Foreign Policy Cooperation: US and EU

IR Policy Workshop

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Executive Summary

Scholars of International Relations continuously debate the nature of the international system, questioning the post-Cold War notion of the United States as the world’s sole superpower. Some proclaim Europe a rising star, while others point to the rapid growth of the BRICS and posit the decline of the West. Nonetheless, in terms of international leverage, no partnership in the world can match the sheer force of US-EU relations. The two regions are united not only by trade and heritage, but also by a shared vision of a world shaped by institutional norms.

To generate lasting stability and prevent the spread of violence, the US and EU must collaborate on critical areas in foreign policy. The following paper offers a few tangible recommendations on US-led policy initiatives that engage Europe in crafting solutions to four presently-unstable regions.

Eastern Europe

US and European interests converge in Ukraine, where Russian-backed forces have annexed the Crimean Peninsula and wage separatist war against government troops. Western attempts to both engage Russia in constructive dialogue and stabilize the crises in Ukraine have been ineffective. Ukraine suffers from energy dependency on Russia and bleeds migrants into the rest of Europe, while Russia’s government scoffs at sanctions and denies continued involvement. To stifle Russian propaganda and strengthen Ukraine, we propose the US guarantee the safety of ethnic Russians in Eastern Europe, reinforce Ukraine with NATO presence, aid Ukraine in establishing
energy independence, and up support for European humanitarian relief programs. The costs of a hostile Russia and unstable East are of paramount concern for the US.

The Middle East

ISIS controls regions in Iraq and Syria where it has overthrown local government and employed its own rule. It is a threat to US national security because it practices terrorism, perpetuates radical Islam, violates human rights, and increases instability in the Middle East. The primary drivers of ISIS are political instability, sectarian tension, a growing youth population accompanied by high unemployment, and social inequality. This report recommends the US counteract ISIS by employing operational coordination with Iran in Iraq, enforcing stricter counterterrorism measures against foreign fighters through shared intelligence, and advocating for a political strategy and humanitarian programs in Syria. The US will benefit from long-term political, economic, and social strategies to undermine ISIS and prevent future conflict.

Africa

The Four Pillars of US Strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa are evidence of US commitment to strengthening and stabilizing the region. The Four Pillars call on the US to strengthen democratic institutions; spur economic growth, trade, and investment; advance peace and security; and promote opportunity and development in Africa. Implementation of this strategy is crucial to US efforts to develop closer ties with the region. A stable Africa would be a strong partner to the US, from an economic and security standpoint. This report integrates the Four Pillars into tangible US strategies in four key African countries (Nigeria, Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Tunisia) that threaten the stability of the region.
Latin America

The US and the EU are the largest foreign investors in Latin America. One of the biggest issues that affects both regions is narcotrafficking, as it has led to several human right abuses, including human, sexual, and child trafficking to these regions and along the major drug routes. Although the EU’s illicit drug market is increasingly being tied to Latin America, the United States has become the major destination of Colombian cocaine and heroin. To combat the distribution and sale of illegal drugs, the US has invested billions of dollars to destabilize major drug cartels in Colombia. For the past 20 years, this has been the dominant strategy in combatting drug trafficking. However, this strategy has proven ineffective because the strategy of targeting one cartel has led to further decentralizations and fragmentation of drug cartels, so instead of having 5 or 6 large cartels, Colombia now has dozens of smaller cartels, each as ruthless as the other. **We propose that the US implement cost-effective, sustainable, and nonconventional methods to target the demand abroad and legitimize the Colombian government and law enforcement agencies.**
Eastern Europe

Glossary

“Baltic States:” Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania

“Chechnya:” Secessionist Muslim region in southern Russia

“Gazprom Neft:” fourth largest oil producer in Russia, a subsidiary of Gazprom

“Hybrid Warfare:” military strategy that combines conventional warfare, irregular warfare, cyber warfare, and information campaigns

“Minsk Agreement:” one of two ceasefire agreements for East Ukraine

“Naftogaz:” national oil and gas company of Ukraine

“Novorossiya:” Russian name for separatist Southeast Ukraine, means “New Russia”

“Slav:” person with identity of one of the many peoples of the former Russian Empire

EC: European Commission

ECHO: European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection

EEU: Eurasian Economic Union

EDPs: Externally Displaced People

EU: European Union

ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross

IDPs: Internally Displaced People

IOM: International Organization for Migration

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

UNHCR: United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNICEF: the United Nations Children’s Fund

WFP: World Food Program

WHO: World Health Organization
Executive Summary: Eastern Europe

The fate of Ukraine has been uncertain since November 2013, when pro-Russian President Yanukovych refused to sign the EU-Ukraine Association and sparked a populist protest ousting him from office. After providing Yanukovych with safe haven, Russia seized control of the Crimean Peninsula in February 2014. Sensing a chance to escape the Ukrainian system, pro-Russian rebels then declared the separation of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the eastern and southern parts of the country. The International Community reacted by isolating Russia and imposing economic sanctions intended to damage the Russian economy and erode support for international aggression. However, Ukraine and the European continent are still critically reliant on Russian gas exports, and the nature of Ukraine as the main transit country for gas gives the country massive strategic significance and forces the EU to engage Russia.

Attempts to de-escalate the crisis have been largely ineffective. The first ceasefire agreement, Minsk 1, lasted mere days. A second agreement, Minsk 2, engaged all parties and aimed to enforce the cease-fire, bringing about an agreement among the rebel controlled territory and the rest of Ukraine. The United States, as the operator of NATO forces and a close European ally, has a critical role in brokering peace and stability within the region to avoid spillover effects.

To tackle this crisis, the US should employ integrated diplomatic, political, and economic tools including:

· Exert political clout to keep Russia in the conversation
· Pursue integration of Russian minorities in the Baltic States as a requirement for NATO assistance to avoid Russian backlash
· Bolster Ukrainian defense forces
· Reassure European NATO members of US commitment to their safety
Counter Russian influence in the energy sector
Promote FDI and the opening of Ukrainian energy markets
Provide humanitarian assistance to displaced Ukrainian citizens
Continue to supply aid to strengthen both financial and civilian capabilities

The main difficulty is implementing policies for the betterment of Ukrainian citizens while not provoking war with Russia. The task is to dismantle incentives in Russia for popular support of a European war, while reprimanding Russian aggression into Ukrainian territory. Before the economy of Ukraine can prosper, there needs to be more military and energy security that can send a unified message to the world of US and EU unity for democracy and rule of law. In the meantime, the citizens most affected by the crisis who have been displaced must continue to receive assistance by the partnership of Western powers.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. **Undermine** President Putin’s mandate on public opinion by guaranteeing the safety of ethnic Russians and by encouraging Russian participation in international fora.
2. **Fortify** Ukraine by reaffirming alliance ties with Russia through the Partnership For Peace Program, reinforcing cooperation in the defense and security sector in Ukraine, stressing EU’s need to increase contributions, closing intelligence-sharing gap between partners, and avoiding offensive military tactics.
3. **Strengthen** Ukrainian energy security by promoting efficient energy use, encouraging foreign direct investment in shale and natural gas sectors, sharing technology for renewable energy, and ensuring proper usage of nuclear energy with diversified uranium enriched fuel sources.
4. **Coordinate** joint funding with the European Commission to support humanitarian assistance efforts, including the cash voucher and airlift programs, to meet the needs of displaced Ukrainians.
Subject 1: Engaging Russia

Recommendation:

Undermine President Putin’s mandate on public opinion by guaranteeing the safety of ethnic Russians and by encouraging Russian participation in international fora.

Background

Attempts to stabilize Eastern Ukraine must coincide with efforts to address the regional hegemon of Eurasia – the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin. Since the beginning of the 2013 civil unrest in Ukraine, American and European policy towards Russia has focused on economically and diplomatically containing the nation. Rather than containing Russia, these countermeasures have aggravated the Russian public and empowered Putin’s alarmist narrative. The president, who views the breakup of the Soviet Union as the greatest tragedy of the 20th century\(^1\), claims personal responsibility for the safety of all Slavs, even those outside of Russia. Behind the fatherly rhetoric, Putin wrestles with a Russian state that is packed with diverse ethnic groups and vulnerable to federalist divisions, as shown by the multiple Chechen Wars fought since 1991\(^2\).

To maintain public support and silence voices of opposition, Putin must unify the country behind common enemies - including Chechen terrorists in 2004, Georgian

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settlers in 2008, and now Ukrainian “fascists” since 2013. By allying themselves with Georgia or Ukraine, the West sends Putin a signal that, too, may pose a threat to ethnic Russians or, more importantly, to Putin’s mandate on power. With the help of a powerful state propaganda machine, Putin has spread his alarmist views throughout the country, accounting for his exceptionally high approval rating of 85%. This uniform propaganda creates a vicious feedback loop, where Western countermeasures increase support for Russian aggression rather than making defection politically costly for the regime.

**Figure A1 in the Appendix** demonstrates examples of the “Feedback Effect,” where Western policies with good intentions are morphed by Russian perceptions and lead to perverse effects.

**Proposal and Implementation**

If the West hopes to see the Minsk peace process succeed, Washington and Brussels must take practical measures to weaken Putin’s monopoly on public opinion; until this is accomplished, all major Western measures will continue to be perverted through the Feedback Effect. Attempts to attack Putin’s anti-federalist power mechanism directly are destined to fail: if insiders like Boris Nemtsov are easily silenced, then similar Western challenges are doomed from the start. However, by examining Russian perceptions, the West can craft policy that de-escalates tensions in Ukraine and on the European continent.

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1. Use NATO to guarantee the safety of ethnic Russians in the Baltic States. Rather than caving to Baltic demands for NATO protection from Russia, NATO should exercise what the State Department calls “Tough Love.” Troop assistance should be made conditional upon the Baltics reforming their citizenship laws to incorporate the many thousands of marginalized Russian speakers residing in the countries\(^7\). This action would demonstrate to the Russian public that NATO’s primary function is not to bully Russia but to encourage future cooperation.

2. Exert diplomatic pressure on Ukraine to achieve decentralization of the Donbass/Novorossiya region. The withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the East would not necessarily lead to another Crimean-style annexation by Russia; Russian public opinion does not support the integration of Novorossiya into the Federation\(^8\). However, this moderate public stance could change again if the rebels face an existential threat. The Ukrainian government should be pushed to accept the de facto autonomy of the Eastern regions, granting them greater local powers and guaranteeing security in exchange for keeping them nominally under Ukrainian government control. Novorossians should be allowed to maintain their own governing structure and security forces, but should partner with the Ukrainian federal government on energy and economic development.

**Challenges and Costs**

Officials in Poland and the Baltic states will beg the US not to leave them vulnerable, but the presence of NATO troops under a tough love framework should reaffirm the US interest in protecting them.

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Ukrainian officials will protest the de facto separation of Novorossiya, calling Russian intervention illegal on all grounds; however, US policymakers can point out that Ukrainian lives will be saved by recognizing facts on the ground.

Finally, the above policies will find strong opposition from hawkish voices in the US Government, who will protest the appearance of weakness or concession to Russia. To counter these arguments, policymakers must demonstrate the opportunity cost of allowing the feedback effect to continue. If the West loses the ability to cooperate with Russia, we face consequences far beyond Ukraine: Russia might no longer assist in future talks with Iran, in transitioning past a post-Assad government in Syria, or, worst of all, in combating the spread of Islamic State to the Northern Caucasus region, where radical insurgents are already present in alarming numbers9. These opportunity costs far outweigh worries about power perceptions.

