Three Political Reform in Anglophone and Francophone African Countries

The regime transformations in sub-Saharan Africa, 1982–92, took place in two distinct waves, or clusters. The first transformations early in this period were often ushered in by national conferences and usually happened in Francophone countries. The second wave took place over the persistent objections or resistance of incumbent heads of state. Domestic demands for political change existed before the changes in Eastern Europe and before the flirtation of donor agencies with political conditionality. Although international aid flows and overseas public opinion influenced the liberalization process, particularly in Zambia and Kenya; domestic pressure triggered the reforms.

Why did some countries acquiesce quickly to demands for reform while others held out? At first glance, there are no clear correlations between reform and standard measures of economic composition or condition. Countries similar in resource endowment, in dependence on export agriculture, and in economic policies and performance show different political tendencies. There is also no association between political liberalization and such standard economic variables as GDP growth, per capita food production, government spending as a proportion of GDP, defense expenditure as a proportion of government spending, development assistance as a proportion of GDP, inflation rates, and proportion of the labor force engaged in agriculture. Fur-
ther, there is no distinction between countries whose economies experienced windfalls—oil or metal profits or foreign aid—and those that depended heavily on taxation of small-scale farming for revenues. Thus revenue base has no effect on political reform in sub-Saharan Africa, contrary to many explanations of regime change in Middle Eastern countries.

To account for the national conference phenomenon, so early and so widespread in Francophone countries and so rare in Anglophone countries, some scholars offer a version of contagion theory. For example, Pearl Robinson argues that close relationships between French and African political actors and intellectuals provided opposition leaders with a common cultural referent: the bicentennial of the French Revolution in 1989 and the metaphor of the états-généraux of 1789, at which the Third Estate appointed itself the National Assembly, replacing the monarchy. Linked not only by this common referent but also by a shared exposure to the short-wave radio broadcasts of Radio France Internationale and print media such as Jeune Afrique, political dissidents learned from one another.1

Although a compelling explanation, especially for the choice of vocabulary of the national conferences, this hypothesis does not account for important aspects of the observed political changes. Not all of the Francophone countries where political liberalization took place held national conferences, even though they legalized opposition parties during the first wave of change. In Côte d’Ivoire, for instance, there was no such assembly, and the language of the French revolution and the estates-general was little in evidence among either incumbent politicians or opposition groups. The leader of Burkina Faso also rejected calls for a conference. Further, although shifts in French aid policy to favor greater political openness is often credited with triggering change, French policy lagged behind actual events and so could not have shaped the initial patterns of political liberalization.2 Finally, although arguably less strongly tied to a metropolitan intellectual community (certainly the Magna Carta and the American Revolution figured less strongly in political rhetoric), opposition and incumbent politicians in Anglophone countries had similar access to news media. They, too, heard about the changes taking place in Western Europe and other parts of Africa. West Africa, Africa Events, and New African reached English-speaking readers of roughly the same social groups as those to which French readers skimming the pages of Jeune Afrique belonged. The contagion theory does not work.

This chapter offers an interpretation of these patterns on two levels. At one level, it suggests that, behind the general indicators, four independent variables distinguish the countries in the first and second waves. The first variable is the change in rent-seeking opportunities forced by economic reform; in some instances, recovery programs pushed political elites to oppose incumbents in order to protect their own sources of income. The prior distribution of rents significantly influenced the political behavior of elites during adjustment. The second variable is whether a segment of the political elite or the popular classes controlled economic “gatekeeping” positions with significant countervailing power. Where elites could not command an economically significant sector, they could not force authoritarian governments to reform. The capacity to muster countervailing power varied with the structure of parallel associations (whether corporatist or decentralized). Where producers’ groups were independent of government but fragmented, general strikes were difficult to organize.

Third, the electoral rules of single-party states affected the linkages between the urban elite and the grass roots. These linkages, when present, reduced the opposition’s cost of campaigning and increased the incumbent’s risk in liberalizing. The fourth variable is the extent of the incumbent’s control of critical electoral resources.

At a second level, this chapter suggest that, whether a country has an Anglophone or a Francophone heritage has affected (1) the way rents are distributed in the polity, (2) the organization of parallel associations, (3) the use of single-party list voting or multicandidate elections and the consequent extent and character of elite bases of support among urban and rural grassroots, and (4) the degree of central control over critical electoral resources, such as radio, print, and television. Thus, the Anglophone-Francophone distinction is a proxy for a cluster of variables that affected regime change. Although common economic and demographic pressures have helped create patrimonial regimes out of the parliamentary systems in place at independence, there are important variations in institutions among them that influence patterns of regime change. The distinctive Francophone and Anglophone patterns of political reform, based on the political structures and traditions that the colonial powers put in place, may also have affected the sustainability of liberalization under new multiparty governments.

The chapter is divided into three parts. It begins with a brief theoretical discussion that introduces the four variables in greater detail. It then considers the paths of political change in two comparable countries: Côte d’Ivoire, which liberalized in May 1990, and Kenya, which did not liberalize until November 1991. This section examines the significance of the four variables in understanding the divergent
paths taken in these two countries otherwise so comparable in economic base, openness to international investment, and cultural heterogeneity. The third section probes the fit between the hypotheses and patterns of regime change in sub-Saharan Africa, generally. The concluding section observes that the institutional differences in Francophone Africa may render reform more rapid but less sustainable than in Anglophone Africa, where it is likely to come more slowly and perhaps with greater violence but where the bases for multiparty competition may be stronger.

Institutions and Paths of Political Change

From the late 1970s until the late 1980s, much of the literature on African politics focused on the rise of patrimonial rule and posited the emergence of relatively undifferentiated neopatrimonial systems. Crawford Young's seminal study, *Ideology and Development in Africa*, found little association between the rhetoric of rulers or the governments they installed and policy outcomes. Other political scientists took this finding to mean that the economic and demographic conditions particular to Africa gave rise to similar patterns of political behavior, regardless of the structure of governing institutions. With a few exceptions, such as the studies of Zaire by Thomas Callaghy, Michael Schatzberg, Crawford Young, and Thomas Turner, political scientists focused on explaining the apparent similarities between these new political systems, whatever their ideological tone or colonial heritage. Following Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, scholars have produced numerous studies of personal rule, patronalism, and neopatrimonialism.

Although many of the insights generated by this literature advance our understanding of political change in Africa, the contributions on the whole overstate the degree of homogeneity. In particular, they overlook the long-term institutional legacies of colonial rule. Colonial experiences figure in analyses of contemporary African politics mainly through the patterns of elite recruitment they inspire or through the way African countries are incorporated into world markets. In contrast, this chapter advances the claim that the continent's differing colonialisms created institutional legacies that are apparent in patterns of regime change.

