special pays that are directly related to the recruitment process: 1) the enlistment bonus, a long-established and successful monetary incentive for new recruits with badly needed skills, and 2) the Army College Fund, an educational benefit which helps eligible military personnel with college expenses, and 3) the Recruiter Incentive Pay pilot program, an experimental scheme that provides bonus pay to outstanding recruiters throughout the country. Each section of the paper analyzes the evolution and cost-effectiveness of one of these recruitment incentives. A final section concludes with four policy recommendations.

The analysis contained this paper was done under the assumption that the current surge in recruitment provides the Army with a fantastic opportunity to revise the existing recruitment
incentive programs, in order to transform them into truly cost-effective schemes that guarantee the service’s long term capacity to attract high volumes of quality candidates. Congress and the Pentagon need to act swiftly in order to cut budgets in programs where there is waste of resources, while other programs that are clearly underfunded must be assisted with more money.

THE ENLISTMENT BONUS PROGRAM

The enlistment bonus is a cash incentive of up to $40,000 paid to non-prior service recruits who join the US Army. In order to be eligible for an enlistment bonus, an enlistee needs to have ‘critical skills’, namely the ability to perform a hard-to-fill occupational specialty, and to be a ‘high quality’ recruit. High quality recruits are those who have a high school diploma and who score in the top 50% of the Armed Forces Qualification Test, an exam performed on candidates who wish to join the armed services. As early as 1980, RAND analysts concluded that “enlistment bonuses can be an effective policy option for efficiently managing the recruiting process.”

Throughout the existence of the All-Volunteered Force, Congress has authorized the armed services to increase the maximum amount for enlistment bonuses in times when recruitment numbers were unsatisfactory. The evidence shows that higher maximum amounts for enlistment bonuses are related with growing numbers of high quality personnel (see figure one).

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Figure 1. Maximum Enlistment Bonus and High quality Recruits. Source: DOD, Recruit Quality Over Time and Military Compensation Background Papers. Enlistment bonus amounts are in constant 2004 dollars.

However, after 2005 higher enlistment bonuses have produced disappointing results regarding quality of enlistments. Since that year, there was a pronounced decline in high quality Army recruits, in spite of an order from Congress to increase from $20,000 to $40,000 the top amount for enlistment bonuses payable to non-prior service enlistees.\footnote{Public Law 109-163 – Act of Jan. 6, 2006 (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006), [Public Law 163, 109\textsuperscript{th} Congress], 119 Stat. 3300 (2006)} The great number of casualties in the War in Iraq, and the fact that this is arguably the most controversial war the Army has had to face since the advent of the All-Volunteer Force, charged a high toll on quality enlistments. Since that significant bonus increase in 2005, however, the fraction of high quality Army personnel has fallen: the Army today offers the highest bonuses of all its history, and yet quality enlistments are at a 25 year low: high quality personnel reached an abysmal 44 percent in 2008.\footnote{Barbara Bicksler and Lisa Nolan, Recruiting an All-Volunteer Force (Arlington, VA: Strategic Analysis, 2006), 15} Figure one illustrates the disappointing results of the enlistment bonus program in recent years.
Thus, recent experience shows that the enlistment bonus is not a panacea for the Army’s quality requirements and that many other factors deeply influence Army accessions.\(^{351}\) A number of studies show that, for instance, both the number of recruiters in the field and the rate of unemployment are positively correlated with the number of high quality recruits. Advertisement also plays a key role in attracting youth to join the services. The prevalence of war, in addition, tends to diminish the number of enlistments, as the War in Iraq has proven. Bonus money, after all, is not the sole best solution for the Army’s recruiting needs.

Nonetheless, this is not to say that the enlistment bonus is a nonperforming recruitment incentive that has outlived its usefulness. On the contrary, past experience shows that, if used correctly, the enlistment bonus is a powerful tool to attract high quality youth with specific skills into the Army. Given that the Army offers bonuses only to servicemembers who enlist in occupational specialties that are “crucial for combat readiness”, or “undermanned in the force”, or for which “high volumes” are required,\(^ {352}\) the bonus helps the Army shape its force in a way that adapts to specific needs in specific points in time. In jargon, this is means that the enlistment bonus is a ‘targeted incentive’, which provides the Army with more flexibility than other benefits open to all servicemembers. Moreover, enlistment bonuses have the benefit that they fluctuate depending on the scarcity of high quality enlistments: the Army pays more bonus money in times difficult for recruitment, and it does the opposite when there is ample enlistment supply. This helps the Army limit expenditure of bonus resources to times when the recruiting market is particularly difficult.

\(^{351}\) Beth J. Asch, and Bruce R. Orvis, *Recent Recruiting Trends and Their Implications* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 21

All these advantageous qualities of the enlistment bonus notwithstanding, there is serious concerns about the cost effectiveness of the program relative to that of other special pays. A good amount of evidence indicates that the Department of Defense could save millions of dollars, while increasing enlistments if less it puts less of an emphasis on the enlistment bonus program.\textsuperscript{353} For example, the Congressional Budget Office maintains that the best way in which the Army could have achieved its recruiting goals in FY 2005, when it fell short of 6,600 recruits, would have been an increase in the number of recruiters, costing between $98 million and $147 million.\textsuperscript{354} In contrast, the Army would have needed between $161 million and $427 million in enlistment bonuses to achieve the same objective.\textsuperscript{355} Although there can be little doubt that enlistment bonuses help increase military recruitment, there are other investments that prove to be much more efficient and economical. Efforts to strengthen other factors mentioned above, such as advertising, number of recruiters, and educational benefits, which we will explore in detail in the next section, are expected to produce better results in recruitment than increases in enlistment bonuses.\textsuperscript{356}

Again, this is not an invitation to get rid of the enlistment bonus, but rather to find the optimal balance between all the forms of recruitment incentives in order to maximize quality and volume of enlistments. The enlistment bonus, of course, plays an important role in this balance, although perhaps one that is less relevant than policymakers have presumed in the past. Consider for instance, that “good pay” is rarely the top motive that young people cite for joining the military; other intangible rewards, such as “duty to country”, “personal achievement” and

\textsuperscript{354} Ibid, 20
\textsuperscript{355} Ibid
\textsuperscript{356} Ibid, 18
“leadership” have a greater bearing for youth who are planning to join military service.\textsuperscript{357}

Perhaps it is time to explore different avenues to attract high quality youth into the military

**Misallocation of resources in the program**

A final major concern about the enlistment bonus program is the significant waste of resources as a consequence of a poor distribution of bonuses across occupational specialties. In principle, if an Army position is overfilled, servicemembers who join it should not receive enlistment bonuses. Nonetheless, the General Accountability Office has found that from 2000 to 2005, the Army offered enlistment bonuses to servicemembers who entered 60-odd positions that were constantly overfilled, some to levels of 120\%, 156\% and even 569\%.\textsuperscript{358}

This brings forward concerns about the affordability and efficiency of the bonus program that Congress needs to address swiftly. Using the data gathered by the GAO, it is possible to calculate that in 2005 alone there were 4,026 recipients of enlistment bonuses working in overfilled occupational specialties.\textsuperscript{359} This is an astounding 11\% of the total number of recruits who received bonus money that year. Moreover, if we apply the average enlistment bonus paid in 2005 ($4,630) to these 4,026 bonus recipients in overfilled positions, the estimated cost to the taxpayer in these excess bonuses would be about $18.6 million —this 8\% of the total expenditures for the enlistment bonus program in FY 2005.\textsuperscript{360} Although the Army has maintained that it sometimes needs to index bonuses to positions that should not receive one, it is difficult to see

\textsuperscript{357} John Eighmey, "Why Do Youth Enlist?" *Armed Forces and Society* 32, no. 2 (January 2006): 325-327. Defense Manpower Data Center, *Youth Attitude Tracking Study.* (Fort Belvoir, VA: Department of Defense, 1999), 67, Table 4-1


\textsuperscript{359} Ibid

\textsuperscript{360} Department of the Army, *Fiscal Year 2006/2007 President’s Budget. Military Personnel, Army.* http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY06-07/mpa.pdf (accessed March 16, 2009). We obtain this average dividing the total cost of the enlistment bonus program in 2005 ($165.8 million) by the total number of members who obtained the bonus in that year (35,832)
why the Army needed to make this exception with more than one out of each ten recruits that year. The baseline is that in reality, this excess bonus money is doing little to attract enlistees that bring badly needed skills to the force.

THE ARMY COLLEGE FUND

Recruiting college-bound youth for military service has been a constant concern for the Army. Currently, only about 25 percent of America’s youth is eligible to serve in the military. Of that 25 percent, however, only 15 percent are “available to recruit”, given that the other 10 percent are college students. In order to attract that sizeable part of the young population that goes to college, the armed services have developed a wide range of programs to combine military service with higher education. The Army College Fund, established nationwide in 1981, is one of these educational benefits that have the aim to make the Army an attractive option for college-bound youth.

The Army College Fund has been widely studied in the literature and its role as an effective recruitment incentive has been long-established. It is a complement of the Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB), a voluntary program that pays veterans up to 36 months to pay for college, which provides additional funds for education to high quality recruits who enlist, for a specified time of service, in occupational specialties that are crucial or hard to fill. In this last aspect, the ACF is akin to the enlistment bonus. For FY 2009, the maximum benefit that a servicemember can receive through the MGIB and the ACF is $81,756 for a six year enlistment,

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361 One Hundred and Tenth Congress. *Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY 2009.* The vast majority of America’s youth is unfit for military service due to obesity, drug and alcohol abuse, criminal issues, having dependents, and low mental aptitude. Hearing EB FY 2009, 42
362 Ibid
money that veterans may use to pay for tuition, books, housing and transportation costs for the entire time of their college education.\textsuperscript{364}

Even though ACF recipients receive these benefits only after they finish their terms of service, this incentive has proven to be a fantastic tool to attract high quality recruits: before it was implemented nationwide, RAND conducted an experiment that showed that educational benefits available to high quality candidates only, such as the ACF, could attract high quality recruits at lower costs than educational benefits open to all enlistees.\textsuperscript{365} After the introduction of the ACF in 1981, high quality Army enlistments increased by a 8.7 percent.\textsuperscript{366} Furthermore, a study in FY 1997 determined that half of the 14,000 high quality recipients of ACF benefits would not have enlisted if the incentive had not been offered— that is about 6 percent of all the high quality recruits the Army had that year.\textsuperscript{367}

Nonetheless, educational benefits that favor a college-after-enlistment path, such as the ACF, create a ‘retention paradox’ that undermines the effectiveness of these enlistment incentives. Given that ACF recipients must withdraw from the Army in order to receive their benefits, the ACF works in effect as an incentive to \textit{leave} the service. It is indeed a paradox that an educational benefit that does so much to attract high quality recruits requires recipients to separate from the military. In turn, this higher separation rate associated with the ACF can increase the costs of training as well as recruitment requirements, because the Army must replace the ACF recipients with new enlistees. For instance, RAND analysts calculated in 1994 that the


\textsuperscript{367} John T. Warner, Curtis J. Simon, and J. Michael Jones. \textit{Enlistment Supply in the 1990s: A Study of the Navy College Fund and other Enlistment Incentive Programs} (Arlington, VA: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2001), 12. We get this number by multiplying the percentage of high quality recruits that year (58\%) by the number of non prior service accessions (188,895). Then, we find what percentage of that the 7,000 ACF recipients represent.
per-recruit additional training costs associated with the ACF were $1,500 higher than those associated with other incentives, especially the enlistment bonus. Moreover, some analysts have also pointed out that the superior performance that ACF recipients will obtain from their college education does not translate into immediate benefits for the force. To put it bluntly, the ACF is a program that pays servicemembers for getting skills from which the Army does not profit. There needs to be a profound change in the way ACF works if the Army is to avoid the adverse effects of this ‘retention paradox’.

Does this mean that the Army should put less of an emphasis in benefits similar to the ACF and rather focus on cash incentives, such as the enlistment bonus? In fact, the answer seems to be the opposite. For all the downsides of the ACF, it is still a more cost-effective option to attract potential recruits than the enlistment bonus. The cost of attracting one additional recruit through the ACF (i.e., the marginal cost) is calculated at $5,500, whereas the same measurement for the enlistment bonus is estimated at $13,900, even after accounting for the increased costs in training related to the ACF. In addition, RAND analysts have estimated that a 10 percent increase in the enlistment bonus would produce a 0.7 percent increase in recruitment, whereas a 10 percent increase in the ACF would produce a 1.7 percent increase.

