TOWARDS A NEW URBAN FUTURE IN DELHI

Policy Analyses and Recommendations for the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report was developed by nine Masters of Public Affairs (MPA) students from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, as part of the Fall 2017 policy workshop aiming to tackle issues related to housing for the urban poor in Delhi, India, with the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (DUSIB) as primary client. We would like to thank the following for helping with this project: the staff of DUSIB; Jeffrey Hammer; Jeffrey Oakman in the Graduate Program; Vasanthakumar Namasivayam (MPP '17); Sundeep Narwani; the staff and residents of homeless shelters at Sarai Kale Khan, Dandi Park, Geeta Ghat, Parda Bagh, and Delhi Gate; residents of the Dwarka EWS housing complex; the staff of CFAR, and MARHAM; and Partha Mukhopadhyay and Ashwin Parulkar of the Center for Policy Research (CPR).

METHODOLOGY

The students of this workshop spent one week visiting homeless shelters, slum communities and DUSIB—constructed housing in Delhi and its environs (October 30 – November 3, 2017). Under the instruction of Professor Jeffrey Hammer, students conducted fieldwork pertaining to DUSIB’s work related to living conditions in slum communities, housing construction, and implementation of basic services at multiple night shelters. In addition, students met with various government and intergovernmental officials, community leaders, and non-profit representatives as part of their research process. This fieldwork was complemented by secondary research.
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## ACRONYMS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFAR</td>
<td>Centre for Advocacy and Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLT</td>
<td>Community Land Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCB</td>
<td>Delhi Cantonment Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDA</td>
<td>Delhi Development Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>DESU</td>
<td>Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking</td>
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<tr>
<td>DJB</td>
<td>Delhi Jal Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRCA</td>
<td>Delhi Rent Control Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSIIDC</td>
<td>Delhi State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSW</td>
<td>Department of Social Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUSIB</td>
<td>Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVB</td>
<td>Delhi Vidyut Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>EWS</td>
<td>Economically-weak section</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNCTD</td>
<td>Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHRRN</td>
<td>India Homeless Resource Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>JJ</td>
<td>Jhuggi-Jhopri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNNURM</td>
<td>Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LG</td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCD</td>
<td>Municipal Corporation of Delhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDMC</td>
<td>New Delhi Municipal Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>No Objection Certificate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSDA</td>
<td>National Skill Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NULM</td>
<td>National Urban Livelihood Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCC</td>
<td>Office of the Supreme Court Commissioners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAI</td>
<td>Perimeter of Integrated Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMAY</td>
<td>Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana – Housing for All (Urban)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMA</td>
<td>Shelter Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRC</td>
<td>Squatter Resettlement Colony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUH</td>
<td>Shelter for Urban Homeless</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### INDIAN NUMBERING SYSTEM KEY

1 lakh = 100,000  
1 crore = 10,000,000

### EXCHANGE RATE*

USD 1 = INR 64  
*Ninety-day average as of January 8, 2017*
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Delhi, India has experienced intense rural-to-urban migration in recent decades, with the city’s population growing from 6 million in 1981 to about 17 million in 2011. During this period of growth, however, the supply of housing and buildable land has not kept pace with increased demand. As a result, Delhi, like many urban centers in India and across the globe, has been faced with two key issues related to housing for the urban poor: the development of informal settlements or slums, as well as a growing homeless population living on the city streets. The Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (DUSIB) is the main nodal agency within the Delhi state government that addresses these two issues.

SLUMS AND INFORMAL HOUSING IN DELHI

DUSIB faces three primary challenges related to slums: (1) creating improved housing or more sanitary conditions for Jhuggi-Jhopri (JJ) residents either on the original land or within a 5 km radius (all referred to as in situ upgrading), (2) making efficient use of already-constructed EWS housing, and (3) ensuring no new JJ clusters develop despite continuing rural-to-urban migration.

Part One of our project seeks to determine what is the best that DUSIB could do for slum dwellers in each of these contexts. We recommend implementing the following recommendations: i) prioritize preserving and building upon private actors’ or JJ residents’ existing capital investments (e.g. using reblocking), and flexibly apply different upgrade approaches within single JJ’s whenever possible to best fulfill community desires and adapt to varying payment capabilities while ensuring the upgrade’s financial feasibility; ii) allow EWS housing to be used for purposes other than allocating JJ residents to the Delhi outskirts which goes against international best practices; and iii) responsibly account for continued in-migration and project affordable housing needs with this in mind.

HOMELESSNESS IN DELHI

Part Two explores DUSIB’s role in addressing homelessness issues. Because DUSIB has no clear mandate to address homelessness, we propose the agency takes initiative by adopting its own “Homelessness Policy Mission Statement” that clearly delineates its goals with respect to service delivery for the homeless.

We also found a dearth of information about the city’s homeless population, including inconsistent definitions of what it means to be homeless and dated or limited demographic statistics. To develop a stronger understanding of the homeless population and its needs, we recommend a bimodal definition of homelessness and a regular, comprehensive survey of Delhi’s homeless.

Finally, we identified several unmet needs in Delhi’s shelters. To address these needs we make the following recommendations: i) enforce minimum quality standards at homeless shelters by upgrading DUSIB’s current contract monitoring practices, and ii) improve the services available at homeless shelters by implementing a new case management system to connect homeless people to existing services that meet their individual circumstances.
GENERAL BACKGROUND

THE URBAN POOR IN DELHI

With the prominent role of cities in India’s economic growth, urban population has increased tremendously over the past few decades. This is particularly true for the City of Delhi, which is one of the country’s most important economic hubs and the nation’s capital. Millions of people have moved to the city in pursuit of better lives.

The country has experienced a clear rural-to-urban migration trend, which has contributed to the growth of Delhi from a population of approximately 6 million in 1981 to about 17 million in 2011. According to the 2011 Census, almost a third of all migrants living in Delhi moved to the city because of employment opportunities, while over 50% moved because of marriage or family reasons. Most migrants (62%) had been in Delhi for at least 10 years, though 20% had been in Delhi for less than four years, which hints at the population growth that is resulting from internal migration. The pattern of urbanization is further complicated by the fact that many economic migrants will become homeless as a result of economic shocks to wages or employment.

In the face of the additional demand for housing caused by increased migration and population, supply of housing and buildable land has not kept pace. As a result, Delhi, like many urban centers within India and across the globe, has been faced with two key issues related to housing for the urban poor: the development of informal settlements or slums, as well as a growing homeless population living on the city streets.

Within the Delhi state government, the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (DUSIB) is the main agency tasked with improvement and/or resettlement of the city’s slum clusters, as well as providing night shelters for the homeless population. To update their short- and long-term goals to address these issues, DUSIB recently developed the Delhi for All: Vision 2030 strategic document in response to the global call for more inclusive cities. This is in line with Goal 11 of the global Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) developed by the United Nations (UN), which aims to “Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable,” with Target 11.1 to, “by 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums.”

Through this workshop, our team aimed to learn more about these two important topics related to housing for the urban poor in Delhi, while providing policy recommendations to DUSIB in order to facilitate the vision of SDG Goal 11 related to inclusive cities. Our report will include two main sections: Improved Housing for Delhi’s JJ Basti Residents and Enhanced Options for Delhi’s Homeless Population.
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE & RELEVANT AGENCIES

In order for readers outside of India to better understand the context of housing for the urban poor, it is important to appreciate Delhi’s complex governance structure. Government stakeholders in Delhi come from three government levels: the national Union Government of India; the Delhi State government, Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD); and the local governments, divided into five municipal corporations and bodies. Box 1 gives us a sense of how difficult coordination can be by summarizing the key agencies at the three governance levels that are relevant as policy makers for the urban poor in Delhi.4

AGENCIES SERVING DELHI’S URBAN POOR:

NATIONAL LEVEL

UNION GOVERNMENT OF INDIA: India’s president appoints a Lieutenant Governor over Delhi to lead executive bodies in charge of the land, police, and public order (e.g. DDA).

THE DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (DDA): Under the Union’s authority, the DDA is responsible for all physical planning and development of all land and housing in Delhi.

STATE LEVEL

GOVERNMENT OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL TERRITORY OF DELHI (GNCTD): The Delhi state government, the GNCTD, manages transport, industrial development, revenue administration, power generation, food and civil supplies, and health and family welfare. However, unlike in other states, the Parliament of India writes all police, public order, and land use laws in Delhi, and bodies directly accountable to the Union (e.g. DDA and Delhi Police) implement them.

DELHI URBAN SHELTER IMPROVEMENT BOARD (DUSIB): Established in 2010 in place of the Slum and Jhuggi-Jhopri (JJ) Department at the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, DUSIB is the nodal state agency for overseeing the improvement, resettlement, and housing for residents of Jhuggi-Jhopri clusters (JJC) as well as providing night shelters for the homeless population.

THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE (DSW): The DSW provides welfare programs and services to people with disabilities, as well as social security for the aged, poor and homeless through a network of residential care homes and non-institutional services.

THE DELHI JAL BOARD (DJB): Formed in 1998, the DJB is responsible for water and sewage infrastructure in Delhi, and distribution of water in the MCD areas.

THE DELHI VIDYUT BOARD (DVB): In 1997, the GNCTD created an electricity management agency, Delhi Vidyut Board (DVB), to replace the MCD level Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking. The DVB was split into six companies in 2002, three of which remain government undertakings.