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Subject 2: Security

Recommendation:

Fortify Ukraine by encouraging cooperation between the Allies and Ukraine by reaffirming alliance ties through the Partnership For Peace Program, reinforcing cooperation in the defense and security sector in Ukraine, stressing EU need to increase contribution, closing intelligence-sharing gap between NATO and Ukraine, and avoiding offensive military tactics.

Background

President Putin and other Russian politicians have been unable to view Ukraine as an independent state from the Soviet Union, but instead uphold that Ukraine belongs “in Russia’s political and economic orbit.” After Russia’s invasion of the Crimean peninsula, Ukraine invoked Article 14 of the NATO-Ukraine Charter and requested a meeting on the 2nd of March 2014 to discuss Russia’s military actions. Meanwhile Poland and Lithuania jointly invoked Article 4 of NATO’s Washington Treaty, concerning instances when “security of any of the Parties is threatened.” The Allies view Russia’s invasion as a breach of international law, which “also contravenes the principles of the NATO-Russia Council and the Partnership for Peace.”

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Two treaties between NATO and Russia have been violated and Europe’s geopolitical security has been destabilized. Russia has violated Europe’s post-World War II security policy that, “states must not use military force to change international borders.” The Allies’ biggest concern is Russia’s seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and the possibility of further expansion. The Ukrainian crisis challenges US foreign policy toward Europe in the post-Cold War era, which calls for: 1) a stable and secure Europe, thus allowing the US to focus greater attention on other areas such as Asia and the Middle East, and 2) Russia being a partner in the region instead of an adversary. The US has encouraged NATO to provide military trainers in order to assist Ukraine in modernizing their military. NATO and US want to “improve the interoperability of Ukrainian and allied armed forces through exercises and joint operations.”

Proposal and Implementation

To stabilize the region, we propose that the US encourage NATO to reaffirm alliance ties with Ukraine using the Partnership for Peace Program. The aim is to strengthen political and military cooperation within Ukraine, bolster comprehensive deterrence and defense posture in Eastern Europe, and assuage fears in the Baltic States, which are NATO members. The Peace program includes helping Ukraine build up its military capacity through joint training and exercises. The US could provide military equipment and NATO could teach Ukraine how to operate the equipment.

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16 Ibid.
Ukraine’s defense capacity needs improvement and NATO needs to reinforce defense and security cooperation; this is best achieved through capacity-building programs for Ukraine. Russian and separatist forces easily took over the Donetsk airport and Luhansk region because Ukrainian forces do not have the appropriate military capabilities to fight Russia. The Allies should give Ukraine additional defense capabilities to strongly deter their opponents in case of further invasion. Russia has employed hybrid tactics; therefore it is important that Ukraine build up the capacity to deal with logistics, command and control, and cyber defense. A Kyiv-NATO partnership capable of delaying Russian attacks will affirmed NATO’s strength and make Putin think twice before he challenges the security or sovereignty of other states.

To lessen the financial burden on the US, European NATO members need to increase their military expenditure to meet NATO’s 2% pledge. Ukraine needs more jet fighters, armored vehicles, and radar detectors because its military does not have the full capacity to fight Russia. The US cannot afford to be the only country contributing to Ukraine’s military. To lessen the burden, the EU members can donate pre-Cold War equipment and weapon systems similar to those operated by the Ukrainian military.

There is also an intelligence-sharing gap between NATO and Ukraine, rending both parties unable to identify clearly how the Russian military is organized in eastern Ukraine. The Allies should increase sharing of intelligence related to the besieged Donbass region. Ukraine needs to resolve its security leakage points. NATO and Ukraine should negotiate terms that help Ukraine meet NATO standards for intelligence sharing, and then encourage both its members and Ukraine to share safely their intelligence and ensure that the information they receive is consistent.17

Any policy changes must be taken cautiously, since both the US and NATO want to avoid agitating Russia to prevent another Cold War. NATO should not offer offensive military equipment or expensive equipment that Russia will see as a threat. NATO should not put permanent boots on the ground because that would violate the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, which serves as a basis for the NATO-Russia Council. Although NATO has suspended civilian and military cooperation with Russia, it should also refrain from stationing “substantial combat forces in countries that joined NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union.”

For Russia, this is a particularly important clause in the treaty.

**Challenges and Costs**

Russia may see NATO building defense capabilities along its border as a threat and could attack one of the neighboring NATO countries. Still, it is imperative for the US and NATO to protect Ukraine from Russia to avoid negative spillover effects within the region. The ultimate goal is to deter Putin from invading Latvia or Estonia since both countries have a significant Russian minority. If this happens, both countries are NATO members and would invoke Article 5, “an attack on one is an attack on all.” This will push the Allies into a war with Russia that they have been trying to avoid.

The Alliance is facing a test right now of the strength and effectiveness of NATO. If NATO appears to be weak to Putin, this will not bode well for Eastern Europe because Putin would use his rhetoric of “defending Russian minorities” to invade the Baltic states, which is what Eastern European states fear. This is why it is important for NATO to augment defense on member states’ borders and within Ukraine. Through military

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Ibid.
aid, the US has also taken steps to reassure US allies in the region by sending F-16 fighters to Poland for joint military exercises. It has sent a US-operated guided missile destroyer to the Black Sea for Bulgarian and Romanian naval forces. It is also working to enhance NATO air presence over Baltic States. The US and Allies have to realize that this crisis may go on for a long time and they have to have the capacity to bear the costs. The US has already contributed approximately $1.5 billion dollars to help Ukraine, and the situation may escalate in the future and become more costly\(^{19}\).

Subject 3: Energy Security

Recommendation:

Strengthen Ukrainian energy security by promoting efficient energy use, encouraging foreign direct investment in shale and natural gas sectors, sharing technology for renewable energy, and ensuring proper usage of nuclear energy with diversified uranium enriched fuel sources.

Background

The Ukraine crisis has changed the dynamic of energy supply for Ukraine and the European continent. Ukraine needs to become less dependent on Russian gas exports. Russia cut gas flows to Ukraine on July 1st of this year due to failed price negotiation talks between Ukraine, Russia and the EU. Ukraine is the main transit country for European-destined Russian gas, which accounted for 40% of total Russian gas exports in 2014. Gas that transits Ukraine has decreased leaving Ukraine with less revenue, currency depreciation, and inability to repay the accruing gas debt to Russia. The need to reduce energy demand in Ukraine is crucial; according to an OECD report, Ukraine uses around 3.2 times more energy per unit of GDP than the average OECD countries. There is much investment potential, both for international and domestic exploitation of energy reserves. See figure A3 in the appendix.

The US and EU have demonstrated their commitment to international principles through the implementation of sanctions on key Russian firms in the energy, financial

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and military sectors. Energy production in Ukraine comprises 40% gas, 31% coal, 10% oil, 17% nuclear, and 2% hydro/other. More than 90% of the coal production is located in the Donbas region, along with shale gas reserves ready for business investment but with security risks. Therefore, it is crucial to couple energy security with practical enforceability of the Minsk Agreement. It is in the United States’ interest to have secure energy for Ukraine to stabilize spillover effects in the region and stimulate their economy.

**Proposal and Implementation**

We propose that the US highlight energy efficiency as a policy objective and opportunity to modernize infrastructure leading to a more competitive Ukrainian market. To tackle Naftogaz’s increasing deficit due to subsidies, the Ukrainian government has increased gas prices to encourage its citizens to practice energy efficiency. This increase in the market price of oil and gas allows for more private sector investment, and an opening up to trade with other international partners. Currently the International Energy Agency in collaboration with the European-Ukrainian Energy Agency has invested in energy efficiency training programs in Ukraine this past March. The main targets include heating systems, building infrastructure, and citizen consciousness. We propose further that the US continue supporting such programs, and channel aid assistance to citizens most affected by the price increase.

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There is a need for foreign direct investment in Ukraine’s shale gas and other natural resources. Ukraine owns the world’s third largest shale gas deposit\textsuperscript{25}, and its exploitation can loosen pressure resulting from its energy deficiency. We propose that the US assist the Ukrainian government in creating more market friendly conditions, whereby companies such as Shell and Chevron can conduct shale exploration. For example, in the western regions of Ukraine there is much untapped potential that is far from the conflict zone. The United States and the EU can provide aid and expertise for equipment modernization of current gas and coal sites to optimize production.

Ukraine has much untapped potential for renewable energy sources with current energy supply totaling just 2\% for hydroelectric power\textsuperscript{26}. The US should provide financial aid for Ukrainian government investment or tax reduction for American corporations that allow development of biomass fuel, hydroelectric power stations, wind turbines, and solar heating panels. The US benefits from exporting expertise on renewable energy, through the cost-minimizing discoveries brought about by Ukraine.

Nuclear energy accounts for almost half of the electricity the country generates\textsuperscript{27}. There are 15 nuclear power reactors in Ukraine, and the country possesses uranium reserves that could be enriched for fueling the plants. Russia has been the main source of fuel for the plants, but American company Westinghouse has recently provided another supply of nuclear fuel. Westinghouse is willing to improve safety and efficiency within the nuclear plants, a much-needed measure given the history of the Ukrainian Chernobyl.

incident. The US can encourage this partnership and also assist with nuclear waste disposal. See figure A4 in the appendix.

**Challenges and Costs**

A major obstacle to Ukrainian energy independence is Russia’s capacity to utilize its energy exports to advance its political aims in the region. Russia will likely pushback at first, but they have more to lose than Ukraine given their dependency on gas exports for revenue. Despite the history of Ukraine and Russia, we continue to see energy sector ties that are difficult to erode. Under current contracts, Ukraine will continue to be a transit country for Russian gas destined to the European market. Our priority is stability in the European continent, and energy is a primary component of a country’s national security. A State Department report estimates US aid to Ukraine for the past year to be over $355 million with a $1 billion loan guarantee. The EU seeks the same objectives as the United States towards Ukraine given the close cooperation and overlying Russian energy dependency threat. US involvement in Ukraine might enhance Russian hostility, but a stronger, energy independent Ukraine can resist Russian backlash in debt repayment programs. The American public and Congress will support the proposals given the strong anti-Russian sentiment. Diversifying energy supplies and modernizing the energy infrastructure is costly in the short term but the long-term benefits outweigh the short term costs.

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Subject 4: Displacement of Persons

Recommendation:

Coordinate joint funding with the European Commission to support humanitarian assistance efforts, including the cash voucher and airlift programs, to meet the needs of displaced Ukrainians.

Background

The armed conflict in eastern Ukraine between Ukrainian government forces and pro-Russian separatists has escalated and led to the displacement of millions of Ukrainians, internally (IDPs) and externally (EDPs). As of June 26, UNHCR counted 1.3 million IDPs (figure 1) and 1.2 million refugees. IDPs and refugees face many challenges, including shortages of basic needs such as food, health services, household items and shelter. See figure 4E in the Appendix.