This high relative cost-effectiveness of the ACF is due to several reasons: first, the enlistment bonus is a contractual obligation that both the Army and the recruit subscribe to, whereas the ACF is an option that the recruit can rescind if he or she chooses to continue in the service after the first term of service expires. The effect is less expenditures for the Army: while virtually all enlistment bonuses wind up being paid to their recipients, only half of ACF

368 Asch et al., Educational Benefits versus Enlistment Bonuses, 31-32
369 Bicksler et al., Recruiting an All-Volunteer Force, 18
370 Warner et al., Enlistment Supply in the 1990s, 46
371 Asch and Orvis, Recent Recruiting Trends and Their Implications, 21
recipients decide to make use of that benefit. Second, with the sharp increase in college costs (between 1980 and 2007, the average cost of higher education rose 260.3 percent) it is not surprising that more youth see joining the Army as good way to pay for college. Moreover, the attractiveness of the ACF is also related to the increasing numbers of young Americans who are going to college, making college degrees both more common and coveted: between 1970 and 2005, the percentage of high school graduates who enrolled in higher education institutions increased from 51.7% to 68%. Reflecting this, a 2006 poll of teens showed that 43% of respondents cited “pay for future education” as an important reason for wanting to enter military service. One could think that the offer of hard cash would attract greater numbers of young people into the armed forces than a benefit that can only be used towards education. Nonetheless, the evidence shows that the ACF is a more desirable recruitment incentive than the enlistment bonus, even if *prima facie*, this sounds counterintuitive.

Surprisingly, in this decade the Army has been doing exactly the opposite: the budget for the enlistment bonus program has reached historic highs, while there is considerably less money for the ACF than ten years ago (see figure 2). In FY 2000, both incentive programs started with more or less the same funding, but ever since, the gap between the two has widened: in 2009, the Army expects to spend almost three times more money in enlistment bonuses than in ACF benefits.

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372 Ibid, 12
375 Bicksler et al., *Recruiting an All-Volunteer Force*, 17
Policymakers must also understand that in spite of all the advantages of the ACF over cash incentives, its structural weaknesses need to be addressed in order to guarantee its future success in attracting high quality candidates into the Armed Forces. For instance, it is odd that the total budgeted cost for the ACF has actually decreased in recent years, considering the marked rise in college costs in the United States. This leads us to the concern that increases in the maximum ACF benefits received by recipients have not kept up with increases in the cost of higher education. As figure three shows, the costs of public higher education have increased several times more than the maximum awards provided by the MGIB and the ACF program over the past two decades (both adjusted for inflation). Even if ACF benefits have increased significantly on nominal terms, the real value of those benefits have not matched the rise in the real costs of public higher education.377

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377 This is a long standing problem of the ACF, as Asch, et alia show Beth J. Asch, Rebecca M. Kilburn, and Jacob A. Klerman, Attracting College Bound Youth Into the Military (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 26
Figure 3. **Real Increase in Higher Education Costs and Assistance Programs Grants (1995-2007) - 2007 constant dollars.** Values for the ACF+MGIB reflect the maximum awards that an eligible candidate may receive. For the other forms of assistance, the bars represent increases in average grants/loans. Source: DOD, *Army Budget Materials, FY 2000 – 2009*, and US Census Bureau.

The gap with the increase in the cost of private education, not shown in the graph, is even greater. The Army’s educational benefits have become less attractive for potential enlistees over time. For example, consider that in 1985 a recipient of the maximum ACF award ($25,000 for a four year enlistment) could easily afford to pay tuition and board at most public and private institutions, whereas the ACF’s maximum award in 2007 was not enough to cover tuition alone at an average private university. Moreover, the fact that average grants of educational assistance programs for civilians, such as the Federal Pell Grant have increased faster than the ACF, puts into question the relative attractiveness of the ACF compared to other assistance programs for higher education for college-bound youth. By reducing the ACF’s purchase power over time, the Army has diminished the potential of one of its most powerful recruiting incentives.

As a final point on the ACF, we must recognize that some may argue that Congress has already addressed these shortcomings related to educational benefits and the rising costs of education.

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378 US Census Bureau, “Institutions of Higher Education -Charges” in *United States Statistical Abstract 2009*, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statatab/tables/09s0282.pdf (accessed March 22, 2009). In 2007 average tuition in a private university was $19,991. In contrast, the maximum MGIB+ACF benefit for one year in 2007 was around $17,500. Compare that to those same numbers in 1985, when average tuition in private universities was $5,315, while the maximum ACF benefit per year was $6,250.
education with the adoption of the Post-9/11 GI Bill, which will come into force on August 1, 2009. This new GI Bill would pay recipients for their college tuition and fees not to exceed the most expensive tuition and fees at a public college in the state where the veteran chooses to study.\textsuperscript{379} Although this will certainly close the gap between the public college costs and educational benefits, at least two concerns remain: the first, weaker one is that the new GI Bill does little to close the even greater gap existing between educational benefits for veterans and the cost of private higher education. The second and more important concern is that the new GI Bill puts too much of an emphasis on educational benefits open to all servicemembers, diminishing the relevance of targeted programs such as the ACF. Although candidates eligible for the ACF will remain so under the post 9/11 GI Bill, their ACF benefits may only be directed to their housing stipends, and not for tuition costs or other fees, contrary to the conditions under the Montgomery GI Bill.\textsuperscript{380} Because the ACF is designed to channel high quality personnel into hard-to-fill positions, the new, less flexible role for the ACF will diminish the Army’s ability to use this incentive effectively in order to attract high quality candidates.

\textbf{THE RECRUITER INCENTIVE PAY}

The Recruiter Incentive Pay (RIP) is an Army pilot program that offers bonuses (between $100 and $8600) in cash to outstanding recruiters who exceed their recruitment goals.\textsuperscript{381} The Army created RIP after the National Defense Authorizations Act (NDAA) of Fiscal Year 2006 ordered the “Secretary of the Army to develop and provide incentives not otherwise authorized

\textsuperscript{379} Department of Veteran Affairs. “Welcome to the GI Bill Website – Benefit Comparison” http://www.gibill.va.gov/GI_Bill_Info/CH33/Benefit_Comparison_Chart.htm (accessed March 23, 2009)


by law” in order to increase enlistments. As a pilot program authorized under section 681 of that Defense Authorization’s Act, RIP was implemented in June 2006 and it is bound to expire in December 31st, 2009.

Before the implementation of RIP, the Army used to focus on symbolic enticements for recruiters that rewarded accomplishment with badges, stars, points, and other nonmonetary forms of recognition. Incentive programs such as Program 300 and Success 2000 awarded recruiters for filling their monthly recruiting goals in specific categories, getting contracts in excess of their monthly missions, and attracting high quality enlistees. Under these programs, outstanding recruiters accumulated points that in time allowed them to receive symbolic rewards and recognition from their peers.

Compared to these previous programs, RIP represents a critical transformation in the way the Army perceives the job of recruiters and their importance in the recruiting process. Before RIP, analysts and policymakers who studied enlistment cash incentives usually focused on how enticements directed to potential recruits could be improved, often ignoring the point of view of the recruiter. However, past research shows that rewarding recruiters can be a critical factor in enhancing military recruiting as a whole, as better incentives can recruiters can increase the motivation and productivity of recruiters.

In deciding to give cash enticements to recruiters through RIP, the Army was also following the lead of many firms in the civilian sector, which already provide incentives for the

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383 General Accountability Office, Military Personnel: Evaluation Methods, 1
384 Ibid, 6-16
385 Ibid
387 Ibid, 136-137
superior performance of people in charge of recruiting new employees.388 Those private companies who have decided to offer these incentives maintain that top recruiters are “worth their weight in gold” and possess a “competency that has to be well-paid-for”.389 Hence, the underlying assumption behind RIP is that cash enticements will be more effective than symbolic awards.390 Has this been the case?

Unfortunately, the evidence has not confirmed this argument. When it was implemented, the Secretary of the Army calculated that RIP would produce an increase of 6,500 active duty enlistments –a rather ambitious goal. Reality, however, reduced calls for optimism, given that during the first year of the program there actually were 2,899 fewer active duty accessions.391 Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to take this as incontrovertible evidence of the inefficiency of RIP. After all, 2006-2007 was a difficult year for recruitment in general due in great part to the Iraq War, and it would be hasty to conclude the failure of RIP given that particular context.

Nevertheless, it is possible to identify at least six major flaws in the way the Army designed and implemented RIP. Without first correcting these flaws, it would be unwise to move forward with the program or to transform RIP into permanent policy. The most worrying problem related to RIP is that it does not count with clear expected outcomes, sound basic assumptions or a well-defined methodology that allows observers to evaluate success.392 The General Accountability Office issued a report on this recently, calling attention to the fact that the Army has not specified how it will measure results related to RIP, or how it will explain

389 Ibid
390 Ibid, 5
391 Ibid
392 Ibid, 8-9
causal links between higher numbers of enlistments and the introduction of cash bonuses to recruiters.\footnote{Ibid}

A second major concern about RIP is in regards to the program’s complex design. The original RIP provides bonus money to recruiters on a monthly, quarterly and annual basis (1-month, 3-month and 12-month cycles).\footnote{SFC Craig Hughes and Mr. Erick Hoversholm, 
\textit{Recruiter Incentive Pay (RIP) Program Overview}. US Army Recruiting Command. (Power Point Presentation)} In addition, the program offers ten different types of RIP compensation depending on the extent to which recruiters surpassed their monthly goals.\footnote{Ibid} In general, recruiters who consistently exceed their benchmarks over several months receive higher compensation, but this can vary greatly from one recruiter to another. The combination of these factors, which interact in complex ways in order to define RIP compensation for each recruiter, render the program hard to assess.

Third in this list of RIP shortcomings is the fact that the Army implemented the program without a preceding experimental stage. Following Congress’ directive under section 681 of the NDAA for FY2006, the Army applied RIP nationwide on June 2006 without first creating control groups that allow to test for different variables and determine what the best design for RIP is. This is an odd way to implement a pilot program that is yet to be made policy. Both the enlistment bonus and the Army College Fund, analyzed in previous sections, were tested in experiments performed on controlled populations, and conducted by RAND analysts, before they were extended to the entire force. It is difficult to see how the Army say with confidence whether RIP is worthwhile if it doesn’t count with any control groups.

The lack of incentives for attracting high quality recruits is a fourth flaw in the way RIP works. According US Army Recruiting Command (USAREC)’s Center for Accessions Research,
RIP is not designed to reward recruiters for attracting high quality candidates or those who possess badly needed skills; RIP merely incentivizes overproduction, so recruiters get exactly the same extra compensation if they attract one high quality recruit or one nonquality recruit beyond their monthly quota. According to the Center this has the unintended consequence of encouraging recruiters to concentrate on nonquality recruits, who are more widely represented among the civilian population. If RIP is going to be a cost-effective tool to increase the volume of high quality recruits, this needs to be changed.

The fifth major concern regarding RIP is that its current design does not allow RIP compensation to fluctuate according to the difficulty of the recruiting environment. As seen before, other enlistment incentives, such as the enlistment bonus, expand or contract depending on this factor. In other words, RIP cannot be ‘turned on and off’ depending on whether enlistment supply is ample or tight. This may have the odd outcome of rewarding recruiters in times when they do not need to make extra efforts to go above and beyond their call of duty. This could also represent an unnecessary cost for the Army, given that more money would be spent to attract recruits who would join the force in any case.

The sixth and final problem regarding RIP is that the program has created concern for some members of Congress that these cash incentives could lead to unethical recruiter behavior. As Senator Claire McCaskill put it in a hearing on the matter, “overzealous incentives could lead to overzealous, even improper recruiting.” Although this concern needs to be taken seriously, there is still room to give RIP the benefit of the doubt. The Army maintains that they have not detected an increase in complaints of unethical recruiter behavior, aka recruiter irregularities.