CITY LEVEL

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS OF DELHI (MCD): Delhi has three MCDs, each governing one of the city’s north, south, and east regions. These bodies run quotidian city functions like park maintenance, waste removal, road construction, property taxation and assessment, etc.

In addition, the Delhi city-level government includes two bodies: Delhi Cantonment Board, and the New Delhi Municipal Council, whose functions are similar to the MCDs.
ORIGINS OF DELHI’S HOUSING SUPPLY SHORTAGE

Both issues of informal settlements and homelessness link to Delhi’s housing supply shortage. Much of the roots of this shortage can be attributed to two heavily outdated policies: the 1959 Delhi Rent Control Act (DRCA) and the authority and mandate given to the DDA.

The DRCA, though now obsolete and even counter to the Constitution, is still in force and was originally meant to 1) protect tenants from eviction and 2) protect them from paying more than an established standard, “fair” rent. Because of this law, landlords can only evict a tenant on extremely narrow grounds and at the same time cannot increase the rent either more than 10% of the cost of any structural improvements they make to a property or by more than 10% in a three year period. By making it legally almost impossible for a landlord to recover an apartment from a tenant paying a below-market-demand amount for rent, the law reduces the incentives and raises the risks for building owners to rent out their properties, in turn chilling housing mobility and creating an artificial housing shortage.

At a deeper level though, the market has produced far too little housing for landlords to rent in the first place because of the structural authority and responsibility vested in the DDA. (As outlined above, the DDA is under the central government, while DUSIB rests under the state government.) The central government in 1957 endowed the DDA with a monopoly over urban planning, land acquisition, infrastructure and housing development, and property sales. Although the DDA has proved quite capable in some of its capacities (land acquisition, housing development, and sales for high-income groups), its underperformance in its other responsibilities and the bureaucratic bottleneck that its policies create for private actors to develop formal housing has led to an enormous housing deficit that the informal market has filled over the years. The DDA has traditionally created a few tens of thousands of houses when millions are needed, and indeed surveys find a preference for non-DDA developed housing. Only 24% of any housing in Delhi originated from start to finish through the DDA as a planned settlement; the informal sector has created the rest through slums and unauthorized colonies. Thus the unplanned housing that shelters more than three quarters of Delhi’s population and the lack of low-cost, temporary rental housing is a direct result of the DDA’s under-delivery of its primary responsibility.

The homeless population is on another level altogether: while lack of access to affordable housing contributes to informal slum development, some of Delhi’s poor cannot get a foothold in the informal or formal housing markets. These are Delhi’s homeless, and their needs are different than the city’s slum dwellers.

These two populations, slum dwellers and the homeless, are the focus of this report. What follows is a discussion of policy to address the needs of both of these groups and a series of recommendations for improving government services to better serve these populations.
1.0 DESCRIPTION OF DELHI'S SLUMS

As Delhi experiences intense urban-rural migration, many migrants have been unable to access proper city housing because of high prices. This has led to the creation of large informal settlements in the city. At this time, there are 675 slums in the Delhi area. According to the 2012 Urban Slums Survey, 675 slum clusters hold approximately 6,343 slums (defined as at least 20 households living in that area). These slums occupy areas that vary significantly in size. Whereas 39% of the slums were on plot areas of less than 0.5 hectares, 58% were on plot areas of 0.5-1 hectares and the remaining on areas of 1 hectare or more. In terms of the type of area, Table 1 provides a basis for understanding the areas being occupied. Nearly 60% of slums are on parks or open space or along the railway. Similarly, almost three quarters are located in residential land.

The latest estimate is that 1,785,390 individuals live in these settlements, making up over 360,000 households. This means that approximately 10.6% of the total population of Delhi lives in some form of informal settlement. The number of individuals, however, is highly contested, with estimates ranging from 10.6% of the Delhi population to 49% of the Delhi population. There are 3 categories of slums in Delhi: i) notified/legal slums, ii) illegal slums, also referred to as JJ Colonies, and iii) uninhabitable colonies or urban villages.

Using data from the 2011 Census, we learn more about the individuals living in these settings. The majority of the population is male (55%), with 45% female. Literacy is about 20 percentage points lower in the slums than at the city level - 66% compared to 86%. However, working patterns of slum residents are very similar to that of the general population, with 35% of the slum population currently working, not far off from the 33% of the city population actively working according to the census.
This backs up the narrative that people move to Delhi seeking jobs, and informal settlements allow them to stay close enough to these opportunities but in units that are affordable. In visits to the Janata Jeevan Camp and the New Sanjay Camp, multiple residents of these settlements mentioned that what they liked the most about the JJ bastis where they lived was the proximity to their jobs and the city. Similarly, people who were hesitant to accept newly built housing units that were further away from the city were primarily concerned about their livelihoods once they relocated. In fact, slums themselves are “the sites of a lot of economic activities - workplace and residence are interwoven”. 12

People living in the slums lack many fundamental amenities, some of which can be observed in Figure 1. Whereas 55% live in structures that have walls and ceilings of pucca materials (concrete or cement), 30% of slum dwellers live in structures that have either walls or ceilings of pucca materials, but not both. Furthermore, 15% of slum dwellers live in structures that are made with less durable materials (grass, plastic, cardboard, etc.). Homes with pucca materials may represent greater investment by slum dwellers as well as greater perceived stability, as they are harder to remove or modify. Most slum dwellers do not have access to electricity in their homes. Additionally, the drainage and water systems also show deficiencies. Similarly, only 32% of the slums had an arrangement for the disposal of garbage organized by local bodies, with the remaining 68% having the arrangement made by the residents themselves or some other type of arrangement.

These deficiencies indicate that there is a need for more investments to provide basic infrastructure if slums are to become dignified habitable spaces. However, the precarious nature of the slums disincentivizes people to make the necessary investments to improve the quality of their dwellings. The 2012 Urban Slums Survey found that most infrastructure improvements had been the result of government investments and not private investments. In fact, only 4% of slums had some form of either formal or informal association of slum dwellers in the given slum working for the betterment of these slums conditions. Yet researchers have found that the provision of secure tenure increases slum dwellers’ investments in infrastructure, in some cases up to four times beyond what government has invested. 15

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**TABLE 1: PERCENT OF SLUMS BY SURROUNDING AREA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Slum</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Along Nallah</td>
<td>16.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Along Railway Line</td>
<td>27.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River Bank/River Bed</td>
<td>0.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park/Open Space</td>
<td>27.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilly Terrain/Slope</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>27.86%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2: DELHI SLUM POPULATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Delhi Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. Households</td>
<td>367,893</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>1,785,390</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population aged 0-6</td>
<td>229,029</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC* Slum Population</td>
<td>482,870</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 3: DELHI SLUM DWELLER DEMOGRAPHICS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Workers</td>
<td>631,539</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Workers</td>
<td>588,543</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivators</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Labors</td>
<td>3,683</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Industry</td>
<td>19,655</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>564,210</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal Workers</td>
<td>42,996</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivators</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Labors</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Industry</td>
<td>1,648</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>40,332</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Non-Workers | 1,153,851 | 65% |

*Scheduled Caste
1.0 DESCRIPTION OF DELHI’S SLUMS

FIGURE 1: SLUM CHARACTERISTICS (INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES)

As can be observed in Figure 2, most slums (87%) are within 0.5 kilometers of a primary school. Similarly, over 80% of slums are within 2 kilometers of a hospital. Being in proximity to them may not necessarily mean that slum dwellers have full access to their services, but at least they are within a reasonable distance.

FIGURE 2: DISTANCE TO NEAREST PRIMARY SCHOOL & NEAREST HOSPITAL

All of these characteristics result in a fundamental problem that needs to be addressed. On one hand, people need additional improvements and services to make these houses dignified, and they need guarantees that their homes will not be taken away in the future. On the other, slum dwellers should also have access to other housing options that represent an improvement in their living situation (without endangering their livelihoods which are currently linked to the city of Delhi).
1.1 CURRENT POLICIES & APPROACHES TO ADDRESS SLUMS

Several key policies create the framework under which DUSIB and other agencies involved in urban housing operate.

