The postneoliberal fabulation of power: On statecraft, precarious infrastructures, and public mobilization in Brazil

ABSTRACT
In Brazil’s hybrid government of social protection and market expansion, there is under way a fabulation of power, which ultimately serves to “de-poor” people seeking care, working infrastructures, and justice while also shifting up state politics as usual. This process became evident through the failure of a collaborative research project that I coordinated on right-to-health litigation. In rethinking that failure as an experiment in public ethnography, I draw on core disagreements with public officials over the interpretation of our findings from a legal database. Analyzing these disagreements provides an entry point into the mechanisms of veridiction and falsification at work in Brazil, whose government sees itself as providing public goods beyond the minimum neoliberal state. Countering state mythology, public ethnography thus illuminates the improvised quality of postneoliberal democratic institutions and opens up new avenues for theorizing power and the political field. [public ethnography, judicialization of health, precarious infrastructures, postneoliberal statecraft, de-poor people, public mobilization, Brazil]

Está em andamento no governo brasileiro—espécie híbrida de proteção social e expansão de mercado—uma fabulação do poder. Ela serve, em última análise, para “despauperizar” as pessoas que procuram por assistência à saúde, infraestruturas eficientes e justiça, enquanto que, simultaneamente, escoa as políticas convencionais de Estado. Neste artigo, repenso um fracassado projeto de pesquisa colaborativa sobre a judicialização do direito à saúde como um experimento de etnografia pública. Para tanto, tomo as discordâncias interpretativas que tivemos com agentes públicos acerca de achados em um banco de dados de ações judiciais como uma janela para o entendimento dos mecanismos de veridicação e falsificação em atividade no Brasil, cujo governo se vê como provedor de bens e serviços públicos muito além de um Estado neoliberal mínimo faria. Contrapondo mitologias estatais, essa etnografia pública ilumina o caráter improvisado das instituições democráticas pós-neoliberais brasileiras, abrindo novos caminhos para teorizar o poder e o campo político. [etnografia pública, judicialização da saúde, infraestruturas precárias, estadismo pós-neoliberal, despauzerização, mobilização pública, Brasil]
**fabulation of power** and the potential of critical public ethnography to produce counterknowledge.

The project in question was a statistical and multisited ethnographic analysis of right-to-health lawsuits in Rio Grande do Sul, which has the highest number of health-related lawsuits in the country (Bassette 2011). I worked with research collaborators in the United States and Brazil to develop a quantitative and qualitative portrait of the people who are turning to the courts to secure access to health care, and to illuminate their travails. But frictions with Dr. X and state representatives started to surface when our initial statistical analysis of lawsuits found that judicialization was in fact a widespread practice, accessible even to the very poor, and that judicialization had, to a large extent, become an alternative path to health care when administrative mechanisms failed to uphold people’s constitutional rights (thus confirming our ethnographic findings). Tensions over the interpretation and dissemination of data ultimately led to an explosive face-off between my university’s legal counsel office, on the one hand, and a Brazilian research institute and state prosecutors, on the other, and to the demise—and, in a sense, failure—of the collaboration.

This failed collaboration might be read as an experiment in public ethnography, whose meanings and stakes, as Didier Fassin (2013) has argued, are foregrounded in moments of challenge to local knowledge production and circulation. Such moments highlight tensions over the reception of counterevidence by the guardians of orthodox knowledge, and hint at the interests and political projects imbricated in the making and policing of local truths.

This ethnographic episode itself has a deeply public character: not only are the questions at stake of crucial relevance to the public interest—health, rights, truth, policy, and the delivery of care—but also the work itself is public, involving direct collaboration with public officials, themselves engaged in judicial, policy, and scholarly projects. Distinct from—although by no means antithetical to—engaged or activist anthropology that speaks truth to power or makes its findings public (Farmer 2004; Kirsch 2014; Scheper-Hughes 1993), this kind of public ethnography simultaneously emerges from and reflects on work with social actors who themselves work, in theory, for the public good. And, while ethnography does indeed have a public afterlife that raises new questions and debates (Fassin 2015), this public life can further participate not only in enlarging the ethnographic record but also in providing new openings for conceptual work. Carving out a retrospective **public self-reflexivity** thus brings into view the broader paradigms of statecraft and the specific mechanisms of veridiction and falsification at play in contemporary Brazil, particularly in the field of public health, and opens up new avenues for theorizing power and the political field.

### When ethnography is a failed collaboration

In recent years, there has been an emergent emphasis on the role of collaboration in anthropological work, particularly in relation to the “studying up” of scientists and other experts. Noting the “profoundly altered conditions in which relations of fieldwork today must be negotiated,” Douglas Holmes and George Marcus, for example, make a case for collaboration as a crucial feature of contemporary fieldwork, envisioning a new form of ethnographic inquiry that brings anthropologists together with other “para-ethnographers” to engage in collective projects as reflexive, active “epistemic partners” (2008, 81). If, however, anthropologists engaged in successful collaborative work might learn from the analysis and knowledge practices of their collaborator-subjects, what is revealed when such epistemic partnerships break down?

In a much-publicized example, Paul Rabinow’s work with Berkeley’s Synthetic Biology Engineering Research Center as a kind of anthropological collaborator-consultant fell apart over disagreements about scientific ethics and public risk, highlighting the fraught sharing of terrain by different kinds of experts and the challenges of critique within collaboration (Gollan 2011; Rabinow and Bennett 2012). If, as Holmes and Marcus write, “the ethnographer is a figure whose presence is anticipated” (2008, 86), what happens when different parties envision his or her role in divergent ways, or for conflicting purposes?

In working on the judicialization project, I found myself, like Rabinow, caught up in the broader interests of my collaborators, who indeed brought their own strategies, political projects, and rhetorical needs to our (then) shared endeavor. Whereas Holmes and Marcus argue that the point of collaboration is “to integrate fully our subjects’ analytical acumen and insights to define the issues at stake in our projects as well as the means by which we explore them” (86), the moments when our insights and analytics clash with those of our collaborators might also become openings to the deeper issues at play (Marcus 2009). Trained on the points of tension within collaboration, these “second-order observations” (Luhmann 1993) lend a kind of dual reflexivity to the work, repurposing them as subjects of ethnographic attention.