Distribution of Rents and Preference for Commodity Stabilization

In general terms, but with local variations, Francophone and Anglophone countries have differed in the way their polities distribute rents. Major rent-seeking opportunities are created by the use of tariffs, credit rationing, foreign exchange rationing, domestic monopolies, and monopolies. There were broad differences in the way Anglophone and Francophone countries used these policy tools and organizations in managing their economies during the period 1960–90. The supranational currency boards of the colonial era survived in most of Francophone Africa, for a long time limiting the overvaluation of currencies and the deficit financing of government. Membership in the CFA franc zone created an external agency of restraint and constrained the rent-seeking opportunities available to the elites of these countries. In Anglophone Africa, equivalent boards did not survive the independence period, and governments faced less powerful budgetary restraints. The consequence was that “budget deficits created excess demand for imports: this was restrained by import controls. Import controls shifted the problem from the balance of payments to inflation: this was restrained by price controls.”

Elites of Anglophone countries thus had different rent-seeking opportunities available to them. Rents from public enterprises, for example, offered a comparatively more important source of income for elites in Francophone Africa than they did in many Anglophone countries, where the relatively greater reliance on tariffs, licenses, and credit rationing provided additional opportunities. In Francophone Africa competition among elites for rents centered more on public enterprises, than in Anglophone Africa. When international donors conditioned their loans on reductions in the number of public enterprises and public sector employees or wage bills, Francophone elites felt the differences in their incomes and options more severely than did their Anglophone counterparts. Unable to engage in deficit financing as easily as their Anglophone neighbors, the “pays d'expression française” either fired public employees or stopped their paychecks. In Anglophone countries, governments simply allowed inflation to reduce the wage bill.

Further, between 1960 and 1990, these countries differed with regard to the use of centralized commodity price stabilization schemes versus systems that pass fluctuations in prices on to farmers. As a general rule (to which there are exceptions), Francophone countries favored stabilization schemes that paid farmers stable prices for their harvests, using savings from boom years to subsidize producer prices when international prices drop. Indeed, in the late 1940s and 1950s French officials were often the moving force behind the creation of these boards, and French farmers in the metropolitan country made stabilization a focal point for their demands in the mid-twentieth century. A higher proportion of the Anglophone countries favored sys-
tems that passed some risk to farmers, in most cases offering variable premiums above a floor payment.

Interest Group Organization

Few governments in either Anglophone or Francophone countries tolerated much independent formal associational life or interest group organization. Nonetheless, many of the Anglophone countries did tolerate employers’ unions, farmers’ unions, and other semiautonomous groupings, usually on a regional-, crop-, or industry-specific basis. In most cases, these groups remained outside of the ruling party and had no formal representation in government decisionmaking.

By contrast, and consistent with the organizational style of the colonial power, Francophone countries tended to use corporatist structures for interest representation. That is, producer organizations were part of a centralized system of peak associations, which approximated representational monopolies. Pearl Robinson calls these systems “neo-traditional corporatism,” which she defines as “interest-representation organized by the state and held in check by participatory structures [created by governors].” Interests were organized through syndicates, often with government subsidy or sponsorship, and met with decisionmakers at intervals and in forums designed for that purpose. These were highly centralized systems of representation, often tied to membership in the ruling party. Drawing on data that appeared in Africa South of the Sahara, a yearbook for the African region, the research reflected in this chapter found that the numbers of producers’ associations in 1988 differed between Anglophone and Francophone countries. Of Anglophone countries, Ghana had twenty-five; Kenya, seventeen; Nigeria, twenty-five; Sierra Leone, seventeen; Zambia, twenty-five; and Zimbabwe, fifty-eight. Of Francophone countries, only Côte d’Ivoire, with twelve, and Burkina Faso, with nine, had more than seven such groups; many had only one.

The corporatist structure of interest representation in Francophone Africa reduced the kinds of collective action problems that interest groups typically encounter, while increasing their vulnerability to government control. Their hierarchical structures may have limited their propensity to free ride and therefore increased the odds of a general strike or other organized action. The national membership of these organizations also granted them a greater ability to paralyze an economic sector or service and conferred greater bargaining leverage in negotiations with governments. Their corporatist structure made them easier targets for government surveillance, however, and their dependence on government-granted access to policy and sometimes to public funds rendered them fiefdoms of patrons, themselves allies of rulers. Thus, where parallel associations had this character, interests could organize quickly to make their views known, but they were, similarly, less resilient when they met with official displeasure. Further, because of their centralized structure, they could be brought into a transition process like a national conference with greater ease and speed than is possible when unions and interest groups are highly fragmented.

Electoral Rules and Opposition Bases of Support

Prior to the recent period of regime change, most sub-Saharan African countries were de facto or de jure single-party systems. Electoral rules in Anglophone countries supported multicandidate, single-party elections in single-member districts. In Francophone Africa, where elections took place they usually did so according to a system of single-party list voting. Party list voting in a single-party system meant that the name of only one candidate appeared on the ballot in legislative elections. Usually, competition for party office was also limited.

Each system had distinct consequences for the bases of support that political elites built. In Anglophone Africa, machine politics tended to flourish at the grass roots level. To secure election against other aspirants, a candidate had to convince voters that he or she could deliver more to the local community—usually water projects, cattle dips, new schools, and so on. Candidates who set themselves up as patrons fared better than those who made broad class or populist appeals. In Francophone Africa, the incentives and outcomes were quite different. Single-party list voting, where the selection of party candidate is not open to popular choice, provides little motivation for politicians to cultivate support among voters and to make legislators or party officials responsive to local interests or to the demands of an interest group, other than those of the bureaucratic class of which they are members. Indeed, these rules lead politicians to invest in support from party elites, which eventually divides the party leadership from the masses.

As a result of this difference, the linkage between politicians and constituents in Francophone Africa was much less than that in Anglophone Africa. More important, the grass roots networks so vital for conducting campaigns existed in many parts of Anglophone Africa but were poorly developed in Francophone Africa. The existence of such networks and a lively tradition of drumming up campaign support at the local level lowered the costs of a serious electoral battle to
the challenger and thereby increased the incumbent’s risk of losing office. On these grounds, then, one might reasonably expect that leaders of Anglophone countries would be much less willing than leaders of Francophone countries to pursue a transition to a multiparty system.

Central Control over Critical Electoral Resources

Until 1989, Anglophone and Francophone countries differed in the degree of central control over such electoral resources as building licenses, telephone permits, zoning variances, and printing presses. These resources are all important to opposition leaders in waging electoral campaigns. They were much more vulnerable to intervention by the chiefs of state of Francophone countries than by those of Anglophone countries, although certainly having a few well-placed clients in local government could have disrupted provision of these services in Anglophone Africa as well.

More important, central government control of the media tended to be somewhat greater in Francophone Africa than in Anglophone Africa. Television, in both areas, was predominantly a central government operation, and few opposition leaders used it effectively as a medium of communication. A higher proportion of Anglophone governments tolerated multiple newspapers than did Francophone governments. In 1988, the reluctant liberalizers of Anglophone Africa included Ghana, with twenty-eight newspapers (including government owned) and weeklies; Kenya, with sixteen; Malawi, with eight; Nigeria, with sixty-four; Sierra Leone, with nine; Tanzania, with fifteen; and Zimbabwe, with thirty-three.11 By contrast, media control was much more concentrated in the Francophone countries: Benin had only five newspapers, Central African Republic had four, Congo had nine, Côte d’Ivoire had six, Gabon had eight, Guinea had six, Mali had eight, Mauritania had three, Niger had three, and Togo had six.12 Although most of the independent newspapers displayed substantial self-censorship, they did provide some competition for government and party dailies and could occasionally voice points of view at odds with those of the head of state. Again, this difference may well have appeared to reduce the campaign costs of opposition leaders and to increase the risk to the incumbent, making Anglophone heads of state more wary of political reform than their Francophone counterparts. After the initial wave of liberalization, between 1989 and 1991, these differences disappeared, however. Greater press freedom in both Anglophone and Francophone countries resulted in a proliferation of weeklies and dailies across the continent.

Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire as Paradigmatic Cases

The broad analytic approach used in this chapter borrows the notion of path dependence from Douglass North’s work on institutions and institutional change in the economic sphere. North suggests that “once a developmental path is set on a particular course, the network externalities, the learning process of organizations, and the historically derived subjective modeling of the issues reinforce the course.”13 That is not to say that profound changes and dramatic shifts cannot occur in the structure of an economy or a polity. Rather, it means that history matters—and matters in specific ways. To North, the effect of institutions on transaction costs is the source of path dependence. This logic is useful in understanding regime change in Africa.

I use North’s theoretical framework to show the puzzling, if possibly temporary, divergence of political paths between two countries quite similar in economic base and colonial and immediate postcolonial history: Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya. During the 1960s and 1970s, a combination of smallholder and plantation agriculture fueled economic growth in both countries and generated significant foreign exchange earnings. Moreover, both were subject to similar changes in terms of trade: that is, both produced beverage crops (cocoa and coffee in Côte d’Ivoire and coffee and tea in Kenya), and neither had significant exploitable petroleum reserves. Their governments pursued interventionist economic policies, but both adhered to policies and practices substantially more market conforming than those of most other countries of sub-Saharan Africa, and both allowed significant latitude to local private sector entrepreneurs and foreign investors. During about twenty years of fairly steady growth, they built extensive road systems and infrastructure, more than on most of the rest of the continent. Between 1965 and the late 1970s, under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya and Félix Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d’Ivoire, citizens of the two countries were governed by single parties that were comparatively weak as vehicles for aggregating and channeling interests and as instruments of control. Power resided in the head of state and in an increasingly technocratic administration. Political suppression of opposition groups and critics were lower than in neighboring countries. Finally, both countries were demographically diverse, with no single cultural community accounting for more than 20 percent of the population. For many years, the policy world recognized Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya as the success stories of Africa.

Beginning in 1980, the two countries took quite different political paths, highlighted by the first multiparty legislative and presidential
elections in Côte d'Ivoire's history (November-December 1990), on the one hand, and the repeated jailing of opposition figures and the rejection of demands for political reform by the government of Daniel arap Moi in Kenya, on the other. At independence, Côte d'Ivoire had a single-party system, in which President Félix Houphouët-Boigny retained effective power over policy, while the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), the sole legal political party, a loose association of political elites, had few functions except as facilitator of intraelite bargaining. A system of party list voting, in place until 1980, meant that PDCI officers effectively selected the députés from each electoral circumscription. Only in 1980 did the government sanction multcandidate single-party competition, with elections in 1980 and 1985. At the end of April 1990, after the onset of a severe economic crisis that rendered many of the country’s banks illiquid and forced cuts in government wage bills—and in the wake of street disturbances—the president announced the move to a multiparty system. Legislative and presidential elections took place in November and December 1990, respectively, only a few months after opposition political parties were allowed to form.

Kenya started with a multiparty system at independence. Through a series of maneuvers, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) became, under Kenyatta, the dominant party, with functions similar to that of PDCI. As Houphouët-Boigny did in Côte d'Ivoire, Kenyatta resisted efforts to make the political party a forum for creating a political platform or for generating policy proposals, although he tolerated the effective expulsion of the populist faction within KANU. After Kenyatta's death and Daniel arap Moi’s accession to the presidency in 1978, the regime curtailed political participation by stages. Ethnic welfare societies, the springboards to political careers and vehicles for constituency building, became illegal in 1980. In 1982, the Moi government won rapid passage of a change in the constitution, making Kenya a de jure single-party state. In 1985, the office of the president moved to strengthen the watchdog role of KANU and to eliminate potential opposition both through intervention in the selection of senior party officials and through replacement of the secret ballot with a queuing system. Detentions of public defenders and opposition leaders and killings and arrests of demonstrators followed, accompanied by resolute statements that Kenya would not liberalize. Only under overwhelming pressure from donors at the end of November 1991, including an agreement to suspend further international assistance to the country, did the Moi government finally agree to legalize opposition political parties. The president and his party used their privileged access to state resources to ensure electoral success in 1992.

Any theory that attempts to explain the patterns of political liberalization that developed between the last quarter of 1989 and the last quarter of 1992 in Africa must shed light on the divergent paths in these two cases. Certainly, further political change is likely in Kenya, as is a period of intensified civil strife in Côte d'Ivoire. A solid theory must account for the initial variation in outcomes, however. The important, if transitory, differences between the cases are rooted in more than the acumen or style of the respective leaders; the way the institutional legacies of the colonial period shaped the perceived costs and risks to incumbents is critically important.

The two countries differed in three key respects. First, they differed in the favor given different systems for distributing the effects of commodity price shocks and for allocating rents. The strong preference of the top Iovarian leadership for central control provoked, in different ways, two important threats to the economic status of elites. The decision to stabilize commodity prices on behalf of farmers, managing revenues through a special caisse in Abidjan instead of indexing producer prices and allowing farmers to bear at least part of the burden of changing terms of trade, precipitated an economic crisis of unprecedented proportion. Likewise, the decision to restructure public enterprises, in part to centralize control over patronage resources, set in motion a series of layoffs, pay cuts, and reductions in rent-seeking opportunities that severely affected elite incomes. Although the Houphouët-Boigny government also launched new public enterprises, the initial restructuring nonetheless reduced and made more uncertain the incomes of many politicians and civil servants.

Second, the organization of a few critical sectors of the economy into centralized syndicates made the Iovarian government initially more vulnerable to countervailing power than did the more decentralized structure of Kenyan civil society, the unity of whose producers was more easily shattered. Third, the centralization of control in Côte d'Ivoire over critical electoral resources, including the media, may have lessened the threat of defeat of the president at the ballot box, making tentative steps toward reform possible.

Elite Incomes, Rents, and Reform Movements

Because the base of political opposition in both Côte d'Ivoire and Kenya is largely elite, any analysis of the differences between cases must pay attention to changes in the economic or political status at the end of the 1980s of what Irving Leonard Markovitz calls “the
organizational bourgeoisie." In both countries, the boundaries between the political elite and the business elite are indistinct. Prominent businessmen often accumulate capital for their enterprises by first working in the civil service or gain entrée to the private sector by holding positions on the boards of public corporations. The households of civil servants, politicians, and well-to-do businessmen usually receive income from several sources. Elite incomes in Côte d’Ivoire declined for two reasons. First, the effects of changes in the terms of trade for primary commodities were intensified by the marketing and price stabilization systems. Second, structural adjustment reforms reduced the income elites and civil servants received from the public sector portion of their portfolios, in the form of salaries and rents, and their standards of living came under threat, triggering disgruntlement and political action. An exact measurement of these effects is difficult, but it is possible to gauge rough differences in magnitude.