1.11 GENERAL POLICY: A THREE-PRONGED STRATEGY

DUSIB, previously the Slum & JJ Department of MCD, has traditionally followed a three-pronged strategy to rehabilitate and improve service delivery in existing slums and squatter clusters.16

1. Environmental improvement in urban slums

This scheme, ongoing since the creation of the Slum & JJ Department, provides basic civic amenities in JJ Bastis to improve the environment, including internal lanes (pavement) and drains within the cluster, water hydrants, community toilets, street lights, dustbins, and play fields for children.17 Currently, these are some of the parameters for the services provided:18

- 1 toilet seat for every 25 women / 35 men
- 1 bath unit for every 50 people
- 1 sweeper for de-silting 1 km length of drain
- 1 tap/hydrant for every 50 people
- 1 electric pole every 30 meters

2. In-situ up-gradation of JJ Bastis (plotted development)

This scheme redevelops JJ cluster sites, where the concerned land-owning agencies issue No Objection Certificates (NOCs) to use their land for planned development and reallocation of plots to the inhabitants. These Economically-Weaker Section (EWS) flats are allotted on a lease basis for a period of 15 years, after which they will become freehold.19

In-situ upgrading was first introduced in the 1980’s, and in 1989 the Government of India formally established it as its preferred method of slum improvement.20 However, due mainly to the difficulty of obtaining NOCs from respective land-owning agencies, only four JJ Bastis have been developed so far, all from 1989 to the mid-1990’s.21 The details are as follows:22

- Ekta Vihar, R.K. Puram (414 families)
- Shanti Vihar, Moti Bagh (113 families)
- Proyog Vihar, Hari Nagar (260 families)
- Shahbad Daulat Pur (4924 families)

3. Relocation of JJ Bastis

This scheme resettles JJ inhabitants to a newly developed site, either by allocating a plot of 12.5-21 square meters (sqm) or by providing a built-up tenement of 25-40 sqm.23 Only those JJ clusters situated on land required by the land-owning agencies for another purpose may be taken up for relocation. Relocation policies have evolved over time, both under the Slum & JJ Department and DUSIB:

- In 1976, all JJ Bastis (2 lakh households) in Delhi were rehabilitated into 45 JJ resettlement colonies on plots of 21 square meters (sqm) by DDA.24
From 1990 to 2007, around 70,000 plots of 18/12.5 sqm were carved out in different colonies and 220 JJ Bastis were allotted plots in 37 Squatter Resettlement Colonies (SRS) including: Dwarka, Rohini, Narela, Holambi, Tikri Kurd, Bakkarwala, Bhalwa, Jahangirpuri, Molar Bandh, Savidha Gheva, and Madanpur Khaddar. 18 sqm plots were given to JJ dwellers possessing ration cards prior to 1990 and 12.5 sqm plots to those possessing a ration card between 1990 to 1998.

In 2010, when DUSIB became responsible for the rehabilitation of JJ Bastis, the relocation policy shifted from plotted development to group housing infrastructure, in accordance to the Master Plan Delhi - 2021. Furthermore, to increase the number of eligible JJ residents, DUSIB has changed the cut-off dates for rehabilitation/relocation at several instances: to March 31, 2002 (18% JJ residents found eligible), March 31, 2007 (35% JJ residents found eligible), June 4, 2009 (47% JJ residents found eligible), and January 1, 2015 (90% JJ residents found eligible).

1.12 DELHI SLUM AND JJ REHABILITATION AND RELOCATION POLICY 2015

The Delhi Slum and JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015 is the latest resettlement policy issued by DUSIB. It builds upon the experiences of past policies and guiding principles such as the Master Plan Delhi - 2021, the Delhi Special Law Act of 2011, Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana – Housing for All (Urban) (PMAY), and the Court Decisions and Protocol for removal of Jhuggis in Delhi.

“Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana – Housing for All (Urban)” (PMAY)

In 2015, India’s Central Government launched the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana mission to provide housing for all by 2022. To address the housing requirement of the urban poor, the mission states the following program objectives:

1. Slum rehabilitation of slum dwellers with participation of private developers using land as a resource.
2. Promotion of affordable housing for weaker section through credit linked subsidy.
3. Affordable housing in partnership with public & private sectors.
4. Subsidy for beneficiary-led individual house construction /enhancement.

Furthermore, the mission establishes in-situ rehabilitation as the main approach for providing houses to eligible slum dwellers. Both DUSIB and DDA are the nodal agencies for the slum rehabilitation, with DDA in charge of the rest.

Court Decisions and Protocol for Removal of Jhuggis in Delhi

In the most recent decision of Delhi's High Court in Sudama Singh vs. Government of Delhi, the Court referred to the provisions of the Delhi Master Plan and emphasized in-situ rehabilitation as the norm. It stated that rehabilitation by relocation is permissible only in extraordinary situations.

Furthermore, as directed by the High Court of Delhi, DUSIB proposed a protocol for the steps to be followed prior to, during and after removal of JJ Bastis in Delhi. The Court noted that “DUSIB shall be the Nodal Agency to conduct comprehensive surveys, and ascertain which JJ Bastis would be entitled for in-situ improvement/development or resettlement,” and that “the protocol should be followed by all agencies.”

Mandates of the Delhi Slum Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy 2015

For this recently-updated policy, the cut-off date of eligibility for JJ dwellers to receive benefits is January 1, 2015. The document states that no new JJ clusters are allowed to develop after this date - a challenge that will be further discussed later considering the in-migration expected to continue in Delhi. Among several
important requirements, the policy states that DUSIB must provide alternative housing a) for residents living in the area prior to the stated cut-off dates and b) that this housing is “either on the same land or in the vicinity within a radius of five kilometers.” The document does allow for some cases where this would not be possible, but DUSIB approval/review is required.

Another important requirement of the policy is that each beneficiary must make a cost-sharing payment, specified as INR 112,000 (USD 1,750) per unit, with INR 30,000 (USD 469) for maintenance by DUSIB of the apartment and common spaces.

### 1.13 IMPLEMENTATION OF REHABILITATION PLAN

As stated in their 2015 plan, DUSIB aims to rehabilitate / relocate all JJ Bastis of Delhi within 5 years, provided land-owning agencies co-operate and pay the relocation charges as per policy.

Initially, in-situ redevelopment of JJ Bastis at 15 sites is proposed, including three sites at Sangam Park, three sites at Sultanpuri, and seven additional sites in other areas of Delhi. A total of 12,000 flats are proposed to be constructed under the scheme. In total, 45 JJ Bastis should be rehabilitated in these flats.

As described previously, DUSIB, in partnership with other implementing agencies such as the Delhi State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation (DSIIDC), DJB and the MCDs, has initiated efforts to make Delhi a more inclusive city in line with the SDGs’ Goal 11 through development of Delhi for All: Vision 2030, including a short-term Action Document for 2017-2020, a medium-term Strategy Document for 2017-2024, and a long-term Vision Document for 2017-2030.
1.2 DUSIB CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS FOR MANAGING JJ CLUSTERS

Given its mandate and the policy environment’s restrictions, DUSIB faces three primary challenges: (1) creating improved housing or more sanitary conditions for JJ residents either on the original footprints or within a 5 km radius (all referred to as in situ upgrading), (2) making efficient use of the already-constructed EWS housing, and (3) ensuring no new JJ clusters develop despite continuing rural-to-urban migration.

Each of these challenges has its own set of constraints, which we will explore and offer potential solutions derived from external (international and Indian) examples and conversations with experts in Delhi. Our project sought to determine the best that DUSIB could do for slum dwellers in each of these contexts, given the current conditions and policies discussed above.

1.2.1 IN SITU UPGRADE

According to the wider literature on approaches that count as in situ upgrading, slum management agencies have four different options:

1. Same-site retrofit sanitation and structural upgrades
2. Upgrades through reblocking
3. Same-site rebuilding into upgraded tenement apartment flats
4. Near-site (within 5km) relocation into upgraded tenement apartment flats

The approach DUSIB will apply depends on the lot size of the JJ cluster, original land use intended for the property the JJ rests on, and whether the original land-owning agency is willing to yield ownership of the plot to the JJ residents. However, the macro-economic environment in Delhi as well as international experiences provide guidance on general approaches and methods to prioritize.

TYPES OF IN SITU UPGRADE APPROACHES

ORIGINAL BUILDING OPTIONS:

1. Retrofit Upgrades typically provide the infrastructure and architectural improvements necessary to make a slum adequately livable from a public health and safety perspective. This can mean, depending on the existing services and most pressing needs in the slum, that the government provides self-help loans or pays workers to install clean water systems, sewage disposal systems and in-home toilets, solid waste collection sites, housing reinforcements, paved and/or widened roads, street lighting, and/or school, community and health facilities. It does not change the slum layout or plot sizes, and thus has been criticized for simply ossifying a slum’s less-desirable characteristics. This approach, used and criticized in Pune and in Rio de Janeiro, also does not allow communities to truly integrate into the city or feel they have become equal citizens.34

2. Reblocking is another minimal-effort and minimal-cost option is to make a slum safer, cleaner, and healthier. In this approach, residents take on the responsibility of reconstructing or moving their homes over time to meet public health size standards and create a more regular grid, thereby allowing drainage, water, and sewer lines to be constructed and for roads to be widened for emergency vehicles. As with retrofits, government agencies provide the resources for the needed public utilities. Reblocking has achieved favorable results in Gauteng and Cape Town, South Africa as well as in Mumbai, and was used to upgrade 60% of all households in Bangkok’s Baan Mankong upgrading initiative.35 Indeed, the fields’ top researchers, expert practitioners, and even leading funders like Rockefeller and USAID have selected this approach as the fastest, most cost effective, and least disruptive way to eliminate many of the problems slums create.36
NEW BUILDING OPTIONS:

Should the government desire to create land-sharing agreements to honor a JJ’s original land-use purpose, use cross-subsidization for upgrade funding, wish to perform necessary remediation on a JJ’s land, or simply not want to tolerate irregularly-shaped buildings, they can choose to build regular apartment buildings (either walk-up or high-rise) on or near the original JJ site. While the two approaches are similar, the former option does not require acquisition of additional land from the DDA.