In the social and natural sciences, negative results are seldom published. Yet, as scientific research communities are increasingly acknowledging, these often-unpublishable nonresults might be differently understood as important contributions to knowledge production. Reconsidering them positively, not as absence but as content, opens up new opportunities for learning from failure, directing attention to the sometimes-invisible dynamics of experimental mechanisms and machineries, their assumptions and entanglements, and their contradictions, uncertainties, and political stakes.
Anthropologists have for some time argued that failure can indeed be productive (Adams 2013a; Das 2015; Ferguson 1999; Jain 2013; Locke 2015). In her work on the offshoring of clinical trials, for example, Adriana Petryna (2009) notes that models of drug development and testing frequently underestimate adverse effects, operating within an after-the-fact “find-and-fix approach” (Petryna 2010, 60). The entire industry functions within what she calls a “paradigm of expected failure”: real risks are known and harms are anticipated, but such failures are normalized under a rubric of experimentalism. If, for Petryna, paying attention to how failure operates sheds light on deeper questions about ethical variability and the manipulation of regulatory regimes, which together create new conditions of risk and unaccountability, how might attending to the failure of the research collaboration in Brazil similarly illuminate core issues of statecraft, evidence-making machines, and political rationality at work?

Returning to the debacle of my collaborative work in Brazil, I am interested in what can be learned from the wreckage. Our project on judicialization in Brazil shows that particular government and market dynamics are tied to mechanisms of veridiction and falsification that shore up post neoliberal political discourses. Moments of tension with my collaborators, here, become openings to the underlying evidentiary regimes and conflicting interests that shape state data. By closely analyzing one material artifact of our failed collaboration, I attend to how official narratives are produced and mobilized to particular ends, illuminating what I have called a de-pooring of people. Ultimately, I reflect on the kinds of politics and publics at stake, problematizing the criteria for inclusion in contemporary political communities (real or imagined).

The fabulation of power

In his lectures on biopolitics and neoliberalism, Michel Foucault argues that we can adequately analyze biopolitics only when we understand the economic reason within government. In his words,

Inasmuch as it enables production, need, supply, demand, value, and price, etcetera, to be linked together through exchange, the market constitutes . . . a site of veridiction-falsification for governmental practice. Consequently, the market determines that good government is no longer simply government that functions according to justice. (2008, 32)

Inverting older relations between state and economy, the market and its liberal principles are no longer subject to state power but, rather, determine the “truth” of government, that is, its jurisdiction and self-limitation. Guided by the principle that it is already in itself too much, government “is now to be exercised over what we could call the phenomenal republic of interests” (46). Excluded from this framework is the possibility that the collective good might be an object of governance, or an organizing principle in individual lives.

The contemporary Brazilian political economy complicates Foucault’s analytics. Since the 1990s, the country has moved through a period of intense neoliberal reform and decentralization of services under the Social Democratic Party (PSDB) to the growth of social programs aimed at reducing inequality during the rule of the Workers’ Party (PT), which took power in 2002. Without radically breaking with neoliberal policies, the PT established poverty-reduction programs and expanded social services that have redefined the government’s self-conception as “beyond the minimal state” (Maillet 2012, 681).

Brazilian state policy and political discourse emphasize the government’s active role in guaranteeing the rights of citizenship and in eliminating poverty through, for example, cash transfers (Gledhill and Hita 2009). But promoting a market-friendly environment remains a central priority—“A rich country is a country without poverty,” as an early slogan of President Dilma Rousseff proclaimed. The country’s political rationality today thus does not neatly align with Foucault’s account, instead suggesting a more complex arrangement between state and economy, in which the market, while critical, is not the sole dimension shaping governmental reason. The state itself is also entangled with personal interests and the demands of electoral politics (Nobre 2013), with recent popular outcry over entrenched corruption highlighting the uses to which government is put even as it operates under the veneer of transparency and social equity (Romero 2015).

As I showed in my study of Brazil’s universal AIDS treatment policy (Biehl 2007b), the consolidation of state activism has been coupled with extraordinary market expansion and the vanishing of civil society as a viable transactional reality. In this mounting sphere of “state activism without statism” (Arbix and Martin 2010, 6), public institutions, in their frugality or futility, act in the name of equity while remaining largely unresponsive to the people they serve. While the verification of one thing normally serves to disqualify another, in Brazil today, there is a decoupling of veridiction and falsification. The state not only produces and authorizes particular kinds of policy truths but also falsifies renderings of its people and their needs. A different kind of unmoored falsification is at work, one that coexists with, but is also distinct from, the joint machine of veridiction-falsification. These dual processes together constitute what I call the fabulation of power. They are the mechanisms that make possible the coexistence of supposed social protection—or “a politics of distribution,” in the words of James Ferguson (2015)—and market expansion, thereby shoring up particular political projects and interests. As Brazil’s current crisis shows, state resources are
used and depleted to such ends, while the public continues to insist on the need for infrastructural developments and the importance of revamping social services; as a recent survey showed, an overwhelming 45 percent of Brazilians list health as the country’s principal concern (Leite 2014).

Thus, in the Brazilian judicialization of health, we do not see a top-down biopolitical model of governance in which the population’s well-being is the object of knowledge and control but, rather, a struggle among multiple private and public stakeholders over the utility and purpose of government. Here, both market and government are leveraged by people seeking access to services amid crumbling public infrastructures, as well as by regional public officials in the spheres of improvised evidence-based policy and electorally motivated politics, and by a federal government invested in reclassifying the poor as middle class. By attending not only to how evidence-based policy is fabricated and deployed, but also to how claims to need and accountability are falsified, we begin to see a more complex phenomenon of fabulation that coexists with political accountability are falsified, we begin to see a more complicated and deployed, but also to how claims to need and electoralism invested in reclassifying the poor as middle class. By attending not only to how evidence-based policy is fabricated and deployed, but also to how claims to need and accountability are falsified, we begin to see a more complex phenomenon of fabulation that coexists with political ideologies and market mechanisms within government. As real people become a part of these strategies, aggregates, and data, public ethnography and the counterknowledge it makes possible open up core questions about paradigms of statecraft and political mobilization.²

In her recent work on precarity and political assembly, Judith Butler (2015) highlights how infrastructures are simultaneously the grounds from which and the demand for which bodies enter into collectives. “Everyone,” she notes, “is dependent on social relations and enduring infrastructure in order to maintain a livable life” (21). The demand for infrastructure is thus “a demand for a certain kind of inhabitable ground, and its meaning and force derive precisely from that lack” (127). How, then might the struggle for workable infrastructures in Brazil shed light on state accountability and politics in the making in emerging democratic economies?