The European Union is the region most affected by the spillover of conflict and is the most involved actor. Even though Ukraine is neither part of the EU nor NATO, the country has a close relationship with the EU through the European Commission’s Neighborhood Policy, Enlargements Negotiations, and Eastern Partnership. However, geopolitical ties between the US and EU mean that the US is also impacted by the Ukrainian spillover. The crisis makes the partners vulnerable because it has led to instability that prevents both European and US companies from participating in the economic development of Ukraine. To protect both its

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interests and those of the US, the European Union’s long term plan is to 1) contribute to a “lasting solution,” 32 2) “protect the unity and territorial integrity of the country and 3) strive to ensure a stable, prosperous and democratic future for all Ukraine’s citizens” (Davis and William). 33

To deal with the immediate crisis, the EU focuses on de-escalating the violence, 34 while channeling its efforts on humanitarian assistance to the Ukrainians affected. In February, the EU reached a ceasefire agreement between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russians separatists. Also, the EC uses its department of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection to provide assistance to those in need. Assistance on the ground is being delivered through the EC and its humanitarian partners, including: UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, IOM, Save the Children, the Danish Refugee Council, People In Need, WFP and ICRC. Humanitarian aid goes to refugees, IDPs, returnees and the people in rebel-held areas. 35 Since 2014, the member states of the EU together provided over €223 million to the 5 million Ukrainians affected by the conflict. As of June 2015, the most vulnerable affected by this crisis are women, children, and the elderly. 36

Proposal and Implementation

We propose that the US offer its full support to the EU’s efforts to de-escalate the crisis. Helping the EU reinforce the ceasefire agreement is a critical step in leading Ukraine on a path to political and economic stability. The agreement required the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the frontline by both parties and the reinforcement of constitutional reform to give eastern Ukraine more autonomy. 37

33 Ibid
34 Ibid
We recommend that the US coordinate with the EU to help it increase its humanitarian assistance efforts and reach non-governmental areas. Working in isolation from the EC poses the risk of duplicating relief efforts or creating inefficiency. The EC will ensure that the assistance reaches people in need and the affected regions by delivering the assistance according to principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.38

For instance, UNHCR provide protection and assistance to the IDPs, returnees, refugees and EDPs in Belarus, and the Republic of Moldova.39 Furthermore, through the ICRC (Red Cross), the EC’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department uses cash vouchers to deliver its assistance. This kind of assistance reaches the most vulnerable groups and directly contributes to the local economy, as people receiving the assistance buy from the local market. The program has been cautiously planned so that it does not lead the local economy to unintended inflation, depression or social imbalances.40 In addition to financial aid, the EC also provides material assistance to the people in areas that are controlled not by the government, but by rebels. The EC delivers this assistance through an airlift and road transport of relief supplies operation program. In January 2015, the EC Civil Protection Mechanism and the EU’s Member States delivered three cargo planes comprising 85 tons of relief supplies including tents, blankets, sleeping bags and warm clothes to the Ukrainians in rebels-held areas.41

The US should collaborate with the EU to expand assistance for the cash voucher program. Also, through the US European Command, the US representative for the Agency for International Development\(^{42}\) should collaborate with the EC and continue to support relief efforts to provide material assistance in areas not controlled by the government.

**Challenges and Costs**

The US should coordinate with the EU to allocate unspent funds toward the EU’s relief assistance programs. According to the Foreign Assistance Department, the US has pledged $139.283 million of its foreign aid to help Ukraine this year to promote financial stability, economic growth, and other conditions for investment. Categorically, 52% of that fund goes toward peace and security and 9% toward economic development. By July 2015, less than half of the funds allocated for FY 2015 have been spent.\(^{43}\) Such coordination will yield great results because the continued involvement of the EU and its expertise in the region provide an efficient foundation for resolving the crisis.

Any recommendation for the United States to increase funding to the EU will meet opposition in Congress. However, opposition can be overcome by highlighting the effectiveness of US support for current measures to de-escalate the conflict and provide assistance aid. For instance, ED efforts laid the framework for the initial ceasefire agreement in the East. Also, the USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives is “supporting government and volunteer-led initiatives”\(^{44}\) for IDPs. Consequently, such coordination with the EU will enable the US to monitor the situation more closely and efficiently, act proactively and avoid duplication of efforts. More importantly, stability in Europe’s eastern border benefits both the US and the EU. Therefore, it is best to coordinate funding programs with the EU.

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800,000 Displaced in Ukraine as Donors Increase Aid. N.p., 1 Apr. 2015. Web. 21 July 2015.
The Middle East

Glossary

CDD  Community Driven-Development
CVE  Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
DOD  United States Department of Defense
EU  European Union
EUROJUST  European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit
EUROPOL  European Police Office
FATF  Financial Action Task Force
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation
Five Eyes  Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States
FSA  Free Syrian Army
HVE  Homegrown Violent Extremism
IO  International Organizations
ISIS  Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (al-Sham)
NCTC  National Counterterrorism Center
Peshmerga  Kurdish Fighters in Northern Iraq
PNR  Passenger Name Record
RAN  Radicalization Assessment Network
SWIFT  Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications
TFTP  US Department of the Treasury’s Terrorist Finance Tracking Program
TIDE  Terrorist Identities DataMart Environment
USAID OTI  US Agency of International Development: Office of Transition Initiatives
UNHCR  United Nations Refugee Agency
VIS  Visa Information System
Executive Summary: Middle East

The Islamic State, often called ISIS, has been rampaging across Iraq and Syria since April 2013. It has made significant gains in Iraq, seizing Mosul and Fallujah and currently rules an area larger than the United Kingdom. Unassisted Iraqi military forces have been ineffective in combating this growing threat to regional actors such as Iran. ISIS has exacerbated the already staggering refugee crisis prompted by the Syrian Civil War, leading to half of Syria’s population fleeing the country, and 7.6 million internally displaced people. ISIS’s broad media presence has encouraged radicalization of people across the globe, leading to home-grown terrorism. A recorded 22,000 foreign fighters have traveled to Syria and Iraq since the conflict began, and experts believe there could be as many as 6,000 more.

The current US policy to combat ISIS includes air strikes against ISIS targets, logistical support to local forces on the ground, counterterrorism efforts to prevent future attacks, and humanitarian assistance to non-combatants in the region. However, the terrorist group has resisted all offensives and continues to pose a threat to the region and the world. See figure B1 in the Appendix.

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The inability of the US and regional actors to subdue ISIS reveals the weaknesses of states in the Middle East debilitated by unemployment, poverty, and limited democracy. Many countries in the Middle East lack both significant economic activity and political opportunities for their citizens. In 2013, it was reported that in the Arab world “about 25 percent of youth, one in four people, are unemployed between the ages of 15 and 24.” These weaknesses have made countries like Iraq and Syria susceptible to ISIS’s military strength and appeal. We propose that along with employing tactics to combat terrorism, the US address the root causes of instability in the region. We assess that if these root causes are not addressed, flare-ups of violence will continue indefinitely.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Coordinate** with the EU to provide training for Iraqi forces and moderate rebel groups in Syria while coordinating tactically with Iran in Iraq and encouraging dialogue in Syria to move towards regime transition.

2. **Prevent** entry into the conflict zone through stricter counterterrorism measures and tighter border security. **Detect** returnees through increased willingness to share threat intelligence with our allies.

3. **Provide** a combination of emergency, livelihood, protection and advocacy programs to encourage sustainable coexistence within countries hosting refugees.

4. **Design** a long-term strategy to address recurring instability in Iraq and Syria and fortify democratic processes within the nations. **Implement** the strategy with the aim of promoting peace and strengthening civil society through economic, political, and social agendas.

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Subject 1: ISIS: Limiting the Movement of Foreign Fighters

Recommendations:

1. **Prevent** entry into conflict zones through stricter counterterrorism measures and tighter border security.
2. **Detect** returnees through increased willingness to share threat intelligence with our allies.

Background

Foreign fighters have inhibited our capacity to combat ISIS; however, the more imminent concern is the threat they present upon returning to their countries of origin. The Syrian and Iraqi conflict zones provide foreign fighters with discrete skills, access to terrorist networks, and battlefield experience, which could be redirected to their countries of origin in the form of a terrorist attack. They comprise 90 different nationalities and represent 100 countries, including 4,000 recorded from western nations. Because of the volume and the inability to distinguish fighters based on phenotypic characteristics, they have the flexibility to travel to conflict zones through various means and return to their home country undetected, presenting domestic law enforcement and intelligence agencies with a considerable vulnerability that must be addressed.

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The current foreign fighter phenomenon is the result of ISIS’ successful social media campaign, directed towards at-risk communities abroad.\textsuperscript{52} Because these messages disseminate quickly across the globe, many lone actors have become radicalized, leading to an increase in HVE.\textsuperscript{53}

Our international partners have set forth several strategies to identify, disrupt, and apprehend those attempting to travel to conflict zones. Because of the US-EU VWP, we have found the EU and its member states to be the most fitting partners for this mission. Specifically, the US has been working in tandem with our EU partners in three broad areas: law enforcement coordination, intelligence sharing, and terrorist financing.

The US and EU have established reciprocal EUROPOL and FBI liaison offices in Washington and The Hague, and have instituted extradition treaties and a wider US-EUROJUST agreement to spur cooperation in prosecuting and extraditing foreign fighters in both locations.\textsuperscript{54} The EU has granted US authorities access to SWIFT financial records in conjunction with TFTP. As a result, the US has shared over 2,000 leads with European governments, developed from SWIFT data, which have led to the prevention of terrorist attacks in Europe.\textsuperscript{55}

Because of the proximity to ISIS and the greater volume of foreign fighters, European countries have taken additional measures to combat radicalization. While member states have primary responsibility for combating the foreign fighter threat, the EU has added value through efforts to standardize legislation for the treatment of foreign fighters. FRONTEX (The European Borders Agency) has provided risk assessment to member states, while the European Commission has implemented a VIS


in the Schengen area. The Commission has also set up RAN to assist and exchange best practice among first-line local practitioners, an IGC has designated FATF as a policy-making body to generate the necessary political will to bring about national legislative and regulatory reforms in the EU. Turkey, as the main transit of entry and exit, has also taken efforts to reduce the flow to reduce foreign fighters. While Turkey’s visa-free travel agreements with over 70 governments has presented a huge vulnerability, it has stepped up its efforts to deny entry to foreign fighters through their “Banned From Entry List”, which reportedly includes 10,000 people.

Policy and Implementation

1. We propose that the US increased engagement with faith-based communities to help target marginalized people and at-risk individuals prior to radicalization. The volume and diversity of foreign fighters indicates ISIS’s capacity to reach disenfranchised groups. The NCTC should directly coordinate with RAN and member states to share CVE tools and best practices to build community resilience across the region.

2. Through NCTC, extend TIDE to the Five Eyes intelligence alliance as well as EU member states and NATO. Integrate TIDE with other identification databases including RAN and PNR. This will drastically improve information sharing across law enforcement agencies so that they can detect, locate and apprehend potential foreign fighters.

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3. Incentivize Turkey through temporary monetary funding to Disband VWP to reduce the influx of unidentified visitors, which will allow Turkish law enforcement to better screen potential foreign fighters and simultaneously bolster enforcement of Turkey’s “Banned From Entry List”.

**Challenges and Costs**

This initiative would add minor budgetary costs for the US, but may secure moderate funding by each member state to implement a target program to reach disenfranchised communities. The greatest difficulty in implementing this proposal is the challenge of coordinating with all 28 EU members. The US must acknowledge that foreign fighters are a domestic challenge, and each country has its own methods for making policies which may not all be aligned. Nonetheless, if the EU is able to provide leadership, their efforts could extend to non-European nations with high volumes of foreign fighters, including Tunisia, Afghanistan, and Australia.

Implementation of shared policy may be hindered by different views and national sensitivities among EU member states and between EU institutions on intelligence-sharing and data privacy issues. While the US has had tremendous flexibility in its data retrieval and surveillance efforts, some states including France and Germany strongly oppose such issues. Therefore, the US can encourage the adoption of temporary legislation that would remain in force until the foreign fighter and homegrown violent extremism threat is substantially reduced. Turkey may be unwilling to disband the VWP because of its substantial tourist economy, which depends on a constant flow of visitors into the country. Thus, we propose that the US in conjunction with willing EU members provide temporary economic support to Turkey and emphasize the benefits of eliminating the visa-free travel agreements.
Subject 2: ISIS: Managing Iranian Involvement in Iraq

Recommendations:

1. **Coordinate** on a tactical level with Iranian initiatives to empower Iraqi troops while monitoring Iranian involvement.
2. **Coordinate** with the EU on training of Iraqi Security Forces and intelligence sharing while engaging regional actors to address root causes of the growth of ISIS.