**Stabilization Schemes and Elite Incomes** The terms of trade for beverage crops such as coffee, cocoa, and tea—which lie at the heart of the export sectors of the Ivorian and Kenyan economies—turned against producers in the late 1970s. However, the structures in place for accommodating commodity price fluctuations determined how severely these changes affected elite incomes in each country; Ivorians endured more dramatic reversals of fortune than Kenyans.

Although the declining price of cocoa on world markets affected Côte d’Ivoire in the early 1980s, it was not until 1987 that crisis struck. The Ivorian government and its colonial predecessor had stabilized the prices of coffee and cocoa, offering farmers a predictable, stable real producer price by taxing producers more heavily when prices were high and using these proceeds to support future subsidies. This system was the undoing of the Ivorian elite, in two respects. First, it proved extremely difficult to sequester the funds collected during periods when world prices were high; some well-connected fonctionnaires, politicians, and businessmen benefited, but many others lost. During the 1970s, the government borrowed heavily from the stabilization fund to finance investments in the north of the country, mainly in sugar refineries, which promised no economic return, because sugar was then in international oversupply. Overbilling became such a problem that the president eventually removed the three ministers most directly involved and launched a public campaign against corruption. Although the country’s cocoa farmers were the principal long-run losers (their earnings had financed the projects), the economic effects of squandered investment funds also hurt those who derived their incomes from other activities.

Second, the 1980s saw a prolonged deterioration in the price of cocoa, as new suppliers came into the market. In the late 1980s, the government subsidized farmers at a rate of one dollar per kilogram of cocoa beans, borrowing to do so. It then withheld cocoa from the world market to force the price of cocoa to rise (with a nearly one-third market share, the country was not necessarily a price taker). Traders who had financed their purchase of the crop from the farmers with funds they had borrowed privately in anticipation of government reimbursement (as was the norm) found they could not repay their loans on time. The collapse of several Ivorian banks followed and produced a liquidity crisis in several banks with French connections.

In the crisis, elites thus lost money both directly, as growers, transporters, and exporters of cocoa, and indirectly, through the liquidity crisis in the banking system, on which they depended for business loans and operations. Many were unable to withdraw funds from bank deposits during this period. Further, the president’s personal funds, from which he might have dispensed largesse, had dwindled because of the expenses incurred in constructing Notre Dame de la Paix, the Florentine basilica constructed at Yamoussoukro, Houphouët-Boigny’s birthplace. There were few patronage resources left in the late 1980s to ease the effects of the collapse of cocoa.

The economic crises of the 1980s did not affect Kenya in quite the same way as it did Côte d’Ivoire. Kenya had eschewed a commodity stabilization system that fully buffered farmers from the effects of world market fluctuations. Instead, it had instituted a pass-through system, in which farmers shared in the variation in prices. Farmers received a stable base price; the actual producer price then provided farmers, in addition, a portion of the world price. When world market prices dropped, so did the indexable portion of the producer price. When prices rose, farmers shared the windfall. Under this system, surpluses in large part accrued to farming households, not to a central government-managed fund where the government could have borrowed against them. This system for administering producer prices, combined with a hesitation to manipulate world prices through cartelization and differences in trade financing systems, meant that changes in the terms of trade had a less negative impact on elite incomes in Kenya than they did in Côte d’Ivoire.

**Restructured Public Enterprises and Elite Incomes** As structural adjustment programs went into effect, governments came under pressure to reduce the public sector wage bill either through reductions in wage rates or through layoffs and hiring freezes. During the early part of the 1980s, Côte d’Ivoire’s government expenditure on wages and
salaries averaged about 26 percent of total expenditure. In 1984, Houphouët-Boigny announced sharp pay cuts for parastatal employees—in some cases by as much as two-thirds—to bring their salaries in line with those of the civil service. Jean-Pierre Lachaud estimates that, for slightly over 25 percent of parastatal employees, base salaries diminished, and for about 13 percent, salary reductions were more than 50 percent. In 1980 in Côte d'Ivoire, wages were 26 percent higher in the private sector than in the public sector. Civil service salaries were frozen between 1984 and 1986 and rose only slightly after that time, until further freezes and a substantial new income tax came under discussion in 1990. The government cut benefits as well, reducing housing allowances and selling over a third of the fleet of official cars, even those allotted to senior elites and long-time allies of the president. These actions, coupled with an announcement of a 50 percent income tax on employees of public and private organizations and of a possible 20-25 percent reduction in teachers' salaries and benefits, provoked university students, civil servants, and teachers in 1990 to join street demonstrations in Abidjan. In 1991, a worried government merely froze compensation levels in consequence.

Côte d'Ivoire also restructured the parastatal sector, eliminating employees from some enterprises and liquidating or privatizing whole organizations. The program began in 1980, at the same time as the country's first steps toward political liberalization, and was quickly recognized as more than just window dressing, although the actual extent of some of the changes remains in dispute. In 1979, 43 parastatals were totally public, in 52 others the government was principal shareholder, and in 110 the government maintained a financial interest but did not hold controlling shares. The World Bank estimates that, between 1983 and 1987, the government privatized (sold its shares in) 14 enterprises and liquidated (sold the assets of) 24 others. During the same period, the government also created a few new enterprises, however. In 1992, the estimate of the number of parastatals, of one type or another, was 150.

One consequence of these changes was to eliminate some employees from the payroll, reducing household incomes of elites. Lachaud estimates that, between 1980 and 1984, 10,679 people lost their jobs in the public enterprise sector—roughly 10.5 percent of all employees in the sector. The general unemployment rate in Abidjan tripled, rising from 7.7 percent in 1980 to 22.8 percent in 1986. After 1985, however, the public enterprise sector began to increase its share in total formal sector employment, rising to about 37.4 percent in the late 1980s.

A more important political consequence was the reduction of rent-seeking opportunities for members of the political elite. Patronage was tightly controlled by the president during the 1960s and into the very early 1970s. Expansion of the parastatal sector, however, provided new ways to create clientelistic relationships, including not only relatively high-paying jobs but also the ability to collect rents through manipulation of quotas, licenses, access to credit, and so on. Initially, Houphouët-Boigny dispensed positions in the sector both to technocrats and to ancêtres, those who had helped in the preindependence period, especially to keep the latter in the political fold at a time when the party and ministerial posts were opening to a younger generation or a "development faction." The senior elites used the opportunity to build support networks of their own, however. For example, in a celebrated case, the mayor of Abidjan manipulated a program to house civil servants by purchasing or renting buildings owned by other elites at above-market rates. One of the domestic rationales for restructuring the sector in the 1980s and for the accompanying attack on corruption was to contain the power of the new barons who had taken advantage of the president's largesse. The restructuring forced a number of key political elites, including the mayor, to stand trial and to pay considerable sums of money.

