

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
BRIDGING DIVIDES:
TRACK II DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
POLICY WORKSHOP 2013



WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

NATE ALLEN, RASHAD BADR, CHRIS BROWN, THOMAS BURNS
LINDSEY EINHAUS, KATHLEEN MERKL, MAYANK MISRA
TRAVIS SHARP, SETH SMITH, ALEXANDRA UTSEY, WILLIAM WAGNER

WORKSHOP DIRECTOR: AMBASSADOR DANIEL KURTZER

CONTENTS



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

I. Leveraging Track II to Support Track I Goals

IRAN

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TALKS

II. Laying New Groundwork for Track I

EGYPT

INTRA-ISRAELI, INTRA-PALESTINIAN

III. Limited Influence Cases

SYRIA

BAHRAIN, LEBANON

IV. Track II Measurement and Evaluation

APPENDICES:

A. FIELDWORK MEETINGS

B. FUNDING & EFFECTIVENESS

C. RISK ASSESSMENT

D. TRACK II EVALUATION SURVEY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report recommends that U.S. policymakers strategically employ Track II dialogues as tools to facilitate conflict resolution in the Middle East. Track II, when conducted with the right participants and at the right time, plays an important role in advancing peace by enabling conflicting parties to open lines of communication, begin to establish trust, and think creatively in an off-the-record domain.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1) Leverage Track II Dialogues to Complement Ongoing Track I Activities

For ongoing conflicts where Track II dialogues have helped facilitate negotiations, Track II should continue to be employed to complement official talks.

- The United States should use Track II to mitigate spoilers and other opponents of the November 24 Interim Agreement between Iran and the United Nations P5+1 members concerning the Iranian nuclear program. The United States should also use Track II to address longer-term regional issues by bringing together Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in discussions.
- The United States can use Track II to discuss sensitive issues surrounding Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, such as the status of Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees.

2) Recognize Opportunities Where Track II Can Facilitate Formal Negotiation

Track II should be applied to new situations to help build trust among conflicting parties and lay the groundwork for official talks.

- Track II can be used to promote internal reconciliation among conflicting parties in Egypt, as well as within Israeli and Palestinian societies.
- Track II can also address cross-cutting regional concerns, such as arms control and the inclusion of women and youth in conflict resolution.

3) Understand the Challenges to Track II Where U.S. Influence is Limited and Key Actors Resist Peace

In conflicts involving regional proxies, U.S. influence is limited and key parties see little to gain from dialogue. We assess that Track II dialogues are less likely to lead to breakthroughs in these situations, though Track II may make modest positive contributions.

- External powerbrokers like Saudi Arabia and Iran perceive dynamics in Syria, Lebanon and Bahrain as zero-sum, inhibiting the prospects for brokering peace outside of Track I. The involvement of regional powers in these countries reduces the likelihood that the parties will voluntarily enter a Track II dialogue focused on conflict resolution.

INTRODUCTION

This workshop recommends that U.S. policymakers consider Track II as an additional strategic tool that can advance U.S. interests in resolving some of the Middle East's most intractable conflicts. Specifically, this report explains how Track II dialogues have contributed to existing negotiation processes and can play a useful facilitative role in other situations; it also provides an assessment of prospects for Track II evaluation. Appendices to the paper include a list of interviews conducted by the contributing authors, information on Track II funding, and a risk analysis of current cases in the Middle East.

Track II dialogues can advance U.S. interests in two separate contexts. First, Track II can play a role *supporting formal negotiations* between conflicting parties, as demonstrated with U.S.-Iran talks and negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. Second, Track II can help spur talks to address *internal reconciliation* in Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinian Territories, as well as *cross-cutting regional concerns* such as youth issues, women's issues, and arms control.

U.S.-supported Track II is likely to be less useful in conflicts where conflicting parties do not believe it is in their interest to negotiate and external powerbrokers have a vested interest in continued conflict. Such cases include Syria, Lebanon, and Bahrain.

What is Track II?

We draw upon the work of Joseph Montville, defining Track II diplomacy as *unofficial, non-structured interaction designed to assist official leaders by exploring possible solutions without the requirements of formal negotiation or bargaining for advantage*. Track II also seeks to promote an environment, through the education of public opinion, that would make it safer for political leaders to take risks for peace.¹ We adopt this version of a Track II definition because of its emphasis on Track II diplomacy as activities which may be designed to influence either official policymaking or the socialization of public opinion.

Methodology

We conducted research in two phases. First, our group reviewed existing Track II literature and met with leading practitioners in the United States. Next, we undertook fact-finding trips and interviewed 80 Track II organizers and participants in Norway, Sweden, Great Britain, Israel/Palestine, Turkey and Qatar. Where possible, we observed several Track II dialogues. Based on the information gathered, we weighed the risks, costs, and benefits to assess how Track II dialogues can be used to advance U.S. interests in resolving Middle East conflicts.

I. Joseph V. Montville, "Track Two Diplomacy: The Work of Healing History," *Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, vol. 17, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 2006): 16.

While subsequent sections of this paper will show how Track II can promote conflict resolution in specific cases, it is important to understand why Track II can be a useful strategic tool. For policymakers, Track II can serve both as a source of ideas to resolve a conflict and as a means to test new proposals. U.S. policymakers need to be aware, however, that engagement with Track II dialogues also poses risks.

Track II as a Source of Ideas

Track II dialogues can offer creative or original proposals about what steps are necessary to resolve a conflict and lay the groundwork for pre-negotiation. The off-the-record nature of a Track II dialogue often allows conflicting parties space to reveal information about their redlines, and a skilled mediator can encourage representatives of the parties to brainstorm how to overcome a conflict. Sustained interaction in an environment that encourages the parties to build mutual understanding without requiring them to make binding commitments can clarify the conditions necessary for a conflict to end. Once lines of communication have been established, Track II dialogues can help the parties lay out the basic parameters of an official resolution.

- **Example:** A Track II dialogue led by Harold Saunders in Tajikistan produced an agreement on negotiation principles just before formal talks began in 1994 under UN auspices. The Track II dialogue helped define the issues for negotiation, and those involved in the UN process were able to draw on relationships with fellow negotiators formed in the Track II dialogue.¹

Track II dialogues can generate discussion on issues too sensitive for official negotiations. Peace talks may not address some sensitive issues, and Track II dialogues can explore issues that official actors may not be able to discuss with the parties, such as dividing territory, post-conflict governance, and refugees. By preparing the parties to address issues not included in formal talks, Track II dialogues reduce the risk of future flashpoints.