1. Same-Site Rebuilding: With same-site rebuilding – used in Delhi’s Kathputli colony upgrade and also in the São Paulo, Brazil and Kibera, Nairobi upgrade campaigns – the agency may temporarily shift residents off of the slum site and redevelop single homes into medium- or high-rise buildings. To avoid incurring the numerous and heavy costs of transitional housing during the process, the implementing agency may employ a “domicile swap” model (see Box 1 - São Paulo case study). In this model, a shack previously occupied by a family moving to a government-built apartment is offered to a family living in an overcrowded or precarious slum area. After families have either moved into government-built apartments or into these formerly-occupied shacks, emptied slums could be turned into either more apartments or into public space that the community wants (e.g. daycares, community centers, parks, or public market space).

2. Near-Site Relocation: This refers to cases where agencies would construct apartment buildings on vacant sites within 5 km of a JJ cluster, and then allot these to the residents. After they have shifted into their new homes, the former site would be razed and sold to defray the cost of construction.

COMPARING IN SITU UPGRADE COSTS

Retrofit and reblocking upgrades tend to be the most economically efficient options. Retrofit and reblocking upgrades build on and extend the private infrastructure investments that JJ residents have already made into their homes, and don’t require DUSIB to supply transitional housing or cover moving expenses. Retrofits and reblocking also save money by allowing residents to supply the labor and implement the upgrades on their own. Allowing residents to implement the upgrades adds emotional attachment to and ownership over the process, which also reduces maintenance costs in the long run as residents want to preserve what they created, rather than sell and move out of an apartment provided to them that doesn’t fit their family needs or tastes. All these aspects make retrofit upgrades cheaper than rebuilding or near-site relocations.

Near-site relocation or on-site rebuilding are the most expensive options. In some cases they are up to ten times more expensive than retrofits or reblocking – because they incur transit housing costs, moving costs, and higher construction costs from necessary higher quality inputs such as deeper foundations or steel stabilizers, and in the case of medium or high-rise buildings, elevators and pumps for water.
In Manila’s experience during the nation’s 2001-2013 National Informal Settlement Upgrading Program, peripheral relocation cost USD 3,677 (approximately INR 2,35,000) per unit, near-site resettlement or on-site rebuilding cost between USD 10-13,000 (INR 6,40,000 – 8,32,000) per unit, and retrofit and reblocking upgrades cost just between USD 1,030-2,300 (INR 66,000 – 1,47,200) per unit. Thailand’s recent successful Baan Mankong on-site reblocking initiative saw similar per unit costs at roughly USD 2,000 (INR 1,28,000) while on-site rebuilding cost roughly USD 5,000 (INR 3,20,000) per unit.

DESIGNING SUCCESSFUL IN SITU UPGRADES

Best practice examples across the breadth of slum upgrade experiences – from Pune to Mumbai, São Paulo to Durban, Nairobi to Manila – indicate that the type of buildings provided does not determine a project’s success or failure. Instead, the outcome depends on (1) the model of tenure provided, (2) the flexibility of the approach adopted, and (3) the degree of community involvement in the building design and apartment allotment processes.

1. Building type (high-rise versus walk-up) doesn’t matter for success outcomes. While Sri Lanka’s Sahaspura high-rise tower for slum residents yielded ostensibly positive results the U.S. government’s and Mumbai Housing Authority’s experiments in providing high-rise apartments resulted in criticism that they had merely turned horizontal slums into vertical slums. Similarly, 5-story walk-up apartments have yielded both strongly positive (e.g. São Paulo, Durban, and Manila) and wholly negative (e.g. Kibera’s Soweto East) outcomes.

2. Slum upgrades with best results provide formalized, adaptively designed tenure. Informal settlement expert, Hernando De Soto, argued that of all possible improvements for slums, tenure security matters the most for urban poor family social status as well as economic efficiency. His case rests on grounds that poor residents have made heavy investment in physical and social capital in their neighborhoods already, and formalizing tenure will increase slum dweller home investment and credit access as well as local government revenues from formal utility and land tax payments. One study found that after the provision of services and infrastructures as well as guaranteeing security of tenure, slum dwellers were motivated to invest up to four times the amount of funds that the government invested in the infrastructure improvements of the area.

Other research has generated evidence to support and expand his claims on the benefits of providing secure tenure. Galiani and Schargrodsky used a randomized natural experiment in the effects of titling for slum dwellers in Buenos Aires, and they found secure tenure increased house values in Buenos Aires by 18.5 percent, with additional external benefits of reducing family size and teen pregnancy rates as well as increasing secondary school completion by 27 percentage points.

However, providing tenure that is immune from down-raiding (or the sale of JJ resettlement flats by the original residents to wealthier non-JJ residents for profit) proves difficult, especially in areas with extreme housing shortages like Delhi. If DUSIB wishes to avoid these threats to project success while still enabling slum dwellers to leverage their homes for credit, it may find useful models outside of traditional freehold or leasehold arrangements. Many countries (e.g. the Philippines, South Africa, Brazil, and Thailand) and cities (e.g. Pune, Mumbai, and Voi) have successfully employed alternatives to freehold tenure that still enable slum residents to access loans based on their capital investments in their homes. Such alternatives emphasize providing communal rather than individual tenure, and formats have included cooperative land purchase or collective titling, long-term lease contracts, land swaps or user rights.

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1 A successful initiative here is defined as one in which the allotted JJ residents remain in and collectively maintain their apartments (e.g. Pune’ Shelter Associate-led upgrades or São Paulo’s most recent upgrades), and a failed initiative is one in which residents illegally sell or sublet their apartments and move back into slums elsewhere (e.g. Kibera, Nairobi’s Soweto East upgrade).
Collective land tenure (otherwise known as Community Land Trusts (CLTs), collective titling, or communal ownership) has been promoted in Voi, Kenya; in Bogotá, Colombia; and in the Baan Mankong Secure Housing Program in Thailand. This structure allows the community to own or lease the land from the government, and individuals to own the homes they built on the land. Individuals may not sell their homes except back to the community at affordable prices, but they do recoup the cost of their infrastructural investments as well as a modest increase (5-10%) on the value of their home. A governing body in the community (usually a democratically elected board of residents) oversees the sale of the vacated home to another low-income family.

3. **Approach flexibility creates more efficient and effective results.** Often slum upgrading agencies adopt a one-size-fits-all approach to redevelopment, which can mean it provides too much assistance in some cases and not enough in others. In the case of tenure provision, the model and degree of regularization should be adaptive to the desires of the affected community. The type of tenure appropriate to a community would depend on their overall desire and ability to pay for formal services, composition (e.g. more migrants, temporary renters, or long-term Delhi residents), community cohesion (which is tied to the viability of communal titling), existing tenure practices, and overall desire for formal tenure. In Thailand’s Baan Mankong upgrade, communities were gathered and provided a menu of potential tenure options, and their choice depended on the community’s internal decision and negotiation.

Similarly, when it comes to the type of upgrade chosen, flexibility is critical to ensure that slum dwellers can afford the costs of improvement and that they can access the level of housing they are financially willing to purchase. Again, a one-size-fits all approach seriously harms some communities while selling others short. Flexibility in terms of applying approaches within a given slum also enables governments to save costs (see São Paulo Case Study on page 18) by minimizing the amount of public expenditure and investment poured into an upgrade, and instead allowing and relying on private, community investment wherever possible.

4. **Community collaboration should factor heavily into the upgrade approach.** The critical factor of community involvement is important not only for inputs into the development product, but also for social learning and the capital accumulated through the planning process. Community involvement during design phase enables residents to internalize and choose between building materials and amenities versus cost tradeoffs, increasing their satisfaction with and ownership in the end product. Regular meetings between implementing agency staff and residents builds trust in the government as well as the community’s capacity for collective action and self-help, which then translates into better long-term maintenance and community policing. From an end-product perspective, incorporating residents’ views allows the upgrading agency to best tailor their intervention to the needs and financial capacity of a JJ cluster.

**POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

1) Prioritize preserving and building upon private actors’ or JJ residents’ existing capital investments (e.g. using reblocking where possible), and flexibly apply different upgrade approaches within single JJ’s to reduce the amount of disruption required.

2) Begin upgrade approach decisions by soliciting and considering JJ residents’ preferences and payment capabilities. This will help ensure community ownership and investment in the upgrade, reducing the chance that residents will move back into a slum.
Surveying the communities and engaging in sensitive negotiations requires support from trained personnel drawn from the legal, technical (engineering, urban planning), and social fields to help residents through the upgrade process for four reasons: (1) to build relationships and trust with the community to foster their engagement, (2) to work with community members in reaching a consensus and negotiating an appropriate approach to the upgrade and tenure model, (3) to spread awareness among the occupants about the final terms of the upgrade, and (4) building community ownership over the project.

In the case of Delhi, DUSIB currently has the technical engineering and planning expertise but is lacking in-house capacity for addressing social elements of managing the process. DUSIB should either expand NGO partnerships to help in this area or should consider hiring individuals within DUSIB who are trained to manage community engagement.