Accurate measures of the reduction in elites' incomes due to these reforms are difficult to calculate. Mark Gallagher offers an index with four components: (1) the value added by manufacturing multiplied by the effective tariff; (2) the effects of price distortions, measured by the nominal protection coefficient multiplied by the value of agricultural exports, (3) the difference between black market rate and the official rates of exchange multiplied by exports in U.S. dollars (as a measure of rents available from foreign exchange allocations), and (4) the below-zero real interest rate multiplied by domestic credit (to measure nonmarket allocation of capital). For lack of complete data, Gallagher does not calculate rents before and after the policy reforms of the 1980s. Foreign exchange rents, resulting from the overvaluation of the CFA franc, increased through much of the period, as did manufacturing rents resulting from tariff protection. The latter dropped significantly in 1990-91, however, as radical reductions in tariff protection took place.

Elite incomes fared better in Kenya than in Côte d'Ivoire. Throughout the 1980s, Kenya typically spent roughly the same proportion of its total expenditure on wages and salaries as Côte d'Ivoire, but it expanded public spending at the same time, incurring large deficits and generating a 25 percent average annual inflation rate. Wage em-
ployment in the public sector increased during the 1985–90 period, with the number of people employed in the central government rising from 252,000 to 269,000; in parastatals, from 241,000 to 317,700; and in enterprises in which the state held controlling shares, from 35,600 to 54,700. Unlike Côte d'Ivoire, however, the Kenyan government did not seek to reduce nominal wages but allowed inflation to take its toll, diminishing wages in real terms. During the 1990–91 period, overall government expenditure increased.29

Kenyan elites also did not suffer a reduction in rent-seeking opportunities through parastatal reform. The failure of the Kenyan government to follow through on its promised reforms of the public sector contrasts with the Ivorian case. Between 1980 and 1990, the Moi government began negotiations for the privatization of one parastatal but added eight new public enterprises, including the Nyayo Bus Services and Nyayo Tea Zones. In the period under study here, it created yet another enterprise—to produce automobiles with high domestic content—and called for a rural development parastatal. Trade liberalization lessened the protection afforded the public sector and reduced the rents available there, but these efforts stopped short of what was promised.

**Countervailing Power and Parallel Associations**

Another key respect in which Côte d'Ivoire and Kenya differed was in the structure of parallel associations. Interest group organization in Côte d'Ivoire took place largely through national syndicates, whose leaders the president consulted in occasional “days of dialogue.” In Kenya, interest group organization was less centralized, more independent of government, and often more vocal, except in the case of formal sector wage labor, which the government had sought to co-opt during the Kenyatta era. Ironically, although there were more parallel producers’ associations in Kenya than in Côte d'Ivoire—and, in some respects the country had a livelier associational life—the character of interest group organization made collective action at once more difficult and more threatening to the incumbents in the short run. The degree to which opposition leaders in the two countries could draw upon the bargaining power of dissatisfied producers’ groups differed, as did the ease of sustaining pressure for change.

Although students and teachers were perhaps the most visible participants in political demonstrations in Côte d'Ivoire, their actions were preceded by that of the country’s transporters. Transport was the economic sector typically both more independent of government than other sectors and more vital to the continuation of trade. In Africa, it was one of the few potential sources of countervailing power. Myriad entrepreneurs equipped small pickups with a few seats to convey passengers or developed small cargo transport services. In some cases, members of the organizational bourgeoisie (administrative elite) invested in this sector, too, developing small trucking businesses or long-distance bus services. Without these enterprises, trade would have slowed considerably, and most important, food would not have reached urban areas. Where this sector remained substantially in private hands, transporters could amass considerable bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the central government.

In Côte d'Ivoire, road transportation was substantially a private sector industry—and a deconcentrated industry at that. The Société des Transporteurs Abidjanais (SOTRA), the capital city’s bus system, was a public enterprise, owned 60 percent by the government in combination with Renault. Most of the other bus systems, taxis, and transport companies were privately held, often by entrepreneurs owning one to seven vehicles. These owners belonged to a syndicate, which reduced collective action costs by assuming organizational functions. Transporters have long participated in the president’s periodic days of dialogue. As economic conditions deteriorated during the late 1980s, transporters sought to defend their interests outside of this forum. In early 1990, truckers and taxi drivers went on strike to oppose the many road blocks manned by the military, customs, and police. At the road blocks, which proliferated during the 1980s, drivers and passengers often had to pay bribes in order to continue along their routes. They might have to stop every five to ten minutes along heavily traveled roads, which significantly increased the cost of transportation. The strike was successful, and by the end of June—two months after the protest—the number of roadblocks was dramatically reduced. Further, the government pulled the army off the streets, where it had been posted to maintain public security.

In the Ivorian case, the teachers’ syndicate held comparable countervailing power, but other groups were more subject to government control. Farmers’ unions were illegal until mid-1991, and growers were unable to bring direct pressure to bear on policymakers. They could exercise indirect influence through groupes de ressortissants, or urban-based relatives, whose members could more easily push their demands in appropriate ministries and advance claims during the days of dialogue. As long as world prices for major export commodities remained low, the bargaining power that attached to crop burning or crop holdups was limited, however. Withholding food crops promised to send a more powerful message, but the many small producers
heavily dependent on such cash staples as manioc and yams provided a poor base for concerted political action. Teachers were well organized, by contrast, and could call out their students to support street demonstrations. Teachers and transporters, along with students, brought Houphouët-Boigny’s government to account and prompted a shift to a competitive party system.

Kenyan elites had less short-run bargaining power (although they may have posed a more credible long-run threat) than their Ivorian counterparts. Their greater numbers and the absence, in most cases, of centralized, panterritorial organizations, made mobilization against policies or incumbent politicians difficult. The higher costs of organizing producers meant that, initially, it was difficult to stage a general strike or to stop operations in a critical sector of the economy. The general strike was more often a phenomenon of the Francophone than the Anglophone countries during the early part of the period of regime change.

Although public protests against the government in Kenya were frequent, they did not demonstrate significant countervailing power, except when the business community got the legal profession and the churches to draw international attention to their plight. The transport sector, however, demonstrated on several occasions, before KANU and the president took steps to counteract its power. In 1986, the government announced that it would enforce a No Standing rule against vehicles and drivers of the Kenya Bus Service, Ltd., a partly British-owned company and the principal provider of bus transportation between the capital and periurban areas. Typically, these buses carried as many passengers as could crowd in. The company responded to the ruling by briefly withdrawing bus service from the routes around Nairobi, stranding many thousands of government workers. So great were the disorder and the public outcry that the government relented, temporarily. Within three months, KANU began to run nyayo buses on many routes (nyayo is a Swahili word meaning “following in the footsteps” and was among the slogans of the Moi government). The nyayo vehicles were contributed by European donors, and the drivers were drawn from the National Youth Service, a government-run vocational training program. Moi took the decision to launch the service at a KANU parliamentary group meeting shortly after the initial protest. Two years later, in 1988, the Nyayo Bus Services Corporation was established as a public enterprise partly directed by the party.

The main alternative to bus transport was the matatu system, a relatively unregulated, low-cost form of travel in converted pickup trucks. This part of the sector proved to have strong bargaining power.