Background

Iran’s increased involvement in combatting ISIS is due to economic ties with Iraq and the 910 miles of poorly defended, shared borders between Iran and Iraq. Regional and international actors are concerned by Iran’s involvement because it could boost Iran’s regional influence and enflame sectarian tension. Currently, Tehran provides weapons and ammunitions to the Iraqi Security Forces, the Peshmerga, and Kurdish fighters as well as providing aircraft and pilots to assist in airstrikes against ISIS. Iran has provided security advisors and intelligence to Iraqi fighters. These actions further US and EU interests through bolstering Iraq’s offensive capabilities combating ISIS, helping

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to preserve Iraq’s territorial integrity, and maintaining the national unity of Iraq.64 Even in light of the nuclear deal and the fact that Iran and the US are both empowering Iraq’s offensive, President Obama has ruled out bringing Iran into the official coalition to defeat ISIS, due in part to Iran’s backing of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad.65

**Proposal and Implementation**

We propose that the US:

· Coordinate with Iran on a tactical level to defeat ISIS in Iraq without official cooperation, taking advantage of Europe’s formal communications with Iran to share intelligence.

· Coordinate with the EU to continue humanitarian aid to non-combatants and training programs for the Iraqi Security Forces while monitoring Iran’s parallel action.

· In the long term, work with the EU to organize regional actors to play a constructive role in addressing the root causes of ISIS’s growth in the region. Gulf nations in particular will be essential to weakening ISIS’s Sunni support group and its appeal.66

**Challenges and Costs**

The US must be mindful that Iranian engagement could enflame sectarian tensions and inflate Iran’s influence in Iraq and the region, which could aggravate countries such as Saudi Arabia and encourage proxy wars. By monitoring which groups Iran supports,


the US and EU will be able to assess the potential risk for sectarian violence. The US can subdue fears of overgrown Iranian influence and American abandonment by monitoring Iran and staying engaged in the conflict instead of rapidly disengaging. This policy requires a small budget increase for expanded intelligence sharing with the EU and monitoring Iranian activity. Tactical coordination is plausible and has occurred already. Combined US air strikes and Iranian-backed ground operations prevented violence and territorial gain with only tacit coordination of the two countries through Iraqi forces.67

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Subject 3: Syrian Civil War

Recommendation:

1. Provide non-lethal aid to people in Syria and train moderate rebel groups.
2. Condemn Bashar Al-Assad publicly and increase sanctions.
3. Encourage dialogue between opposition groups and increase the likelihood of democratic transition.

Background

The Syrian civil war has evolved beyond a mere battle between the Assad government and its opponents. The rise of jihadist groups, including ISIS, has added a sectarian dimension to the conflict, pitting a Sunni majority against the president's Shia Alawite minority. While ISIS wages a campaign of terror in northern and eastern Syria and Iraq, it simultaneously fights a "war within a war" with other rebels, Kurdish and government forces, and jihadists from the al-Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front. The groups fighting the Assad government are severely divided by rival alliances and enemies. Even the most prominent rebel group backed by the West and Gulf Arab states, the “moderate” National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, has little influence in the country. The country seems to have no alternative to the Assad government, and western powers face continued political and legal difficulty of military action in Syria.


Proposal and Implementation

The Syrian crisis poses a security threat to the US and its allies by exacerbating the conflict of terrorism and destabilizing the region. US-EU cooperation on counterterrorism, which increased after 9/11, is now working to counter ISIS while seeking a political solution to the Syrian Civil War. Currently the US government refuses to intervene in Syria. Criticisms of this policy point out the administration’s inability to address humanitarian disaster while allowing a minority Shia government to continue oppressing the Sunni Arab majority.  

We propose a three-fold US strategy that calls for increased action and strengthened strategy in Syria:

1. Allow for increased non-lethal equipment, financial assistance, and training of moderate rebels, such as National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.
2. Publicly condemn the Assad regime and renew imposed sanctions to pressure ceasefire.
3. Encourage a peace dialogue involving the Arab League and UN where the concerns of the opposition can be addressed. An active dialogue brings all rebel groups (including FSA and moderate Islamists) to increase the likelihood of a long-term democratic political transition.

Suggestions of providing military weapons have triggered a backlash. The CIA mission to arm Syrian “moderate” rebels landed in the hands of extremist Islamists, specifically

the Nusra Al-Qaeda affiliates.\textsuperscript{71} Non-lethal aid, such as communication equipment, body armor, and medical aid, along with training should be boosted, since these are relatively feasible options whose costs do not exceed benefits and would address the criticisms of the US policy in Syria. The US and EU recognize the Syrian National Coalition as the moderate representative of the Syrian people, but in many cases US backed rebel units have defected to the Islamists, quit the fight, or gone missing. For example, the Harakat Hazzm group recently disbanded and joined Nusra Front Islamists.\textsuperscript{72} As analyzed by activists and officials, limited military and financial aid from supporting governments causes opposition to change sides or quit the fight. While the Nusra Front pays hundreds of dollars to their fighters, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) does not provide a stipend. The US should solicit and work with regional governments to provide financial aid to FSA and other “moderate” fighters to prevent the dissolution of these groups.

To support and restructure the US-backed rebel groups, the US must work with regional governments to implement training programs. Currently, the US plans to train 15,000 fighters in three years, but has not commenced training, allowing for the conflict to continue and FSA coalitions to dismantle from the pressure of the fight. Training programs to enhance the skills of the FSA and moderate Islamists, should be implemented through US-backed safe zones.\textsuperscript{73} Possible training sites could include Jordan, where the US provides aid to the rebels, and Turkey. Both countries have


lobbied Washington to widen its support for the Syrian opposition. While the US provides $660 million in US aid to Jordan and has pledged an additional $1 billion in aid to the refugee crisis, it should continue such aid for cooperation with its new Syrian training program strategy. We recommend the US act quickly to solicit regional governments’ cooperation in its strategy if it still hopes to win the “moderate” fight in Syria.

Additionally, media focus on ISIS actions in Syria has lessened pressure on Assad, who has resumed abuses of power. The US and EU should revitalize the conflict’s importance by encouraging the Arab League to play a constructive role and place further conditional sanctions to pressure Assad to ceasefire. The current US sanctions against Syria, initiated in 2010, prohibit all foreign assistance to the country, including exports and re-exports of items on the US Munitions List, financial transactions with the government, and all property of its senior leaders. President Obama has issued a number of executive orders imposing and expanding sanctions against Syria. We propose that the US expand sanctions to target proliferators and abusers of chemical weapons, including supporters of both the government and militias like the brutal Shabiha militia. Following the EU, the US should increase the number of targeted government officials to include those supporting the Islamic State and involved in violent civilian repression.

Through the pressure of renewed sanctions from the US, the EU, and regional governments, Assad should be publically condemned with media attention and

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pressed to ceasefire. The US must involve regional actors like the Arab League to begin dialogue. All opposition groups, including FSA and moderate Islamists, should be involved to increase the likelihood of a long-term democratic political transition. To prevent a US imposed transition government, with little legitimacy among the Syrian people, this internal dialogue is necessary. As a moderator for opposition talks, the US must require that Assad’s successor end violence, does not engage in terrorism, participates in global diplomatic relations, and be elected among the opposition.

**Challenges and Costs**

The challenge of implementing this policy lies in rebels out of the field, placing them in training programs, and compensating their absence from the fight on ground, as well as the costs associated with creating a US–backed safe zone. Encouraging and mediating dialogue involving rebel groups may be difficult for the US since rebel groups do not always recognize US legitimacy. However, these costs would require a small increase in the budget and are politically feasible. It is essential that the US work to end violence and encourage a power transition. Once there is a new government, the US can employ diplomacy as its primary tool. This would allow the US to be a more constructive actor in the conflict.

One criticism to expect is that coordination with Iran in Iraq will be difficult if the US actively opposes Assad, who Iran publically supports. However, because ISIS in Iraq is a severe threat to Iran’s security, whereas Syria is considered an optional war in which Iran can increase and decrease its involvement depending on political feasibility, the risk of conflicts of interest with Iran are limited.76

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Subject 4: Addressing the Refugee Crisis

Recommendation:

*Create* mechanisms for long-term development and sustainable coexistence within host communities, along with providing a combination of emergency, protection, and advocacy programs.

Background

The Syrian civil war and the advance of ISIS have caused millions of refugees to flee neighboring countries. This and related conflicts, including the Israel-Palestinian conflict, have combined to create a refugee problem the UN terms a “time-bomb” for the Middle East.77 Syrian refugees now make up over 1/6th of the Jordanian population, and about 257 per 1,000 Lebanese citizens are refugees. Although Turkey has had a lower proportion of refugees relative to its population, the over 1 million refugees have noticeably impacted the country.78 Added to the overall weak economic, political, and social structure of the region, the crisis has exhausted the resources of neighboring countries (especially Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey) and threatens further destabilization.

Proposal and Implementation

The US has a major stake in the refugee crisis due to the resource drain on its allies and the threat of overloading an already unstable region. Americans currently contribute

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towards UNHCR initiatives, including food vouchers and shelter camps, but the programs only have a short-term effect on refugees who have become a protracted challenge. Moreover, by late 2014, only 30% of needed funds had been contributed by the US and other donors, jeopardizing the lives of millions in the harsh climate of the region.\footnote{“Syria: The Story of the Conflict.” BBC News. March 12, 2015. Accessed July 18, 2015. 3. Web. 10 May 2015.} The UN warned that the lack of funds would lead to serious consequences of regional security threats. Hence, to prevent long-term consequences of the refugee crisis, the US needs to take a proactive role.

We propose that the US:

1. Encourage funders and implementers, such as USAID, to create programs of sustainable development that empower local and refugee communities to find common solution to their problems.

2. Aim to improve social cohesion, psycho-social well-being, education, and sustainable livelihood solutions to vulnerable host countries and refugees.

The concern of a growing number of protracted refugees should refocus the attention of IOs and NGOs, both local and international, to establish ways of empowering communities. Sustainable development programs can be implemented by focusing around community centers or safe haven approaches. The Community-Driven Development (CDD) community centers would encourage refugee and host communities to collaborate and develop lasting solutions to common problems by equipping them with self-reliance mechanisms and knowledge applicable to long-term solutions.\footnote{Hansen, C., & Crivellaro, M. Danish Refugee Council Jordan Proposal. Community Cohesion: Reinforcing Self-reliance Mechanisms in Vulnerable Communities of Amman, 1-19. 2013.} These centers aim to provide psychosocial counseling, tutoring, educational...
training, community events, group discussions, skills development, and income generating activities such as catering services for long-term sustainability. While some funding has been provided for these programs, they are severely underdeveloped and unable to address the needs of millions of refugees.\textsuperscript{81}

We recommend the U.S. collaborate with regional governments and IOs to create sustainable policies that develop tools, standardized operating procedures, resilience-centered techniques, and other methods for programs and for refugees to engage in their host communities. We recommend the US involve regional governments in proposing and implementing solutions to employment, education and housing of protracted refugee because limited mobility and work opportunities create the risk of future instability, security threats, generations of uneducated populations and poverty. The US-Jordan dialogue on migration and mobility to grant greater opportunities and security measures for refugees should be replicated in Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq.