Allow me to contextualize. Just two years before the 2010 confrontation with which I began this article, I had embarked on a multidimensional and collaborative study of an intriguing new medico-sociolegal phenomenon in Brazil: people whom I came to understand as “patient-citizen-consumers” (Biehl 2013) were suing the government for access to treatment in the name of their constitutionally guaranteed right to health. The rights-based demand for treatment access championed by AIDS activists throughout the 1990s had fast migrated not only to other patient-advocacy groups but also to the general population. People were not waiting for new medical technologies to trickle down and were using all available legal levers to access them. This judicialization of the right to health opened a new chapter in the pioneering history of patient citizenship and pharmaceutical access in the country.

States were now seeing the number of lawsuits brought in their courts—particularly for access to pharmaceuticals—reaching the tens of thousands. With a population of about 11 million people, Rio Grande do Sul was an epicenter of this phenomenon: right-to-health lawsuits rose from 1,126 new cases in 2002 to 17,025 in 2009; 70 percent of these lawsuits were for access to medicines (Biehl et al. 2012). Right-to-health litigation had become a subject of contentious debate in political arenas and in the media throughout Brazil. According to government officials and some public-health scholars, this practice was dramatically altering administrative practices, encroaching on state budgets, and ultimately producing new inequalities (Vieira and Zucchi 2007).

Despite the circulation of numerous opinions, there was no reliable and comprehensive information concerning this avalanche of health-related judicial cases, their medical and anthropological character, and their impact on lives and on health systems. Official data-collecting systems were tenuous at best, and what little scholarly evidence on right-to-health litigation existed was constrained by small samples, limited geographic coverage, and the examination of few variables. I was intrigued by this lacuna and, detective-like, I wanted to identify accessible, real-time data in order to get a clearer sense of who was judicializing and what was being judicialized: What sort of citizenship were these patient-litigants exerting on what sort of state, and what kind of politics was being enacted here?

I was familiar with Dr. X’s health-care research, and he was also familiar with my work on the pharmaceuticalization of health care, which has tracked how, in both delivery and demand, public health has shifted from prevention and primary care to access to medicines, making Brazil into a profitable platform of global medicine (Biehl 2007b). We agreed that a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon of judicialization was in order and assembled an interdisciplinary “dream team” (as we called it then) of Brazilian and North American scholars in anthropology, medicine, epidemiology, and health policy.

Our initial work together was off to a positive start, and Dr. X introduced us to public officers at the Health Secretariat and Solicitor General’s Office of Rio Grande do Sul. Dr. X and his colleagues welcomed the resources and prestige that came with such an international collaboration and, given the dearth of available information, were interested in producing new scientific knowledge. The narrative of judicialization as a tool of wealthy patients seeking access to high-cost medicines was already deeply entrenched, and state officials saw the research as a way of showing how market forces shape physician prescriptions and patient demands. The officers, ever eager to demonstrate state transparency, ultimately authorized the state prosecutors working on right-to-health litigation to make the legal cases they were reviewing available to our research team.
With funding from my university and an external foundation, we gathered information from over 1,000 active lawsuits, collecting data on demographic and medical characteristics of patient-plaintiffs as well as on their legal claims and judicial outcomes. In addition to this numerical work, I had also teamed up with local social scientists and started full-scale ethnographic research. I wanted to study this phenomenon from multiple perspectives and to produce a comprehensive view of judicialization on the ground. The broader idea, as I articulated it in a proposal, was “to create a critically informed public space in which social actors can move beyond polarized positions and, hopefully, identify a common good.”

The findings from our initial analysis of the database were startling, and I was enthralled by the power of numbers to corroborate our ethnographic evidence. In contrast to official state and media accounts, which presented judicialization as a practice of the better off, our results revealed that patients who procured medicines through the courts were mostly low-income people who were not working (they were either retired or unemployed), and who depended on the public system for obtaining both health care and legal representation.

The numbers plainly confirmed what we had been chronicling at public defenders’ offices, where the poor get free legal assistance and where more than half the lawsuits requesting medicines from the state actually originated. Roughly two-thirds of the medicines requested were already on official formularies, suggesting that government pharmaceutical programs were failing to fulfill their role of expanding access. The medicines most frequently requested were for common problems such as hypertension, high cholesterol, asthma, and mental illness. The vast majority of lawsuits indicated that treatment was requested for a continuous duration, reflecting the chronic character of the diseases that afflict these patient-citizens. Moreover, judges at district and higher court levels almost universally granted access to the medicines requested, recognizing that their provision was consistent with Brazil’s constitutional right to health.

While it is now common in anthropology to think the power of numbers through Foucauldian analytics or in relation to biopolitical modes of governance (Foucault 2008, 2009; Hacking 1982), what is particularly striking, in this case, is how the obscuring or unavailability of certain kinds of numbers mobilizes nonknowledge in the service of state agendas and interests (for another take on the power of state-produced data, see Peterson 2009). As Jacques Rancière has pointed out, being uncounted—or unaccounted for—is crucial to how political exclusion takes place, where the “part of no part” is invisibilized within a given social field (2006, 12; see also Rancière 1999, 2001). Before our study, data on right-to-health litigation was un-systematized and not publicly available, leaving open a space easily filled with assumptions, self-serving narratives, and large claims based on small-scale studies with limited representativeness.

Numbers are indeed powerful tools in the game of veridiction-falsification that is at the heart of policy making. They can, however, also buttress critique—especially when found within the state machine, like the lawsuits that composed our database. Taken together, these 1,080 lawsuits refuted mainstream (government, academic, and media) arguments against judicialization—for example, that judicialization was driven by urban elites and private interests, and used to access high-cost drugs that were not part of governmental formularies. Coupled with ethnography, our numbers told a different story, exposing such arguments as part of what I came to think of as a broader mythology of judicialization that, in fact, undercut the complexity of the phenomenon and ultimately misinformed public opinion and health policy.