- **Example:** The Jerusalem Old City Initiative brought together former officials and academic experts to examine proposals for dividing and administering Jerusalem after a final status agreement.²

Track II as a Means to Test New Proposals and Complement Existing Efforts

U.S. policymakers can work with trusted Track II participants to gauge negotiation proposals before they are discussed in official channels. Because many Track II dialogues are private and operate under rules of non-attribution, government officials can work with Track II participants to put forward proposals for conflict resolution and gauge the reaction of the parties. Even though policymakers may not be participating in the dialogue, officials can use relationships with Track II participants or organizers to ask them to float ideas in the Track II dialogue and report back.

¹ Harold H. Saunders, "Sustained Dialogue in Managing Intractable Conflict," *Negotiation Journal*, vol. 19, no. 1 (January 2003).

² For more information on the Jerusalem Old City Initiative, please see <http://www1.uwindsor.ca/joci/>.

- **Example:** The 1995 Stockholm talks between Israelis and Palestinians reflected close collaboration between each negotiating team and senior officials in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The talks helped produce an understanding of what a final status agreement would entail, though they did not lead to formal negotiations.³

Government officials can work with Track II dialogues to ensure complementarity.

Government officials can leverage Track II channels in tandem with formal negotiations, working with Track II organizers to ensure that dialogues discuss issues that are useful to policymakers. As the Track II dialogue proceeds, government officials can meet with Track II organizers to determine whether there are any issues that formal talks are not discussing, or any groups that ought to be included in Track II discussions. A basic level of coordination can ensure that the Track II process does not disrupt official discussions of sensitive issues.

- **Example:** The organizers of a series of Track II dialogues on the Transdnistria conflict consulted with official mediators from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and held Track II meetings for participants in the formal negotiations. The Track II meetings allowed the participants to think creatively about how to overcome obstacles, and principles from Track II eventually spurred several formal joint declarations and memoranda.⁴

Risks of Greater Engagement with Track II Dialogues

Publicized participation or support for a Track II dialogue can prompt domestic criticism.

Many Track II dialogues seek to move beyond existing conflict dynamics by bringing together adversaries unwilling to meet in public. Moreover, Track II dialogues may include non-state actors, such as Hamas, whose violent backgrounds make any engagement through Track II deeply controversial. When U.S. officials either participate in Track II dialogues or appear to endorse their proceedings, they incur a risk of exposure that may lead to a backlash from Congress or other domestic lobbies. For participants, the stakes may be even higher, as leaks revealing participation may compromise the safety of their families and associates. An experienced Track II sponsor is essential for ensuring secrecy.

Track II dialogues may not produce policy-relevant outcomes. Not all Track II dialogues seek to influence policy in a direct manner. Many are designed to bring people together to build sustained contact and mutual understanding. Dialogues that aim to promote agreement may fail to achieve it because of deep differences among participants.

Track II diplomacy may undermine or compete with official conflict resolution efforts.

Track II efforts that are poorly coordinated with Track I can serve as distractions and drain resources and attention from official initiatives. At times, Track II participants come away from their experiences feeling less confident about the odds of reaching agreement. In other cases, ideas or proposals from Track II become public and distract from the substance of formal talks.

³ Hussein Agha, Shai Feldman, Ahmad Khalidi, and Zeev Schiff, *Track-II Diplomacy: Lessons from the Middle East* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003), 72.

⁴ Ronald Fisher, "Coordination Between Track Two and Track One Diplomacy in Successful Cases of Pre-negotiation," *International Negotiation*, 11, (2006) 79-80.



SECTION I: LEVERAGING TRACK II TO SUPPORT TRACK I

Track II played a significant role encouraging official negotiations on Iran's nuclear program and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by developing some of the ideas and frameworks that led to major diplomatic breakthroughs. While the most important diplomatic action on these issues is now at the official level, the United States is likely to benefit from employing Track II as a strategic tool to support official negotiations.

IRAN

Recommendation 1:

The State Department should, through partnered funding with other parties and Track II sponsors, encourage practitioners to focus future Track II dialogues on Iran's relationships with neighbors in the Persian Gulf and to expand participation to include potential spoilers to the interim (and any permanent) nuclear deal with Iran.

For more than ten years, an ongoing series of Track II dialogues facilitated relationships between influential U.S. and Iranian officials and academics, which in turn led to the development of ideas that formed the groundwork for the November 24 Interim Agreement on Iran's nuclear program. President Hassan Rouhani's negotiating team includes several figures, such as Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, who participated in Track II discussions, where they gained a better understanding of U.S. positions and discussed possible compromises.

On the U.S. side, former White House National Security Staff Senior Director Puneet Talwar participated in Track II dialogues, later playing an instrumental role in both official and secret back-channel talks. Other U.S. Track II participants with close ties to the Obama Administration include former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry, former Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering, and former Ambassador Frank Wisner. Several of the officials involved in these dialogues published a series of op-eds and reports to highlight the potential areas of compromise discussed in Track II sessions. A summary of these proposals, as well as the main components of the November 24 Interim Agreement, is contained in Figure 1 below:

Progression of ideas on Iran's nuclear program from Track II to Interim Agreement				
Track II outcomes			Interim Agreement	
March 2008*	April 2013**	August 2013***	November 2013****	
<p>✍Iran prohibited from producing highly enriched uranium</p> <p>✍No work on nuclear fuel inside Iran, outside any multilateral arrangement</p>	<p>✍Iran limits the level it continues to enrich uranium, no higher than 3.5% to 5%</p> <p>✍Iran limits the quantity of enriched uranium stockpiled</p> <p>✍Iran ceases production of 20% enriched uranium</p>	<p>✍Iran limits its 20% enrichment program and agrees not to stockpile such material</p> <p>✍Iran agrees not to separate plutonium</p>	<p>✍Iran agrees to stop enriching uranium beyond 5%</p> <p>✍Iran's stockpile of 20% enriched uranium would be diluted or converted to oxide</p> <p>✍Iran halts progress on enrichment capacity, growth of 3.5% stockpile</p>	
<p>✍Iran fully implements Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Additional Protocol</p>	<p>✍Iran implements the Additional Protocol and provides a description of the scope and parameters of its civil nuclear program</p> <p>✍Continued modernization and improvement of monitoring techniques</p>	<p>✍Iran fully opens its nuclear facilities to greater and more frequent IAEA oversight</p> <p>✍Iran implements Additional Protocol</p>	<p>✍International monitors allowed to visit Natanz and Fordo on daily basis</p> <p>✍Ratify and implement the Additional Protocol (as a final step of a comprehensive solution)</p>	
<p>✍Iran commits to a program of only light water reactors (LWRs)</p>			<p>✍International civil nuclear cooperation on acquiring modern LWRs (as a final step of a comprehensive solution)</p>	
	<p>✍U.S. commitment to no new sanctions</p> <p>✍Easing of existing U.S. and EU sanctions</p>	<p>✍U.S. and partners lift some of the most severe sanctions</p> <p>✍Possible lifting of UN sanctions in response to further progress</p>	<p>✍U.S. and EU suspend sanctions on petrochemical imports, gold and precious metals</p> <p>✍No new U.S., EU, or UN Security Council nuclear-related sanctions</p>	
		<p>✍An initial agreement providing for a verifiable trial period during which each side complies with the interim deal</p>	<p>✍Iran, U.S., EU to work on implementation of above elements during a six-month period, renewable by mutual consent</p>	
		<p>✍U.S. and negotiating partners accept Iran's peaceful nuclear program</p>	<p>✍"This comprehensive solution would enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the NPT in conformity with its obligations therein."</p>	
<p>* Thomas R. Pickering, William Luers, and Jim Walsh. "A Solution for the U.S.-Iran Nuclear Standoff," <i>The New York Review of Books</i>, March 28, 2008, accessed November 26, 2013: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2008/mar/20/a-solution-for-the-us-iran-nuclear-standoff/.</p> <p>** The Iran Project, 2013. "Strategic Options for Iran: Balancing Pressure with Diplomacy," (New York: The Iran Project), pp. 50-53.</p> <p>*** Thomas R. Pickering, William Luers, and Jim Walsh. "For a New Approach to Iran," <i>The New York Review of Books</i>, August 15, 2013, accessed November 26, 2013: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/aug/15/new-approach-iran/.</p> <p>**** Joint Plan of Action agreed to between Iran and P5+1 members in Geneva, November 24, 2013.</p>				

The number of American and Iranian actors with prior experience in Track II activities can serve as a bench of talent to organize future Track II dialogues. By tapping into this existing expertise, policymakers can not only draw upon their unique understanding of the issues, but can also organize new dialogues in a shorter time period. As many past participants are familiar with one another, these pre-existing relationships – and the trust that comes along with it – can overcome one of the largest obstacles to generating productive outcomes in Track II. Moreover, these networks and relationships can provide useful feedback on Track I initiatives and address problematic issues that may arise and potentially threaten progress in official talks.

Substantively, future Iran-related Track II activities can complement Track I by addressing Iran's relationships with other regional powers. Competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia is a key driver of regional instability and could be a catalyst for future conflict. While previous Track II dialogues have focused on the United States and Iran, future activities could bring former senior Iranian officials together with Saudi counterparts and others from Gulf Cooperation Council states to address mutual insecurities. As nuclear talks between the P5+1 and Iran progress, there may be an opportunity for Saudi Arabia and Iran to reassess their relationships; the unofficial nature of Track II would allow both to engage in tentative discussions with minimal risk. At some point, Track II could also foster Iranian-Israeli contacts.

In a similar vein, Track II dialogues should expand their participation to include skeptics of a nuclear deal as a means of mitigating the role of spoilers who may seek to undermine the November 24 Interim Agreement or future negotiations. Whereas most dialogues with Iran include only retired diplomats or military leaders, Track II could bring Congressional staff, journalists, and other political analysts (from the United States and the region) together with Iranians to discuss nuclear issues and help raise awareness about what kind of a deal would be acceptable. These discussions can eventually expand to areas beyond the nuclear question.

ISRAEL-PALESTINE

Track II processes have been an integral part of efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict beginning in the 1970s, and still buttress formal negotiations today. While previous dialogues have brought parties to a level of familiarity, and the general parameters of a final status agreement are known, Track II initiatives can address sensitive issues in a setting where parties do not feel forced to make binding commitments. While U.S. officials work with Israeli and Palestinian negotiators on a comprehensive agreement, Track II processes offer support on issues that may hinder the implementation of any peace agreement in the long term.

Recommendation 2:

Track II processes should complement official Track I efforts on particularly sensitive issues in negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. Such efforts were helpful in the past and may contribute to final-status agreements regarding Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugee issue.

Recommendation 3:

Track II efforts should cover areas beyond those included in official negotiations, which are nevertheless important for lasting peace. These include infrastructure and development, inter-religious dialogue, and relationships between Israeli and Palestinian youth.

Recommendation 4:

The State Department should work with Congress to make funding available through USAID or another State Department office, such as the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, to support Track II initiatives on the above subjects. While the Obama Administration has labeled resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a top priority, USAID has generally declined to fund projects in Israel and the West Bank focusing on conflict resolution, citing perceived Congressional concerns about supporting specific negotiation proposals. USAID and the State Department should proactively seek out implementers for Track II on areas that could support formal negotiations, and remove impediments to programming such funds.

Sensitive Issues to Address in a Track II Process

- **Jerusalem:** The status of Jerusalem is a key issue that could benefit from a renewed Track II process. Past Track II activities, such as the Jerusalem Old City Initiative, have laid the groundwork for discussions on how Jerusalem can be governed and how access to holy sites in the Old City can be managed.⁵ A successful Track II forum on this topic may allow negotiators to incorporate ideas or draft language into a formal peace agreement.
- **Refugee Issues:** The treatment of Palestinian refugees, particularly those outside Israel and the Palestinian territories, is another area to explore via Track II. Chatham

⁵ For more information on the Jerusalem Old City Initiative, please see <http://www1.uwindsor.ca/joci/>.

House's Minister Lovell Process previously examined the question of how the perspectives of Palestinian refugees and their host countries could be incorporated into any final status agreement.⁶ Preparing these refugees for a peace agreement and a possible return to a Palestinian state may be best addressed in a confidential Track II process, where Palestinians from different areas and factions could speak more openly and constructively about their concerns.

