Ambassador Barbara Bodine, a former senior foreign service officer, spent most of her 30-year diplomatic career in the Middle East and on the Arabian Peninsula. She served in Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq War and as Deputy Chief of Mission in Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion and occupation in 1990. On October 22, she shared her views and candid criticism of U.S. involvement in Iraq, citing her experience in 2003 when she served as coordinator for post-conflict reconstruction for Baghdad and the central governorates of Iraq.

Ambassador Bodine, currently serving as a diplomat-in-residence at WWS, states honestly that it is very difficult to analyze the current successes and failures of U.S. policies in Iraq. She notes that comprehensive analyses in these situations are usually difficult, as the consequences and lessons learned from them traditionally do not emerge without the benefit of hindsight—something for which she believes we can ill afford to wait. In her opinion, the Iraqi invasion is fraught with grave mistakes, and she urges that analysis of U.S. failures must be undertaken swiftly if we are to have any hope of learning from them.

As Ambassador Bodine talked candidly and with detail about the process by which decisions were made for the invasion and subsequent “rebuilding,” she expressed deep concern about one key issue—the unwavering and unquestioned support afforded to decision makers. She posited that if the U.S. aimed to liberate rather than occupy, the war would have been brief and neat, with movement toward nation-building rather than mere regime change. Instead, five months of occupation has turned into five years, with the useless loss of countless American and Iraqi lives, and monetary costs totaling one billion dollars every eight hours.

In searching for an explanation for what she considers a great failure in foreign U.S. policy, she stated with great conviction, “Iraq unraveled not because the administration did not know, but because they did not listen.” According to Bodine, there was very little debate surrounding the “how,” “when,” and “with what resources” issues when the decision was made to invade Iraq. Key officials, especially those in the field, either were ignored, marginalized, or fired rather than heard. She cited this lack of debate and open discussion within the administration as the direct cause of an unplanned, unilateral invasion.

She continued by saying that the failure lay not only in the decision to invade hastily, but in the aftermath of the invasion and the attempts to rebuild. It was here that the U.S. lost its credibility with the Iraqi population—a population that needed security and stability after years of brutal dictatorship. She pointed out that the U.S. either was unable or lacked the will to curb the riots and looting that occurred after the invasion, and that these instances are symbols of our country’s neglectfulness. She stressed this neglect simply because we failed to take care of the citizens we were there to protect and to encourage. Instead, the Iraqi citizens watched as the U.S. allowed riots and anarchy in the streets, labeling these problems as by-products of “liberation.”

As a result, the U.S. has lost the opportunity to prove itself a legitimate force in Iraq, and has become painted as a nation more interested in liberating assets than human beings. Moreover, as rebuilding efforts continue to spiral into disarray, the failure to listen to key intelligence and strategists that know the area, history, and people of Iraq, serves to denigrate further U.S. goals and their legitimacy.

So where do we go from here? Ambassador Bodine said that Iraq first must have the capacity to create and maintain a legitimate and stable government. She joked that one of the lead strategists once looked at her team and said, “Can you at least pretend that we’re a sovereign nation when you speak about your plans for our country?”

Today she believes that the U.S. needs to change its approach, and she urged the administration to stop talking about withdrawal and begin talking about transition. She is confident that the Iraqi people can and do manage multiple identities, and that the U.S. needs to focus on those that can serve to unite the nation. She trusts that through diplomacy and acceptance of all sectarian parties, unity can be achieved. To that end, Ambassador Bodine called for an increasing demilitarization of U.S. foreign policy, citing that when you have 200 times more people in the National Guard than in the Foreign Service, it is little wonder that officers are being tasked with service missions for which they are under-prepared and under-trained.

Bodine’s final recommendation was clear, the U.S. must leave Iraq; but she cautioned that the U.S. cannot leave as it came: unplanned, unilaterally, and without Iraqi involvement—an element of the plan on which Bodine placeed the most importance. She maintained that the Iraqi people are capable and willing, and that they are the only ones that can bring true legitimacy and stability to their government and nation due to the simple fact that it is their government and nation and they will be the ones living with the results.

Bodine closed with a touching story that should serve as a warning and a reminder to those who tend not to think about the human element in this war. She recounted her experience with an Iraqi military strategist who came to her when she first was charged with the planning and reconstruction strategy. According to Bodine, he was a young man who had developed the most intricate of plans involving a bottomup approach linking neighborhoods in the community and unifying them. He insisted that by encouraging the people to voice their needs to higher levels, more good could be achieved, but that the people required direction. It was an extremely high-level, detailed city plan that included public participation, a transparent hierarchy, clear roles and responsibilities, and a framework by which Iraqis could effectively govern on the city level.

What amazed her was that he had not learned this at university, but had come up with it himself. Having worked in the field and living the life of a typical Iraqi citizen, he understood the issues and needs of his people. Unfortunately, this young man was assassinated shortly after their encounter.

However, Ambassador Bodine assured us that there are many Iraqis like this man—capable and bright people that have the desire to participate in the rebuilding of the Iraqi nation. Her opinion was that until the administration recognized this potential in the people of Iraq, the U.S. would be unable to move forward.