In 1990, the government moved against owners and drivers on suspicion that some were broadcasting seditious tapes to their passengers—protest songs about the razing of Nairobi shanty towns, Kenyatta’s early speeches, and songs about such men as Kenneth Matiba, a wealthy businessman who had led a public bid for multiparty rule and had been detained, and J. M. Kariuki, a populist who was assassinated during Kenyatta’s reign. Many of the tapes were played in advance of the multiparty demonstrations and riots of mid-1990. The president deregistered the offending vehicles and the Matatu Vehicle Owners Association, making it difficult for the sector to organize.

Growers of export crops were also organized in Kenya and had considerable bargaining power because of the government’s heavy dependence on the revenues from these crops as a source of foreign exchange. These growers were possible advocates of multiparty government, because government-run agricultural services and pricing procedures had deteriorated in both fairness and quality. The Moi government defused the threat from farmers’ unions by reorganizing or proscribing these groups. For example, it introduced the Nyayo Tea Zones, a new parastatal, which limited the bargaining power of Central Province tea farmers by flooding the tea factories with cheap leaves from new, government-controlled land, thus rendering smallholder’s leaves less valuable. Similarly, Moi moved to take the direction of their coffee cooperatives away from Central Province farmers, who threatened opposition.

If interest group associations were less centrally organized in Kenya than in Côte d’Ivoire and, therefore, subject to more severe collective action problems, they nonetheless inspired sufficient fear in the president for him to take steps to weaken them further. Moi shifted access to rent-seeking opportunities to his supporters, especially Kalenjin backers, shattering the community of interests among the country’s business and government leaders. He also tried to establish central control over the women’s movement by absorbing it into KANU and over the legal profession by interfering in the elections of the Law Society of Kenya. These measures made collective action by parallel associations, especially producers’ groups, still more difficult.

Electoral Rules and Constituency Building

By limiting the government’s ability to spread the costs of economic downturns and by providing or tolerating industrywide rather than enterprise-specific organization of unions and parallel associations—which by their very structure could command greater economic clout
than small, voluntary associations—the Ivorian political regime was more vulnerable than its Kenyan counterpart. By the same token, however, it was much easier for Houphouët-Boigny to control the resources necessary to ensure his reelection and the maintenance of PDCI as an important political force. Political acumen played a role in his decision to liberalize, but so did central control over building permits, meeting permits, telephone service, printing presses, information systems, and so on. As long as he called elections early, before opposition groups could devise ways around the limitations the centralized political and social system imposed, Houphouët-Boigny could be fairly confident that we would carry the vote.

Until 1980, the electoral rules and party system of Côte d'Ivoire militated against the rise of politicians with strong local constituencies, because the constitution provided only for single-party list voting. PDCI leadership held the right to screen and appoint nominees for both party office and legislative seats. In this system, those who aspired to become députés to the National Assembly in Abidjan needed to curry favor not with the electorate but with the party hierarchy. That meant appealing first to the secrétaires généraux, the men and women who acted as links between the PDCI leadership (the party’s Political Bureau) and the small party comités in the villages and urban quartiers, which replaced the official ethnic associations that ran local party affairs until 1972. In reality, however, members of the party’s Political Bureau itself wielded ultimate nominating power, and ambitious candidates sought to establish ties directly with this elite, sometimes bypassing the local officers of PDCI.

Although political aspirants had to lobby hard for the leadership’s backing, this system provided little incentive to cultivate support among voters and to make legislators or party officials responsive to the interests of farmers or entrepreneurs. Indeed, it promoted division between the party leadership and the masses. Although the electoral system changed in 1980, by the 1990 elections, few local political leaders had emerged with the kinds of clienteles or constituency bases that many of their Kenyan counterparts had developed.

The Kenyan situation was quite different. A longer history of multi-candidate local elections and of decentralized local development initiatives enabled some elites to gain broad regional constituencies and limited national followings. These Kenya politicians as a group were far more habituated to the demands of political competition, even though their actions were increasingly constrained by the regime. Many of those clearly outside the Moi camp—men such as Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia—commanded significant incomes and influence in both private and public sectors and could amass patronage independent of government coffers. Further, Kenyan politicians had sponsored haratimbe, or local self-help development projects, to persuade voters to lend their support. They invited senior members of the government to contribute and often found government monies to staff the schools and dispensaries that were constructed, at least in the early years. In Côte d’Ivoire, on the other hand, the distribution of finance for local projects and the control over patronage networks were tightly managed from the center. When Houphouët-Boigny observed what he considered excessive use of the spoils system—using party resources or public sector jobs and equipment for building followings—he usually relieved the would-be patron of major responsibilities. In consequence, by 1990 no political leader in PDCI or any opposition party commanded the public attention or the networks that Kenyan underground opposition leaders like Charles Rubia, Kenneth Matiba, Oginga Odinga, and Martin Shikuku had. When Philippe Yacé attempted to build such a network in the 1970s, the president limited his access to resources.

Further, during the extended period of multicandidate competition, senior Kenyan politicians learned to broker party platforms and broadly representative slates of candidates in order to win a majority of the party or popular vote. Former Vice President Mwai Kibaki (who launched his own political party when the government legalized opposition in late 1991) and others had direct experience of the process of forging compromises and cutting deals in order to win office. They engineered the victory of Daniel arap Moi in 1978, a fact of which the president was well aware when he resisted calls for a multiparty system. Their experience posed a threat.

Central Control over Campaign Resources

The two countries also differed in the organization of the media and other resources important for waging political campaigns, although high levels of censorship existed in both systems. Through its hold on government, PDCI controlled radio and television news, the two daily newspapers, Fraternité Matin and Ivoire Soir, and the weekly, Fraternité Hebdo. These media carried little local political news or coverage of meetings attended by candidates. During the campaign, opposition leaders complained that they could secure coverage of their campaigns only in late-night television slots, when most people were asleep. In the end, they produced and circulated their own audio cassettes. New newspapers proliferated, but the manifestos of the
new parties often appeared very late and in limited copies, because the government or PDCI officials controlled the printing presses. Kenya had a livelier tradition of critical journalism. The government controlled the *Kenya Times*, the party newspaper, and could suspend publication of other magazines and newspapers when they overstepped government-prescribed limits. The existence of multiple newspapers, with independent, often foreign-based owners, meant that the editors of each had to differentiate their products from the others or lose a market. Although most were careful to avoid direct criticism of the president, they also competed to cover meetings at which politicians and senior civil servants were present. When the country’s major publications engaged in self-censorship, transient broadsides often filled the breach, including photocopied Sunday sermons. Although vilified by some members of the opposition, the *Weekly Review*, edited by Hilary Ng’weno, offered much more coverage of issues and disagreements among key political figures than did *Fraternité-Hebdo*, its counterpart in Côte d’Ivoire. Ng’weno ventured occasional criticism of the president’s policies, something Ivorian publications did not do prior to 1990.

The new presses that grew up in the two countries after the periods of political opening were also dramatically different. Abidjan’s streets saw the sale of a new satirical genre and weeklies with political party backing, while Nairobi’s residents could pick up substantial news-magazines, such as *Society* or the *Nairobi Law Monthly*, independent of the political parties, whose pages carried extended exposes and discussions of political issues, grist for the development of political platforms.