Issues that Move Beyond Official Negotiations

- **Infrastructure and Development Issues:** Water resource management is crucial to the viability of the two-state solution, and Track II efforts could investigate how to mitigate this potential area of disagreement. The challenges of implementing customs agreements to govern trade with a future Palestinian state, as well as fostering economic growth more generally, could also merit discussion in a Track II format.
- **Inter-religious Dialogues in Israel and the Palestinian Territories:** Israeli and Palestinian religious leaders can shape public opinion, and political leaders on both sides highlighted to this workshop the potential benefits of addressing the religious aspect to the conflict. Previous religious dialogues have focused mainly on historical relationships and other theological questions, but a more solution-focused discussion could help promote a successful Track I negotiation. Specifically, Jewish and Islamic leaders at varying levels should discuss how to use their influence in their respective communities to create the conditions necessary for a durable political peace agreement.
- **Youth:** Younger members from the two societies have interacted less with each other compared to older generations, which has led to increasing separation between young Israelis and Palestinians. This gap has fostered mistrust, cynicism, and misperceptions among youth on both sides. A Track II initiative for young Israeli and Palestinian professionals connected to policy circles could generate fresh ideas for conflict resolution and broaden constituencies for peace.

⁶ For more information on Chatham House's activities with Palestinian refugees, please see <http://www.chathamhouse.org/research/middle-east/current-projects/minster-lovell-process>.

Track II Success Stories in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

- Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Harvard psychologist Herbert Kelman led a series of private, off-the record workshops among influential Israelis and Palestinians. These Track II workshops succeeded in building trust among participants and allowed each side to gain an understanding of the other's views on the conflict. Many of the participants became official negotiators, and the relationships built in these meetings helped facilitate formal talks. Observers widely credit Kelman's Track II process with laying the groundwork for the 1994 Oslo Accords and promoting the idea of a two-state solution.
- The NGO Friends of the Earth Middle East established the "Good Water Neighbors" (GWN) project in 2001 to raise awareness of the shared water problems of Palestinians, Jordanians, and Israelis. The GWN identifies communities from all three societies and utilizes their mutual dependence on shared water resources to foster cooperation on sustainable water management, even in the midst of conflict. GWN has attracted \$240 million in investment.
- In 2012, Ben Gurion University launched a "Business for Peace" competition based on the idea that joint Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation could serve as a catalyst for peace. The winning entry, which received \$20,000, sought to connect Israel's high-tech industry with Palestinian software engineers through the development of a website that lists collaborative employment opportunities. Its goal is to create a cooperative economic environment in which each side seeks out the other, and, in the long run, builds lasting cross-border relationships that can facilitate successful Track I agreements.
- The NGO Search for Common Ground's (SFCG) Jerusalem office recently produced *Under the Same Sun*, a docu-drama following an Israeli-Palestinian business venture. The film attempts to "normalize" the idea of joint Israeli-Palestinian projects and underscores the idea that each society must gain familiarity with the other to achieve a durable peace. Israel's popular TV Channel 2 and the independent Palestinian Ma'an satellite stations broadcast the film simultaneously on October 2, 2013. Producers will screen the project with audiences in the United States and Europe in the coming months.



SECTION II: LAYING NEW GROUNDWORK FOR TRACK I

Beyond supporting existing talks, Track II can facilitate successful official negotiations across a wide array of conflicts and challenges in the Middle East. In recent years, many disputes in the region have involved internal struggles about a society's identity and political orientation. Track II can help address these national divisions, particularly in Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinian Territories. Likewise, participants in Track II have used the format to discuss larger regional issues, and Track II can be applied more broadly to address arms control and the roles of women and youth in conflict resolution.

PROMOTING INTERNAL RECONCILIATION

Recommendation 5:

U.S. policymakers should utilize Track II dialogues as a means to promote national reconciliation and offer partnered funding for qualified institutions willing to organize dialogues on the subject. Because Track II dialogues offer adversaries the chance to voice grievances and build mutual understanding, they can be particularly useful in resolving internal conflicts about identity within Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinian Territories.

- ***Egypt:*** In Egypt's highly-charged political environment, a secret and private Track II dialogue can offer representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis, liberal parties, youth activists, and the security forces the chance to better understand each other's grievances and open lines of communication. Because many Egyptians consider no single institution sufficiently objective to moderate a dialogue, a Track II sponsor could identify a team of facilitators representing Egypt's various factions to lead the process. Alternatively, former UN officials may be acceptable as facilitators. An off-the-record Track II process may be the only way to promote reconciliation, given that opponents to negotiation would criticize any party's participation in a public negotiation process as capitulation.
- ***Dialogues within the Israeli and Palestinian Communities:*** Major unresolved schisms within Israeli and Palestinian societies threaten a durable peace agreement. Rather than focus on discussions between Israelis and Palestinians, Track II dialogues aimed at bringing together different groups *within* each society can help improve prospects for peace.

- **Among Palestinians**, Track II dialogues could be a useful forum for promoting Palestinian reconciliation, given the sensitivities surrounding public meetings of political parties Hamas and Fatah. As mentioned in Section I, Track II can also facilitate dialogue among Palestinian refugee populations.
- **Among Israelis**, a Track II dialogue could help liberals and conservatives better understand each other's views on a peace agreement, especially regarding the question of settlements. Given the strength of Israel's religious right, implementing a peace agreement without cooperation between conservatives and liberals would be a challenge. A Track II dialogue could look at options for how to manage the closure of settlement outposts and land swaps, as well as the issue of a referendum on a peace agreement.

ADDRESSING REGIONAL ISSUES

Recommendation 6:

U.S. policymakers should support Track II dialogues aimed at facilitating formal negotiations on arms control and promoting the participation of youth and women in conflict resolution to help socialize these issues in the Middle East. Socialization is an essential function of Track II, and the mutual understanding gained from such initiatives can help resolve conflicts when political conditions are ripe. In addition, policymakers can use Track II to float or test ideas that might eventually be included in formal negotiations.

Recommendation 7:

Key roadblocks to the creation of widespread Track II activities on a regional level are a lack of capacity and a lack of interest. By supporting local efforts to foster Track II activity, the U.S. government and its various international partners can address this gap. For example, the United States can match outside funding to support regional think tanks and educational institutions, or it could arrange joint ventures with local institutions. By matching funds from other donors, the United States can support local capacity while minimizing perceptions that it seeks to manipulate or dominate Track II initiatives.