**Challenges and Costs:**

Long-term development aid must be implemented alongside short-term aid for sustenance, which makes it significantly challenging and expensive. The costs associated with sustainable program development and emergency relief is likely to be a heavy burden for the U.S. and politically infeasible without constituent support. If development funds are drawn from regional security initiatives as well as the EU, it may be a more feasible. Congress and the American population must be convinced that the crisis is a matter of national security. Although it may be difficult to curb the refugee crisis while violence is still occurring in Syria, it is vital to address the current crisis as it

\textsuperscript{81} Sundelin, G. “Syrian refugee supporters shift focus to host communities.” October 8, 2013. Web. 10 May 2015
arises with proper assistance to prevent the burden of responsibility and accountability in the long-run.
Subject 5: Creating Long-Term Regional Stability

Recommendation:

1. **Design** a long-term strategy to address recurring instability in Iraq and Syria and fortify democratic processes within the nations.
2. **Implement** the strategy with the aim of promoting peace and strengthening civil society through economic, political, and social agendas.

Background

There are no apparent long-term strategies for territories under ISIS influence. Territories controlled by ISIS and the surrounding areas will continue to relapse under the control of terrorists without long-term preventative measures, and this cycle of perpetual conflict threatens the US and its allies. The various causes of political instability in Iraq and Syria derive from economic and social disparities along with unstable regional governance. We recommend the US coordinate with the region to build an educated, working society and give citizens the tools to create peace and prevent cyclical violence.

Lack of economic activity in the region has prompted citizens to react violently, often in the form of joining radical/terrorist groups, as a way to meet their needs or identify a sense of belonging and determine their self-worth. Conflict is caused by the desire for self-enrichment, which often occurs in states with negative economic growth and/or systemic poverty.\(^{82}\) Furthermore, poverty is linked to limited state capacity in providing opposition groups with economic concessions and a greater likelihood of the absence of

an effective military/police apparatus to contest those seeking power or resources. Middle Eastern countries are experiencing staggering unemployment rates, particularly among the youth. The countries with the largest employment rates have seen large-scale protests, namely, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and Iran. Today, Egypt’s unemployment rate is 13.4%, Tunisia’s rate is 15.2%, and Yemen’s unemployment rate is approximately 27%. Educated citizens under the age of 30 comprise of over half the unemployed population. If the unemployment rate continues to falter and economic productivity stagnates then this will create greater social unrest for the Arab countries.

The Arab Spring highlighted that political inclusiveness is a challenge for the region. Human development must continue in the form of increasing political participation among minorities, women, and youth in the Middle East. By investing in stable democracies that surround territories controlled by ISIS, surrounding governments will be better suited to counter local terrorism and Islamic extremism. Monitoring elections and encouraging election transparency are crucial as various state actors in the region continue the transition to democracy. Newly democratized states addressing internal conflict struggle to relinquish authoritarian control in the face of violence.

Iraq is vulnerable to ISIS military strength while the appeal of ISIS increases because of poverty, a Sunni-Shiite divide, exclusion of women from peace agendas, and a large unemployed youth population. Poverty is the most pressing issue for 75% of the population. This is an increasing concern for the US since 50% of the population is

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under the age of 19. With more civilians searching for work and fewer opportunities, ISIS will continue to employ and appeal to many in the region. Engaging civil society and stakeholders to provide viable, inclusive solutions will prove most effective in securing long term peace.

Proposal and Implementation

We propose that the US launch a long-term regional stability strategy focused on job growth and inclusion, educational attainment for women and youth, and investment in stable democratic governments for nations and populations affected by ISIS with the following actions:

- Reduce non-discriminatory tactics of drone strikes and military techniques. Support more viable economic investment in the surrounding regions, stable governments, and youth empowerment through education and job obtainment. Once the region stabilizes, diplomatic measures will be more effective.

- Increase educational and employment opportunities for the people in the region, particularly the youth and women. Support economic reforms, create public-private partnerships, and assist in the development of enterprises and entrepreneurship so that more jobs are created in the Middle East.

- Encourage a more politically engaged civil society. Specifically, collaborate with surrounding states to prevent further spread of terrorism in the long term. Support the Arab League, empowering youth by creating a dialogue forum among young Middle Eastern leaders, and engaging countries to help loosen ISIS’s ideological appeal on Sunni Muslims through inclusive politics.

Challenges & Costs

Already, the US spent $91.9 billion in FY 2014 and projects to spend $71.4 billion in FY 2015 on military spending against ISIS.87 The US and its allies can expect to continue to spend on conflicts in the Middle East until ISIS is expelled from the region and uprisings are quelled. Short-term costs may increase, however the economic and social programs to counteract ISIS will become self-sustaining through increased revenues from enterprise growth in hopes of preventing future expenses on conflict. Although the US faces significant challenges in transitioning from a militaristic role to a role with greater civilian forces, the EU offers examples of reliable, long-term, grassroots solutions that the US can employ.

Congress may focus on the short-term goal of defeating ISIS rather than incorporating post-conflict strategies to prevent another terrorist organization from gaining power post-ISIS. To counter this sentiment, working with the well-funded DOD to incorporate long-term solutions can help convince Congress to play a role in the region.

Weary of war, feeling the heavy burden of a rising deficit, and coping with issues of violence and injustice at home, the American people may not see the connection between the Middle East and their own lives. It is important that the Administration explain to American people why Middle East stability is essential to America’s national security.

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Africa

Glossary

AU- African Union
AQIM- Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CAR- Central African Republic
EU- European Union
IDP- Internally Displaced Person
IRI- The International Republican Institute
ISIS- Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham
MINUSCA- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDI- National Democratic Institute
NGO- Non-governmental Organization
OSCE- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
SGI- Security Governance Initiative
UNOCHA- United Nations Office of Humanitarian Access
USAID- United States Agency for International Development
Executive Summary: Africa

The US is committed to strengthening the continent of Africa. In 2012 the Department of State released a document that identifies US interests in Africa and the US approach to empowering and stabilizing the region. The document, entitled US Strategy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa, clearly lays out the benefit of a politically and economically stable Africa. A stable region will allow for a closer relationship to form, enabling the US to promote democracy in the region and combat the rise of terrorist groups that threaten US security. Greater stability will allow for greater US trade and investment. The four countries below have been identified as countries experiencing great instability and political upheaval. This report focuses on conflicts in these four countries, and offers recommendations for US action.

**Nigeria**

Boko Haram continues to rage in Nigeria, and the continued presence of this extremist group is abhorrent to American values and detrimental to inter-governmental and cultural relations. President Obama’s Four Pillars of African Policy can be improved by including measures to make the United States a more appealing partner for Nigeria. We recommend deepening engagement by incentivizing good governance, forging cross-cultural ties, and aiding the legitimization of the African Union.

**Central African Republic**

The overthrow of former Central African Republic president Francois Bozize in March of 2013 sparked a violent religious conflict between Muslims and Christians. In May 2015, the government and rebel groups signed the Republican Pact for Peace, National Reconciliation, and Reconstruction. To assist in rebuilding the country and protecting citizens, we recommend that the US support the current UN peacekeeping mission and the CAR’s efforts to implement the peace accord.
**Tunisia**

Since its 2011 revolution, Tunisia has struggled with Islamic extremism amidst democratic consolidation. Even as civil and political actors seek to balance traditional and pluralistic values, ideological tensions and economic stagnation leave the country vulnerable to radical influences and terrorist attacks. Strengthening civil society through active internal and external engagement is crucial to sustaining the political transition. We recommend that the US seek EU cooperation to increase various aspects of economic and security aid while increasing engagement with Tunisian civil actors.

**South Sudan**

In December 2013, civil war broke out within South Sudan between the ethnic groups, Dinka and Nuer. The civil war was spurred by tensions between President Salva Kirr and former Vice President Riek Machar. Rebel groups have formed within South Sudan and instigating violence. The severity of violence in the Unity and Upper Nile regions has made it difficult for humanitarian efforts to reach people. It is in U.S. interests to support South Sudan in ensuring South Sudanese people in critical areas have access to aid.
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. *Deepen* engagement with Nigeria by incentivizing good governance, forging cross-cultural ties, and aiding the legitimization of the African Union.

2. *Support* the current UN peacekeeping mission and the Central African Republic’s efforts to implement the Republican Pact for Peace, National Reconciliation, and Reconstruction.

3. *Strengthen* Tunisian civil society by encouraging greater engagement between US, EU, and Tunisian civil actors, increasing economic aid to education and investment, and focusing security assistance to protect both citizens and foreign nationals.

Subject 1: Nigeria and Boko Haram

Recommendation:

1. **Deepen** engagement with Nigeria by incentivizing good governance, forging cross-cultural ties, and aiding the legitimization of the African Union.

Background

Nigeria’s 1999 civilian government formation stripped the military of its numbers and its resources, devoting it to peacekeeping training after a bloody history of military coups. Boko Haram was founded in 2002 to spread its vision of a caliphate and has entrenched itself in Northern Nigeria in the face of an initially inadequate military response. The pseudo-Islamic extremist group has since gained membership nearing ten thousand, finding sympathy among disillusioned young men seeking salaries and a sense of identity, while also forcibly recruiting soldiers.

Proposal and Implementation

The Four Pillars of Sub-Saharan African Policy put forth by President Obama are nuanced and comprehensive objectives that unfortunately suffer from unilateralism. While the Four Pillars offer comprehensive guidelines on how Americans can foster positive change in Africa, they do not instruct on how to make the US a more appealing partner for Africans. Entrenched in corruption, Nigerian leaders must be convinced that cooperation with the US is to their benefit. We recommend deepening engagement by three means:

1. Incentivize good governance rather than punish bad governance;
2. Forge cross-cultural ties to give Nigerians a stake in the American public eye;
3. Legitimize the African Union by offering public support of it

China continues to invest billions of dollars in African countries including Nigeria and developing industrial infrastructure\(^8\) without attempting to influence African policy or push for human rights reform. Nigerian leaders cannot ignore that the United States does not conduct business in such a non-normative fashion; politically apathetic trading partners like China may look more appealing in comparison. We can see the ineffectiveness of traditional diplomatic threats in cases like Burundi’s President Nkurunziza.\(^9\) In line with President Obama’s “tough love” stance, the U.S. should offer aid conditional on improvements in governance rather than take away benefits as punishment for poor governance.

Threadbare reporting on Boko Haram is unable to capture the public eye in the US or Europe; satellite stills from Amnesty International cannot compete for attention with live footage from hostage crises in Parisian marketplaces.\(^9\) Nigerians need more visceral exposure in American and European news outlets, and the Western public would benefit from exposure to Nigerian culture through cinema and news. Likewise, the US should provide Nigerians and their leaders reasons to care about American public opinion. The US should broaden the reach of Nigerian issues by establishing a deeper cultural connection through talent exchange, capitalizing on Nollywood’s existing talent and technology and sharing Western journalistic expertise and


equipment. Nigerian news teams could produce higher quality releases that would gain more attention abroad and legitimize the issues at home if they could embed in the military with modern reporting equipment such as cameras, vehicles, and body armor.

The African Union is the most appropriate organization to address continental issues, and it needs to be treated as a mature international actor to develop as one. In accordance with the “Do No Harm” and “Local Ownership” principles, the US should shift material involvement with Nigeria over to the AU while maintaining strong diplomatic ties within the state. Nigerian leaders have declined American security training for military and police forces, which was subsequently redirected to Cameroon, the neighboring country most affected by spillover. A successful joint operation led by Nigerian, Nigerien, Chadian, and Cameroonian armed forces and local vigilantes cost Boko Haram their capital Gwoza and most of its occupied territories. Western forces are notably absent on Nigerian soil. Further successes will depend on intra-African state cooperation, which can be strengthened through further legitimization of the African Union. The US and EU can do this by cooperating on international issues like Boko Haram through the AU rather than independently sending aid to individual African nations.