396 Ibid
397 Ibid
398 One Hundred and Tenth Congress, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Personnel of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate (January 31, 2008), 42
(RIs), as a consequence of RIP. Figure four shows data of recruiter improprieties for FY2004-FY2007. The graph shows that there was a slight increase in RIs as a percentage of the number of recruiters after RIP was implemented, but calculations show it is too small to be statistically significant. Yet, if the number of RIs continues to grow under RIP, this should ring the alarms in Congress and the DOD that RIP may be a perverse incentive.

![Figure 4. Effect of RIP on Substantiated Recruiter Irregularities as a Percentage of the Number of Recruiters.](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>RIs as % of Recruiters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY2004, no RIP</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2005, no RIP</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2006, with RIP</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2007, with RIP</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Very recently, the Army took steps to correct some of these mistakes. A new RIP was planned for FY2009, focusing exclusively on one month-cycles and counting with only three different levels of payment. Moreover, the new RIP will be implemented just in four out of six recruiting brigades, rather than nationwide. This is an enormous step in the right direction, given that it simplifies the structure of the program and reduces its area of implementation, possibly leading to results that are easier to compare and analyze.

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399 Ibid, 42.
400 The author performed a classical one-sample-mean test of hypothesis using STATA. For these four data points, we tested the null hypothesis that the mean number of RIs in FY 2004 and 2005 was the same as in FY2006 and 2007 (H₀: RIs=2.6 if RIP=0), against the alternative hypothesis that the mean number of RIs was smaller in FY2004 and 2005 than in 2006 and 2007 (H₁: RIs<2.6 if RIP=0). Our level of significance was α =0.05. The p-value for the test statistic was 0.1289, and so, we did not reject the null hypothesis. Hence, we concluded that the mean number of RIs in FY 2006 and 2007 (under RIP) is not statistically different from the mean number of RIs in FY2004 and FY2005 (without RIP).
Nonetheless, there is still ample room for improvement: the expected outcomes and the methodology the Army will use to evaluate the success of the new program are as unclear as they were for the previous version. It should be noted that already in 2007, the USAREC’s Center for Accessions Research concluded that the $3.7 million spent on the old RIP was too high a cost for the inconclusive results produced by the program and called for its abolition.\textsuperscript{402} However, the new RIP more than doubles the reward received by a recruiter who signs one contract beyond his benchmark (from $100 to $250) even when the old RIP produced no evidence that this was necessary. Furthermore, this increase means that the maximum amount a recruiter could earn in the new RIP is increased to $9,000 per annum, up from $8,600 with the old version. Thus, the new RIP increases costs even when there were calls from within the Army that the old program was already too expensive. Finally, one must note that the new RIP does nothing to address the third, fourth, fifth and sixth RIP-related problems that were listed above.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Create stronger controls regarding bonus allocations but seek no reduction of maximum enlistment bonus benefits. Congress should direct the Secretary of the Army to create stricter guidelines about the distribution of enlistment bonuses in order to cut the great deal of waste of resources documented in recent years. These guidelines must ensure that enlistment bonuses are paid only to recruits with badly needed skills. Accordingly, the number of bonuses paid to servicemembers in overfilled occupational specialties must be significantly reduced, so that enlistees are not attracted into positions of which the Army already has a sufficient supply. Congress should consider using the methodology proposed by the Government Accountability Office’s report to Congressional Committees no. GAO-06-134, and used in this paper, as a good example of how overfilled occupational specialties can be tracked and counted.

\textsuperscript{402} General Accountability Office, \textit{Military Personnel: Evaluation Methods}, 8
through time. The enactment of these stricter guidelines should lead to a decrease in the overall budget for the enlistment bonus program.

Nonetheless, Congress is advised against a reduction in the maximum benefits paid through enlistment bonuses, currently at $40,000. Even if the results of the enlistment bonus program have been disappointing in recent years, the evidence suggests that cutting maximum benefits is likely to harm the Army’s ability to attract high quality recruits.

2. **Restore the purchase power of Army College Fund benefits, and increase the flexibility of this program in order to prevent the ‘retention paradox’**. In the future, increases in the maximum amounts of Army College Fund benefits need to be made a function of the increases in the costs of higher education. Congress should act fast to make the ACF again as attractive in financial terms as it was in the early 1980s and close the gap between increases in college costs and increases in the ACF. Congress should also direct the Army to put greater emphasis on educational benefits open only to high quality enlistees who possess critical skills, such as the ACF, rather than on benefits open to all servicemembers. Increasing GI Bill benefits that reduce the importance of Army College Fund benefits is a mistaken approach.

Furthermore, as some analysts have proposed in the past, the Army should explore policies that allow ACF recipients who leave the force to attend college, to return to military service after graduation as enlisted members.403 This would allow the Army to benefit from the enhanced performance of those recruits and would make ACF a program that does not require separation from the force. Veterans who use the ACF and then reenlist for a second term of service should enter the force at higher compensation grades in order to make their return to military service attractive to them. In addition, this enlisted-college-enlisted alternative could be offered to enlistees since the time of their accession, while the Army could offer higher ACF

403 Asch et al., *Attracting College Bound Youth Into the Military*, xvi
benefits to recruits who choose that option. Recruits who intend to return to service after college should be contractually bound to do as a condition to receive their increased ACF benefits.

3. Reduce the gap in expenditures between the enlistment bonus program and the Army College Fund program. Having seen that increased benefits and budgets for enlistment bonuses has not increased the volume of high quality enlistments in recent years, it is time for the Army to give priority to educational benefits as effective recruiting tools. The combined results of recommendations 1 and 2 shall lead to a reduction in enlistment bonus spending and an increase in ACF budgets. Moreover, it is very likely that the Army can boost recruitment without increasing total expenditure in these recruitment incentives if there is a transfer of resources cut in the enlistment bonus into the ACF. Using the respective marginal costs of the enlistment bonus program and the Army College Fund, as calculated by Warner et alia, one concludes that a $40 million reduction in enlistment bonus expenditures, matched by a $40 million increase in ACF expenditures, would bring around 4,200 new enlistees to the Army.404

4. Allow the Recruiter Incentive Pay programs to expire and set up an experiment to assess the effectiveness and viability of cash incentives to recruiters. The two versions of the Recruiter Incentive Pay implemented so far are flawed. In the absence of clear evidence that shows that either of these programs increases the volume and the quality of enlistments, they only represent an unjustified burden in the Army’s budget. Hence, Congress should direct the Army to abandon both these programs and set up a test cell-based experiment in order to assess whether cash incentives for recruiters have market expansion effects in military recruitment, similar to the experiments done in the 1980s about enlistment bonuses and the ACF.

404 This estimated number of recruits is obtained by calculating the expected number of recruits obtained through increases in AFC minus the expected number of recruits lost through reductions in the enlistment bonus program: [Increase in AFC expenditure / Marginal cost of AFC] – [Reduction in enlistment bonus expenditure/ Marginal cost of enlistment bonus] \( \rightarrow \) \(\frac{($40,000,000/$5,600)}{(40,000,000/$13,900)}\) = 4,265.2 new recruits. Warner et al., Enlistment Supply in the 1990s, 46
Should this experiment yield positive results, and in accordance to the RIP flaws identified in the last section, Congress should only authorize the Secretary of the Army to implement RIP schemes that 1) have clear expected outcomes and methodologies for success, 2) have simple structures that are easy to evaluate, 3) provide higher rewards for recruiters who attract high quality enlistees, 4) allow recruiter rewards to fluctuate according to conditions in the recruiting environment, and 5) are not expected to increase the number of recruiter improprieties.

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SFC Craig Hughes and Mr. Erick Hoversholm, *Recruiter Incentive Pay (RIP) Program Overview*. US Army Recruiting Command. (Power Point Presentation)


AMERICA'S ARMY NEEDS OFFICERS
Growing and Maintaining the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps

Sar Medoff

WWS 402-J07: Revitalizing Military Recruitment Without Restoring the Draft

Professor Julian Zelizer

May 5, 2009

I pledge that my work is in accordance with the University’s Honor Code.
Growing and Maintaining the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps

Comprised of more than 32,000 cadets at 273 college campuses, and at least 1,100 satellite schools, the Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) is the Army’s largest, most reliable source of commissioned officers. More than 60% of the Army’s officer corps are former ROTC cadets and will continue to increase as the ROTC recruiting goals rise over the next three years. In 2008, ROTC fell 200 officers short of its stated goal of commissioning 4,500 cadets. In 2009, ROTC plans to commission 4,500 cadets as Second Lieutenants, and this goal will increase to 5,350 commissioned officers by 2011.

Of the 4,088 ROTC cadets commissioned in 2007, approximately 68% (2,816 cadets) received a scholarship from the federal government that paid the cadet’s full tuition for either two, three, or four years. The Army is in the process of growing the number of ROTC scholarship cadet commissions to 80%. In order to meet this end, the Army has been increasing the total number of ROTC scholarships awarded; in the last two years, the number of scholarships awarded has increased by more than 75%. Since 2005, the number of four-year scholarships has expanded significantly faster than the number of two and three-year scholarships offered, even though this is the most expensive of the three options since it pays for more years of tuition and program costs.

RECOMMENDATION #1
Increase the number of three-year scholarships awarded to non-scholarship ROTC cadets after freshman year

The Army is trying to raise scholarship cadet commissions to 80% by dramatically increasing the number of scholarships offered since 2005. Since offering a total of 8,361 scholarships in the 2005-2006 school year (SY), this number has increased by more than 75% to 14,685 scholarships in SY 2008-2009. Between FY 2006 – FY 2009, the number of two and three year scholarships awarded has increased by 500-1000 while the number of four year scholarships has increased by 4,700. The number of scholarships offered and the amount of funding appropriated for all scholarships has consistently increased since SY 2005-2006.

In 2008, almost 11,000 non-scholarship freshman entered the ROTC program; by 2009, the Army predicts that only 4,000 will continue with the program. Problems with retention are not seen amongst the scholarship candidates, but with non-scholarship cadets.

In the class of 2010, the number of scholarships offered has failed to keep pace with the number of non-scholarship cadets who drop out of ROTC for an overall decrease of more than 2,000 cadets since freshman year. The most pronounced retention shortcoming though is for the class of 2011. In 2007-2008, almost 11,000 non-scholarship cadets enrolled in ROTC, but the Army estimates that 7,000 will drop out by 2008-2009. This past year Cadet Command did not significantly increase the number of two and three-year scholarships available, which will lead to a greater loss of interested candidates than in years past.

I recommend that Cadet Command should increase the number of three and two-year scholarships in relation to the estimated decrease in non-scholarship. In light of the increased freshman participation, Cadet Command should reduce the number of expensive four-year scholarships and
instead, increase the number of three and two-year scholarships, which are less expensive and may improve retention in light of the massive future participation decreases estimated by the Army.

**RECOMMENDATION 2**

*The Department of Defense should maintain and expand the Critical Languages Incentive Program (CLIP) with funding provided by reducing the monthly stipends*

The Department of Defense began a Critical Language Incentive program in 2009 to encourage cadets to study key, strategic languages and to improve the Army’s foreign language capabilities. The bonus is contingent on the officer’s completion of the language program, but it pays $100-$250 per month and can pay up to $3,000 per year to cadets who have signed contracts with the Army.

The CLIP aims to increase the Army’s language capabilities by utilizing universities’ resources instead of sending soldiers to the Army’s Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California. The pilot program was passed in 2008 with projections that 50% of eligible ROTC cadets would enroll, which for Army ROTC was estimated as 3,121 cadets. Maintaining the current pay ladder, the program is estimated to cost between $7-8 million per year and $45 million over the next six years. To provide some comparison, the monthly ROTC stipend program currently costs more than $78 million per year and increases directly with increased ROTC participation. If the monthly stipend amount is reduced and the CLIP maintained or even increased, it is possible that more than 50% of cadets would participate which would increase the program’s cost.

Cadets who have signed a contract with the Army are eligible to receive a monthly stipend between $300-500. In SY2008-2009, the stipend appropriations request was $78.2 million, an increase of $2.5 million over the previous year.