- ***Arms Control:*** For more than 20 years, officials have called for a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)-Free Zone in the Middle East. These efforts are now more urgent following Syria's use of chemical weapons, in addition to increasing tensions over Iran's nuclear program. Track II has facilitated off-the-record dialogues among technical experts and policymakers on how to develop mechanisms to ensure and monitor compliance with arms control initiatives. They have also helped socialize key policymakers and experts to the idea of a WMD-Free Zone. The idea of a WMD-Free Zone may not come to fruition in the near future, but Track II efforts can continue to facilitate formal negotiations on the issue should the right political conditions arise. Historically, Track II has played a vital role as a means for policymakers to float ideas for official negotiations, and it should continue to play this role in the future.

- ***Women's Issues:*** Approximately 70% of civilian casualties in recent conflicts were women and children, and armed conflict disproportionately affects these groups. However, women are historically underrepresented in peace and reconciliation processes. Convening a series of women-only Track II dialogues can bring attention to the hardships that war imposes on women and give them a platform from which to advocate for their rights and express their views. The inclusion of women can lend additional credibility to peace processes and possibly lead to further breakthroughs.⁷ Support for such dialogues also advances broader U.S. interests in promoting women's issues.
- ***Youth Issues:*** Recent events in the Middle East have established youth as an important voice for change that officials ignore at their own peril. Moreover, youth-oriented events such as the Young Pugwash conference on Dialogue, Disarmament and Regional Security have proved to be an important way to identify and educate future leaders on conflict resolution issues. Finding ways to incorporate youth leaders into policy-oriented Track II dialogues can provide the current and next generation of decision-makers with a deeper understanding of the causes of regional conflicts and the steps necessary to resolve them.

⁷ The World Bank, *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2011), 120-123.



SECTION III: LIMITED INFLUENCE CASES

Track II efforts are less proven in conflicts where key actors lack an interest in promoting or pursuing dialogue. This is particularly true in conflicts where regional powers have become heavily involved and exacerbate local tensions, such as in Syria, Lebanon, and Bahrain. In these conflicts, U.S. influence is much more limited because those powers in the region supporting a continuation of the conflict will seek to undermine any U.S. effort to promote dialogue. Unless all parties to the conflict, including their chief sponsors, are willing to commit to an off-the-record dialogue, Track II will likely not lead to a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the near term.

SYRIA

Recommendation 8:

A Track II dialogue on Syria would be most productive if focused on discrete issues to which all parties have previously committed. Examples of these issues include access for humanitarian assistance organizations or management of internally displaced persons and refugees.

Recommendation 9:

The United States should consider supporting third-party Track II efforts focused on organizing the Syrian opposition and developing a unified vision for an end to the conflict, although this is a riskier endeavor due to the likely inclusion of Islamic extremist groups among the opposition.

This workshop assesses that Track II dialogues on Syria are unlikely to lead to a comprehensive resolution of the conflict, yet given the strategic and humanitarian implications of the Syrian civil war, the United States should consider Track II options that may achieve necessary progress at the margins. A comprehensive Syrian peace agreement facilitated by Track II is unlikely because such dialogues rely on voluntary participation; given that both the opposition and the government of Bashar al-Assad have powerful patrons supporting a military

solution to the conflict, neither side has a strong incentive to enter into a Track II dialogue regarding a comprehensive peace agreement.

Track II dialogues concerning Syria are most likely to be effective if focused on more modest goals that each side would be willing to discuss without pressure from outside governments. For example, representatives from Damascus and the opposition could discuss issues related to the provision of humanitarian assistance or management of internally displaced persons. These topics have received support in the past, and could help facilitate ongoing Track I negotiations.

Track II dialogues could also bring together representatives of various opposition factions for discussions on common principles. The disorganization and internal rivalries of the Syrian opposition decrease the likelihood that they will achieve a military victory against Assad's regime or impose a mutually hurting stalemate—short of which the opposition is unlikely to attain one of its primary objectives, that Assad step down from power. The United States should therefore consider supporting Track II efforts focused on organizing the opposition. This recommendation involves risk due to the likely inclusion of Islamic extremist groups among the opposition, and may best be pursued through a third party.

BAHRAIN & LEBANON

Recommendation 10:

Due to the sectarian nature of conflicts in Lebanon and Bahrain, the United States should not expect Track II activities to lead to major breakthroughs in the near future and instead adopt a long-term view regarding the potential of Track II dialogues to make a significant impact.

Both Lebanon and Bahrain face rising sectarian tensions that have at times sparked violent confrontations. Because these tensions reflect larger regional problems (the Syrian conflict for Lebanon; the Saudi-Iranian rivalry for Bahrain), Track II dialogues are unlikely to lead to major breakthroughs in the politics of either country in the immediate future. Similar to the Syria conflict, Track II dialogues could focus on helping to manage existing tensions, but this workshop assesses the odds of immediate success as low. In Lebanon, Track II might focus on how to manage specific flashpoints, such as Tripoli, or address goals to which all sides have committed, such as countering arms smuggling or absorbing Syrian refugees. For Bahrain, Track II could focus on the implementation of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry recommendations.

The Dilemma of Engaging Terrorists and Controversial Groups

From Hamas and Hizballah to Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, addressing conflicts in the Middle East often entails establishing some level of contact with groups who rely on illegal or immoral means to achieve their desired political ends. Dealing with these groups, especially State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), may run counter to U.S. values and regulations. Although the legality of speaking with FTOs creates a fundamental dilemma for Track II outreach, this workshop learned various “best practices” from European Track II practitioners in the field that could help inform outreach to terrorist organizations and other controversial groups. These interlocutors emphasized the need for secrecy to limit public scrutiny of any contact with terrorist groups, and they offered the following methods they have employed to engage these groups in the past:

- **Third Country Cooperation Enables Indirect Communication:** Some governments who are open partners with the United States are willing to engage terrorist groups directly. For example, the Qatari government has worked with the Norwegian government to conduct talks with certain Islamic groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Taliban, and Hamas. New governments eager to mediate—such as Turkey, Qatar, and Brazil—may afford Washington opportunities for indirect outreach.
- **Cutout Organizations Remove Logistical Barriers to Contact:** Some European governments have relied heavily on small cutout organizations to bridge networks of militant Islamists with NGOs willing to engage them. These cutout organizations are funded by the European governments for a broader mission and not paid expressly for these activities, but the cutouts—who recognize the importance of learning how to incentivize nefarious groups—voluntarily work to remove logistical challenges to facilitating third-party discussions. For instance, an organization identified key participants and leveraged a Middle Eastern institute to organize travel of Hamas members to a safe third-country location. In effect, these organizations enable the governments to maintain legal proprieties while eliminating barriers to contact.
- **Case-by-case Legal Analysis May Reveal Limited Opportunities:** European interlocutors also emphasized that legal constraints on engagement can be less stringent than policymakers perceive, and they could potentially be worked around carefully. For example, a Norwegian project will trigger financial scrutiny when its funding level passes a specific monetary threshold – making amounts beneath that bar less problematic for funding dialogues with Islamic militants. The government strategically limits such funding and keeps meetings small.