There is substantial evidence that Houphouët-Boigny retained stronger control over the distribution of patronage than Moi. Houphouët-Boigny installed Antoine Cesario, an Antillean, to direct *grands travaux* (public works), which during the early 1980s approved all major expenditures. Although the president’s control over resources may have attenuated slightly after Cesario (a man much hated by the Ivorian elite) left the country, the president nonetheless had significant knowledge of who had secured what resources and how. The skillful use of such resources during the brief campaign of 1990 is believed to have caused several key defectors to return to PDCI, including Lanciné Gon Coulibaly, son of a prominent political family in the north—the man the opposition coalition hoped would oust Konan Bédié, president of the National Assembly and the man who succeeded Houphouët-Boigny in 1993. By contrast, and in a departure from the tradition established by his predecessor, Daniel arap Moi had lost control over such practices. Nicholas Biwott and other Kalenjin appointees skimmed an estimated 2 percent of the country’s GDP. People in some parts of the opposition had independent access to funds. Again, the uncertainty about the resources that potential opponents could tap contributed to the president’s unwillingness to engage in an electoral competition.

**Summary**

The differences between Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya have roots in the character of the institutional legacies of colonial rule in the two countries. There may be distinctively Francophone and Anglophone patterns of political reform, based on the political and economic structures the colonial powers put in place.

First, the strong preference of the top Ivorian leadership for central control provoked, in different ways, two important threats to the economic status of elites. The decision to stabilize commodity prices on behalf of farmers—managing revenues through a special *crise* in Abidjan instead of indexing producer prices and thereby allowing farmers to bear at least part of the burden of changing terms of trade and to acquire a larger share of the surplus during booms—helped precipitate an economic crisis of unprecedented proportion. Likewise, the decision to initiate a restructuring of public enterprises, in part to centralize control over patronage resources, caused layoffs, pay cuts, and less access to noncompetitive rents, which severely affected elite incomes.

Second, the organization of the critical sectors of the economy into centralized syndicates made the Ivorian government more vulnerable in the short run to countervailing power than did the more fragmented structure of Kenyan civil society.

Third, the electoral rules that prevailed in single-party Kenya spawned local political machines and networks, as well as skills, that reduced the costs of opposition campaign activity, increasing the risk that the incumbent might lose a multiparty contest. The electoral rules in effect in Côte d’Ivoire between 1960 and 1980 loosened the ties between elites and the grass roots and made the costs of opposition campaigns much higher.

Fourth, the centralization of control over critical electoral resources, including the media, lessened the threat of the president’s defeat at the ballot box, making possible steps toward reform in Côte d’Ivoire, whereas in Kenya the international community helped force change.
Testing the Generalizations in a Larger Context

An argument of this chapter is that the patterns observed in the Côte d'Ivoire and Kenya comparison hold across a larger number of cases: that the 1990–92 pattern of regime change in countries with a Francophone institutional legacy differs systematically from the pattern in countries with an institutional legacy from Britain. Quantitative analysis is constrained by the numbers of cases and the quality and completeness of the available data. Because the p-values used to test significance of effects is greatly influenced by the number of cases, it is not likely that statistical analysis will reveal many significant effects at p-values of .05 or .01. Thus, this analysis focuses on determining whether inclusion of variables that are part of the hypothesis advanced improves the goodness of fit of more standard models, accepting p-values of .1. Further, available data on changes in the rents available to elites in the public sector were relatively poor. Measures of rents were unavailable for as many as seven cases. Finally, the data for analyzing patterns of regime change in Africa lag considerably; I was unable to include in the analysis changes in the public sector wage bill or in the number of public sector employees. With due regard for the limits these conditions impose, it is nonetheless possible to use statistical techniques to explore and test the generalizations.

The data set this analysis employed contained thirty observations. The research excluded countries of sub-Saharan Africa (1) that already had de facto multiparty systems (Botswana, Gambia, Senegal, and Mauritius), (2) that were in the midst of civil war (Angola, Somalia, Chad, Sudan, Mozambique, and Ethiopia), and (3) that were under the influence of South Africa (Swaziland, Lesotho, and Namibia). The resulting group of thirty countries were coded Anglophone, Francophone, or other, according to colonial heritage. Cameroon was coded in the other category; former Belgian colonies were coded Francophone.

The data set included a number of economic variables: the annual rate of inflation for 1988, the year before the wave of political change; the proportion of the labor force engaged in agriculture; urbanization rates; the average annual rate of GDP growth for 1984–88 and 1988; the change in exchange rate overvaluation from 1987 to 1988; overseas development assistance as a proportion of GDP (1988 and the 1980–87 average). It also included several measures of rents, including foreign exchange rents (the 1980–86 average and the 1987–88 level); manufacturing rents (the 1980–86 average and the 1987–88 level); and import duties (the 1980–86 average and the 1987–88 level). I used logit techniques to assess the effect of colonial heritage on regime change, which was treated as a dichotomous variable (that is, whether a country held a national conference or legalized opposition parties before September 1991). The preliminary results suggest that a model incorporating measures of the four parts of the theory performs better than a model that uses standard economic variables and understands regime change as a straightforward response to deteriorating economic conditions. A clear test of the theory must await better data, however.

As expected, the logit results suggest that standard economic variables, such as rates of inflation could not explain patterns of regime change. Initially, only one standard economic variable appeared to have any explanatory power: lower rates of 1988 GDP growth were at first moderately correlated with either a national conference or the legalization of opposition political parties. This effect disappeared when the analysis controlled for colonial heritage, however. Further, although Anglophone countries displayed higher overall rates of GDP growth in the year prior to the first wave of change, unlike many Francophone countries, their GDP growth rates in 1988 were generally below the average annual GDP growth rates for 1984–88. Francophone countries and countries with mixed or Portuguese colonial heritage, on the other hand, generally had higher GDP growth rates in 1988 than during 1984–88. Thus, a sudden downturn in rates of growth also lacked explanatory power.

After the analysis controlled for colonial heritage, only one standard economic variable exercised a significant effect on patterns of regime change. The proportion of the labor force engaged in agriculture showed a negative relationship to political liberalization when this variable was included with a dummy variable indicating heritage. Because rurality usually implies lower education levels and less exposure to media, this finding coincides with political science theories that posit political liberalization as a concomitant of urbanization and industrialization.

Separate tests of the four parts of the theory advanced in this chapter indicate that the system of electoral rules dominant since independence is the strongest single predictor of the pattern of regime change. A tradition of single-party list voting made political liberalization more likely in the first wave of change. By itself, centralization of electoral resources as measured by concentration of the print media proved to have little causal effect. Fragmentation among parallel associations also lacked significant explanatory power.

Goodness of fit improved when a measure of the fourth variable, change in rents, was included in the analysis. Although change in
import duties, change in foreign exchange rents available, and change in manufacturing rents available did not improve the goodness of fit or exercise significant effect, the inclusion of a measure of public enterprises in 1986 privatized or liquidated by 1990 did improve the fit.