This mythology of judicialization resonates with Michael Taussig’s (1997) observations on how modern states use the dead to generate magical power and maintain control through mythmaking and monuments, thus obscuring labor inequality and supporting military might. For Taussig, the dead do “double duty,” serving the interests of the modern state first as tragic deaths and then as memorialized, farcical deaths, each working to build and strengthen the state while instructively “weigh[ing] like a nightmare” on its citizenry (10). In a mythology of judicialization, too, stories are woven together and ultimately settle into a particular kind of common sense that serves a specific function for the state. In modern-day Brazil, the state similarly conjures its own kind of magic through the bodies of its subjects, although in this case, its narratives concern the living.

Entranced by the power of the numbers we were uncovering, I wanted to build on our initial quantitative findings and secured funding for a second, more rigorously representative database drawing from all health-related lawsuits filed against Rio Grande do Sul in 2008, when relevant information was first digitized. Work on this more comprehensive second database was close to complete when tensions heightened with Dr. X over the meaning and destiny of the initial numerical knowledge we had produced, and our cooperation reached a breaking point.

State data

How could I have not seen this coming?

The fact is that I needed Dr. X’s contacts within the state apparatus to access the information for our databases. At the time, I truly did not think much of the rituals of power in which I partook, performing a kind of courtship ultimately aimed at accessing data. As is perhaps inevitable in collaborative research, and especially striking in the
contact zones engendered through this kind of public ethnography, all parties came to the project with distinct views on its import, value, and potential, with certain sacrifices and compromises undertaken, especially at first, to appease one another and keep the project afloat.

In retrospect, such moments of compromise and participation in uncomfortable rituals of state and academic politics serve as openings to the underlying tensions and maneuvering at work in both the collaborative encounter and public-health policy. On one occasion, I spoke to a conference of 200 state attorneys about my work on the pharmaceuticalization of health care (Biehl 2007a), a talk preceded by the singing of anthems and pledging of allegiance to state and country flags, interspersed with interminable populist political discourses and an interview with the region’s largest newspaper about my research in partnership with the Health Secretariat. In other forums, both Dr. X and state officials had referred to my research as proof of how business interests were corrupting the meaning of the right to health. These sound bites were inevitably linked with pronouncements about “public money” and “equity,” explicitly giving voice to the logics of state actors. They were also linked to a growing global interest on the part of public-health specialists and policy makers to engage with anthropologists, and in corridor talks, officials also voiced pride in the “scientificity” and “transparency” I supposedly bestowed on state institutions simply by researching in their precincts.

On another occasion, at a public lecture, an officer from the Health Secretariat adamantly denounced judicialization as “a scandal,” driven by well-off patients seeking high-cost and largely ineffective medicines new to the market, and by overprescribing doctors in cahoots with profit-driven laboratories. He repeatedly emphasized the role of public disinformation, the draining of public-health funds, and the inequity inaugurated by a selective population’s demand for new medical technologies. “We try to guarantee the availability of medicines,” he said. “But it is extraordinarily perverse that we have to guarantee the most expensive medicines, which have no effect whatsoever. The laboratories use patients to increase profits.”

For him and other state actors, such criticisms of judicialization were, at least in part, a means of insisting on a certain vision of public health and of the public itself: one that emphasizes population well-being and rejects what they see as the injustice of unevenly shared collective funds and services. There are limits, after all, to what the state can actually provide for its citizens, given that there are other pressing infrastructural needs and that medical technologies are developing and circulating ever more quickly.

The same officer proudly proclaimed that the state Solicitor General’s Office had created its own task force of medical consultants to verify or disqualify claims for treatment access and efficacy. Indeed, Dr. X and this group of evidence-based medicine (EBM) consultants were now crucial assets for the state’s efforts to contest judicialization cases and contain costs.

Premised on the positive relationship between the use of experimental evidence and improved health outcomes, EBM has since the 1990s fast become a dominant force in policy making and health-care research and delivery (Daly 2005; EBMWG 1992; Lemieux-Charles and Champagne 2004). EBM emerged as a “rigorous” scientific means of establishing clinical guidelines to improve routine medical decision-making and the quality of care received by patients; “evidence-based policy” then followed as a rational foundation for standardization, efficiency, and cost-effective rationing in health policy (Klein, Day, and Redmayne 1996; Timmermans and Mauck 2005). For example, a paragon of such approaches, the Cochrane Collaboration—founded in 1993 under the motto Trusted Evidence, Informed Decisions, Better Health—now represents an international network of over 28,000 people in over 100 countries, including Brazil, preparing and disseminating health-care information and research.

The retrofit of EBM to public health has been neither easy nor uncontroversial. Critics have focused on the narrow conceptions of evidence that EBM creates by excluding practitioners’ knowledge and by producing formulaic guidelines, as well as the incommensurability of population evidence and individual patient needs (Behague 2007; Lambert 2006). Many see EBM’s experimental metric as a scientific legitimation of neoliberal political and economic models of health governance, which have significantly shifted the priorities of caregiving practices such that people no longer come first (Biehl and Petryna 2013). As Vincanne Adams (2013b) argues, this new landscape of evaluation is displacing the previous goals of interventions, making the purveyance of actual health services secondary to the development of reliable methodologies and the generation of comparable data. In this context, statistics are presented as objective, value free, and abstracted from social and political contexts. Yet, in reality, as Susan Erikson notes, statistics “operate as administrative apparatus that shape health futures by reducing contextualizing ‘noise’ and enabling business management rationalizations and decision making” (2012, 369).

Unlike certain health systems in the Global North that have been practically reorganized around the principles of EBM (such as the United Kingdom’s National Health Service; see Harries, Elliott, and Higgins 1999), the system in southern Brazil has not seen the pretense of evidence-based approaches borne out in solid institutional structures. While little has changed in the allocation of resources or the organization of health-care services, state officials like the health secretary cited above invoke the language of EBM as a stand-in for a certain kind of scientific modernity
that works in the service of political interests that are both electorally motivated and publicly marketable. Deployed in the name of equity and the public good, these evidentiary regimes stand in for social concerns while effectively absolving the state of responsibility for actually attending to people's needs and demands or working to remedy administrative and infrastructural failures.