TRACK II MEASUREMENT AND EVALUATION

Track II practitioners make many claims about the measurability and effectiveness of their efforts. Many Track II practitioners and proponents argue that Track II contributions to conflict resolution do not lend themselves well to evaluation because Track II outcomes are difficult to measure, multifaceted, and often take time to manifest themselves. Yet there have been few attempts by independent, outside observers to measure the effectiveness of Track II, and some experts admit that the lack of systematic efforts to evaluate Track II harms Track II's overall credibility.⁸

Recommendation 11:

Fund a systematic literature review, comprehensive comparative case analysis, or large-N study of the effectiveness of Track II initiatives, with specific attention as to which types of Track II interventions achieve which types of outcomes.

Recommendation 12:

Commission a white paper or report aimed at setting standards in measuring and evaluating the effectiveness of Track II diplomacy initiatives

Recommendation 13:

Track II funders should begin requiring practitioners to use independent, third-party evaluators to assess the effectiveness of their work and set aside fixed portions of their budgets towards evaluation.

Over the past decade or so, some scholars have attempted to more seriously think about and design ways in which Track II might be better measured. Tamra Pearson D'Estrée and her colleagues have designed a comprehensive 'conceptual framework' for evaluation in interactive conflict resolution, proposing a variety of context-based criteria and indicators, as well as ways to link micro-level impacts with macro-level goals and longer time frames.⁹ Cheyenne Church and Julie Shouldice propose a framework which forces planners of conflict resolution efforts to focus on operationalizing their goals and assumptions, developing a monitoring system to assess the process of the intervention itself, and consider more systematically short-term and long-term

⁸ See, for example, Nadim N. Rouhana, "Unofficial Third-Party Intervention in International Conflict: Between Legitimacy and Disarray." *Negotiation Journal* vol. 11, no. 3 (1995): 255-270; during an interview with the workshop on October 10, 2013, Dalia Dassa Kaye expressed similar sentiment.

⁹ Tamra Pearson D'Estrée, Larissa A. Fast, Joshua N. Weiss, and Monica S. Jakobsen, "Changing the Debate about Success in Conflict Resolution Efforts." *Negotiation Journal* vol. 17, no. 2 (2001): 101-113.

impacts.¹⁰ Finally, at the more macro-level, Tobias Böhmelt has recently completed the first quantitative study of the effectiveness of third party interventions, finding that combined Track I and Track II negotiation efforts are more successful together than either are alone.¹¹

Our conclusion is that Track II advocates are doing a disservice in claiming that Track II efforts do not lend themselves well to being quantified and measured. Although Track II diplomacy efforts may lead to diverse short-term outcomes, there appears to be little dispute that the ultimate goal of Track II diplomacy is to contribute to the resolution of conflict. At the macro-level, Track II diplomacy efforts have been around long enough that numerous analytical techniques, from the intensive examination of case studies, historical analysis, as well as certain types of surveys and quantitative analysis, lend themselves well to an assessment of the overall effect of Track II efforts on conflict resolution. Böhmelt's data contains 345 specific instances of Track II diplomacy in 70 individual conflicts during the period of analysis. It may be true that every Track II effort is slightly different, but the wealth of data that exist suggest that broad comparisons concerning the inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and impacts of varying Track II approaches are possible.

At the micro-level, Track II practitioners could be more systematic in outlining the goals and objectives of their activities, and then evaluating the extent to which some of the short-term outputs and outcomes are achieved. One way of measuring short-term outcomes might involve no more than asking prospective Track II participants to fill out short structured or semi-structured surveys about their conflict perceptions before, during, and after participating in Track II dialogues. This workshop developed one such survey instrument, which is attached in Appendix D.

The fact that there may be no immediate link between Track II interventions and official agreements or policy outcomes is not a reason to avoid measuring, monitoring, and evaluating short-term outcomes. Researchers and practitioners can also trace longer-term outcomes of various Track II initiatives as they emerge. Track II practitioners need to understand that evaluation is not a judgment of them or their work, but an opportunity to think more carefully about what they are trying to achieve and learn how to improve. By insisting that Track II diplomacy does not lend itself to quantification and measurement, practitioners are denying themselves and their profession an opportunity to more rigorously demonstrate Track II's effectiveness and to more deeply investigate how specific techniques work and what outcomes Track II practitioners can expect to achieve. This is especially true because a substantial amount of evidence exists to suggest that Track II diplomacy can be quite effective at supporting conflict resolution.

¹⁰ Church, C., Shouldice, J. 2002. *The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Framing the State of Play*, (Letterkenny, Ireland: Browne)

¹¹ Böhmelt, Tobias. 2010. "The Effectiveness of Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies in Third-Party Interventions." *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (2): 167-178.

APPENDIX A: FIELDWORK MEETINGS

We are grateful for the help that we have received from numerous Track II experts during our research. The following is the list of interviewees with whom members of this workshop met over the course of our research. Interviewees are listed under interview location.