In today’s lush recruiting environment with ample interest in ROTC, I believe that the Army can afford to reduce the amount of the monthly stipend without serious detriment to students’ interest in the program. A 2004 study by RAND, “Policy Options for Military Recruiting in the College Market,” found that the incentive of a $65,000 loan repayment program (LRP) increased “the probability that college market youth would express a positive propensity to enlist” by 50%.

Using a regression model, the study predicts that creating such an effect with other incentives would require a “35 percent pay raise, the enlistment bonus would need to increase to $50,000, and the monthly stipend would need to be raised to $2,100 per month.”

Increasing the monthly stipend amount appeared to have a “positive, although modest effect” on the traditional recruit’s propensity to be positively inclined to enlist. The similarities between ROTC scholarships and the LRP reinforce my recommendation that the Army can reduce the amount of the monthly stipend without significantly reducing student interest in the program, so long as the tuition benefits are maintained. The money saved by reducing the amount of the monthly stipends could be reinvested in the CLIP to encourage more cadets to study strategically important languages.
INTRODUCTION

Across the United States, thousands of college students are training to lead America’s Army into the twenty-first century. Comprised of more than 32,000 cadets at 273 college campuses, and at least 1,100 satellite schools, the Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) is the Army’s largest, most reliable source of commissioned officers. All ROTC cadets complete a four-year Military Science academic course with mandatory physical and technical training; upon graduation, cadets are commissioned as Second Lieutenants, the lowest ranking commissioned officer. More than 60% of the Army’s officer corps are former ROTC cadets and will continue to increase as the ROTC recruiting goals rise over the next three years. In addition to ROTC, the Army officer corps is drawn from Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia and the United States Military Academy at West Point.

The demands on the Army will invariably grow with ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and combating terrorist networks around the world. When Congress increased the Army’s end strength by 30,000 in 2004, the Army was ill prepared to deal with the increased need for officers who would lead these troops. Since the increase, the Army has been trying to expand the officer corps to necessary levels, with measured success that has fallen short of stated goals. In 2008, ROTC fell 200 officers short of its stated goal of commissioning 4,500 cadets. In 2009, ROTC plans to commission 4,500 cadets as Second Lieutenants, and this goal will increase to 5,350 commissioned officers by 2011.

Of the 4,088 ROTC cadets commissioned in 2007, approximately 68% (2,816 cadets) received a scholarship from the federal government that paid the cadet’s full tuition for either two, three, or four years. The Army is in the process of growing the number of ROTC scholarship cadet commissions to 80%. In order to meet this end, the Army has been increasing the total number of ROTC scholarships awarded; in the last two years, the number of scholarships awarded has increased by more than 75%.

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405 Ron Schachter, “Cadets on Campus. (cover story),” University Business 11, no. 3 (March 2008): 48-52
Since 2005, the number of four-year scholarships has expanded significantly faster than the number of two and three-year scholarships offered, even though this is the most expensive of the three options since it pays for more years of tuition and program costs. However, looking at the tremendous attrition rates for non-scholarship ROTC cadets between their freshman and sophomore years, it may be more cost efficient and effective to increase the number of three-year scholarships.

**RECOMMENDATION #1**

*Increase the number of three-year scholarships awarded to non-scholarship ROTC cadets after freshman year*

**ROTC PROGRAM**

**Structure**

The Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program is a four-year college course of study in Military Science Learning (MSL). The Army offers four-year scholarships to qualified high school applicants, and three and two-year scholarships to qualified college freshmen or sophomores who wish to participate; the first two years of the program are also open to non-scholarship students without any military service obligation but after sophomore year, all cadets must either sign a contract with the Army or leave ROTC.

Once a cadet signs any contract with the Army, he or she is subject to a mandatory military service of eight years, typically served as four years on Active Duty and four years in the Individual Ready Reserve with no military component. The only exception to this rule is for cadets who sign a four-year contract; they are allowed to try the first year of the program without any penalty for withdrawal from ROTC. After signing the contract, cadets also become eligible for ROTC benefits such as monthly stipends, book allowances, and pay for summer training.

The ROTC curriculum includes topics such as: management principles, national defense, military history, leadership development, military courtesy, discipline, military customs, organization and

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407 Reserve Officers' Training Corps, “USAREC Pamphlet 145-1: Reserve Officers' Training Corps Programs and Scholarships” (United States Army Recruiting Command, May 18, 2006), 4
management, ethics and professionalism, group dynamics, small unit tactics, administration, and leadership.\footnote{Ibid., 3.} These subjects are part of the West Point course of study and provide a common well of knowledge for all officers. Cadets face almost no restrictions when choosing a major, and the primary requirement of ROTC participation is that scholarship cadets must maintain a 2.5 GPA or higher, while non-scholarship cadets must maintain a GPA of 2.0 or higher.

**Scholarships**

Since 2005, the Army has offered more than 4,400 scholarships worth $959 million. Of the 32,700 ROTC cadets in 2009, 14,685 are receiving a ROTC scholarship. These scholarships pay for the cadets' tuition, book costs ($1,200 per year), and a stipend of $300-$500 per month.\footnote{Department of the Army, *Military Personnel, Army: Justification Book - Volume I - Active Forces, Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 Budget Estimates*, February 2008, 143, http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY09/mpa.pdf} Many public universities also waive room and board fees for ROTC cadets.\footnote{At schools with tuition <$10,000 per year, cadets have the option of using the scholarship money to pay for room and board up to $10,000 instead of tuition} The number of scholarships available to each battalion is determined on a school-by-school basis by the one of the seven regional brigades' recruiting mission. Because it pays for the most number of semesters, the four-year scholarship is the most expensive option but as seen by its growth, is also the one most favored by Cadet Command over the last four years.

In the last few years, the Army has begun an initiative to increase the percentage of commissions for scholarship cadets from 60% to 80%. In 2007, approximately 68% of ROTC officer commissions were cadets who received an ROTC scholarship; the Army is trying to raise scholarship cadet commissions to 80% by dramatically increasing the number of scholarships offered since 2005. Since offering a total of 8,361 scholarships in the 2005-2006 school year (SY), this number has increased by more than 75% to 14,685 scholarships in SY 2008-2009.\footnote{Cadet Command, “Scholarships by Type by Year,” May 4, 2009} Breaking down the scholarships by
duration, we see that the over this four year period, the number of both two and three year scholarships awarded has increased by 500-1000 while the number of four year scholarships has increased by 4,700. During this time frame, FY2006 – FY 2009 (FY 2006 approximately coincides with SY 2005-2006), the scholarship funding has increased more than 100%. However, the roughly estimated average scholarship amount (Budget executed/total scholarships) has remained relatively constant, fluctuating between $14,500 and $18,700. The number of scholarships offered and the amount of funding appropriated for all scholarships has consistently increased since SY 2005-2006.

The four-year scholarship is undoubtedly the most expensive scholarship option since it pays for eight full semesters of tuition. I believe that the Army needs to increase the number of three-year scholarships awarded to address the retention problems, which will be explained in the next section. In order to fund this expansion, the Army could reduce the number of four-year scholarships awarded. Lacking specific data, one can still imagine that this would be a prudent move since high school seniors cannot completely anticipate their future choices and more prone to changing their mind about ROTC than a college sophomore who has already experienced one year in the Corps.

For charts and a breakdown of the scholarship awards and budget since 2005-2006, refer to Appendix I.

Retention

In 2008, almost 11,000 non-scholarship freshman entered the ROTC program; by 2009, the Army predicts that only 4,000 will continue with the program. This 63% decrease begs the question, what can be done to keep more of these cadets in ROTC? When I asked Major Harlan why ROTC is having trouble meeting its accession goals of roughly 5,000 cadets, he replied that there are probably more than 5,000 interested, but wondered, “Are they qualified? And those that are qualified...this is not

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413 Cadet Command, “Princeton RFI”; Cadet Command, “Scholarships by Type by Year.”
necessarily their thing.” When pressed for reasons as to why so many freshmen drop out of the program, he said, “The freshman class can be a large class at many colleges and there is an attrition rate, where they may see...an Army paycheck as a second lieutenant versus as an entry level program candidate at...a major investment bank.” For cadets who don’t sign contracts with the Army before their junior year, there is no penalty for dropping out of the program. And even for cadets who receive scholarships, if it is a four-year scholarship then they are allowed to drop during the first year without any penalty, or they can drop at any other point and are then required to repay whatever money they received, similar to a government student loan.

Looking at data for the classes of 2009, 2010, and 2011, the problems with retention are not seen amongst the scholarship candidates. The largest drop, much more evident in recent years and apparently predicted to increase, is for non-scholarship cadets.

For the cadet class of 2009, the number of total cadets decreased significantly between first and second year, but then remained relatively constant for the next three years, which suggests that the number of two year scholarships offered offset the loss of cadets after the second year. Between sophomore year and junior year, the number of non-scholarship cadets decreased by approximately 1,600 while the number of scholarship cadets increased by 2,000, and the total number of cadets actually increased by almost 400.

In the class of 2010, the number of scholarships offered has failed to keep pace with the number of non-scholarship cadets who drop out of ROTC for an overall decrease of more than 2,000 cadets since freshman year. The most pronounced retention shortcoming though is for the class of 2011. In 2007-2008, almost 11,000 non-scholarship cadets enrolled in ROTC; this is almost double the amount of non-scholarship freshman in 2006-2007. It is unclear why there was such a marked increase other than

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417 Department of the Army, Military Personnel, Army: Justification Book - Volume I - Active Forces, 147
possibly mounting pressure from the Department of Defense for ROTC to meet its accession mission. There was no significant increase in the number of three or two-year scholarships offered in 2007-2008, so this could not be an explanation for the increased freshman enrollment. Regardless of its source, Cadet Command must now focus on retaining as many of the qualified participants as possible. The Army estimates the number of non-scholarship cadets to drop from 11,000 in 2008 to 4,000 in 2009, while the number of scholarship cadets will only increase by 2,000.418

In 2009, Cadet Command did not significantly increase the number of two and three-year scholarships available, which will lead to a greater loss of interested candidates than in years past.419 In 2007, the number of two-year scholarships offered was increased by 2,000, which matched the decrease in the number of non-scholarship cadets and led to a net increase in the number of cadets in the class of 2009.

I recommend that Cadet Command should increase the number of three and two-year scholarships in relation to the estimated decrease in non-scholarship cadets in order to keep the number of total cadets in each class as constant as possible. In light of the increased freshman participation, Cadet Command may consider reducing the number of four-year scholarships, which have increased by 4,700 since SY2005-2006,420 and instead increasing the number of three and two-year scholarships which are less expensive and may improve retention in light of the massive future participation decreases estimated by the Army.

For charts and a breakdown of the cadet classes, refer to Appendix II.

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418 Ibid.
419 Cadet Command, “Princeton RFI.”
420 Ibid.
RECOMMENDATION 2
The Department of Defense should maintain and expand the Critical Languages Incentive Program (CLIP) with funding provided by reducing the monthly stipends

Critical Languages Incentive Program (CLIP)

In addition to the scholarships and the monthly stipend, the Department of Defense began a Critical Language Incentive program in 2008. Already experiencing the need for military officers proficient in languages native to the military arenas in which they are or will be operating, the Department of Defense initiated this pilot program to encourage cadets to study key, strategic languages. The need for officers to have greater language abilities is outlined in The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): "Developing broader linguistic capability and cultural understanding is also critical to prevail in the long war and to meet 21st century challenges.... The Department must dramatically increase the number of personnel proficient in key languages such as Arabic, Farsi, and Chinese and make these languages available at all levels of action and decision – from strategic to the tactical." 421 The FY 2008 Department of Defense Authorization Act allows for the incentive to be paid to any ROTC member who “participates in a language immersion program...or in study abroad, or is enrolled in an academic course that involves instruction in a foreign language of strategic interest.” 422

The Department of Defense predicts that this monetary bonus will significantly improve the Army’s foreign language capabilities, although Major Harlan, Recruiting Officer of the Princeton ROTC Battalion, claims that he has not yet seen a difference in freshman cadets’ studies as a result of the bonus. 423 Maj. Harlan certainly did not judge the program’s success based on this first pilot year, but its tangible effects remain to be seen. The bonus is contingent on the officer’s completion of the language...
program, but it pays $100-$250 per month\textsuperscript{424} and can pay up to $3,000 per year to cadets who have signed contracts with the Army. As a pilot program, the incentive is only payable to “newly contracted Cadets beginning with the Fall Semester, AY 2008-2009” and the languages currently qualifying are “Arabic, Persian-Farsi, Persian-Dari, Chinese-Mandarin, Pashto, Urdu, Indonesian, Swahili, Hausa, and Korean.”\textsuperscript{425}

The CLIP aims to increase the Army’s language capabilities by utilizing universities’ resources instead of sending soldiers to the Army’s Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California. The pilot program was passed in 2008 with projections that 50% of eligible ROTC cadets would enroll, which for Army ROTC was estimated as 3,121 cadets. Maintaining the current pay ladder of $100/$150/$200/$250, the program is estimated to cost between $7-8 million per year and $45 million over the next six years.\textsuperscript{426} To provide some comparison, the monthly ROTC stipend program currently costs more than $78 million per year and increases directly with increased ROTC participation.\textsuperscript{427} If the monthly stipend amount is reduced and the CLIP maintained or even increased, it is possible that more than 50% of cadets would participate which would increase the program’s cost.