**SÃO PAULO CASE STUDY: FROM FAVELAS TO FORMAL NEIGHBORHOODS**

São Paulo’s current approach has developed and matured through many iterations – from evictions to resettlement to redevelopment and finally to need-sensitive upgrades. Beginning in 2005 on the back of a federal 2001 policy that gave all favela residents ‘a right to the city’ and defined several new land-use and development control mechanisms for municipal governments to use in supporting this right, São Paulo’s Ministry of Social Housing began a full campaign to understand each low-income settlement in its entirety and specificity. The project’s central goal was to bring electricity, sewage and clean water services to as many areas as the city could afford, and the approach followed a regimented process with 5 key features.

**Step 1:** The MSHS partnered with slum communities and GIS experts to create a multi-dimensional mapping program, called HABISP, that analyzed and categorically ranked the needs of all favelas. Their mapping program displays registered map data (e.g. on road networks, hydrology, and sanitation) as well as social data such as occupation conditions and urban, social and legal infrastructure. The program analyzes these data to generate a score for each favela in terms of its risk and urgency for upgrading.

**Step 2:** They divided the slums into regionally-blocked “Perimeters of Integrated Action” (PAIs) based on environmental conditions and risk areas. In aggregating favelas into PAIs, the MSHS ensured they gained a comprehensive view of the area and problems, and could broker in assistance from other relevant agencies.

**Step 3:** Focusing on creating a lasting positive impact, the MSHS hired social workers and support staff to work closely with families throughout the process to 1) increase resident input in the mapping and upgrade design process, and 2) figure out how to structure incentives to foster social monitoring and self-help maintenance.

**Step 4:** The MSHS used a flexible framework for deciding which upgrading approach to take, doing on-site upgrades whenever possible in stable slums and relocating families on untenable land. Within each favela, they minimized the number of families who would need to be removed or resettled. For example, after evaluating conditions and working with resident leaders in Paraisopolis, officials’ long-term goals shifted from 50% removal of the neighborhood’s population to just 10% (those in risky areas like sharp slopes or drainage facilities).
IN SITU UPGRADE CHALLENGES AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

DUSIB’s position relative to the DDA creates significant challenges in terms of land or construction cost financing, land rights negotiations, and development permissions associated with in situ upgrading.

1. Recouping the costs of development: DUSIB’s current reliance on cross-subsidization – i.e. building more apartment units than required by the full community to sell at a market rate to defray the costs of construction for JJ residents who cannot afford to pay full prices – is just one possible way to finance in situ upgrades. Public auctioning of apartments among eligible residents could also create an efficient market for housing among JJ residents. Poorer families can choose to take lower-priced upper-level apartments while those with businesses can choose to pay for more-expensive lower-level apartments. This also would enable DUSIB to recoup more of the construction costs. 47

MUMBAI CASE STUDY

In Mumbai, the government was able to have private developers build apartments on JJ sites at no cost to the agency or residents by offering the developer preferential development rights in wealthier residential and commercial zones of the city, which helped them recapture profit from the apartments they had built for JJ residents. 48a Implementing such an approach within Delhi would require DUSIB negotiate with the DDA for Master Plan 2021 FAR variances for the developer incentives. DUSIB would also need to modify this scheme to make it more inclusive as critics found that developers chose to build uninhabitable “vertical slums” because residents were excluded from the design process and the government did not monitor the quality of the developers’ output. 47b

2. Financing land purchases: For where an existing JJ site is too densely settled to build adequate housing on-site (and use cross subsidization), as is the case with 61 of the 99 JJ clusters under DUSIB’s management, DUSIB must find creative means to finance additional land acquisition. If DUSIB was able to sell wider amounts of land or apartments at market rates on Delhi’s periphery, they might use the profits to subsidize purchase of small plots of more expensive land in urban core for near-site JJ resettlement. However, such a scheme would require extensive negotiation with the DDA for land sale rights.

As an alternate example for creative and more affordable land acquisition, Manila’s slum upgrading agency was able to negotiate a partnership with the state bank to have first bid on all foreclosed properties to use for slum resettlement housing. 48 DUSIB might set such an agreement with banks in Delhi (e.g. the Oriental Bank of Commerce), but the DDA’s land disposal monopoly again would require that DUSIB engage in ardent negotiation for the right to first bid. Should DUSIB successfully be able to acquire foreclosed properties, it still must negotiate for the right to repurpose them outside of their designated uses in the Master Plan 2021. However, the Delhi Supreme Court in its 2006 MCD sealing drive ruling provided precedent for modifying the Master Plan to reflect the needs of the city. 49
1.22 MAKING EFFICIENT USE OF EWS CONSTRUCTED HOUSING

In an effort to provide housing to the inhabitants of Delhi’s slums that is not on contested land and allows for better living conditions, DUSIB has constructed EWS housing units on the outskirts of the city. Since 2011, 1,866 residents of 265 JJ bastis have been relocated to apartment complexes in Bawana, Baprola, and Dwarka. DUSIB has been in charge of constructing 18,084 flats during this time as part of the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), with 10,684 completed and an additional 7,400 anticipated by the end of the year.\(^50\)

Moving JJ residents into these areas is another task, however. While the apartment complexes were built with good intentions, not all have been filled, resulting in some of the housing lying vacant for an extended period of time. The following elements make this a complex challenge for DUSIB:

1. The 2015 policy makes relocation to EWS housing politically challenging

As described above, the 2015 Delhi Slum and JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy emphasizes that the new way forward for relocation of slum dwellers is **in situ rehabilitation**, and the policy specifies that this relocation should be to land **within 5 kilometers** of their current dwelling. This newly updated policy responds to the need of the slum residents to retain proximity to their livelihoods, essential for their quality of life. Much of the motivation for migrating to Delhi in the first place is to secure jobs which are lacking in other states and regions of the country.

However, this policy as the standard moving forward presents DUSIB with important constraints regarding use of EWS housing on the city’s outskirts, in particular for filling currently-vacant EWS units. Going forward, this housing should instead be treated as an asset no longer appropriate for relocating Delhi’s JJ residents, given that it only fits the 5 km restriction for 84 of the 675 JJs (15%) in Delhi.

Members of the WWS team conducted site visits to Dwarka and Savda Ghevra that were facilitated by DUSIB. While earlier policies gave slum dwellers a plot of land on which to construct their own homes, for later projects DUSIB constructed apartment buildings ranging from four to six stories. These apartments have a living room, a bedroom, a kitchen, and a bathroom.

Although DUSIB engineers are available to respond to concerns with water and plumbing on site, the incentive to move to this housing is now significantly weakened, as the current policy of **in situ** rehabilitation states new relocations should be within 5 kilometers of their existing homes and networks.

MAP 2: SLUMS WITHIN 5 KM OF EWS HOUSING

While current government policy dictates **in-situ** rehabilitation within 5km of the slum location, only 84 of the 675 slums (constituting 15% of the total jhuggis in Delhi) are within the 5km radius of these houses.
2. International best practices do not recommend relocation to periphery housing

The policy of *in situ* rehabilitation is in line with global best practices and recommendations. According to UN HABITAT, cities that have seen the number of people living in slums decrease have used “large-scale slum upgrading and tenure regularization programmes” in combination with extension of infrastructure (i.e., sewer and water lines) and programs to promote availability of affordable housing.\(^{51}\) Resettlement to housing located on the periphery of the Delhi metro area, however, is not recommended. Rather, agencies such as UN HABITAT recommend “participatory slum improvement” as discussed in the above section related to *in situ* rehabilitation\(^{52}\). Global best practices include “avoiding any displacement of people to the extent possible.”\(^{53}\)

Concerns with regard to relocation to the periphery were echoed during the WWS site visits, during which several team members had the opportunity to speak with residents. Many emphasized the importance of livelihoods to their acceptance of a new residence after relocation. Others explained that their slum community had been assigned a different housing area but together they lobbied for placement in Dwarka which would provide the relocated individuals with easier access to job opportunities.

![Map 3: Location of EWS Housing from City Center](image)

*Mapping 3 of the EWS housing complexes shows that they are located between 15 and 30km from the city center. Research shows that relocating slums farther away from the city center leads to a substantial decrease in income. This is a strong case for finding other uses for these EWS houses and to promote *in-situ* upgrading of the slums instead.*

However, DUSIB’s scope of work does not include attention to this and other necessary social services, and the agency is not closely connected to the social welfare department’s role in the area. Personnel recruited for DUSIB have primarily an engineering background rather than in social services, and therefore focus on the development of and improvement of housing. While this housing attempts to meet an important need for better quality structures in which to live, the distance of EWS housing from many inhabitants’ original sources of employment paired with the lack of opportunity available on the outskirts make relocation to this housing an incredibly difficult transition for JJ residents.

As documented in the case of slum upgrading or relocation in Mumbai, “workers… place a premium on living close to where they work. Model 1 of this study suggests that a household with income of 6,250 Rs. per month would give up about 330 Rs. to decrease the main earner’s one-way commute by 1 km.”\(^{54}\)
PART 1: SLUMS IN DELHI

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ALTERNATIVE USE OF EWS HOUSING

During WWS site visits, DUSIB engineers emphasized that leaving apartment buildings vacant is problematic for maintenance and security reasons, and this creates a need for further investment to refurbish them to a livable standard once houses are allocated. At the same time, global best practices are clearly against the relocation of slum residents to housing complexes in the periphery.