As our research continued, I started to see the cracks where the fabulation of power was coming into view: moments when deception and discomfort were made visible and state agents revealed contradictions, ambivalence, posturing, and manipulation. In one such moment, a representative of the Solicitor General's Office proudly announced to the media that the office was no longer contesting lawsuits for medicines that were part of governmental formularies, while, behind the scenes in the offices, the attorneys told me about devising other ways of disqualifying claims (allegations that the prescribing doctor was not part of the public-health system, for example, or—in the name of EBM—that dosages were incorrect and that a prescription did not abide protocols). “It is no secret,” said a state pharmacist who asked for anonymity, fearing for her job, that pharmaceutical programs were “a mess,” with no efforts to upgrade formularies or to address problems with distribution and access.

On another occasion, when Ms. Z, an attorney working on health-related lawsuits, had started to feel at ease with us, she let slip her discomfort. “This is tough work we do, to deny treatment,” she said. “When it is a lawsuit concerning a child, the lawyers generally enclose a photo of the plaintiff. I have a child. This is too much. I hide the picture in order to go through with it.” While she was perhaps articulating an attempt to remain objective rather than be swayed by emotion, I could not help but hear in her words inklings of a broader process through which people and their embodied vulnerabilities were invisibilized from the state's handling of judicialization. Despite my unease, I kept quiet. Throughout this research enterprise, I had trained myself to read the warning signs popping up from Dr. X and other members of the research team as idiosyncratic markers of stress, narcissism, ambition, academic theater—you name it. Nothing insurmountable, or so I then reasoned with myself, to keep the research going. But no longer.

I agreed to meet my collaborator-turned-adversary in neutral territory (or so I supposed): the research institute managing the project's finances. As planned, the meeting would be an opportunity to address growing points of tension, moderated by the institute's executive director and Dr. A, the head researcher I had reached out to for some clarity on how to navigate the treacherous terrain of this international interdisciplinary research collaboration gone awry. To my total surprise, Dr. X came into the conference room escorted by three state prosecutors, including Ms. Z.

Instead of easing frictions, the meeting exacerbated them. I was shocked and furious to hear Dr. X tell blatant lies—that “the American team” (I was born and raised in southern Brazil!) had, for example, simply translated what he himself had written and then added an irrelevant anthropological veneer (so much for the work of critique)—not to mention his unwarranted personal attacks coupled with self-praise as the pioneer scholar of judicialization in Brazil. I was equally incredulous that the prosecutors seemed to believe the tale so shamelessly being woven. I could not help myself and did not hold back in denouncing the wrongs that Dr. X had committed throughout our collaboration. Among other things, I exposed Dr. X's earlier attempt to publish some of the database results without consulting me—a move I was made aware of only because he had listed me as coauthor, and the journal had contacted me to verify.

Through this back-and-forth of accusation, the tone of the meeting had become unbearable. With no resolution on the horizon, we all agreed to the head researcher's suggestion: Dr. X and the state attorneys would have two weeks to provide substantial comments on the draft article that I and three collaborators had written, which had been the catalyst for this painful confrontation. And because I had heard a rumor that Dr. X had prohibited the project's IT assistant from giving us a copy of the second database, which was now complete, I made sure, before fleeing the meeting, to have him agree on record to share it with us in the next few weeks, although with a caveat: "after it is ready for analysis."

To make a long and tortuous story short: the face-off continued for almost two years, and, ironically, we almost had to judicialize ourselves. After several months and numerous reminders, Dr. X's “team” finally sent comments on the article. Their request for the removal of all critical assessments from the text amounted to intellectual censorship and spoke volumes to the political and evidentiary stakes of our findings, as well as to our incommensurable takes on truth and the place of the human subject in producing state knowledge and in the political sphere. Moreover, Dr. X was now denying us access to the second database.

We had no other recourse but to reach out to my university's legal counsel, who assessed the situation. Ultimately, in accordance with the agreements between the research institutions involved, we made the data from the first database publicly available on our website (with due reference to all researchers and sponsors). We later finalized the article and published it (Biehl et al. 2012) on our own terms, without Dr. X but including all authors who met criteria for authorship consistent with best practices for scholarly publications.

As for the second database, the counsel reached out to the research institute with which the university had contracted and, in an effort to get the institute to provide the
database, proposed to make the results publicly available on the Internet so that everyone (collaborators and ex-collaborators alike) could access and analyze them, and write freely. But, because the institute now claimed that the database whose production it had been paid to facilitate was actually “state data,” the counsel began suggesting that legal action might be necessary to access it. Two years after the start of the collaboration, it seemed quite possible that we would be denied access to the data because our initial results did not support the state’s narrative.

How, then, did we finally gain access to the second database?

In a welcome, if unexpected, turn of events, a federal judge in Porto Alegre learned of our travails and found our results too crucial for health policy to remain locked up. The PT had recently come into power in the state, and transparency was a key political buzzword of the moment. The progressive judge made some calls and put me in contact with the human rights attorney of the state’s revamped Solicitor General’s Office. A few weeks later, Ms. Z released the second database, which closely corroborated our initial findings.

De-pooring people and limiting state accountability

The saga of our collapsed research collaboration adds further texture to the critique that emerged from the data itself. Particularly telling were the state prosecutors’ comments on our original article draft, read in light of a broader sense of prevalent (and ultimately misconstrued) accounts of judicialization and who it is for.

Backing up to when we finally received the comments from the state prosecutors, before anything had been published: the comments on our draft came with the warning that “any publication based on the database must be submitted to the review of the Solicitor General’s Office and the Health Secretariat.” While there were no comments on or requests for changes to the actual numbers drawn from the database, there were plenty of highlighted notes throughout the text signaling “things we disagree with” and orders such as “This must be removed,” together with a few minor editorial suggestions. The objective (so to speak) labor of the social scientists was acceptable; the problem was with contextualizing, making connections across scales, and moments of interpretation and critique.