**Challenges and Costs**

The avenues suggested for deepening engagement are designed as supplements to the existing Four Pillars; they are approaches rather than programs. Shifting our intervention approach from that of punitive, normative actions to positive incentivizing.

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may be difficult for the public to stomach, but in combination with an increase in cultural presence, the American public may gain empathy for Nigerians and vice versa. Forging cultural ties may incur moderate costs; leveraging Nollywood’s existing infrastructure will cost the US or the EU little, but talent exchanges and equipment deliveries would require significant funding. The AU reflects the continent’s mixed levels of cohesion, but the organization is progressing. Challenges lie in increasing the AU’s self-funding and enforcement capabilities, but funding projects through the AU rather than directly aiding Nigerian, Cameroon, and other countries affected by Boko Haram could theoretically increase cost efficiency via pooled funds.
Subject 2: Democratic Consolidation in Tunisia

Recommendation:

*Strengthen* Tunisian civil society by encouraging greater engagement between US, EU, and Tunisian civil actors, increasing economic aid to education and investment, and focusing security assistance to protect both citizens and foreign nationals.

Background

Since the 2011 revolution, Tunisia’s democratic consolidation has faced ongoing threats from religious extremism. Fringe movements of radical Salafists and jihadists remain vocal in the developing political sphere. Major organizations such as AQIM, Ansar Al-Sharia (Students of Islamic Law), and ISIS have also gained influence. This has sparked attacks against both Tunisian civilians and foreign visitors. In September 2012, an attack on the US embassy killed four individuals. A suicide bombing in the coastal town of Sousse claimed several lives in October 2013. In March 2015, gunmen suspected of ties to ISIS killed 21 people in Tunis’ Bardo museum. Most recently, a June 2015 shooting in Sousse killed 37 people, including foreign tourists. Tunisia has also experienced an exporting of extremism: many Tunisian nationals have emigrated to join armed extremist movements in Libya and Syria.

Much of the threat of religious extremism ties to Tunisia’s fragile political and civil sphere. While major political parties have demonstrated a desire to advance political and social pluralism, they still struggle to reach ideological balance and internal cohesion. Ennahda, Tunisia’s leading Islamic party, is divided between members favoring democratic values and those who strictly adhere to traditional Islamic doctrine. The main secular party, Nida Tounes, has also experienced internal conflict.
Economic stagnation remains another significant concern. The country continues to suffer from high unemployment and high inflation. Low foreign investment and foreign currency reserves have deterred substantial economic reforms. Young adults have become frustrated with the lack of socioeconomic opportunities, leaving them particularly vulnerable to radical ideological messages.

These conditions compound the threat of extremism to Tunisian civil society. Extremist attacks and messages could inflame ideological conflict between mainstream Islamists and secularists. This could, in turn, lower public confidence in the state and reverse democratic progress. Jihadists could also increase their influence among unemployed youth. The recent evacuation of British citizens from Tunisia highlights the threat to tourism, a crucial component of Tunisia’s fragile economy; a loss of tourism to future attacks could exacerbate the country’s economic struggles, thus further derailing the democratic process. Finally, Tunisian nationals joining neighboring conflicts could further disrupt US and EU security and endanger their strategic interests in the region-at-large.

Both the US and the EU have financially assisted Tunisia’s political transition. Much of the aid focused on international debt relief, independent media, education and training, local development, and entrepreneurship. The US and EU have also voiced interest in establishing free trade agreements with Tunisia. Tunisian security remains a top policy priority. The US supplied $40 million for counterterrorism training and $51 million for police assistance since 2011. The US also intends to include Tunisia in a Security Governance Initiative (SGI) to promote security cooperation with other African states. In addition, in July 2014 the US announced its intent to sell Tunisia $700 million in defense equipment.
Proposal and Implementation

Moving forward, the US should collaborate with the EU to expand their joint engagement with Tunisian civil society to help strengthen constructive interaction and pluralistic values. Continued financial aid and the promotion of democratic discourse can promote among Tunisian citizens a greater sense of individual and collective ownership and responsibility for their country’s democratic transition. Greater civil engagement through such means can also counter jihadist influence and recruitment. This can both make Tunisian democracy more self-sustaining and secure, and lower the risk of Tunisia becoming a threat to regional stability and US security.

We recommend that the US cooperate with the EU on cultural exchange programs to facilitate interaction between civil society actors (e.g. NGOs, media, artists, students, etc.) in the US & EU and their Tunisian counterparts. This should include constructive dialogue with moderate Islamic political parties that have demonstrated a strong commitment towards democratic pluralism. Such opportunities could encourage them to build a positive role in the political transition and bolster their legitimacy among citizens. Cultural exchange programs such as student exchanges and civic service projects should also encourage Tunisian youth to express their concerns.

We further recommend that the US urge the EU to join the US in expanding economic aid to Tunisia. Such aid should emphasize small-scale business support, entrepreneurial programs, and education reform. As with civil engagement, economic aid should specifically focus upon youth education and employment. Such aid could be conditioned upon determined benchmarks of democratic progress by both Tunisia’s political system and its civil society actors. The US should urge the EU to join it in acting upon free trade proposals with Tunisia to increase the flow of capital and market dynamism to Tunisia.
Finally, we recommend that the US solicit EU cooperation in refining the focus of their security assistance to Tunisia. Military and security support should be conditioned on constructive protection of the rule of law and civil liberties. Special care should be taken to assure the protection of foreign diplomatic personnel and tourists from extremist attacks. The US and EU should jointly encourage Tunisia to partake in comprehensive regional engagement through institutions such as the SGI.

**Challenges and Costs**

Although committed to Tunisia’s political transition, both the US has placed greater emphasis upon Tunisia in a narrow counterterrorism framework than in the context of democratic consolidation. Increased civil engagement will thus require a significant shift in joint strategic thinking. Concerns regarding Tunisia could also be overshadowed by more overt sources of conflict in the region. Security and foreign policy officials may be tempted to overlook the need for continued engagement with Tunisia, or regard it solely from a narrow counterterrorism framework. A policy of increased civil engagement may also face resistance from Congress due to the increase in funding required. The Defense Department requested a budget of $134 million to support Tunisia for the upcoming fiscal year, more than double the amount appropriated for this past fiscal year. Whether Congress will approve that full amount, or approve of similar levels of spending for Tunisia beyond the next year, remains to be seen.
Subject 3: The Central African Republic

Recommendation:

Support the current UN peacekeeping mission and the Central African Republic’s efforts to implement the Republican Pact for Peace, National Reconciliation, and Reconstruction.

Background

The Central African Republic (CAR) has a long history of violence and political upheaval. The current crisis began in March of 2013, when the predominantly Muslim rebel group, Séléka, overthrew President Francois Bozize and seized control of the country. The Séléka targeted Christians, and as a result, a predominantly Christian rebel group, the Anti-Balaka formed and began to target Muslims. The CAR is predominantly Christian, with 15% of the population that is Muslim. This conflict has led to economic ruin and increased religious tensions. This is a humanitarian crisis; about 25% of the population is internally displaced, and USAID estimates that around 2.6 million people in the CAR need aid. The religious tones of the conflict are similar to the ethnic tensions that led to the genocide in Rwanda. The political and economic harm occurring in the CAR are likely to spill over into neighboring countries (thousands have fled to countries such as Chad), causing instability throughout the

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entire African continent. It is in the US interest to act now to prevent a situation like the 1994 Rwandan genocide from occurring and to create a more stable African continent.\(^95\)

**Proposal and Implementation**

In May of 2015 the Republican Pact for Peace, National Reconciliation, and Reconstruction was signed at the Bangui National Forum. The government of the CAR and 10 rebel groups agreed to end the violence and begin working towards restoring their country. The pact established a date for a presidential election, to be held on October 18, 2015.\(^96\) We recommend that the US support this pact and assist the CAR in holding the elections. The US can utilize organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), The International Republican Institute (IRI), and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) to assist in this effort.

In 2014 the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) replaced African Union forces. There are currently 10,000 UN peacekeepers and a separate French effort, entitled Operation Sangaris.\(^97\) We recommend the US continue to support UN peacekeeping efforts. Although the Republican Pact for Peace, National Reconciliation, and Reconstruction purported to end the conflict, the population is still facing abuse and violence from the different rebel groups. Peacekeepers are needed to protect the population as the CAR undergoes political turmoil as it attempts to implement the peace accord.

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Costs and Challenges

The current budget of the MINISCA is $628,724,400. The US ought to encourage the UN to maintain funding and discourage any action towards reducing it. A likely criticism of the US support of UN peacekeeping efforts is the recent revelations of UN Peacekeepers’ sexual abuse of children. The American people are horrified and disgusted by this act. We recommend that the US press the UN to act forcefully and swiftly in catching the perpetrators of these crimes and work with their governments to ensure they are prosecuted. Peacekeepers still offer valuable assistance in preventing violence and protecting citizens. We recommend that the US press for greater accountability of peacekeepers and their home countries regarding sexual abuse.
**Recommendation:**

*Promote* social stability in South Sudan by ensuring relief commodities are reaching vulnerable areas in Unity and Upper Nile regions by supporting the United Nations Office of Humanitarian Access (UNOCHA) in restructuring modalities of engagement and overcoming access constraints.

**Background**

As of January 2015, humanitarian assistance from the US and EU has been hindered by rebel grounds and ethnic conflict in South Sudan. Critical areas most affected by the violence and severe drought are unable to receive relief commodities. Since December 2013 over 1.5 million South Sudanese people have been internally displaced.\(^8\) Many IDP have fled into neighboring countries such as Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Kenya. The most pressing concerns as of May-June 2015 are the critical regions in Unity and the Upper Nile where violence has escalated significantly.

The regions of Unity and the Upper Nile are reaching famine levels.\(^9\) With the dismissal of Toby Lanzer, United Nations Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General and Humanitarian Coordinator, unhindered humanitarian access has been challenged.\(^{10}\) In late May 2015 the World Food Program had to suspend all truck

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envoys transporting food from Ethiopia to South Sudan because unidentified armed actors looted over 40 trucks transporting food commodities.

The conflict in South Sudan is crucial to US national interests according to the US Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs. The US has supported South Sudan since the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreements between Sudan and South Sudan. The US has also contributed monetarily to the establishment of South Sudan as a sovereign state in the international community. Additionally, there is now the potential threat of Chinese presence in the region that may counteract US influence. The Chinese have been supplying South Sudan with arms during this conflict; these transactions could draw the South Sudanese government into a closer relationship with China.101

Proposal and Implementation

We recommend the U.S. collaborate with the EU monetarily, to encourage the restructuring of modalities of engagement for UNOCHA to overcome access constraints in Unity and the Upper Nile. Currently UNOCHA uses helicopters and other aircraft transport methods to reach critical areas but these techniques are not sufficient for the long-term and generate a large cost.102 Land transport would be more efficient in terms of cost, but rebel groups hold checkpoints at popular routes into the Unity, and Upper Nile regions and most of South Sudan’s paved roads are in disrepair.103 UNOCHA, with


the help of other NGO’s in the area, is searching for the best procedures to address
these transportation challenges

To solve this transportation problem, we recommend the US and EU urge UNOCHA to
work with the government of South Sudan to overcome access constraints due to the
presence of rebel groups. Encouraging UNOCHA officers to participate in diplomatic
talks with the South Sudanese government and local authorities in the Unity and Upper
Nile region about ceasefire agreements would contribute to the restructuring of
strategies for humanitarian transport. We should push for meetings between UNOCHA
and South Sudanese government officials as soon as possible to arrange more sound
and secure humanitarian access methods.