Given these conflicting elements, DUSIB should consider putting the EWS housing to other use. Even though the EWS apartments provide healthier living environments, the lack of connectivity to livelihoods and central Delhi makes such a move highly disruptive to slum dwellers. Below we provide alternative options for putting EWS housing to use:

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Allow free market sale of EWS apartments. Structures such as the Savda Ghedra complex are built but not allocated. DUSIB should consider auctioning the housing on the public market. The high quality buildings may be attractive to another buyer and would allow DUSIB to recover construction costs. Delhi has a housing shortage, and this could be attractive to the middle-income or upper lower-income groups.

Revenue can be used to finance purchase of land for in-situ upgrade, which is the globally recommended option and more politically feasible given the 2015 policy. Cash from market sale of EWS housing will support DUSIB’s in situ work, help counteract the notion that EWS buildings are a sunk cost, and demonstrate that EWS buildings can still be leveraged in a way that is consistent with the best practices for slum upgrading.

Coordinate with industries located on Delhi’s periphery and offer the units as rental housing for workers. Developing contracts with local industries to use the space as worker housing would allow them to be used as a place to stay and could be an alternative to full sale of the property.

Provide the housing as a rental option for recent migrants to the Delhi area. DUSIB faces challenges both with the inflow of migrants to the Delhi metropolitan area and with the vacant EWS housing. EWS apartments could function as transitional accommodation for recent migrants to Delhi, available for them to rent for a period of time. This could help create a buffer for the numbers of migrants coming to central Delhi. DUSIB need not administer the day-to-day operations of transit rentals, but could contract with a private sector actor to manage the rentals. This as well as worker housing, could follow the hostel model used by companies like Aarusha Homes (www.aarusha.com).

DUSIB should consider these potential solutions in order to effectively use the housing already invested in and constructed while not worsening the conditions of an already vulnerable group of people.
1.23 Ensuring no new JJ clusters develop

As discussed, in-migration and natural population growth will keep increasing the demand for housing in Delhi in the short and long terms. Although migration rates have stabilized in Delhi during the last decade, around 75,000 people a year still migrate to the city in search of better employment opportunities. Additionally, the cut-off date of DUSIB’s current slum rehabilitation policy is January 1, 2015. This cut-off date does not account for the people who moved to the slums from 2015 to present, who will still be forced to relocate but will have nowhere to go except for another slum or a homeless shelter.

Given that the current pace of housing construction for lower-income citizens and EWS groups is slower than the growth in demand, JJ clusters will most likely continue to develop. In this section, we discuss the current situation and suggest ways that DUSIB can proactively address the concern of new JJ clusters developing.

1. Housing shortage for lower-income and EWS groups

Developing affordable housing in Delhi faces significant challenges. On the supply side, lack of available land, rising costs of construction, and regulatory issues are among the most significant constraints. On the demand side, access to housing finance by the lowest income groups is one of the major constraints. These factors contribute to the formation of JJ clusters around the city.

Given the current regulations, real estate developers often undergo lengthy approval processes that result in escalating construction costs. World Bank’s Doing Business Index ranks India 177th out of 183 countries with respect to dealing with construction permits. Due to these costs, private developers have traditionally focused on housing for higher-income groups, leaving housing for lower-income and EWS groups to the government agencies. It is estimated that around 96% of the housing shortage affects the lower-income and EWS groups.

Furthermore, investors control the real estate market in India, in part due to the previously discussed Delhi Rental Control Act of 1958. As a result, an increase in house construction does not lead to an increase in availability of homes, with owners viewing rental as very risky. The current urban housing shortage in India is of 1.88 crore units, while there are 1.2 crore completed homes lying vacant.

2. Provision of affordable housing by government agencies

The current environment and policies have created a housing shortage that neither the public nor private sectors have been able to address.

The DDA has not been able to build enough housing for lower-income and EWS groups. From 2000 to 2010, the Authority only constructed 22,955 of the 42,655 (or 53.8%) targeted houses for the period. Census data shows that the housing provided by DDA only accounts for 2.3% of the nearly one million houses built in Delhi during the same period. Furthermore, between 2005 and 2010, no EWS flats were constructed by the DDA, and from 2003 to 2013, the construction of housing for different income groups was the following:

- HIG (Higher Income Group): 4,479
- MIG (Middle Income Group): 2,014
- LIG (Lower Income Group): 13,549
- EWS (Economically Weaker Sections): 3,114
In sum, the DDA has been unable to develop the housing stock necessary to meet the demand of Delhi’s residents. This shortage is met, in part, by the unplanned settlements that continue to house a great proportion of Delhi’s population. According to the Center for Policy Research “the DDA consistently underestimates the need for EWS housing and under-delivers on that underestimate, sustaining a cycle of homelessness, informal settlement, and demolition.”

DUSIB has not been able to fully meet the housing demands either. The Master Plan of Delhi 2021 establishes that 2.5 million housing units will have to be constructed by 2021, of which 40% must be for EWS. To meet this goal, 25% of the target EWS (or 240,000 EWS houses) is to be constructed by DUSIB. This means that beginning in 2010, DUSIB should be building an average of 22,000 EWS flats each year. However, by the end of 2014, DUSIB still faced a gap of 25,000 EWS flats. An additional challenge is that even flats that are completed remain empty due to several reasons regarding eligibility and desirability of built housing.

**POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT GROWTH OF NEW JJ CLUSTERS**

DUSIB has previously been involved in construction of EWS housing, but does not have an active role in planning for future flows of migrants to Delhi. DUSIB should account for the in-migration that will continue to impact the city in the coming years and clarify what is the agency’s role in ensuring that they are adequately housed. Proposed activities of DUSIB would be:

**Provide estimations on affordable housing needed based on number of new migrants at risk.** There are currently no estimates of unmet demand for affordable housing. As the agency in charge of surveying slum populations, DUSIB could expand its mandate to provide estimations for number of new migrants at risk of establishing new slums, and the affordable housing need. These estimations would include current residents of JJ clusters that are not currently eligible for rehabilitation, and would inform next steps for both the private and public actors involved in the provision of housing.

**Act as nodal agency, along with the DDA, for the affordable housing objectives of the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana mission.** The PMAY’s “credit-linked subsidy scheme” and “affordable housing in partnership” interventions discussed earlier are crucial in advancing the provision of housing for EWS groups. DUSIB could also provide “transit housing” to migrants that plan to stay temporarily in the city, or that are ineligible for rehabilitation, potentially by using vacant EWS flats as previously suggested in this document. The latter recommendation was also suggested in 2013 at the Ninth Board Meeting of the DUSIB.

**Increase affordable options the rental housing market.** The provisions in the Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958 deter landlords to rent their vacant properties. The Draft Model Tenancy Act of 2015 is a potential solution to this issue. This Act could help to increase the rental housing market churn by establishing a framework for regulation of rent, and balancing the rights and responsibilities of landlords and tenants to provide faster adjudication for resolving disputes.

**Measure and target outcomes instead of outputs.** DUSIB’s mandate needs to expand beyond housing outputs to target outcomes— upward social mobility for JJ residents. This would help to provide achieving metrics of improvement and accountability, not only on DUSIB, but also on other agencies involved in the provision of housing for lower-income and EWS groups.
SUMMARY OF KEY CHALLENGES & RECOMMENDATIONS

**In situ upgrading:** Slum residents’ preferences and payment capabilities should be considered as part of the decision on upgrading approach. Considering resident characteristics and preferences in this decision helps ensure community ownership and monitoring for longer-term, lower-cost outcomes, and also minimizes the chance that the upgrade results in residents moving back into another slum. Reblocking should be used when possible as the most economically efficient and least disruptive option per international examples and best practices.

**Making efficient use of EWS housing:** DUSIB should no longer proceed with their established allocation system moving JJ residents to EWS housing on Delhi’s outskirts as this conflicts with internationally recognized best practices. They should instead aim to fill it for other uses.

**Ensuring no new JJ clusters develop:** DUSIB should responsibly account for continued in-migration and project affordable housing needs with this in mind.
1.3 IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

As outlined above, DUSIB is the Delhi State government’s only means to engage with land and housing issues. While the DUSIB Act of 2010 clearly outlines the functions of the body, it does not define the ultimate purpose or goal of DUSIB’s work in performing these functions. In the agency’s Vision 2030 document, DUSIB sets out a plan to advance SDG 11 and ensure access for all Delhi residents to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services. However, lacking the power to rectify the non-market-based policy structures generating Delhi’s housing shortage and subsequent slums, DUSIB is tasked with addressing JJ cluster residents’ lack of basic services, ensuring that JJ residents’ homes are adequate for healthy habitation, and resolving their informal tenure on lands that DUSIB owns.

With 675 slum clusters housing over 1.7 million residents in the city, DUSIB’s best approach for achieving its Vision 2030 goals would require minimizing per-slum expenditure by i) flexibly incorporating as much of the informal capital in existence and ii) relying to the greatest extent possible on more efficient, private providers to meet many of JJ residents’ needs. The ultimate goal in this should be to create a stock of houses that can be traded in a market among low-income Delhi residents.