The “officer of special affairs” who signed off on the document did so in the name of the Solicitor General’s Office and the Health Secretariat, lending the views expressed an official, public character. The draft made visible certain assumptions and positions, laying bare the core tensions underlying our faltering collaboration. As Anneliese Riles has shown, documents are “paradigmatic artifacts of modern knowledge practices” (2006, 2): they instantiate and render legible ways of knowing, doing, and studying. She calls for attention to documents as artifacts that enable us to take seriously “other people’s knowledge practices as an ethnographic subject” (2006, 17), shedding light on the commitments of their and one’s own knowledge. In this sense, the document in question—the article draft with commentary—becomes a window into conflicting epistemic practices as they play out over time.

This particular document gains analytic currency not only as an embodiment of our failed collaborative project, but also as a critical artifact of political rationality (Hull 2012; see also Latour 2009). In this capacity, it embodies how evidence is constructed and deployed in the service of political schemes and an improvised statecraft ultimately removed from the people it supposedly represents and governs. As I have shown elsewhere (Biehl 2013), judicialization has become a “para-infrastructure” that allows the state to disqualify claims and delay action; in the logic of state actors, if the poverty of claimants can be denied, so too can the pressing need to change policy and improve the delivery of services.

Knowledge, power, and the criteria for inclusion in political communities were long a subject of interest for Foucault, and are here made visible in documents qua artifacts of power. In his moving essay “The Lives of Infamous Men,” Foucault (2000) considers people who were immortalized in history through their fleeting brush with power; otherwise anonymous, they became exempla in the archival record, known to us only because they were caught up, for a moment, in some larger system. “What snatched them from the darkness in which they could, perhaps should, have remained,” he writes, “was the encounter with power; without that collision, it’s very unlikely that any word would be there to recall their fleeting trajectory” (161).

Without this clash with power and its classificatory, disciplining, and normalizing apparatuses, Foucault tells us, we would have no knowledge of these men; power, here, affirms its grip on knowledge as the very force through which subjects are brought into history, discipline, and normality. Similarly, Taussig (1997, 173–74) conceptualizes the “Arch of Triumph” as purporting to honor the dead by bringing them into history, but instead disciplines the living by mystifying and sacralizing the dead and empowering the state. There is something then, in the push and pull between knowledge and power, visibility and invisibility, that resonates with the research collaboration and its collapse, but in a kind of reversal of this Foucauldian moment: the encounter with state power actually disqualifies subjects from the governmental radar, excluding them from the production of official knowledge.

Our draft of the article began with a case study: that of Ms. Y, a patient-litigant I knew from my ethnographic research, who was suing the state for medication to treat her...
pulmonary hypertension. Forty-eight years old and HIV-positive, married to a taxi driver, and living in a shantytown of Porto Alegre, Mrs. Y lost her job as a custodian when shortness of breath made it impossible for her to work. Unlike her HIV medication, which is provided for free, Sildenafil, the drug her doctor prescribed, is not offered through the public health-care system and costs $1,300 a month. With free legal representation from the Public Defender’s Office, Mrs. Y sued the state for the medication, losing her initial lawsuit but winning on appeal. As we noted later in our article draft, Mrs. Y was, in many respects (age, gender, low income, ill health) a “typical” patient-litigant, although in other ways (HIV status) somewhat anomalous.

The state prosecutors’ response to this story, in the introduction and throughout the article, was unequivocal: it had been excised. There was no place for particular stories, and ethnographic knowledge was rejected as unscientific. They took issue not only with the chosen vignette—which, they claimed, did not represent the larger sample and was therefore misleading—but also with the broader possibility of acknowledging or learning from life stories, dismissing such personal narratives as working against objectivity. As they wrote, “There is no one specific case that could represent the issue of judicialization.” From this perspective, no singular life story has value against the supposedly generalizable aggregate of data. An appeal to accuracy becomes a means of erasing human stories, and the fetishization of data performs a kind of scientific legitimacy. Staying with the numbers lends the guise of objectivity while leaving space for tinkering with interpretations, unbound by the precarious realities of bodies and voices on the ground. Visible in this interpretive machinery are efforts to erase the singularity of circumstances and to reduce public dissensus. These efforts enact political work as they circumscribe state accountability.

The commentators also objected to much of the interpretive and analytic work of the article. They denounced contextual information on the health system and public bureaucracy as irrelevant, and decried commentary on the failings of current drug-formularies and systems of provision as “speculative” and “opinion,” even though it was backed up by interviews with local patient-plaintiffs, families, pharmacists, caregivers, and public defenders, all of whom alluded to local and regional administrative failures. They cast aside arguments about the limitations of the public-health system in adequately meeting the needs of the public as “not based on the data.” Here, data come to stand in for infrastructure, and in a strategic inversion, where there are no data, there can be no problems with existing services. This reasoning buys time, as it were, postponing the need to address gaps and lacks in the system and slowing the immediacy of judicialization’s temporality. The political thus becomes a means of controlling time.

As a demonstration of an incipient, grassroots form of counterpower, judicialization is subject to a war over interpretations. As Rancière reminds us in the introduction to Moments politiques, “All transformation interprets, and all interpretation transforms” (2014, xii). Dismissing our analysis as “differing opinions” and “value judgments” and relying on a narrow view of evidence that casts anything beyond the reporting of numbers as unobjective, the state officials’ suggested edits and commentary reduced our findings—which in fact countered dominant accounts of judicialization—to the selfsame stories we sought to challenge, all in the name of science. Rehashing arguments that blame patient-litigants for making unnecessary and unjust use of the system, while denouncing our analysis as irrational and value-laden, their policing of what counts as relevant became a means of controlling the judicialization narrative. These explanations both erase critique and its power to enlarge public conversation and foreclose broader political questions. In this way, an epistemic machine comes into being through which evidentiary claims are mobilized and perpetuated, performing a work that folds all data (even counterknowledge) into its own logics.