Challenges and Costs
The costs associated with humanitarian access from UNOCHA and other NGO’s will be
minimal because the US and EU have already promised to donate over $600 million in
development assistance to South Sudan. These funds are divided by NGO’s
contributing to humanitarian service to South Sudan. As of June 19, 2015, USAID had
pledged to give UNOCHA $2 million dollars for humanitarian coordination and
information management.104

104 South Sudan- Crisis. Issue brief 9, Fiscal Year 2015. United States Agency of International Development,
Latin America

Glossary

**CINDE**: Centro Internacional de Educación y Desarrollo Humano (International Center for Education and Development)

**CNTOC**: Counter-Narco-Terrorism Operations Center

**DAS**: Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (Administrative Department of Security)

**DEA**: Drug Enforcement Administration

**DIAN**: Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales

**ILO**: International Labor Organization

**INCB**: International Narcotics Control Board

**EpC**: Espacios para Crecer (Spaces for Growing)

**EpE**: Espacios para Emprender (Spaces for Entrepreneurship)

**FARC**: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (United Revolutionary Forces of Colombia)

**PENS**: Pre-Export Notification System

**PICS**: Precursor Incident Communications System

**POA**: Partners of the Americas

**POLFA**: Policía Fiscal y Aduanera

**TOC**: Transnational Organized Crime

**UIAF**: Unidad de Informacion y Analysis Financerio

**USDOL**: United States Department of Labor

**WFCL**: Worst Forms of Child Labor
Executive Summary: Latin America

The United States government has invested billions of dollars in anti-drug production and trafficking efforts since the 1970s. Representing the country with the largest demand for illicit drugs, the US has advanced foreign policy strategy in fighting illicit drugs from drug supply control to citizen security and institution building. A number of new programs, such as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) and the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), focus on rule of law, anti-corruption, and community and youth development programs. While these programs have developed progressive strategies, they have not expanded the accountability of all nations along the Central America-Mexico corridor to buy into these policy changes. This report analyzes four different ways regional capacity building can establish a safer and more drug-free US and Latin America by focusing on Colombia.105

Today, Colombia boasts the fourth largest economy and the second freest in Latin America.106 For the past two decades, Colombia has undergone an economic transformation and benefits today from an increasingly diversified and internationalized production sector.107 However, most of the positive economic progress has been undermined by drug trafficking and the increased violence and corruption that comes with a greater demand for the distribution of illegal drugs. Although corruption occurs at multiple levels of public administration, the justice system remains weakened by corruption and extortion, delegitimizing the Colombian government

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altogether. The ever growing demand for illegal drugs from the United States and Europe has incentivized Colombia to export at a large scale, which threatens US national security through increased corruption, violence, and trans-border crime. Cocaine, heroin, and other high-profile drugs make their way north through centralized networks and routes.

To maintain the effectiveness of lists banning chemicals necessary for the production of narcotics, we recommend that the US continuously update these lists with newly-revealed substitutes.

To prevent contraband from entering and exiting the country, we propose that the United States fund the purchase of drug-detection technology, software programs, and tools used by American border security and customs.

To combat the negative effects of drug trafficking in Colombia, we recommend that the United States enhance its collaboration with Colombian domestic law enforcement agencies to coordinate investigations and share intelligence through both conventional and newly-developed measures.

To promote local education, we recommend the US continue investing in educational programs in Colombia that will reduce the child labor problem.
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. *Strengthen* governance within nations along the Central America-Mexico Corridor by increasing regional multinational cooperation against pre-cursor chemicals through high technological networks.

2. *Fortify* existing Colombian customs and border security control, known as La Policía Fiscal y Aduanera, which can systematically identify contraband items and implement a regulated exchange of information and technology on contraband as a method of money laundering.

3. *Enhance* collaboration among US domestic law enforcement agencies and their foreign counterparts to strengthen our ability to coordinate investigations and share intelligence through geospatial and maritime technologies to combat drug trafficking and Transnational Organized Crime.

4. *Implement* a six-year educational project addressing child labor resulting from drug trafficking through strengthening past educational projects for elimination of child labor.
Recommendation:

*Strengthen* governance within nations along the Central America-Mexico Corridor by increasing regional multinational cooperation against pre-cursor chemicals through high technological networks.

**Background**

There are more than 300 active drug smuggling organizations operating in Colombia today. These organizations produce and transport cocaine and opiates that are shipped to nearly every industrialized country in the world. With fifty years of organized and sophisticated drug trafficking in Colombia, traffickers have produced sophisticated smuggling equipment, such as high technological submarines, and have increased access to precursor or “designer” chemicals. 108 As large Colombian drug cartels have become vulnerable to the Colombian and US authorities, small factions of organizations have been formed, decentralizing the drug trade networks. Smaller groups now work specifically with lab production, coca base travel to the labs, or transport to North America. Many small organizations have ties with Colombian Marxists guerilla groups and Colombian right wing paramilitary, which provide them physical and economic security. 109

In transit routes to the United States, both coca plants and opium poppy are mixed with precursor chemicals. These chemicals, often referred to as “essential chemicals or precursor chemicals,” act as refining agents and solvents for natural materials, coca and

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109 *Americas Quarterly*
opium poppy. As noted in the 1988 United Convention on Drug Precursors Chemicals under the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) at least 15 chemicals require licenses to produce, possess, or import/export. These precursor chemicals contribute to the addictions to and demands for illicit drugs. The Pre-Export Notification System (PENS) was expanded in 2012 to create a network for participating nations to notify the INCB and a system for tracking new shipments, the Precursor Incident Communications System (PICS). 110

As more chemicals were identified through this system, traffickers were forced to become more innovative to meet the growing demand for cocaine and opium. Many new chemicals with new names are not listed as precursor chemicals but function similarly to other listed chemicals. These chemicals are used and trafficked through nations with loose security. The introduction of new chemicals is creating a political and security threat to Latin America and the United States. 111

Proposal and Implementation

We propose that the US should implement a regional network system that will monitor the production and movement of precursor chemicals throughout Latin America. Since the United States has been working towards combatting narcotics in Colombia since Plan Colombia was signed in 2000, nearly $8 billion has been spent on “combating drugs, guerrilla violence, and related institutional and social problem.” As drug trafficking continues, especially through networks in Central America, there is a need


for regional cooperation and modern technological systems that focus on tracking precursor chemicals.

First, we propose the establishment of an online regional network between key actors—such as governmental, non-governmental organizations, and private business within Central America, the US, and Colombia. This online network will be guided by a research team, including representatives from each nation along the corridor. Extensive research on current and future precursor chemicals will be essential to monitoring future impacts of precursor chemicals on drugs. This research will also address the possible advantages and disadvantages of implementing restrictions on the movement of precursors. These findings will contribute to determining where the greatest need for control should be as well as the data necessary to complete the online system.

The regional network will track identified chemicals as they move throughout various nations. They will be traced through an online and mobile application, accessible to government officials, non-governmental organizations, and private actors with stakes in drug control. Governments will be held responsible to submit:

- Name and address of the exporter and importer
- Name of the substance; Quantity of the substance to be exported/ imported
- Expected point of entry and expected date of dispatch;
- Purpose of use
- Any other information which is mutually agreed upon by participating governments. (Adapted by the International Narcotics Control Board: https://www.incb.org/incb/en/precursors/precursors/annex_x.html)

This system will be utilized through border control and customs agencies to detect precursor chemicals traveling through maritime and other unconventional trade routes. We suggest that the U.S. and other regional bloc nations develop a list of destinations.
where precursor chemicals will be authorized to be exported to/imported from, as well as indicated activations that will require authorization from U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Each time a chemical is found to be of suspicion, national governments within the bloc will quickly be informed and governmental investigations will begin to target the origin/purpose of production. Additionally, we recommend stricter licensing on licit precursor chemicals from key industries that utilize these chemicals. If the licensing is not present, customs and border control agencies must move forward with taking action towards the eradication of these chemicals from transit. This model will be connected to the UN’s PENS website, so international partners will also be aware of the movement of precursor chemicals in Latin America.  

Challenges and Costs

The implementation of these networks should become an extension of Plan Colombia. Many of the costs will be limited because of the high amounts of money that are already previously dedicated to military support and security within Colombia. The US would assist Central American nations in implementing technological capabilities. Growing the technology infrastructure and personnel necessary to monitor the system within Central America will be one of the largest costs.

The challenge is instituting a system that requires good governance. Individual governments will be expected to respond to the alerts, but it will be their responsibility to act efficiently when alerts are alerted. There is a responsibility for each of the nations along the trafficking pathway to create greater domestic security restrictions and mandates on precursor chemicals and manufactures. It is vital not to impact industries such as, pharmaceuticals, perfumes, cosmetics, fertilizers, oils, that are created from licit

precursor chemicals. This may create a challenge for government regulations agencies, yet it will be a rewarding challenge to ensure governments along the corridor are empowered through technical and personnel support to monitor licensed/approved and not licensed industries/chemicals. Even though nations may seek to participate on the regional scale, without the necessary domestic means, to increase global governance and transparency, regional networks are at risk of facing slow response, inefficiency, and stagnant growth.
Subject 2: Economic Implications

Recommendation:

Fortify existing Colombian customs and border security control, known as La Policía Fiscal y Aduanera, which can systematically identify contraband items and implement a regulated exchange of information and technology on contraband as a method of money laundering.

Background

Trafficking of drugs in Colombia is a $10 billion business, over a quarter of the economy’s legal exports\textsuperscript{113}. At the macro-economic level, Colombia has made great progress with a low unemployment rate at 9.2\%, a variety of trade agreements, and a fourfold increase in foreign direct investment. In 2012, the World Bank named Colombia as the fifth “friendliest” country in the world to do business with given investor protection practices.\textsuperscript{114} Despite the strides to foster growth and economic stability, the illicit drug industry greatly undermines businesses both domestically and internationally due to laundering of money through contraband.

An estimated $6 billion of trade contraband is smuggled into Colombia annually.\textsuperscript{115} Some examples of contraband items imported into Colombia are textiles, gasoline, alcohol, and cigarettes. These high priced items from abroad are sold at lower than market price in Colombia, which takes away from potential tax revenue from imports.


and lowers sales for legitimate businesses. In 2013, Colombia implemented the Anti-Contraband Law, which increased penalties for infractions to de-incentivize contraband and internally coordinated the UIAF, DIAN, POLFA, and other agencies. Additionally the goal was to increase regional cooperation across countries to stop the movement of contraband\textsuperscript{116}. Although the Anti-contraband Law promotes cooperation and an exchange of knowledge, the limited tools and capacity have hindered the Colombian efforts.

**Proposal and Implementations**

We recommend that the United States fund the purchase of technology, software programs and tools similar to those used by the American border security and customs to prevent contraband from entering and exiting the country. With this material support should also come technical training to ensure the Colombian DIAN and POLFA are able to benefit fully from these programs. Over 100 free trade zones in Colombia have already been identified by the US Foreign Service as points where lack of regulation and transparency cause high levels of vulnerability to contraband\textsuperscript{117}.

These two recommendations should be implemented as soon as possible, but a long-term tactic would be committing to continuing dialogue and sharing of technology and information particularly with the UIAF to ensure there is bilateral coordination in tracking and stopping money laundering through trade. The US is Colombia’s number one exporter and importer; hence, artificially cheap products impact US foreign trade and delegitimize US businesses.


Challenges and Costs

The cost of implementation is relatively low since some cooperation already exists. The US government stated in 2014 that Colombia must have the technology to prevent effectively trade laundering. Financing this technology and assisting with professional advisors would not be a significant budgetary increase. Money laundering is increasingly occurring at Internet world games and casinos. Although considered, trade contraband is still where the majority of drug money is being funneled. Addressing this problem is more feasible due to established initiatives.
**Subject 3: Maritime and Geospatial Technology**

**Recommendation:**

*Enhance* collaboration among US domestic law enforcement agencies and their foreign counterparts to strengthen our ability to coordinate investigations and share intelligence through geospatial and maritime technologies to combat drug trafficking and Transnational Organized Crime.