**Monthly Stipend**

Cadets who have signed a contract with the Army are eligible to receive a monthly stipend between $300-500. Due to both an increase in ROTC participation and stipend amounts in SY2007-2008, the stipend appropriations request increased by $23 million. In SY2008-2009, the stipend appropriations request was $78.2 million, an increase of $2.5 million.\textsuperscript{428}

\textsuperscript{426} \textit{Foreign Language Incentive Pay for Members of Precommissioning Programs}, 3
\textsuperscript{427} Department of the Army, \textit{Military Personnel, Army: Justification Book - Volume I - Active Forces}, 145-146
\textsuperscript{428} Ibid.
In today’s lush recruiting environment with ample interest in ROTC, I believe that the Army can afford to reduce the amount of the monthly stipend without serious detriment to students’ interest in the program. In a 2004 study by RAND, “Policy Options for Military Recruiting in the College Market,” high school seniors, college students, and college dropouts were surveyed in 2001 to measure their likelihood to enlist in the Army in response to thirty-six hypothetical incentive programs. The hypothetical incentives included federal loan repayments up to $65,000, an increased enlistment bonus, increased monthly stipends, and increased entry-level pay and different combinations of these programs with other non-monetary incentives (limited choice of college major, military field requirements, etc.).

The study was initiated to judge the efficacy of programs such as the Army’s College First experimental program that “repays up to $65,000 in federal college loans, pays between $250 to $350 per month college stipend for two years of college, [and] allows the individual to enter the military as an E-4.” The study found that the incentive of a $65,000 loan repayment program (LRP) had increased “the probability that college market youth would express a positive propensity to enlist” by 50%.

Using a regression model, the study predicts that creating such an effect with other incentives would require a “35 percent pay raise, the enlistment bonus would need to increase to $50,000, and the monthly stipend would need to be raised to $2,100 per month.” This survey expressly excluded college students involved in ROTC, but it is reasonable to assume that the same factors are important to most college-bound high school students, regardless of their inclination to participate in ROTC or not.

Increasing the monthly stipend amount appeared to have a “positive, although modest effect” on the traditional recruit’s propensity to be positively inclined to enlist. However, this effect pales in comparison to the loan repayment program and it could be assumed that ROTC scholarships have

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430 Ibid., xv
431 Ibid.
positive effects on the traditional recruit similar to, or perhaps even greater than, the effects of the loan repayment program. The similarities between ROTC scholarships and the LRP are even more striking in light of the fact that RAND used LRP usage statistics from FY 2000, which show that most LRP recipients only use $16,000 of the $65,000 available to them.\textsuperscript{432} This is similar to the ROTC scholarship in that the average cost of the scholarship per cadet has consistently been between $15,000 and $18,600 over the last four years.\textsuperscript{433}

The similarities between ROTC scholarships and the LRP reinforce my recommendation that the Army can reduce the amount of the monthly stipend without significantly reducing student interest in the program, so long as the tuition benefits are maintained. The money saved by reducing the amount of the monthly stipends could be reinvested in the CLIP to encourage more cadets to study strategically important languages.

\section*{ALTERNATIVE LONG TERM STRATEGIES}

\subsection*{Increase OCS and/or USMA Capabilities}

Officer Candidate School (OCS), a twelve-week training course at Fort Benning, Georgia, is the most cost efficient and flexible of the institutions. Lacking strict accession goals for each institution, OCS has traditionally expanded or contracted to meet demand. This informal policy did not present a problem until OCS reached its capacity in 2006-2007. In early 2007 “OCS program officials stated that without increases in resources and support such as additional housing and classroom space, OCS cannot produce more officers than 1,650 officers, its FY 2007 goal.”\textsuperscript{434} However, the demand for officers outstripped OCS capabilities and in response, officials shortened the course from fourteen to twelve

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{432} Ibid., 58
\textsuperscript{433} Cadet Command, “Scholarships by Type by Year”; Cadet Command, “Princeton RFI.”
\textsuperscript{434} United States Government Accountability Office, \textit{Military Personnel: Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army's Emerging Officer Accession and Retention Challenges} (Government Accountability Office, January 2007), 11
\end{flushright}
weeks. By shortening the timer required for commission, OCS was able to commission 1,922 officers in 2007, 1,760 officers in 2008, and an estimated 1,817 officers in 2009.\textsuperscript{435} Despite these recent increases, the shorter course doesn’t remedy the existing staffing and facility constraints that limit OCS’s growth. If the Army wishes to continue using OCS as the safety net, in case USMA and ROTC miss their goals, they will have to heavily invest in improving the School’s infrastructure to handle more personnel.

The United States Military Academy at West Point is the least flexible and most expensive of the three officer institutions. Cadets who attend the Academy receive free tuition, room and board, and are paid an annual salary of $10,148. Each entering class contains approximately 1,000 cadets, but “facilities and staff limit additional increases.”\textsuperscript{436} In a column for the Washington Post, author Tom Ricks proposed that the government should close down the military academies (West Point, Naval Academy, and Air Force Academy), and reinvest the savings in ROTC programs. Ricks estimated the average cost of a West Point education to be $300,000 per cadet versus $130,000 for an ROTC cadet.\textsuperscript{437} The column sparked heated debate, garnering more than ten pages of comments, and although his column highlighted the important role ROTC plays and its need for more resources, the academies will not and should not be closed any time soon.

The option of increasing the training capabilities of either of these institutions certainly merits an in-depth cost-benefit analysis. ROTC is an invaluable institution but improvements to the system take at least two years or longer to affect real change, whereas changes to OCS can be felt in a matter of months. I am uncertain how many more officers OCS would be able to commission if its infrastructure were improved, but I doubt it would be as efficient and beneficial as reinvesting in ROTC.

Create Alternative “Hooks”

\textsuperscript{435} Department of the Army, \textit{Military Personnel, Army: Justification Book - Volume I - Active Forces}, 15.
\textsuperscript{436} United States Government Accountability Office, \textit{Military Personnel: Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army’s Emerging Officer Accession and Retention Challenges}, 22.
In addition to offering more scholarships, maintaining the CLIP, and possibly expanding OCS and/or USMA, Cadet Command may wish to brainstorm additional “hooks,” or programs, other than scholarships, that will include a military service obligation once cadets begin participating. Such a program could be a more extensive language study program that mandates and pays for cadets to study abroad, study social sciences to better understand foreign systems of interactions, and the student would then be obligated to serve in the military in some capacity best suited to their language skills. This program, essentially an intensive CLIP, is just one example of a program that would be less expensive than ROTC since it wouldn’t be paying for years of tuition, but could still offer enough incentives to students such that they would enroll and agree to a military service obligation. For this example language program, perhaps the military service commitment could be shortened from eight years to six years since the overall investment is lower than traditional ROTC. There are an endless number of possible programs such as this language intensive that could potentially act as “hooks” to entice more freshmen and sophomores to commit to serving in the Army.

CONCLUSION

In light of the needs of America’s 21st century Army, it is clear that an efficient, robust, and well-supported Reserve Officers’ Training Corps will play a vital role in the future of our nation’s military. By increasing the number of scholarship cadets commissioned as officers and maintaining the Critical Languages Incentive Program, the Department of Defense will ensure that our Universities are creating the best leaders possible who will forever defend our country, our liberty, and our freedom.
Acknowledgements

I’d like to thank Major Stephen Harlan of the Princeton ROTC Tiger Battalion, Paul Kotakis of Cadet Command, Tom Ricks, Princeton librarians Nancy Pressman-Levy and Joanne Donatiello, and Professor Julian Zelizer. This paper would not have been possible without their guidance, assistance, and encouragement.
APPENDIX I

ROTC Scholarship Breakdown - 2005-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2 yr</th>
<th>3 yr</th>
<th>4 yr</th>
<th>Graduate</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>1637</td>
<td>1424</td>
<td>5284</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>1670</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>5590</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>7420</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>11700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>2158</td>
<td>2457</td>
<td>9934</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>14685</td>
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</table>

ROTC Scholarships & Program Budget Executed ($)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Year</th>
<th>Program Executed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>127,395,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>134,181,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>218,020,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>260,518,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

438 Cadet Command, “Princeton RFI”; Cadet Command, “Scholarships by Type by Year.”
APPENDIX II

ROTC Class of 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st Year (SY2005-2006)</th>
<th>2nd Year (SY2006-2007)</th>
<th>3rd Year (SY2007-2008)</th>
<th>4th Year (SY2008-2009)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Scholarship</td>
<td>6,043</td>
<td>3,276</td>
<td>1,667</td>
<td>898</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scholarship</td>
<td>1,813</td>
<td>2,270</td>
<td>4,251</td>
<td>4,090</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Cadets</td>
<td>7,856</td>
<td>5,546</td>
<td>5,918</td>
<td>4,988</td>
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</table>

Years in Program

ROTC Class of 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st Year (SY2006-2007)</th>
<th>2nd Year (SY2007-2008)</th>
<th>3rd Year (SY2008-2009)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Scholarship</td>
<td>6,370</td>
<td>4,084</td>
<td>1,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholarship</td>
<td>2,151</td>
<td>3,690</td>
<td>5,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cadets</td>
<td>8,521</td>
<td>7,773</td>
<td>6,379</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Years in Program

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439 Department of the Army, Military Personnel, Army: Justification Book - Volume I - Active Forces; Department of the Army, Military Personnel, Army: Justification Book - Volume I - Active Forces
ROTCA Class of 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years in Program</th>
<th>1st Year (2008)</th>
<th>2nd Year (2009)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Scholarship</td>
<td>10,997</td>
<td>3,938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholarship</td>
<td>2,860</td>
<td>4,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cadets</td>
<td>13,827</td>
<td>8,217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Aamer Madhani. “ROTC recruits paid to command new languages.” *USA Today.*


---. “Scholarships by Type by Year,” May 4, 2009.


*Foreign Language Incentive Pay for Members of Precommissioning Programs. Chapter 5 of title 37, 2008.*


Ricks, Thomas E. “Why We Should Get Rid of West Point.” *The Washington Post.*


http://www.memphis.edu/armyrotc/pdfs/Language_Incentive_Pay.pdf.


Note: Documents from Cadet Command – “Princeton RFI” and “Scholarships by Type by Year” – have been included following this bibliography.

**Princeton RFI**

Because the Army ROTC Scholarship Program is a multi-year program funded one year at a time, we do not allocate scholarships by type, rather by mission set. A mission set covers those students graduating between 1 Oct of one year and 30 Sep of the next year. The funds allocated to a particular mission set will pay for students having 2-, 3- or 4-year scholarships depending on when they began the program and how they have progressed through the program.

Scholarship Expenditures for last 5 years:

FY 06 Original Budget: $126,155,000; program executed $127,395,000 (additional funds received from DA)

FY 07 Original Budget: $111,921,000; program executed $134,181,292 (additional funds received for DA)

FY 08 Original Budget: $218,020,000; program executed $218,020,000

FY 09 Original Budget: $260,518,300; program execution is in process.

*Source: Cadet Command*
The U.S. Army’s Recruitment Interest in Improving and Ensuring Quality of Housing for Soldiers and their Families

Sarah Clark Schiff

May 5, 2009

This paper represents my own work in accordance with Princeton University regulations.