The story is still being written. The judicialization of the right to health remains a contentious subject in Brazil, extending its reach into the national sphere of media and political discourse, where the narratives I encountered in the field continue to circulate and gain strength (Chieffi and Barata 2009; Da Silva and Terrazas 2011; Economist 2011). “Judicialization Increases Health Inequity,” read a recent headline in Folha de São Paulo (Collucci 2014), one of Brazil’s most influential newspapers. The article framed judicialization as a scandal of the “haves” triumphing over the “have-nots,” a view echoed by the government officials quoted in the article: Brazil’s health minister said that lawsuits seeking medicines “take resources away from the poorest to benefit those who have more.” “It’s a kind of Robin Hood in reverse,” added the health secretary of the State of São Paulo, “to take from the poor to give to those who can afford to pay for a good lawyer.” The director of Brazil’s Cochrane Center for EBM, also quoted, speculated that the pharmaceutical industry is behind the phenomenon of judicialization: “Why does no one file a lawsuit for the government to give calcium to pregnant women and prevent hypertension? Because calcium does not cost anything. There is no lobby behind it.”

I searched online and found the study most likely mentioned in the Folha article: “The Right to Health in the Courts of Brazil: Worsening Health Inequities?” by legal scholar Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz (2009). As in his other publications (Ferraz 2011a, 2011b), the author, unsurprisingly, responded yes to the leading question of his title, restating his judgment on studies that “confirm that a majority of right-to-health litigants come from social groups that
are already considerably advantaged in terms of all socio-economic indicators, including health conditions."

In a more recent article, Daniel Wang and Ferraz (2013) declared that the “pro-litigation” camp “simply overlooks or ignores as irrelevant the picture emerging from . . . empirical studies.” Through multiple rhetorical gimmicks, the authors then simplistically retranslated (via the Human Development and the Health Need Indexes) the self-reported socioeconomic data from litigants served by the Public Ministry and the Public Defender’s Office of the city of São Paulo. They wanted to show that “public attorneys face important obstacles for reaching the neediest.” The ultimate goal was to discredit the prolitigation argument that “if significant improvement in access to Justice occurred, litigation could in principle have a positive effect” (161). One can only imagine that Wang and Ferraz’s exercise was a reaction to discredit studies such as ours, which actually found that patient-litigants are mainly low-income people who depend on the public system for obtaining both health care and legal representation. Repeated and self-reinforcing, these portrayals congeal into a dominant myth that casts patients as malingerers and the state as a just defender of equity, depoliticizing the actions of patient-plaintiffs while buttressing state actors’ political projects.

What comes into view in the prosecutors’ comments on our article draft is precisely the production and perpetuation of such state stories. “In all legends,” writes Foucault, “there is a certain ambiguity between the fictional and the real—but it occurs for opposite reasons. Whatever its kernel of reality, the legendary is nothing else, finally, but the sum of what is said about it. It is indifferent to the existence or nonexistence of the persons whose glory it transforms” (2000, 162). For Foucault, legends walk the line between the fictional and the real, ambulating between what is known and how it is talked about, thereby gaining a kind of story life of their own and crystalizing into truth. The stakes of such circulating stories are both real and unfigured by human concerns, “indifferent” to the “persons whose glory it transforms.” They thus come to serve as a kind of machine of fabulation, managing how evidence is absorbed, reconfigured, or put to work.

A recent review article on lawsuits for access to medicines, published in a Brazilian public-health journal, sought to aggregate available research (our own study included) in order to offer a more general, comprehensive account of the phenomenon of judicialization (Gomes and Amador 2015). Read critically, the article speaks to the extent to which the mythology of judicialization operates largely unchecked; the authors misread and inaccurately report on our research, restating conclusions that, while unsubstantiated by available evidence, have already made their way into the dominant narrative. For example, on drug costs, Vanessa Gomes and Tânia Amador state, “In most cases, the prescribed drugs can be classified as medium to high cost” (9). This assertion is at odds with the strong evidence in our results. Moreover, only one study under their review actually included specific drug costs (6). Self-reinforcing and recounted as scientific fact, such arguments insidiously come to stand in for the truth of judicialization, in which the fictional is recast as the real. Attending to falsehood on its own terms thus opens up space for asking what stories are told and how they gain currency, offering entry points into both the conditions of their making and their force in the world.

An ethnographic approach to our numerical data produced an entirely different empirical portrait from the one that officials and public-health scholars rely on (Biehl 2013). This discrepancy highlights the potential of publicly engaged ethnography to produce counterknowledges that might render pressing infrastructural challenges visible and support the mobilization of counterpublics. Indeed, as cost-cutting public officers kidnap the discourse on equity, one wonders how the inequalities produced by government policies (or lack thereof) can be alternatively politicized.

While a reduction in inequality under the federal rule of the PT and the associated rise of the so-called “new middle class,” which now supposedly comprises 50.5 percent of the population (Kopper 2016; Neri 2011; Souza 2010), have been heralded as the end of endemic poverty, mainstream narratives about judicialization frame the phenomenon as a practice of the wealthy. In a sense, these stories dovetail with the knowledge and policy systems through which this new middle class is being fashioned, as new forms of statecraft and ideas of citizenship and legitimate politics accompany a massive social recasting of Brazil’s poor in terms of market inclusion and the potential to consume. While poverty has been stigmatized and rewritten as illness in the United States (Hansen, Bourgois, and Drucker 2014), in the populist, postneoliberal state of Brazil, the erasure of poverty takes a different form, in which those who were once poor now find themselves categorized as middle class.

Ultimately, critical ethnography allows us to call into question the fabulation of power that not only makes poor patient-citizens publicly invisible but also proves (through stylish modeling and bizarre quantitative maneuvers) that they are not poor at all—an epistemic mechanism I think of as de-pooring people. This supposed proof is generally offered in the name of the country’s neediest, who, the argument goes, suffer from the impact of judicialization on health-care budgets and policies. The mythology of judicialization that de-poors actual people seeking access, care, and justice in a faltering public-health system thus sits in awkward tension with a state caught up in projects of championing and speaking for “the new middle class.” These shifting categorizations and ways of imagining citizenship, justice, and politics actually render the poor less visible—all in the name of the public good. As
ethnographers, we must attend to these forms of statecraft, and to the kinds of evidence and political subjectivities built into the para-infrastructure of rights and interests that the judicialization of health has occasioned.