Given the analysis of DUSIB’s three main challenges related to slum housing and the corresponding recommendations discussed above, we suggest that DUSIB build upon the political momentum surrounding the recently developed *Delhi for All: Vision 2030* document and incorporate these approaches into the work of a task force for affordable housing and slum upgrading. This will work in tandem with the Vision 2030 document and ensure DUSIB is present at the table for some of the key conversations that take place related to the challenging dynamic of land holding policies and the DDA. DUSIB, with the support and backing of the Aam Adhmi party, should propose this task force and solidify their leadership role on this issue.

Meanwhile, the Aam Aadmi Party should support DUSIB by advocating that the DDA land sale monopoly be devolved, to reduce bureaucratic and time costs for development approval and allow the private sector greater ability to participate in housing provision & housing supply. Delhi can look to Kyrgyzstan’s land privatization process as an example of one of the best transitions from state-owned to fully privatized land. 63
PART 2: HOMELESS IN DELHI

ENHANCED OPTIONS FOR DELHI'S HOMELESS POPULATION

2.0 BACKGROUND ON HOMELESSNESS IN DELHI

This background section provides the justification for government involvement in homelessness policy and for DUSIB’s involvement as lead policymaker on homelessness. We then analyze the homeless population by reviewing its size, demographic characteristics, and a brief discussion of the causes of homelessness. This section establishes several “categories” of homeless people to assist policymakers in addressing the needs of individuals and their unique circumstances.

THE CASE FOR GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN HOMELESSNESS

Homelessness is a global problem that poses both human rights and economic challenges. India’s Supreme Court has called for a response to homelessness based on their interpretation of the constitutional Right to Life as the right to human dignity. This underscored the human rights-based case for a governmental response to homelessness. The economic case, on the other hand, considers the negative externalities of homelessness on the rest of society. For example, human waste from people living in open areas can increase disease prevalence. Homelessness can also result in troubled areas where consumers feel unsafe, negatively impacting business development. These are market failures, and the government has an economic imperative to find solutions to correct them whenever possible. The policy recommendations articulated in this section specifically target and address the economic challenges.

WHY DUSIB SHOULD TAKE LEAD ON HOMELESSNESS POLICY

During our field visit to Delhi, we learned that DUSIB is building and servicing night shelters mainly as an inherited legacy from the agency it replaced. As a result, DUSIB’s homelessness policy is more legacy-based and reactive than intentional and proactive.

DUSIB is qualified to assume a leading policy role in addressing homelessness. Considering DUSIB’s unique role within Delhi government and its preexisting relationships with civil society organizations that serve the homeless, DUSIB ranks among the best-positioned governmental entities that can affect major change by transforming the lives and well-being of the city’s homeless community. DUSIB’s status as an agency of engineers is also important because it has the invaluable technical expertise to ensure shelters are equipped with the required and appropriate sanitation systems and infrastructure.

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DELHI’S HOMELESS

1. The Delhi government has no consistent definition of homelessness, leading to variable and conflicting population estimates

Estimates for the number of homeless people in Delhi range from 16,000 to 246,000, which is between 0.09% and 1.3% of the city’s population and 0.9% and 14.5% of the city’s poor. The 2011 census puts the number at 46,724. The gap between the low and the high estimates is large because definitions differ between agencies and organizations. There are different policy reasons for adopting different definitions.64

2 Based on a Delhi population of 16.8 million, as calculated in the last Indian Census in 2011. Low end estimates come from DUSIB and higher end estimates come from the India’s Office of the Supreme Court Commissioners. By contrast, the Indian Census put the number at 46,724 in 2011. NGOs estimate the number of homeless to be 180,000.

PART 2: HOMELESSNESS IN DELHI
2. The homeless population is mostly adult, male and illiterate

According to India’s 2011 census, 80% of the homeless population is male, with adult males between the ages of 18-65 comprising 60% of the total homeless population.65 Children below age 18 make up just 20% of the homeless, which is low compared to the portion of Delhi’s overall population that is below 18 (31%).66 Seniors (those above age 65), on the other hand, are over-represented among the homeless, comprising 9.2% of the homeless population and just 2.4% of the Delhi population overall.67 68

3. Delhi’s Working Homeless: Nearly 9 in 10 homeless earn income

Homelessness is often associated with joblessness, but this is not true in Delhi. Many of Delhi’s homeless people work long hours only to remain homeless. By the numbers, 85.3% of the homeless are earning income, 12% are dependents, and about 2% are involved in illegal activities.69

The specific jobs undertaken by the homeless population include “Day Wage Laborers,” (21%), Rag Pickers (18%), Rickshaw Pullers (17%), Street Hawkers/Vendors (13.8%), Beggars (11%), Party Workers (7%), and “Other” (13%).70

4. Geographic trends in homelessness

Homelessness is acute in Delhi compared to the rest of the country. In 2011, Delhi’s share of India’s homeless population was 5.1%. Its state’s share of total population comprises only 4.2% of the country’s urban population.71 The New Capital Territory is home to three out of the six districts in the country (of 640 districts in India) with the highest rates of homelessness.72 These districts are Central (1.54%), New Delhi (1.44%), and North (0.91%).73 By way of comparison, the North East and North West districts of Delhi have homelessness rates of just 0.11% and 0.13% respectively, and the national average is 0.15%. Delhi’s homeless population is more urban than its overall population (99.3% of homeless people live in urban settings vs. 97.5% of the total population).

The rural-to-urban population trend is higher among the homeless population. Between 2001 and 2011, the number of homeless households in urban centers grew 37% while those living in rural India declined by 26%.74 But the overall growth rate in urban centers over the same period was only 32%, compared to an increase of 12% in rural areas.75

According to a 2013 survey conducted by the Delhi Government, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar comprise nearly 80% of the city’s migrant population.76 Of those, 63% from Bihar and 46% from UP were considered “poor.” While migration is slowing down relative to prior decades, the continued influx of migrants, and in particular poor migrants, could exacerbate homelessness in the city.
CAUSES OF HOMELESSNESS

1. Becoming homeless is a multi-causal and non-static phenomenon

Homelessness is rarely the product of just one root cause. Rather it occurs at the nexus of several factors, both individual and structural. Many of the structural factors that cause homelessness were discussed at the start of this report (rural-to-urban migration, housing shortages, and limited economic opportunities). Individual factors include a person’s family situation, drug or alcohol addiction, and mental health disorders. The factor most cited by shelter staff and by the homeless during our field visit was rural-to-urban migration.

Aside from being multicausal, becoming homeless is not a static phenomenon. Rather, it represents a gradual and continuous process of mental, social, and economic marginalization from society. It is often self-perpetuating. According to the U.N., it is both a symptom and a cause of poverty and social exclusion.

2. Drug abuse: a cause or a consequence of homelessness?

According to the Delhi Aids Control Society, there are 20,000 homeless drug users in the city. While this number may appear high, without a clear denominator for the total number of homeless people, it is difficult to determine the magnitude of the problem. This highlights a major problem with inconsistency in defining and counting the homeless.

Further, teasing out which came first, drug abuse or homelessness, is a difficult task due to potential reverse causality. Perhaps becoming homeless leads people to turn to drugs as a coping mechanism, rather than drugs causing homelessness. Academic research on the question is conflicting.

Qualitative findings from our site visits indicate that homelessness may lead to drug abuse in Delhi (see Vignette below). Regardless of which causes which, drug abuse is endemic among the homeless population and must be addressed in any homelessness policy.

VIGNETTE: DRUG ABUSE AND HOMELESSNESS IN DELHI

During shelter visits in November 2017, our team spoke with a homeless man who explained that he turned to drugs because he felt very lonely and unloved in the shelters and on the streets. He explained that drugs made him feel better and forget his miseries. This illustrates the theory that homelessness can also lead to drug abuse, instead of only the other way around.

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3 There is an expansive literature on drug abuse as both a cause and consequence of homelessness, and studies have found evidence to support both theories.
BREAKING DOWN THE HOMELESS POPULATION BY DESIRED END GOALS

As the demographics section makes clear, homeless people are not all the same, so applying a “one-size-fits-all” theory of change would be inappropriate. The central question of this section is: What is the appropriate “end goal” for each population? Before rushing to propose skills training or detox programs for all homeless people, the appropriate sub-population should be targeted.

During our site visits to shelters, we met children, seniors, disabled people, those recovering from injuries, and working-age adults. We learned that some residents have stayed in shelters for years and others for only a single night. Below is a general overview of the categories of homeless people and the associated “end goal” of a homelessness policy toward the group.

1. **Children 0-14.** Many children live in shelters with their parents. The end goal for this population should be safety, especially if parents are away working during the day, and connection to nearby schools, where possible.

2. **Children 14-18.** 14 is the legal age for working in India and 18 is the legal age of adulthood. The end goal for children in this age category should be a safe place to sleep, connection to education facilities where possible, and skills training for eventually joining the workforce and reaching self-sufficiency after turning 18.

3. **Working-age Adults.** These individuals are able to work, but are unable to do so either because of a lack of education, training, or other otherwise. This is the ideal group for skills training programs. The short-term end goal for this group is a safe place to sleep, with a long term goal of “graduation” out of homelessness and into self-sufficiency.

4. **Individuals with drug or alcohol addiction.** This group may include both children and adults. The end goal for this group is detoxification, a safe place to sleep, and in the case of adults or working age children, skills training when feasible.