**Background**

For the North American market, cocaine is typically transported from Colombia to Mexico or Central America by sea and then onwards by land to the US and Canada. For the European market, cocaine is trafficked to Europe mostly by sea, often in container shipments.\(^{118}\) Growing routes in West Africa have increased the mobility of illegal drugs in that region as well. Due to the continuous expansion of coca planting, Colombia has become the world’s main exporter of cocaine.\(^{119}\)

Although many people believe that the repatriation of enormous profits from the drug trade has been beneficial, drug trafficking has had an overall negative impact on Colombia’s economy. Most of these profits have been invested in luxury construction and speculation in rural property. Drug trafficking has also led to the increase in corruption, violence, and environmental harm. The market for illegal drugs allows for

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distortions in the allocation of public funds and for example, in processes of savings and investments. To combat the negative effects of drug trafficking in Colombia, the US should enhance its collaboration among domestic law enforcement agencies to strengthen its ability to coordinate investigations and share intelligence through geospatial imaging and maritime measures.

**Proposal and Implementation**

We recommend enhanced intelligence sharing and coordination among law enforcement, intelligence agencies, the military, and the US diplomatic community. This will enable the development of aggressive and multi-jurisdictional approaches to dismantle TOC networks involved in drug trafficking. By sharing American intelligence with Colombian law enforcement agencies, the US can keep these forces accountable and provide legitimacy to the domestic government. With a perceived legitimate government, especially one that upholds the rule of law, drug trafficking can be brought to a minimal.

In Fiscal Year 2002, the DEA formally established the Counter-Narco-Terrorism Operations Center (CNTOC) within SOD, which coordinates all DEA investigations and intelligence linked to Narco-terrorism and is central to US efforts in disrupting crime-terror relationships. ¹²⁰ The US has the ability to share geospatial intelligence and can utilize its bilateral maritime counterdrug agreements and operational procedures to facilitate cooperation in counterdrug operations. Just recently, the US, through the Department of Justice, implemented a plan to build a national database to track in real

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time the movement of vehicles in the US to combat drug trafficking. All-source intelligence is used by US Coast Guard assets in the transit zone to extend US borders by intercepting and apprehending traffickers, specifically the borders that are affected in the transit routes. This dataset could be extended into the primary land and sea routes in Latin America, which drug traffickers use to track potential drug carriers. By forward deploying its law enforcement and intelligence assets, the US can incentivize upholding the rule of law in other countries.

Efforts should be sustainable and cost-effective, which can include complementary and comprehensive assistance programs across the prevention, intervention, and enforcement spectrum. By disrupting and dismantling the world’s major TOC networks involved in drug trafficking, the US will be able to reduce the availability of illicit drugs, inhibit terrorist funding, improve national and international security, and bring TOC networks to justice.

**Challenges and Costs**

A potential challenge for this policy is sharing a dataset, or past monitored conversations with drug traffickers and civilians. It raises questions about privacy and the scope of government surveillance. The DEA was found to have gathered the phone records of Americans calling foreign countries, without judicial oversight, to sift through that data looking for drug suspects. The program was then canceled in 2013.

Another challenge is if the United States attempts to eradicate illegal drug markets out of Colombia, the production could easily switch over to another country or region due

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to the high price incentives. This is called the “balloon effect.” ¹²² Peru recently surpassed Colombia in coca production, and Peruvian outfits, such as the remnants of Shining Path, will likely enjoy higher prices and profits and will increase production. On the other hand, reducing Colombian drug production even temporarily could improve security in Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean.

The biggest challenge that the US faces is trust from the Colombian government. For example, in February 2009, a huge scandal broke out revealing that Colombia’s intelligence service, the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS), had engaged in widespread illegal surveillance.¹²³ The targets were not suspected terrorists nor drug lords, but prominent journalists and human rights activists. Other suspects also included Supreme Court justices who had made heroic efforts to expose collusion between dozens of members of Congress and the country’s ruthless drug-running paramilitaries, which had slaughtered thousands in gruesome massacres and targeted assassinations. Many of them were critical of the administration of Colombia’s then-president, Alvaro Uribe, and viewed the surveillance as politically motivated.

The revelations were particularly chilling because parts of the DAS had worked with the paramilitaries. There was even evidence that the DAS had given the paramilitaries kill lists of trade unionists and other targets, whom the paramilitaries then murdered.

Thus, if the US can focus primarily on intelligence sharing, Colombia will be able to take matters into its own hands, be held accountable for having this information and be expected to take action for the safety and prosperity of its citizens.


Subject 4: US-Colombian Partnership to address Child Labor

Recommendation:

*Implement* a six-year educational project addressing child labor resulting from drug trafficking through strengthening past educational projects for elimination of child labor.

Background

Narcotraficking in Colombia has long been linked to widespread humanitarian and social issues. One of the most troubling aspects of narcotrafficking involves child labor. From September 2007-December 2010, the United States Department of Labor (USDOL) funded *Edúcame Primero Colombia: Education in Colombia Project*, in conjunction with Colombian government agencies such as Centro Internacional de Educación y Desarrollo Humano (International Center for Education and Development, or CINDE), and other organizations including Partners of the Americas (POA), DevTech Systems, and Mercy Corps. The main objective of this project was to “reduce and progressively eliminate exploitive work and the worst forms of child labor (WFCL) in Colombia.” We recommend that the US create and expand on this past successful project with the guidance of the Department of Labor and the Colombian government into a six-year long project.

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125 Ibid.
In Colombia, approximately 3.8 million people are internally displaced, half of them children, due to the ongoing internal conflict. Although the drug conflict in Colombia is one cause of child labor, other causes include the lack of recreational options, the quality of education, poverty, and cultural attitudes tolerating child labor and exploitation. Hence, Edúcame Primero Colombia recognized the need for an educational program for children to have and escape the dangers they face when their only option is to enter the workforce at such a young age. Evaluation of the program reveals that the US needs to continue to invest in educational programs in Colombia, because that will reduce the child labor problem caused by drug trafficking.

Proposal and Implementation

The proposal is to rebuild, extend, and revise Edúcame Primero Colombia so that it has a greater and lasting impact. The new project will last six years and will target 15,000 youth ages 5-19 living in all the departments of Colombia. In comparison to the first project, Edúcame Primero Colombia only served 10,200 WFCL children and lasted three years. The children were ages 6-17 and were living in the cities of Bogota, Cali, Yumbo, Cartagena, Barranquilla, and Santa Marta, as well as departments like Boyacá and Santander. In the end, the project gave educational opportunities to children who were previously trapped in child labor due to drug trafficking and other aforementioned reasons; the reasons stated above and one being drug trafficking. Both quantitative and qualitative results support the proposed recommendation: to extend Edúcame Primero Colombia for the purpose of alleviating child labor in Colombia.

To implement the proposal, the USDOL and the Colombian government should follow similar guidelines and structures as Edúcame Primero Colombia, where the quantitative

126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
and qualitative results from the first project were shown through individual, parental, and community changes. Children increased their school enrollment while parents became more involved in their child’s schooling stating how they, take “pride toward their kids doing something that they were not able to do.” In the community, there was an understanding of the importance of education and how education gave opportunities for children, whereas their only opportunity before was to work. These results foreshadow future outcomes of the new proposed project. However, the main objective is to create a stable society that will adopt and normalize schooling so attending school is the new norm in Colombian cities. After the six years, child labor will no longer be an option, having been replaced by school attendance.

This program will have yearly evaluations testing the overall improvement in child development as well as follow the educational development of participants from their start date until they graduate high school. Similar to Edúcame Primero Colombia, there will be EpCs (Espacios para Crecer-Spaces for growing) and EpE (Espacios para Emprender-Spaces for Entrepreneurship); however in this new project will implement EpE’s at the beginning of the program instead of just the last year, as it was done before. This will cause children to develop different learning tools from the beginning and not just toward the end of the program. Additionally, the Education Office of Bogotá will train teachers in quantitative and practical subjects; these teachers will then be able to pass this knowledge along to their students. Many of these tools are carried on from the past project and will continue to yield positive results.

This recommendation is crucial to solving internal social issues that may spread up into Central America and even in the United States. In August 2014, the US experienced a major influx of unaccompanied minors fleeing into the country. US Customs and Border Protection “apprehended 66,127 unaccompanied minors and 66,142 family units” from June to October 2014. There are many reasons that people choose to seek refuge into the US, one being internal conflict in their home country. Hence, having an educational program like Edúcame Primero Colombia will deter people from leaving their home country and the US will minimize the challenges of refugee shelters, detention facilities, fast-track hearings, and resettlement challenges.

**Challenges and Costs**

The overall budget of the first Edúcame Primero Colombia program was US$5.1 million and the Colombian government estimated an investment of approximately US$500 per student. The new budgetary requirements need to allocate additional money since the new project will reach more areas in Colombia, including small rural areas that are not in the main city and lack educational opportunities. It will be challenging, however, to implement an anti-child labor educational program before child labor is fully banned by law and society. To recognize this, the Colombian government will need to enforce strictly the parameters of the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor, which Colombia previously signed on January 28, 2005. Indeed, WFCL specifically condemns “the use, procuring or offering of a

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child for illicit activities, in particular for the production and trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant international treaties.” 132 The most effective form of accountability is for governments to regulate the laws that are already in place. With these actions taken, the United States will be able to continue the educational gains seen from the first project *Edúcame Primero Colombia.*

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# Graphics and Additional Information

## Figure A1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Western Policy</th>
<th>Intended Effect</th>
<th>Russian Perception</th>
<th>Russian Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Sanctions</td>
<td>Weaken Russian Economy to reduce public approval for Putin’s policies</td>
<td>Western economic giants abuse their power</td>
<td>Russia pushes “Eurasian Economic Union”[6]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The West is “out to get” Russia</td>
<td>Putin’s approval ratings skyrocket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Troop buildup in Baltic countries</td>
<td>Demonstrate that the West is ready to protect Baltics</td>
<td>Ethnic Russian speakers in the Baltics are under threat by NATO</td>
<td>Russia “reviews legality of Baltic independence”[7]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian dismissal from G8 summits</td>
<td>Show consequences for breaking international norms</td>
<td>International institutions are not worthwhile</td>
<td>Russia stops observing NATO and Council of Europe meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Ukrainian Government in Donbass</td>
<td>End violence in Donbass</td>
<td>Risk of annihilation of Donbass separatists</td>
<td>Russian troops arm and reinforce rebels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure A2

UKRAINE’S EUROPEAN NATURAL GAS OPTIONS

Ukraine has three sources of natural gas that it imports from Europe. These “reverse flows” enable Ukraine to substitute some of the gas they receive from Russia.

Figure A3

GAS PIPELINES IN THE UKRAINE

In 2011 Russia opened the Nord Stream pipeline bypassing Ukraine to enter Germany.

Source: The National Energy Union of Ukraine
Figure A4

Electricity generation by fuel

Ukraine

Figure A5

Ukraine: Internally Displaced People

22 June 2015
Figure B1

ISIS Sanctuary: June 19, 2015

**CONTROL ZONE:** An area where ISIS exerts physical and psychological pressure to ensure that individuals may not return as directed.

**ATTACK ZONE:** An area where ISIS conducts offensive maneuvers.

**SUPPORT ZONE:** An area free of significant action against ISIS and which provides logistics and administrative support to ISIS fighters.


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