Sarah Clark Schiff
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Briefing Memo: The U.S. Army’s Recruitment Interest in Improving Housing

Influencers, who, according to the Department of Defense (DoD), are “adults who have a direct, influential role on the decisions youth make about their post-high school options,” have an increasingly negative perception of the well-being that they associate with military service. The 2005 DoD Influencer Poll, conducted by the Joint Advertising Market Research and Studies (JAMRS), warns that well-being, as opposed to patriotic adventure and skill development, is the beneficial outcome that influencers care most about in making their decision to support a youth’s enlistment. However, influencers only minimally associate well-being with military service. The Influencer Poll warns that if this poor association between well-being and military service continues, influencers may become less likely to recommend military service to youth. Already, the Influencer Poll indicates that the number of influencers willing to recommend joining the military has decreased over the past few years. Housing, is a key contributor (although often a negative contributor) to the Influencer Poll’s attractive lifestyle rating, one aspect of well-being.

Recent efforts by the Army’s Residential Communities Initiative (RCI) and Barracks Modernization Program (BMP) have transformed Army housing from “unsuitable” and “substandard” to award-winning. However, the economic downturn currently threatens these initiatives. In addition, despite these remarkable improvements, influencers continue to believe that housing remains poor. Thus, it is incumbent upon the U.S. Government and Army to: first, ensure the highest standards of housing possible for Army families and unaccompanied personnel by providing the financial wherewithal and planning to guarantee the completion and sustainability of all housing, and second, publicize the accomplishments of both the RCI and BMP, thereby transforming the image of housing and accordingly, well-being, that influencers associate with military life.
**Recommendations:**

The U.S. Government and Army must:

**Recommendation 1:** PLEDGE government contributions and general commitment to the RCI private developers, who will need financial help in closing the increased gap between the cost of complete revitalization and the decreased amount of available private capital due to the credit crunch and generally poor environment for lending.

**Recommendation 2:** PLEDGE government contributions and general commitment to the RCI private developers, who might need to refinance their debt in an unfavorable economic environment for commercial refinancing to ensure continued project viability.

**Recommendation 3:** EXPAND the RCI privatization model for permanent party barracks at Fort Bliss, Fort Bragg, Fort Drum, Fort Irwin, and Fort Stewart to all permanent party barracks that are viable for privatization.

**Recommendation 4:** LIMIT the use of the Army’s BMP to the construction of training barracks for unaccompanied personnel with ranks E1-E5 and permanent party barracks for unaccompanied personnel with ranks E6 and above that are not viable for RCI privatization.

**Recommendation 5:** ELIMINATE the opportunity for more inefficiency and higher costs by writing or supporting legislation that pressures Congress to make the Sustainment, Restoration, and Maintenance funds available to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment at the beginning of the fiscal year so the Army can enter new maintenance contracts as soon as possible, allowing for cheaper project completion.

**Recommendation 6:** INITIATE new campaigns that advertise the new and award-winning RCI and BMP housing installations to transform the image of housing and accordingly, well-being that influencers associate with military life.
I. INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Unlike the recruiting challenge that the Army faced between 2001 and 2008, today’s Army recruiting challenge is not about a failure to meet recruiting benchmarks. In a marked turn of events, the economic downturn has created a recruiter’s paradise.440 Despite this temporary relief, however, the economic downturn should not mask underlying strains on recruiting. The Army must seize this opportunity for strong recruitment and adopt a successful long-term approach to recruitment so that when the economy rebounds, the Army can overcome some of the challenges it faced previously. Influencers play an absolutely critical role in surmounting such impediments to successful recruiting as strong war opposition, faulty intelligence, and a long and violent war.441

Influencers, who, according to the Department of Defense (DoD), are “adults who have a direct, influential role on the decisions youth make about their post-high school options,”442 have an increasingly negative perception of the well-being that they associate with military service.443 The 2005 DoD Influencer Poll, conducted by the Joint Advertising Market Research and Studies (JAMRS), warns that well-being, as opposed to patriotic adventure and skill development, is the beneficial outcome that influencers care most about in making their decision to support a youth’s enlistment. However, influencers only minimally associate well-being with military service. One particular aspect of well-being, a recruit’s ability to have an attractive lifestyle, falls far short of influencers’ expectations.444 The Influencer Poll further warns that if this poor association between well-being and military service continues, influencers may become less likely to recommend military service to youth.445 Already, the Influencer Poll indicates that the number of influencers willing to recommend joining the military has decreased over the past few years.446

For influencers, housing for both Army families and unaccompanied personnel (i.e., single soldiers) is a key determinant of the attractive lifestyle rating, according to Keith Eastin, Assistant Secretary of the Army

442 Ibid., 1-2.
443 Ibid., 2-9.
444 Ibid.
445 Ibid., ii.
446 Ibid., 1-1.
for Installations and Environment (ASA-I&E). Unfortunately, the Army has not always delivered acceptable or adequate housing for its soldiers and families. In 1995, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Quality of Life reported that a majority of the DoD-owned or -leased family homes and barracks spaces were “unsuitable” or “substandard.” Similarly, in 2008, a video on YouTube aired that documented the poor living conditions at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Narrated by Ed Frawley, the father of Sergeant Jeff Frawley, the video contrasts his son’s honorable service in Afghanistan and Iraq with abhorrent conditions in the barracks.

These reports about the poor state of Army family housing and unaccompanied personnel housing during the mid-1990s and again in 2008, reeked havoc on the public’s image of Army housing. The Task Force on Quality of Life warned that if service members and their families continued to raise complaints about housing in town hall meetings across the country, first-time enlistments would, in all likelihood, continue to decline. The provision of quality housing is thus intimately linked to recruitment outcomes.

Recognizing that traditional funding sources were inadequate to achieve high quality housing for soldiers and their families, Congress sought a massive overhaul of military family housing policy in the aftermath of the Task Force on Quality of Life Report. With the 1996 National Defense Authorization Act, this massive overhaul was realized with the birth of the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI). The 2005 National Defense Authorization Act made the MHPI a permanent feature of military family housing policy. The MHPI created legislative authorities that provide real estate, investment, and financial tools to the government in order to facilitate real estate transactions between the government and private developers and property managers. For the Residential Communities Initiative (RCI), the Army-specific MHPI authority, the privatization model consists of a transfer of title to the private developer via a fifty-year lease, with the retention of an ownership interest by the Army and thus, the government, in the form of a limited partnership interest and a reversionary property interest. Through this arrangement, the private developer becomes the landlord/operator, taking on all construction, operation, management, and rent collecting

449 Ibid., 1.
responsibilities and costs. Since then, the RCI has drastically improved the state of housing and residential communities for soldiers and their families, successfully privatizing 98% of military family housing into award winning homes.

Ironically, while the economic downturn has created a recruiter’s paradise, it has simultaneously threatened the RCI’s ongoing housing efforts. For the installations yet to be privatized, current economic conditions make tapping into private capital very difficult. With less private capital available for privatization, the government must be willing to fill the increased gap between the cost of complete revitalization and the decreased amount of available private capital. In addition, for the installations that have been privatized, money that private developers borrowed at the peak of the housing bubble may need to be refinanced for project solvency. Given the unfavorable economic environment for commercial refinancing, private developers will need help from the U.S. government to ensure continued project viability.

Similarly dissatisfied with the state of unaccompanied personnel housing, in 1994, the Army embarked on the Barracks Modernization Program (BMP) in order to modernize all unaccompanied personnel housing in accordance with the current DoD module – two bedrooms, one bathroom, cooking area, and appliance and laundry facilities. Unlike the MHPI, the BMP uses two government-funded sources – Military Construction and Operations & Maintenance. By the end of 2008, the Army had funded 70% of this $15 billion project. For unaccompanied personnel with the ranks of E1 – E5, their training barracks are currently projected to be 100% funded by 2015 and beneficially occupied by 2017. For unaccompanied personnel with the ranks of E6 and above, their permanent party barracks are currently projected to be 100% funded by 2013 and beneficially occupied by 2015. The completed barracks, although they retain the name “barracks,” now finally serve as homes for unaccompanied soldiers with privacy, space, and amenities.

454 Ibid.
The sweeping mood of fiscal responsibility, however, has triggered doubts about the merits of the BMP for all unaccompanied personnel housing. While the RCI model is cheaper than the BMP, the Army’s concept of training barracks for E1-E5 unaccompanied personnel is, unfortunately, incompatible with the privatization model. The Army’s strategic use of sergeants throughout the training barracks is not practically feasible under the privatization model. On the other hand, since the strategic use of soldiers is not applicable for soldiers with ranks E6 and above, the concept of permanent party barracks is compatible with the RCI model. Using the RCI’s five successful permanent party barracks test sites at Fort Bliss, Texas, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Fort Drum, New York, Fort Irwin, California, and Fort Stewart, Georgia, the Army should expand the RCI model for all eligible permanent party barracks.

In addition, while the BMP will succeed in providing new housing spaces for E1-E5 unaccompanied personnel in accordance with Army values, it—unlike the RCI model— is not currently designed to maintain the current modernization efforts. The Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (SRM) budget is responsible for the maintenance projects for BMP installations. Delays in funding of the SRM budget not only preclude timely maintenance efforts but also drive up the costs of completing the maintenance projects once the funding is in place.

Despite concerns associated with the financial crisis and fiscal responsibility, both the RCI and BMP are responsible for transforming military housing from “unsuitable” and “substandard” to award-winning. However, influencers continue to believe that housing remains in its mid-1990’s and Fort Braggs scandalous state, mostly because the Army has not sufficiently advertised otherwise. Thus, it is incumbent upon the U.S. Government and Army to: first, ensure the highest standards of housing possible for Army families and unaccompanied personnel by providing the financial wherewithal and planning to guarantee the completion and sustainability of all housing, and second, publicize the accomplishments of both the RCI and BMP, thereby transforming the image of housing and accordingly, well-being, that influencers associate with military life.

456 Eastin Interview.
458 Russel Santala, interviewed on the telephone by Sarah Schiff, Princeton, NJ, April 13, 2009.
II. INFLUENCERS

Who They Are; What They Are Thinking

Unfortunately, today’s Army is faced not only with the challenge of enlisting a potential recruit, but also with the greater challenge of gaining the support of a potential recruits’ parents or other “influencers,” who significantly affect a potential recruit’s decision about whether to enlist. The DoD defines “influencers” as parents and non-parents between the ages of twenty-two and eight-five that have relationships with youth ages twelve to twenty-one. These parents, educators, relatives, clergy, coaches, counselors, and the like play a major role in youth decision-making due to their direct involvement in youths’ educational goals, scholastic achievement, and career goals. Thus, persuading influencers, in addition to potential recruits, is a task that the Army should take very seriously.

This task, however, is particularly challenging when recruits and influencers seek different benefits from the Army. While a young potential recruit sees benefits in the short term, like the immediate cash in hand offered with the enlistment bonus, parents and other influencers, according to Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Sterling and Lieutenant General Michael Rochelle, are more likely to examine future benefits that the military will provide to their children. In evaluating the future outcomes associated with military service – well-being, patriotic adventure, and skill development – JAMRS finds that association ratings for well-being and military service had the strongest relationship to likelihood to recommend. Influencers view attributes like personal safety, contact with family and friends, an attractive lifestyle, good pay, and an exciting job as critical in making their decision on whether to recommend military service. Unfortunately, the results from the Influencer Poll indicate that personal safety, contact with family and friends, an attractive lifestyle, and good pay all receive the weakest associations with military service.

461 Ibid., 1-3.
For parents, the military’s ability to provide an attractive lifestyle falls into this dangerous red category, where the gap between parents’ expectations and military reality is greater than 1.0. Although parents influence fewer youth than non-parent influencers, they exert a greater amount of influence on their own children than non-parent influencers exert on the youth they mentor. According to Colonel Russel Santala, a member of Secretary Eastin’s staff, the quality of housing that the Army provides is a key determinant of the attractive lifestyle rating.