FIELD INTERVIEWS

Israel-Palestine:

Ron Pundak, *Co-chair, Palestinian-Israeli Peace NGO Forum*
Nidal Fqaha, *Palestinian Director General, Geneva Initiative*
Hiba Hussein, *Partner, Hussein & Hussein*
Dan Schueftan, *Director of the National Security Studies Center, University of Haifa*
Hassan Khatib, *Birzeit University*
Riman Barakat, *Co-Director, Israel Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI)*
Yossi Alpher, *Former Director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University*
Saeb Erakat, *Former Chief Negotiator for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)*
Oded Eran, *Senior Research Associate, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)*
Sulaiman Khatib, *Co-founder, Combatants for Peace*
Adi Greenfeld, *Coordinator of Beth Lehem-Jerusalem Group, Combatants for Peace*
BG (Ret) Shlomo Brom, *Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS)*
Shlomo Avineri, *Professor Emeritus, Hebrew University*
Orni Petruschka, *Co-chairman, Blue White Future*
Gidon Bromberg, *Israeli Director, Friends of Earth Middle East*
Michal Milner, *Assistant to the Director, Friends of Earth Middle East*
Nimrod Novik, *Chairman, Economic Cooperation Foundation*
Yair Hirschfeld, *Co-founder, Economic Cooperation Foundation*
Alick Isaacs, *Professor, Hebrew University*
Rabbi Michael Melchior, *former member of the Knesset*
Avi Gil, *Senior Fellow, Jewish People Policy Institute*
Sharon Rosen, *Co-director, Search for Common Ground*
Sari Hussein, *Project Manager, Search for Common Ground*
Ziad Khalil Abu Zayyed, *Project Manager, Search for Common Ground*
Jonathan Kamin, *Deputy Mission Director, United States Agency for International Development (USAID)*

Norway:

Jon Pedersen, *Managing Director, Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies*
Tomas Stangeland, *Deputy Director General, Section for Peace and Reconciliation, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

Elisabeth Slåttum, *Adviser, Section for Peace and Reconciliation, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

Mariano Aguirre, *Managing Director, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre*

Hilde Waage, *Professor of History, University of Oslo*

Sweden:

Bruce Koepke, *Senior Researcher, Armed Conflict and Conflict Management Program, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*

Elisabet Hedin, *Lead Policy Specialist for Peace and Security, Department for Conflict and Post-Conflict Cooperation, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)*

Desiree Nilsson, *Associate Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University*

Magnus Hellgren, *Director Deputy Head of Department, Middle East and North Africa Department, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

Qatar and Turkey:

Matthew Kroenig, *Associate Professor, Georgetown University*

Kai-Henrick Barth, *Assistant Dean for Academic Affairs, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service-Doha*

Sir John Thomson, *former UK Ambassador*

Christopher Paine, *Director of Nuclear Program, Natural Resources Defense Council*

Al-Sharif Nasser Bin Nasser, *Middle East Scientific Institute for Security*

Sema Kalaycioglu, *Professor, Isik University (Istanbul)*

Hilmi Ozev, *Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies*

Ben Rusek, *Program Officer, National Academy of Sciences; International Student/Young Pugwash*

Poul-Erik Christiansen, *International Student/Young Pugwash; University of Ottawa*

Brandon Friedman, *Researcher, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University*

Ambassador Ozdem Sanberk, *former Turkish Ambassador*

Memduh Karakullukcu, *President, Global Relations Forum*

Ali Vaez, *Senior Analyst for Iran, International Crisis Group*

United Kingdom:

Mick Dumper, *Professor, University of Exeter*

Sir Richard Dalton, *Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House*

Ahmad Khalidi, *St. Antony's College, Oxford University*

Gabrielle Rifkind, *Director of the Middle East Programme, Oxford Research Group*

Isobelle Jaques, *Programme Director, Wilton Park*

Rosemary Hollis, *Professor, City University of London*

Hussein Agha, *St. Antony's College, Oxford University*

Tony Klug, *Advisor, Oxford Research Group*

John Bell, *Director, Middle East and the Mediterranean, Toledo International Centre for Peace*

Nadim Shehadi, *Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House*

UNITED STATES

Michelle Warren, *Program Officer, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, State Department*

Haleh Esfandiari, *Director of Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*

Mayesha Alam, *Assistant Director of Institute for Women, Peace & Security, Georgetown University*

Steve McDonald, *Senior Adviser, Africa Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*

Ambassador William Luers

Ambassador Thomas Pickering

Peter Jones, *University of Ottawa*

Ali Vaez, *International Crisis Group*

Ambassador Seyed Hossein Mousavian

Randa Slim, *Adjunct Research Fellow, New America Foundation, and Scholar, Middle East Institute*

Steven Cook, *Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations*

Nathan Brown, *Professor, George Washington University; Nonresident Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*

Amy Hawthorne, *Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council*

Lori Rowley, *Director, Global Food Security and Aid Effectiveness Programs at the Lugar Center*

APPENDIX B: FUNDING


U.S. spending on Track II efforts is small and diffuse. Measuring exact expenditures, however, is difficult. There is no consensus on what qualifies as a Track II initiative. Many Track II organizers aim to keep their efforts quiet and do not publish their expenditures openly. Other Track II organizers are skeptical of using traditional cost-benefit analyses to measure Track II's effectiveness. Using the available literature, the following is a cost-model that estimates U.S. non-governmental spending on Track II initiatives.

**Table 1. High-Low Estimates for Major U.S. Foundations'
Average Annual Spending on Track II
(in millions)**

Foundation	High		Low	
	% Grants Spent on Track II	Average \$ Spent on Track II	% Grants Spent on Track II	Average \$ Spent on Track II
Ford Foundation	0.03%	0.149	0.02%	0.076
MacArthur Foundation	0.34%	0.737	0.23%	0.505
Hewlett Foundation	0.08%	0.234	0.01%	0.036
Carnegie Corporation of New York	1.47%	1.686	0.22%	0.253
Smith Richardson Foundation	0.83%	0.211	0.00%	0.000
Rockefeller Brothers Fund	0.70%	0.179	0.46%	0.118
Ploughshares Fund	4.79%	0.259	3.39%	0.183
United States Institute of Peace	5.25%	0.341	1.00%	0.065
Prospect Hill Foundation	1.25%	0.041	0.00%	0.000
Richard Lounsbery Foundation	2.25%	0.059	0.00%	0.000
Totals	1.69% (average)	3.895 (sum)	0.53% (average)	1.236 (sum)

Notes: "Average \$ Spent on Track II" represents each foundation's estimated annual spending, which is an average of estimates of annual spending from 2002 to 2011.