Conclusion: Regime Change versus Sustainability

This chapter aims to explain patterns of regime change. The problem of consolidating the base for competitive politics (or consolidating democracy in the larger political science literature) features more frequently in public policy discussions and in much current academic research than the problem of explaining why regimes altered as they did in the 1989–92 period, however. In these final paragraphs, therefore, I assess the implications for understanding the long-term survival of these new multiparty systems.

Four main factors account for patterns of regime change: First, where multicandidate, single-party voting dominated between independence and 1989, the grass roots ties of politicians were more extensive, the possibility of mounting a campaign to dislodge the incumbent was greater, and leaders resisted political liberalization more strongly than where single-party list voting prevailed. In the latter, the costs of building an electoral base were greater, and heads of state were less concerned that they would lose an election (rightly or wrongly; some were ousted in the actual event).

Second, where parallel associations, especially producers’ associations, were centralized a corporatist structure of interest intermediation, as in Francophone countries, the costs of mounting a general strike to force a government to liberalize were lower and incumbent governments more vulnerable. But given such centralization as well as a tradition of government consultation with the leaders of these groups, it was feasible to try to control the process of change; that is, the centralized structure of these interest groups made national conferences possible. Thus, the inclination of heads of state in these countries was to bend to pressure for greater political openness, given the immediate high cost to the economy and to social harmony of not doing so and the prospect of being able to control the process once launched. In Anglophone countries, although producers were often less dependent upon government, they faced short-run collective action problems, and their autonomy and more limited dependence on government may also have raised the specter, in leaders’ minds, of a political opposition more difficult to control over the long run.

Third, where governments were restricted from going over their budgets or of overvaluing their exchange rates, the economic crises of the 1980s forced cuts in pay, disbursements of IOUs instead of paychecks, layoffs, and other measures that affected the incomes of political elites. Thus, elites in the countries of the CFA franc zone were more immediately and severely affected than their counterparts in Anglophone Africa, where inflation was allowed to erode wages and where there was little restructuring of public enterprises. In this instance, again, incumbents in Francophone Africa were more vulnerable in the short run than were their Anglophone counterparts.

Fourth, control over resources important in waging political campaigns was also more centralized in Francophone than in Anglophone Africa. Thus, costs to opposition groups of waging political campaigns in Anglophone Africa were lower than they were in Francophone Africa. That meant that incumbents in Anglophone Africa reasonably feared loss at the ballot box more than their Francophone counterparts did. Opposition to liberalization was a rational response on their part, given the formal and informal political rules in place.

Each of these factors has implications for the sustainability of competitive political systems and for the measures that supporters of multiparty systems must take to consolidate the changes that occurred.

First, the meager network of relationships between politicians and the grass roots in Francophone Africa may have made a competitive political system easier to introduce (because less threatening to incumbents) but more difficult to sustain. The tendency of politicians to invest in developing ties to party elites rather than to voters under single-party list voting was long responsible for the generational fights that plagued Francophone countries. It also created distrust of debate among voters. Indeed, an analysis of election returns in Côte d’Ivoire suggests that voter turnout in 1985 and 1990 was lowest where the number of candidates was largest and that turnout negatively correlated with competitiveness.39 (Returns in Kenya from earlier multi-candidate, single-party elections do not show this pattern.) Candidates in Francophone Africa have to learn new rules of behavior, as do their constituents, in order to reduce the gap between voters and the political elite. New politicians of Anglophone Africa—who come not from the old political class but from the ranks of lawyers and intellectuals—may need to do the same.

Second, if the ability of producers’ associations to exert countervailing power over government is critical to sustaining government respect for constitutional rules, then the independence or autonomy
of these parallel associations is critical for consolidating multiparty systems. Centralized corporatist associations that are part of the dominant political class and that have been co-opted through participation in transition governments or conferences (and so are vulnerable to government control) may be less likely than fragmented groups to exercise countervailing power over the long run. The evidence available from Africa to date is mixed, however. In Côte d'Ivoire, for example, political liberalization encouraged followers dissatisfied with their leaders to break away from other syndicates and organize their own interest groups, creating a flourishing associational life outside the reach of the state.

Third, although the political economies of Francophone countries may force new governments to make the layoffs and wage cuts that destabilized the ancien régime, triggering more political upheaval, their Anglophone counterparts may also have a difficult time. Pressure on them from aid donors to stop using the public sector as a source of patronage may place countries of both heritages on a similar—difficult— footing.

Fourth, control over resources critical to campaigning became, in the short run, dramatically less concentrated in Francophone Africa after political liberalization. New newspapers and magazines flourished, making it easier for opposition leaders to get their message out to urban elites. Nonetheless, the legacy of concentration and strict media control plagued journalists, who had to forge new contacts with sources of information and build their own news gathering skills.

At first glance, there is reason to think that, although these regime changes came more slowly, over greater resistance from incumbent heads of state, and often with greater violence in Anglophone countries, they may be easier to sustain in these countries than in Francophone Africa. Regime change itself rapidly eroded some of these differences, however, and all of the newly competitive regimes will face severe tests throughout the 1990s.

Notes

4. For a lengthier discussion of this subject, see Mark Gallagher, Rent Seeking and Economic Growth in Africa (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), 57–61.
6. Ibid., 340–41.
7. This definition is one component of the concept of corporatism that Peter Katzenstein employs in his book on the way the positions of small countries in international markets shape domestic politics. See Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 89–90. Note that, according to Katzenstein's theory (not discussed here), domestic political economies of small states—presumably including those of African countries—should converge. Katzenstein's thesis suggests that the differences used as explanatory variables should in this instance disappear with time.
10. For a discussion of other aspects of the electoral systems of these countries, see Ruth Berins Collier, Regimes in Tropical Africa: Changing Forms of Supremacy, 1945–1975 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
11. Zimbabwe was a de facto multiparty system, although a de facto single-party system, at the time of this study. During the 1989–92 period, in contrast to political rhetoric in many other countries, Zimbabwe's president, Robert Mugabe, indicated an interest in moving the country to de jure single-party rule. He backed away from that sentiment in later public statements—but not in actions.
12. Throughout this analysis, Cameroon is counted neither as Francophone nor as an Anglophone country. Cameroon has a mixed colonial heritage. Although it remains part of the CFA franc zone, it bears greater similarity to Anglophone countries than to Francophone countries in degree of central control over the media and in patterns of interest group organization.
14. This analysis differs from, but is compatible with, the observations of Jean-François Médard, who also focuses some of his recent work on this two-country comparison. See Jean-François Médard, "The Historical Trajectories of the Ivorian and Kenyan States," in Rethinking Third World Politics, ed. James Manor (Harrow, England: Longman Group U.K., 1991); and "Autoritarismes et démocraties en Afrique noire," Politique africaine 43 (October 1991): 92–104.

16. There is a difference of opinion about the degree to which an independent business class exists in these countries. For more on this subject, see Ernest J. Wilson III, “Strategies of State Control of the Economy: Nationalization and Indigenization in Africa,” *Comparative Politics* 22 (1990): 401–19.

17. For a more extensive discussion of the Kenyan system, see David Bevan, Paul Collier, and Jan Willem Gunneweg, *Peasants and Governments* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989).


30. For an extensive discussion of such attempts to control political action in Kenya, see Widner, *The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya*.