In accordance with the attractive lifestyle ratings above, the military reality of housing, as perceived by influencers, has not acted as a positive contributor to the attractive lifestyle rating. Most recently, Ed Frawley’s 2008 video of the Fort Bragg barracks, after his son returned from Afghanistan, was devastating. Among other problems, the video displayed mold, peeling paint, broken plumbing fixtures and a drain plugged with sewage in the dilapidated, Korean War-era barracks. During a speech at Fort Bliss, Texas, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who was “appalled” after viewing the video, declared: “Soldiers should never have to live in such squalor.” In the video, Mr. Frawley remarks that his son often expressed how depressing it was to live in these barracks after returning from a day’s work.

In terms of the impact on influencers, Colonel Santala described the situation at Fort Bragg as a “black eye for the Army” and a “public relations nightmare.” The YouTube video, which remains posted on YouTube, has been viewed nearly 500,000 times. If these YouTube views were not damaging enough, the

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464 Ibid.
465 Ibid., 1-3.
468 Santala Interview.
video triggered a worldwide inspection of Army barracks by both the Associated Press and Army officials. The spot check by the Associated Press revealed many more barracks facing similar problems with mold, mildew, plumbing, and wiring. The Army, which ordered an inspection of all 148,000 rooms at bases worldwide, found that the problems revealed at Fort Bragg were widespread. The ensuing exposé of Army housing by the press resulted in telling commentary. For example, Special Loren Dauterman said: “It [Army barracks] is better than sleeping out in the woods, but not a whole lot better,” and Guard Master Sergeant Patrick Robinson said: “You couldn’t pay me to go into the shower rooms without shower shoes on.” In an attempt to save face, the Army immediately appropriated $248 million in emergency money to fix the problems found during its worldwide inspections.

Despite this weak association between well-being and military service, influencers strongly associate the other future outcomes, patriotic adventure and skill development, with military service. Accordingly, the ratings for patriotic adventure and skill development do not display any gaps between influencer expectations and military reality greater than 1.0. However, because the association ratings for well-being and military service had the strongest relationship to likelihood to recommend, the ratings for patriotic adventure and skill development are being overlooked because influencers are not currently making strong associations between the military and aspects of well-being. This weak association, particularly for the attractive lifestyle rating, is further aggravated by a generation of adults who has less military experience than generations before them (about 11% of today’s adults have military experience compared to 20% in 1970) and accordingly, is more skeptical of an army way of life. JAMRS attributes the decline in adults surveyed who were likely to recommend Army service (from 36% in August 2003, shortly after the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, to 23% in June 2006) “to a fear that youth will face personal hardship, danger, and a lifestyle that is not attractive to them if they enlist.”

469 Hall.
470 Ibid.
471 Ibid.
473 Mazzetti.
Indicating the urgency of the situation, the results warn that the decline in likelihood to recommend is likely to continue unless “something is done to improve the image and appeal of joining the military.” However, the results indicate that if the military shows it is possible for a youth to have a happy, healthy, and attractive life in the military, then influencers would be more likely to recommend enlistment.

“Uncle Sam Wants You, But Ads Target Mom, Dad”

In response to the growing impact of influencers who are wary of having their children in the armed forces, the Army engaged in a massive ad campaign entitled “Today’s Military.” The campaign was targeted toward parents and other influencers to tackle the Army’s “troubled brand.” “Today’s Military” ads urge parents to engage in informed dialogue with their children about military service, often portraying an initially reluctant parent who eventually becomes convinced by the child’s portrayal of military life – the association of military service with both intangibles like strength and tangibles like the military’s ability to pay for college tuition. Notably, “Today’s Military” ads stay away from actual military combat, never once alluding to Iraq, Afghanistan or the War on Terror. Psychologically, these ads urge parents to support their child’s decision to enlist and further, by closing every ad with text, “Help them find their strength,” demonstrate that a parent’s decision to support their child’s decision to enlist is indicative of a parent who has successfully raised his or her child.

Ironically, despite the drastically improved state of housing, only one of these recent advertisements targets housing. This advertisement, which began airing in January 2008, pitched a test recruitment program, the Army Advantage Fund, which offers up to $40,000 towards the purchase of a home or the creation of a business. However, it is unlikely that this sixteen second advertisement made much of a dent in influencers’ perceptions of Army housing, especially with the airing of the Fort Bragg barracks video just a few months later. Besides local efforts around the bases to advertise the improved housing, there has been

475 Ibid.
476 Ibid., 3-7.
477 Title for section taken from the title of an article appearing in the Wall Street Journal on November 29, 2007 by Yochi J. Dreazen.
478 Mazzetti.
479 Ibid.
481 Dreazen.
no concerted effort by the Army to advertise the high quality of housing to the general public. Thus, the Army Advantage Fund advertisement and other local efforts can only do so much to limit the effect of the Fort Bragg video and countless other videos on YouTube that reveal the substandard housing for unaccompanied personnel and soldiers with families. The lack of advertisements to the general public that display the high quality of Army housing, despite the fact that high quality now generally characterizes Army housing, does not convince influencers that an attractive lifestyle is associated with military service.

In addition, the Fort Bragg video and other prominent images of the substandard state of housing will continue to hold more weight with influencers until the U.S. Government and Army provide the financial wherewithal and planning to guarantee the completion and sustainability of all housing. As Seth Godin, an author of books on marketing, indicated, the real change in convincing influencers to support a potential recruit’s decision to enlist will come from concrete policy change that positively affects well-being for military personnel. Godin remarks: “The Army brand is hurt by a lack of effort in Washington to sell Americans on the value of military service. It is the White House, not an advertising agency, that needs to make the Army’s case to the nation.”482 Thus, without real policy change that prevents future Fort Bragg scandals, this marketing campaign is limited in its ability to convince parents and other influencers of the quality of housing and accordingly, well-being, associated with military service.

III. CASE STUDY: HOUSING AND RECRUITMENT IN THE 1990’s

The Condition of Housing

A deteriorating housing stock and unreliable funding characterized the condition of both family housing and unaccompanied personnel housing in the mid-1990’s. Although construction projects from the 1950’s and 1960’s had produced “modern” housing for the day, by the 1980’s, Congress’ failure to provide adequate funding for maintenance transformed “modern” housing into poorly maintained, low quality, and inconveniently located housing.483 Besides their poor condition, the homes also lacked the size, privacy, and amenities that characterized housing in the civilian sector.484 Unaccompanied personnel were particularly

482 Mazzetti.
483 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, 19.
484 Ibid.
dissatisfied with the conditions of the barracks and consistently expressed the view that the Army treated them like second-class citizens, as compared to soldiers with families. Accordingly, in 1995, the Task Force on Quality of Life reported that 64% of the 387,000 family homes, which the DoD owned or leased, were “unsuitable.” Similarly, 62% of the 612,000 barracks spaces were “substandard.” At the time, 43% of Army families and 82% of unaccompanied soldiers lived in DoD-owned or leased housing. By the mid-1990’s, the estimated cost for deferred maintenance, repair, revitalization and replacement of military family housing and unaccompanied personnel housing was about $20 billion and $9 billion, respectively.

**Housing Policy**

Because funding for maintenance, repair, and replacement of Army housing was subject to the government budget process, the Army lobbied every year for sufficient appropriations to no avail. The Military Family Housing account, which financed all operations, maintenance and construction, fluctuated every fiscal year due to shifting Service, departmental and congressional priorities. For unaccompanied personnel housing, the Military Construction and Operations & Maintenance funds were subject to similar fluctuations. In the face of political decision-making, shrinking budgets, and shifting priorities, the Army was never able to garner adequate and consistent appropriations from any of these funds to maintain the construction projects from the 1950’s and 1960’s.

With the obvious inadequacy of housing in the 1990’s, the Task Force on Quality of Life identified the major funding problems that prevented the resolution of the housing crisis. Although the Military Family Housing account is a fenced account (the money can be used only for operations, maintenance and construction of family housing once appropriated), the amount of money appropriated to Military Family Housing was subject to cyclical and political changes. Thus, future large appropriations were not a guarantee since quality of life funding has to compete every year with other demands on appropriations. Accordingly, the Task Force on Quality of Life concluded that while Military Family Housing had received on average $4.5

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485 Ibid., 3-4.
486 Ibid.
488 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, 21.
489 Ibid., 37.
490 Ibid., 21.
billion annually over the last five years, the DoD was still light-years away from providing quality family housing.491 By contrast, for unaccompanied personnel housing, the Operations & Maintenance account (as opposed to the Military Construction account) is not fenced; these funds are controlled at the installation level and thus, are easily shifted from one area to another.492

Furthermore, for any military family housing or unaccompanied personnel housing appropriations, strict institutional funding regulations under Title 10 Military Construction legislation prevented this money from being used efficiently. Due to certain Title 10 Military Construction laws and regulations that barred private sector resource opportunities, the cost of military housing construction, maintenance, and repair remained high and the burden continued to fall solely on the government. In essence, while the goal was quality, Title 10 Military Construction legislation only provided one very expensive way of achieving that quality.493

Thus, rectifying the housing crisis through traditional funding channels would be nearly impossible since funding for both military family housing and single unaccompanied housing is subject to not only cyclical and political decisions but also institutional regulations that preclude efficiency. The Task Force on Quality of Life estimated that at the current, inadequate, and inconsistent funding rates, a comprehensive revitalization of all housing would be exorbitantly expensive and take decades to complete. Therefore, the Task Force deemed this policy completely unsustainable and concluded that a massive overhaul of military family housing policy and unaccompanied personnel housing policy was necessary since any piecemeal revisions would not suffice.494

The Relationship Between Housing and Recruitment

According to Secretary Eastin, because the Army is in constant competition with the private sector for recruits, providing high standards of housing and other quality of life benefits is the key to recruiting and sustaining the all-volunteer force. As Secretary Eastin stated, “We are out there competing with the Toyota plant, with the Home Depot plant, and with the hardware store for employees. If they [soldiers] are not living

491 Ibid., 23.
492 Ibid., 37-38.
493 Ibid., 27.
494 Ibid., 15.
Thus, faced with the choice between joining the military and entering the private sector, potential recruits must see that the military provides a quality of life that is equal to or better than the quality of life provided by private sector opportunities. By providing high quality and sufficient housing on par with the private sector, the military is able to attract the highly skilled recruits who might otherwise be turned away from military service. By the 1990’s, however, it became increasingly clear that the Army was no longer competitive with the private sector. “One bath for three or four bedrooms might have been satisfactory in the 1950’s; now, military families want not only more bathrooms, but more living and storage space, various appliances, parking for at least two cars and other amenities.” Thus, as the condition of military housing deteriorated throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, the material values and expectations of soldiers simultaneously increased, reflecting the values and expectations of their civilian peers.

In turn, as this chasm between the quality of housing in the private sector and the quality of housing that the military provided not only grew but also permeated the media, the military’s ability to compete with the private sector for promising young recruits decreased. As the unsuitable state of housing for both soldiers with families and unaccompanied soldiers became more apparent, the military encountered an image problem, such that people no longer associated high quality housing with joining the military. Accordingly, the 1998 DoD Youth Attitude Tracking Survey, which measures youth propensity, a valid indicator of first-time enlistment behavior, found that youth propensity to enlist in the military steadily declined throughout the 1990s. Thus, the chasm in quality of housing contributed to a failure to meet recruiting benchmarks in 1998 and 1999.

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495 Eastin Interview.
498 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, 18.
IV. FAMILY HOUSING POLICY – ISSUES SURROUNDING IMPROVEMENT

The U.S. Government and Army Approach

In advocating for a massive overhaul of military family housing policy, the goal would remain the same – achieve the highest quality of housing for military families. The means of achieving this goal, however, would be performance-based instead of means-based, thus allowing for greater flexibility in achieving excellent housing for military families. With the MHPI, the U.S. government successfully attracted private sector developers who could achieve a higher quality of housing for military families faster and cheaper than the government. In support of the initiative, a 1996 GAO study found that on average, the government spent $4,957 less for each family that lived in private housing compared to government-owned or -leased housing. An earlier 1993 CBO study found that over the long run, the cost of providing DoD-owned or -leased housing was 35 percent greater than the cost of private sector housing. On Capitol Hill, with the universally accepted view that current military family housing was incapable of solving the housing crisis and with strong bipartisan support for better military housing, the MHPI encountered virtually no resistance.