**Figure 1. High-Low Estimates for Major U.S. Foundations’
Average Annual Spending on Track II
(in millions)**



APPENDIX C: RISK ASSESSMENT

The cases that we have discussed above can be graphed according to their probable benefits and their relative policy importance based on this workshop's understanding of U.S. interests and priorities. Our first category of cases where Track II can complement existing Track I efforts gravitates toward the upper right of this chart, indicating that these efforts are likely to contribute positive benefits to issues of high policy importance. Our second category of Track II interventions is grouped around the midpoint, reflecting that their possible benefits are significant but that U.S. interests in these issues are of relatively lower priority. Our final category of possible Track II interventions includes cases that are unlikely to contribute to conflict resolution but are of varying importance to U.S. policymakers. Figure 1 below depicts these categories on a graph measuring policy importance and probable benefits.

Figure 1: Prospects for Track II Effectiveness



APPENDIX D: TRACK II EVALUATION SURVEY

2/5/2014

Track 2 Diplomacy Mini-Survey - Google Drive

Track 2 Diplomacy Mini-Survey

Thank you for agreeing to Take Part in the Track 2 Diplomacy Mini-Survey being conducted by Princeton University in collaboration with the facilitators/organizers of Track 2 meetings you have attended. We ask you to complete a brief series of questions that will help assess the degree to which Track 2 dialogue efforts are successful in achieving their goals. The survey does not ask you to reveal any personal information, and therefore your answers will remain anonymous. Your participation in this survey is voluntary, and you may choose to skip or not answer questions if you wish. However, the feedback is very important for the facilitators/organizers, and thus we encourage you to be complete and honest in your answers, as the results of this survey will help to improve the effectiveness of Track 2 dialogue efforts.

If you have any questions, comments, or concerns you may contact Evan Evaluator at ev@eval.edu.

General Track 2 Evaluation

This section asks broad questions about your experience with Track 2 initiatives in general

1. **Approximately how many individual Track 2 dialogue meetings have you attended?**

Fill in the number

2. **On which subject(s) have you participated in Track 2 dialogue initiatives?**

Check all that apply

Check all that apply.

- ☐ Arab / Israeli conflict
- ☐ Iran
- ☐ Gulf regional security
- ☐ Weapons of mass destruction
- ☐ Arab Spring
- ☐ Egypt Uprisings
- ☐ Syrian Civil War
- ☐ War in Afghanistan
- ☐ War in Iraq
- ☐ Other: _____

3. In general, how effective do you feel Track 2 dialogue initiatives are in helping to resolve conflict?

Mark only one oval.

- ☐ Very effective
☐ Moderately effective
☐ Somewhat effective
☐ Not effective

4. In general, how effective did you expect Track 2 dialogue initiatives to be in helping to resolve conflict prior to participating in Track 2?

Mark only one oval.

- ☐ Very effective
☐ Moderately effective
☐ Somewhat effective
☐ Not effective

5. How often do Track 2 initiatives help participants or elites from opposing sides in a conflict gain understanding of the issues, concerns, and behaviors of one another?

Mark only one oval.

- ☐ Never
☐ Often
☐ Sometimes
☐ Occasionally

6. How often do Track 2 initiatives help societies from opposing sides in a conflict gain understanding of the issues, concerns, and behaviors of one another?

Mark only one oval.

- ☐ Often
☐ Sometimes
☐ Occasionally
☐ Never

7. How often have ideas generated in Track 2 initiatives you have participated in been made known to policymakers?

Mark only one oval.

- ☐ Never
☐ Often
☐ Sometimes
☐ Occasionally

-
8. How often have ideas generated in Track 2 initiatives you have participated in become part of official policy or policy agreements?

Mark only one oval.

- ☐ Often
☐ Sometimes
☐ Occasionally
☐ Never
-

9. How often do Track 2 initiatives help to generate trust and foster healthy working relationships among participants on opposing sides in a conflict?

Mark only one oval.

- ☐ Often
☐ Sometimes
☐ Occasionally
☐ Never

10. How important do you feel the presence of a third-party mediator is to ensuring the success of Track 2 dialogue initiatives?

Mark only one oval.

- ☐ Very important
☐ Important
☐ Somewhat important
☐ Not important

11. Have you every taken part in a Track 2 dialogue initiative that you feel did not succeed?

Mark only one oval.

- ☐ Yes
☐ No

-
12. If so, why did you feel the initiative was unsuccessful?

Check all that apply

Check all that apply.

- ☐ Ineffective mediator
☐ Did not translate into policy
☐ Did not generate an atmosphere of trust and understanding among participants
☐ Information was leaked to the press
☐ The conflict was not ripe for dialogue
☐ Participants who did not play a constructive role
☐ Other: _____
-

Most Recent Track 2 Experience

This section asks you questions about your most recent Track 2 experience

13. On which subject was the most recent Track 2 dialogue in which you took part?

Check all that apply

Check all that apply.

- ☐ Arab / Israeli conflict
- ☐ Iran
- ☐ Gulf regional security
- ☐ Weapons of mass destruction
- ☐ Arab Spring
- ☐ Egypt Uprisings
- ☐ Syrian Civil War
- ☐ War in Afghanistan
- ☐ War in Iraq
- ☐ Other: _____

14. In which Track 2 initiative did you most recently take part?

Choose one

Mark only one oval.

- ☐ UCLA Track II
- ☐ Other: _____

15. How successful was the most recent Track 2 dialogue initiative in which you took part?

Mark only one oval.

- ☐ Very successful
- ☐ Successful
- ☐ Limited Success
- ☐ Unsuccessful

16. What, if any, factors contributed to the success of the initiative?

Check all that apply

Check all that apply.

- ☐ Had a direct policy impact
 - ☐ Succeeded in helping elites from opposing sides gain understanding of the issues, concerns, and behaviors of one another
 - ☐ Helped to generate trust and foster positive working relationships among participants
 - ☐ Effective mediator
 - ☐ Succeeded in helping societies from opposing sides gain understanding of the issues, concerns, and behaviors of one another
 - ☐ Other: _____
-

17. What, if any, factors did not contribute to the success of the initiative?

Check all that apply

Check all that apply.

- ☐ Ineffective mediator
- ☐ Did not translate into policy
- ☐ Did not generate an atmosphere of trust and understanding among participants
- ☐ Information was leaked to the press
- ☐ The conflict was not ripe for dialogue
- ☐ Participants who did not play a constructive role
- ☐ Other: _____

18. Please provide any comments or feedback you might have that to the facilitator of the most recent Track 2 initiative in which you participated that you feel might help to improve future efforts

19. Please provide any comments or feedback you might have that might prove the effectiveness of Track 2 efforts in general.

Powered by
 Drive