**Entering justice**

This experiment in public ethnography asks what happens when the ethnographer approaches the black box of power and grapples with what might be learned from it. In this attempted entry, failure itself opens space for considering how and for what ends truths about both citizens’ needs and rights and state accountability are mobilized. Opening the failed collaboration to self-reflexive scrutiny, I assembled elements for a critique of contemporary political rationality, showing how public ethnography might simultaneously contribute to enlarging the ethnographic record of statecraft and evidence-making machines and to theorizing power and politics more broadly. It is only through second-order ethnographic reflexivity that it becomes possible to consider not only the explicit logics of what state actors say and do but also, through careful exegesis, to move beyond face value to the more entrenched political rationalities at play.

Arguments about the reality and impact of the rampant judicialization of the right to health in Brazil are often crafted around economic analysis and appeals to EBM and policy. Critics fail to recognize that judicialization can itself help to create alternative sources of practice-based evidence, showing where existing administrative mechanisms fail people and offering clues on how to improve the system. A rhetorical machinery is at play that not only denies poverty but also erases people. Just as EBM is mobilized to “rationally” allocate resources, fictions and falsehoods are marshaled in the name of equity and the public good, even though there are no existing mechanisms to actually assess or act on public needs. A fetishization of evidence lends an aura of authority to the aggregates of quantitative data as researchers deny the value or evidentiary force of the singular lives out of which all data are ultimately produced.

The individual patient-citizen, here, is at once blamed for abusing the system for personal gain and dismissed as a potential embodiment or representative of the collective. Such subjects do not meet the thresholds of acceptance for political inclusion, even as the state supposedly guarantees health coverage for all. In the fallout of our collaborative research, we glimpse the calculus of this exclusion, where fabulation and the machineries of veridiction and falsification are thrown, ever so briefly, into stark relief. Truth production is tied to forms of political rationality that depend on slippages of scale between individual and collective, the person and the public, where claims for the broader collective are defended at the expense of the individuals who actually compose it, obscuring unexpected grassroots politics around workable infrastructures while shoring up state politics as usual.

Right-to-health litigation is not a perfect process—it is administratively and humanly costly—but it is an opportunity for citizens’ diverse and often urgent (life-or-death) demands to be politicized and brought to the state’s attention. Certainly, litigation is not a substitute for health policy, but it can be a crucial adjunct. Individual claims can highlight gaps in health planning, policy, and delivery, as well as the lack of responsiveness of health systems to the citizens they aim to serve.

While thinking through the kinds of politics at play in this story, I found economist and political thinker Albert O. Hirschman’s (1970) *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* particularly helpful. Hirschman offers an account of the opposing strategies through which social actors respond to undesirable situations and seek to exert influence. He draws a distinction between “exit,” which involves removing oneself from a given situation entirely, and “voice,” premised on changing the situation from within by uttering complaints or making demands. While exit follows traditional market dynamics, voice is, in Hirschman’s words, “political action par excellence” (15), because it is premised on enacting change from within a given system. Loyalty helps make sense of when and why one mechanism or the other might prove preferable; in situations where loyalty is strong, an actor cares for the well-being of the collective beyond his or her own participation in it, and thus favors voice over exit.

In addressing a dysfunctional health system that fails to provide for their needs, low-income patients face the option of exiting the public system (seeking private-sector alternatives) or voicing concerns through cumbersome and slow political and participatory mechanisms like voting or community councils. Through right-to-health litigation, however, a growing number of Brazilian citizens are finding new ways of acting as political subjects to hold the state accountable and exposing the electorally motivated realpolitik of executive and legislative bodies. Without the possibilities of exit and voice, and unwilling to loyally defer to a state whose promises to them remains unfulfilled, these patient-citizens use judicialization to simultaneously demand services and to make the system respond to its own failures and to their expressed needs—engaging a complementary mechanism I think of as *entry*.

Referring to their lawsuits, people often use the expression *entrar na justiça*, “to enter the judiciary” or, literally, “to enter justice.” This suggests a more capacious reading of individual acts of suing the state in light of the broader forms of “entry” at stake—into politics, an emergent collective, and a different conception of truth, justice, and the public sphere. It is only through ethnographic work, and by undoing the mythology surrounding judicialization, that such moments and mechanisms come into view, allowing a
politics of entry to complicate prior understandings about the judicialization of health and its subjects.

Going against the grain of appearances and affirming dissensus, public ethnography thus illuminates the improved quality of postneoliberal democratic institutions of government, challenging the remodeled logics of today’s inequality. It also breaks open a distinct sense of politics in the making, in which people find means of holding the state locally accountable, creating an alternative political space amid dire infrastructural conditions. Only by working against the fabulation of power and insisting on a space where precarity is actually a mobilizing force might we restore the place of the poor in political community.

Notes

Acknowledgments. This article builds on an earlier paper presented at the 2014 workshop “If Truth Be Told: The Politics of Public Ethnography,” organized by Didier Fassin at the Institute for Advanced Study, in Princeton, New Jersey. I want to express my deepest gratitude to Naomi Zucker for her critical reading and wonderful editorial help. I am also grateful to Heath Pearson, Miquêias Muggê, Igor Rubinov, and Serena Stein for their insightful comments and help. Throughout the years, Joseph J. Amon, Joshua Franklin, Alex Gertner, Peter Locke, Adriana Petryna, and Mariana P. Socal have been the best-possible interlocutors: thank you! I benefited greatly from the comments and suggestions of the article's anonymous reviewers, and I am thankful to them and to Niko Besnier for his superb editorial guidance at every step.

1. To protect anonymity, the names of all institutions and actors have been changed, along with their professional positions.
2. John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff (2006) have been attending to such a “judicialization of politics” in postapartheid South Africa and how it has affected social mobilization, particularly in the field of HIV/AIDS. Class struggles, they argue, “seem to have metamorphosed into class actions. Citizens, subjects, governments, and corporations litigate against one another, often at the intersection of tort law, human rights law, and the criminal law, in an ever mutating kaleidoscope of coalitions and cleavages” (2006, 26).
3. States can also, as has been shown, intervene in and influence research through the process of ethics review (Amon et al. 2012).

References


Souza, Jessé. 2010. _Os batalhadores brasileiros: Nova classe média ou nova classe trabalhadora?_ Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG.


João Biehl
Department of Anthropology
Princeton University
128 Aaron Burr Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544
jbiehl@princeton.edu