Once implemented, the RCI complied with the following model of privatization: For a given area of government-owned family housing (in-kind housing) that is in poor condition, the government calculates the cost to fix the homes. With this cost in mind, the Army seeks to tap into private capital and thus, holds a competition for developers to present revitalized housing communities. The Army awards the project to the private developer with the best revitalized housing community using criteria like experience and qualifications, financial capacity, design and construction concepts, past performance, and proposed financial terms and conditions. The selected private developer and the Army then enter negotiations to reach a business agreement, at which point the Army notifies Congress that in thirty days the Army and the private developer will close the deal. Assuming Congressional approval, the Army and private developer close the deal. The day after closing, occupants receive housing allowances from the Army and become rent-paying occupants in

502 Bradley Graham.
privatized housing. The income stream from rent supports the private developer’s access to private capital in the form of private debt and developer equity.\footnote{Helwig Interview.}

Thus, the extent to which the U.S. government is involved is limited, but essential. Government contributions help leverage private capital and support development by closing development gaps and insuring the feasibility of transactions from a financial cash flow perspective. With the exception of making contributions when needed to ensure project solvency, the government continues its interest in the development of the project by acting as overseer to ensure that terms and conditions of the business agreement are met.\footnote{Ibid.}

**Residential Communities Initiative: Faster, Cheaper, Better**

Through the RCI, the Army is able to provide soldiers and their families with quality housing using private sector standards for less money at a faster pace. In terms of pace, Robert Helwig, the Deputy Director for Housing and Housing Privatization at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, projects that the RCI will successfully privatize all family housing within five years, a marked decrease from the thirty year projection for completion by the Task Force on Quality of Life.\footnote{Helwig Interview.} With regards to cost, a 2000 GAO study found that over the course of the fifty-year lease, the privatization model would be, on average, 11 percent less costly than comparable projects that would have been funded with Military Family Housing funds.\footnote{General Accountability Office, Military Housing: Continued Concerns in Implementing the Privatization Initiative (Washington, DC: GAO, 2000), 7.} Helwig agreed: “Privatization of family housing is 10% cheaper if one calculates the cost in life cycles and if one compares the cost to what the government appropriations should have been to ensure quality housing

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for Army families.”508 The RCI currently estimates that while the private developers initially invested $10.5 billion in private capital, the government equity in these completed projects is only $955 million.509 Thus, RCI has exceeded the DoD’s goal to obtain at least $3 in military housing improvements through the private sector for each dollar that the government invested,510 yielding $11 in private sector revitalization for each government dollar.511 Further, military families, like the Funkhouser’s, have deemed the RCI a success: “I wouldn’t have it any other way. It’s much better – no comparison with what we had before.”512 In turn, by providing a higher quality of housing faster and cheaper than previously used sources, the RCI is able to quickly and (relatively) cheaply deliver an image of increased well-being that is attractive to influencers.513

**Residential Communities Initiative: Progress Report**

At the launch of the Army’s Residential Communities Initiative, the Army faced a tough agenda: 99% of the Army’s family housing inventory, over 88,000 homes, needed to be privatized. The RCI grouped this inventory into forty-five installations and began soliciting private developers. Presently, RCI has successfully privatized and completed thirty-six of the forty-five installations, which are comprised of 89,295 homes or 98% of the Army’s current family housing inventory in the United States. Although 98% of the Army’s family housing inventory has been successfully privatized and completed, a significant number of installations are in vulnerable stages of the privatization model, especially given the current economic climate. Four installations in Fort Richardson, Arkansas are in solicitation or development with an estimated transfer of title closing date in March 2010. The five remaining installations have been awarded transfer of title closing dates between July 2008 and August 2009.514

**Financial Crisis Implications**

Thus, while the RCI has successfully privatized and completed 98% of the Army’s family housing inventory, nine more installations have to be successfully privatized and completed before the Army can say that it has completely eliminated the problem of deficient and substandard housing for Army families.

508 Helwig Interview.
509 U.S. Army, “Overview, Residential Communities Initiative.”
511 U.S. Army, “Overview, Residential Communities Initiative.”
513 Helwig Interview.
514 U.S. Army, “Overview, Residential Communities Initiative.”
Unfortunately for these installations, current economic conditions provide an environment that makes private developers’ ability to tap into private capital more difficult. The government must be willing to close the increased gap between the cost of complete revitalization and the decreased amount of available private capital (in the form of private debt and developer equity). In addition, many loans that private developers may have taken in the peak of the housing bubble may need to be refinanced. Unfortunately, current economic conditions provide an unfavorable environment for refinancing commercial debt. The government must be willing to help the private developers refinance the acquired debt to ensure the project’s solvency and accordingly, the ability for the private developer to continue in its capacity as landlord/operator. For purposes of recruitment, the government must ensure speedy and successful privatization and completion of these installations to avoid any image of inequitable well-being among families in the eyes of influencers, which could result in a failure to meet recruiting benchmarks.

V. UNACCOMPANIED PERSONNEL HOUSING POLICY
   – ISSUES SURROUNDING IMPROVEMENT

The U.S. Government and Army Approach

In attempting to improve the quality of housing for unaccompanied personnel, the U.S. Government and Army have adopted a multi-method approach – a completely government-funded approach through the BMP and a privatization approach through the RCI’s awarding of five installations at Fort Bliss, Texas, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Fort Drum, New York, Fort Irwin, California, and Fort Stewart, Georgia to private developers. These approaches vary in terms of both their target populations and their means of achieving high quality housing. While the BMP targets housing for all unaccompanied personnel housing (both training barracks for E1-E5 unaccompanied personnel and permanent party barracks for E6 and above unaccompanied personnel), the privatization model targets only unaccompanied personnel with ranks E6 and above (permanent party barracks). With regards to means, while the BMP, which is estimated to cost $15 billion, combines funds from two appropriations, Military Construction and Operations & Maintenance, the

515 Helwig Interview; Savoy Interview.
516 Ibid.
518 Savoy Interview.
RCI model for unaccompanied personnel housing is similar to the model for family housing, obtaining private sector expertise for housing in accordance with private sector standards for less money at a faster pace.

**Barracks Modernization Program for Training Barracks**

Despite the known inefficiencies and inadequacies of the Military Construction and Operation & Maintenance funds, the BMP is uniquely qualified to deliver modernized training barracks for E1-E5 unaccompanied personnel.\(^{519}\) Although the RCI has proved to be cheaper, faster, and generally, better, at delivering quality housing to soldiers, the RCI privatization model is not compatible with the “Army business model” of building esprit de corps and unit integrity among new enlistees.\(^{520}\) This business model entails the presence of leadership and discipline and accordingly, sergeants, to mold new enlistees into an operational unit. Unfortunately, the RCI privatization model, since one of its main goals is to provide unaccompanied soldiers with more privacy, is antithetical to having sergeants dispersed in private barracks.\(^{521}\)

**Residential Communities Initiative for Five Permanent Party Barracks**

The five test sites for privatization of unaccompanied personnel housing, four of which are now home to tenants, indicate that, with correct implementation, privatization can succeed in delivering quality unaccompanied personnel housing.\(^{522}\) Thus, although the BMP works for the unique case of unaccompanied personnel with ranks E1-E5, this use of the BMP should be the exception; not the rule. Judging from past history, the U.S. Government and Army should be reluctant to rely on funding from Military Construction and Operations & Maintenance more than they have to. Accordingly, because the “Army business model” of building esprit de corps and unit integrity no longer applies to unaccompanied soldiers with ranks E6 and above, who have already become accustomed to life in the Army, the U.S. Government and Army do not have to rely solely on government funding to deliver high quality permanent party barracks.

Unfortunately, however, despite the clear benefits of privatization of permanent party barracks, not all permanent party barracks can be privatized. Financial wrinkles exist in the privatization model such that

\(^{519}\) Eastin Interview; Santala Interview.

\(^{520}\) Santala Interview.

\(^{521}\) Eastin Interview; Santala Interview.

\(^{522}\) Savoy Interview.
certain bases with low proportions of unaccompanied personnel with ranks E6 and above will not be eligible for privatization since smaller installations provide less of a private sector opportunity for profit. Nevertheless, the benefits of privatizing are beyond doubt and preliminary evidence indicates that the models at Fort Bliss, Texas, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Fort Drum, New York, Fort Irwin, California, and Fort Stewart, Georgia can be expanded. In addition to delivering better housing to unaccompanied soldiers with ranks E6 and above more quickly and cheaply than the government could, privatization of the permanent party barracks will also result in a more universal image of increased quality housing for all soldiers. Considering the “world-class” results of the privatization efforts for Army family housing, an expanded RCI for permanent party barracks is the only way to ensure that the Army is sincere in its belief that unaccompanied soldiers deserve the same quality residence that has been provided to married soldiers.

Barracks Modernization Program Contains No Plan for Maintenance

Unlike the RCI privatization model, which contains a built in maintenance plan, with the private developer acting as landlord/operator, taking on all construction, operation, management, and rent collecting responsibilities and costs, the BMP contains no plan for the maintenance of this $15 billion modernization effort. This lack of a maintenance plan is yet another reason why the U.S. Government and Army should not rely on the BMP more than they have to and accordingly, why they should expand the RCI privatization model for permanent party barracks to the furthest extent possible.

To the extent that the BMP must be implemented to deliver quality housing for unaccompanied personnel with ranks E1-E5, the funds for the Sustainment, Restoration, and Maintenance (SRM) Budget must arrive at ASA-I&E as close to the beginning of the fiscal year as possible. While the fiscal year begins October 1, the SRM funds have been “almost traditionally late,” according to Secretary Eastin. This delay in SRM appropriations prevents the Army from entering into new contracts and accordingly, beginning urgent maintenance projects in a timely fashion, since the Army is not allowed to enter contract negotiations

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523 Helwig Interview; Savoy Interview.
524 Savoy Interview.
525 Helwig Interview.
528 Savoy Interview.
529 Eastin Interview.
until it has the funds in hand. By February, when the funds belatedly arrive, ASA-I&E is expected to enter contracts with the same project completion dates, transforming, for example, a twelve-month project into an eight-month project. This shortened period for completion drives up costs dramatically. Furthermore, until the funds are appropriated, ASA-I&E can operate only under continuing resolution authority, which permits piecemeal funding for the continuation of contracts from previous fiscal years. Thus, ASA-I&E is often in a position where it must buy the project in more expensive increments as opposed to an initial lump sum.530

VI. CONCLUSION

Improving and ensuring the quality of housing for Army soldiers and their families will certainly further the U.S. Army’s recruitment interest. Beyond this, these actions will significantly serve other ethical and pragmatic interests including valuing soldiers’ service and improving morale, combat readiness, and retention. At a very basic level, these actions honor “a special duty” to the soldiers.531 It is this kind of multifaceted, long-term approach that ensures not only successful recruitment but also, the success of the all-volunteer force.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

The U.S. Government and Army must:

**Recommendation 1:** PLEDGE government contributions and general commitment to the RCI private developers, who will need financial help in closing the increased gap between the cost of complete revitalization and the decreased amount of available private capital due to the credit crunch and generally poor environment for lending.

**Recommendation 2:** PLEDGE government contributions and general commitment to the RCI private developers, who might need to refinance their debt in an unfavorable economic environment for commercial refinancing to ensure continued project viability.

**Recommendation 3:** EXPAND the RCI privatization model for permanent party barracks at Fort Bliss, Fort Bragg, Fort Drum, Fort Irwin, and Fort Stewart to all permanent party barracks that are viable for privatization.

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530 Santala Interview.
531 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, 3.
**Recommendation 4:** LIMIT the use of the Army’s BMP to the construction of training barracks for unaccompanied personnel with ranks E1-E5 and permanent party barracks for unaccompanied personnel with ranks E6 and above that are not viable for RCI privatization.

**Recommendation 5:** ELIMINATE the opportunity for more inefficiency and higher costs by writing or supporting legislation that pressures Congress to make the Sustainment, Restoration, and Maintenance funds available to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment at the beginning of the fiscal year so the Army can enter new maintenance contracts as soon as possible, allowing for cheaper completion of the project.

**Recommendation 6:** INITIATE new campaigns that advertise the new and award-winning RCI and BMP housing installations to transform the image of housing and accordingly, well-being that influencers associate with military life.

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