5. **Individuals recovering from diseases or injuries.** The end goal for those healthy enough to recover should be (1) a safe place to stay while recovering and (2) “graduation” out of homelessness into self-sufficiency.

6. **Individuals with debilitating diseases or disabilities.** The end goal is a safe place to sleep and health care when appropriate or possible.

7. **Elderly individuals who are no longer capable of working.** The end goal for this population is a safe place to sleep.

In sum for categories 1, 6, and 7, the main end goal is simply a safe place to sleep. For 2, 3, 4, and 5, the end goal is a safe place to sleep in the short run, but eventual graduation out of homelessness in the long run.
2.1 CURRENT GOVERNMENT POLICIES & APPROACHES TO HOMELESSNESS

In this section we analyze the policies set forth by the Supreme Court of India and by the National Urban Livelihoods Mission and discuss the policy implications each have on Delhi’s effort to address homelessness.

We then discuss DUSIB’s current effort to address homelessness. As discussed above, DUSIB is well positioned to lead on homelessness policy. Yet the agency does not currently have an articulated vision or mandate. Therefore, this section lays the foundation for our proposed “Homelessness Policy Vision Statement,” a guiding framework that outlines DUSIB’s commitment to provide homeless shelters, as well as the process by which to do so in both the short- and long-term.

2.11 SUPREME COURT AS POLICY-MAKERS

The Supreme Court’s writ petition has stood in place of any official policy articulated by DUSIB. The Supreme Court of India issued a writ petition in October 2010 requiring all state governments and union territories in the country to provide homeless shelters. This included the provision of shelters compatible with the needs of vulnerable communities, such as single women, the elderly, and the disabled. The Supreme Court also mandated that homeless shelters were to be built in the ratio of at least one per one lakh urban population in each city, roughly one homeless shelter for every 100 people in an area with a population greater than 100,000.

Early in the winter of 2010, the number of homeless people dying in Delhi escalated, sparking concern and outrage by the state government, Public Interest Litigation, and Delhi civic society. By April of that year, both the Delhi High Court and the Supreme Court passed orders on ways the city could address homelessness.

Such deliberations prompted the Courts to pass a blanket order on remedying the problem—thereby implicating all state governments and union territories in the matter.

The following year, the Courts specifically tasked DUSIB with the provision of toilets, drinking water, fans, and lights in shelters. In part, the Courts were motivated to ensure all shelters provide basic amenities for the homeless in order to transform Delhi into a “world class city.” Furthermore, at both the national and city levels, particularly under the Aam Aadmi Party, there was growing sentiment that the homeless deserve the right to live dignified lives—that they, as members of society, were entitled to the right to life.

2.12 NATIONAL URBAN LIVELIHOODS MISSION

In 2013, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation of the Government of India released official Operational Guidelines for the Scheme of Shelter for Urban Homeless (SUH). These guidelines were issued under the National Urban Livelihoods Mission (NULM). As extensive as they are pragmatic, the NULM Scheme of Shelter Policy (hereinafter “NULM Policy”) addresses all pertinent policy areas, such as where shelters should be located, what types of facilities should be available for vulnerable communities, who is needed to help run and manage shelters, and how states are expected to pay for them.
The purpose and intent of the NULM Policy is to provide permanent shelter to the urban homeless and ensure such shelters are equipped with essential amenities. More precisely, the NULM Policy clearly articulates its primary objectives as ensuring the availability and accessibility of permanent shelters that offer safety, sanitation, and water for the urban homeless; catering to the unique needs of vulnerable populations like the aged, disabled, women, and children; providing access to welfare entitlements such as social security pensions, education, and various forms of identification; and lastly, formulating basic monitoring and management systems to evaluate the quality of shelters.

Like the Supreme Court writ petition, the NULM Policy mandates that shelters should be provided for every one lakh population, with the capacity to house 50-100 people. Similarly, both national policies articulate a clear need for different night shelters for different vulnerable communities. In order for shelters to meet safety objectives, separate shelters must be available to house women and children, the aged, disabled people, and substance abusers.

However, the Scheme of Shelter Policy departs from the policy outlined by the Supreme Court of India in several ways. First, the SUH identifies the need to locate shelters near public transportation and work sites, as these areas are often frequented by the urban homeless. Furthermore, shelters must be managed by a team of no less than three people, one of which must work eight hour shifts. Lastly, the NULM Policy greatly expands the list of basic services shelters should provide. While the Supreme Court order only advocated for the provision of basic infrastructure such as lights, toilets, water, and fans, the NULM Policy calls for the provision of pest and mosquito control, fire safety equipment, first aid kits, common cooking spaces, and more.

2.13 DUSIB’S CURRENT POLICY ON HOMELESSNESS

While DUSIB does not have an explicit mandate or policy on homelessness, DUSIB actively builds and manages shelters. As mentioned, this is because Supreme Court ordered the states to provide homeless shelters and specifically tasked DUSIB with the provision and maintenance of basic amenities and services.

For its part, DUSIB intends on building additional night shelters with a combined capacity of housing over 21,000 people. Since 2010, DUSIB has been working toward the construction of new night shelters, as well as the redevelopment of existing shelters. To date, DUSIB has helped build around 266 night shelters, many of which offer basic amenities such as sanitation systems, fans, lights, drinking water, libraries, first aid kits, and lockers. Many of these are also within close proximity to Mohalla Clinics. These are important steps in ensuring the homeless community in Delhi can live dignified and respectful lives.

To run these shelters DUSIB contracts with various Shelter Management Agencies (SMAs), which provide a variety of services to homeless people. However, during field visits and through secondary research, we discovered great inconsistency in service provision across shelters among other unmet needs. These unmet needs are discussed later in the document in the section entitled “Unmet Needs & Policy Recommendations.”

2.14 POLICY RESPONSES TO HOMELESSNESS IN OTHER INDIAN CITIES

Looking at other states can illuminate other policy ideas for addressing homelessness. According to the Commissioner’s report to the Supreme Court in 2011, Delhi, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh were leading the change, though none of the states were meeting the compliance standards set by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, several other states have also shown improvements on other aspects. One thing remains consistent: in most states, while temporary and permanent shelters have been either identified or built, usage remained low.
Other states are making progress on three fronts: (1) definitional changes; (2) alternatives to shelters; and (3) governance changes. Karnataka, for example, has a broader definition of homelessness that includes people living in their places of work or in homeless shelters.\(^{84}\)

**CASE STUDY: KARNATAKA HOMELESS DEFINITION**

State of Karnataka’s defines the ‘homeless’ as those who:

1. Do not have a home, either self-owned or rented
2. Spend their nights sleeping in the place of work such as shops (including dhabas), factories, construction sites and offices
3. Spend their nights in or on their means of livelihood such as in hand/push carts or rickshaws
4. Live and sleep on pavement, parks, railway stations, bus stands, and places of worship, outside shops and factories, at construction sites, under bridges, in hume pipes and other places under the open sky or places unfit for human habitation,
5. Spend their nights or days in shelter or transit, short stay, beggars’ or children’s homes.\(^{84}\)

Regarding alternatives to shelters, Kerala has announced that it is in the process of formulating “sustainable shelter homes,” which would provide around the clock security and other facilities such as water and sanitation.\(^{85}\)\(^{86}\) Rajasthan has adopted a policy where emergency shelters are the first step towards rehabilitation, offering skills training and housing options to transition out of emergency shelters.\(^{87}\) In Tamil Nadu, some shelters integrate services such as health centers and provide meals. Tamil Nadu has also set aside a budget for 200 Amma Unavagam which means “Mother Restaurant” in Tamil, which provide cheap hygienic food for subsidized costs for the urban poor.\(^{88}\) In Andhra Pradesh, foundations are creating community kitchens that provide meals for shelter homes.

For changes in governance, Tamil Nadu has created a separate budget for construction and upgrading of new shelters under the Tamil Nadu Livelihoods Mission, and has also formed shelter advisory committees in various cities. These various state efforts are all worth consideration, and their outcomes and effectiveness should be followed to the extent feasible. The recommendations offered throughout this report draw in part on these efforts to address homelessness.
2.2 CURRENT UNMET NEEDS IN HOMELESS SHELTERS

Our team has assessed the quality and success of DUSIB’s progress meeting Supreme Court orders to provide homeless shelters with basic amenities. While DUSIB has made important progress, there are several steps it can take to improve its homeless shelters and provide services to the homeless.

Delhi government offers a range of services designed to aid the homeless population in accessing the basic conditions to lead a dignified life. Night shelters provide occupants with protection from the weather and some semblance of family. Shelters welcome families and other vulnerable persons, with select shelters offering facilities for persons recovering from medical events, such as accidents or invasive procedures. Other services provided at select shelters include assistance in obtaining Aadhaar cards, meals, basic skills training for employment and other services as outlined under the NULM Scheme of Shelters for Urban Homeless guidelines. Homeless shelters in Delhi provide vulnerable persons with a stable home base from which they can seek to build a more happy and productive life. Persons utilizing these shelters reported gratitude for access to such facilities.

Our team observed that Delhi’s night shelters differed considerably in services provided and environmental quality. Some shelters offered food, medicine, skills training, lighting and a clean and loving environment. Other shelters have serious deficiencies, including lack of security, unclean environments conducive to the spread of disease (unwashed blankets, poor ventilation, etc.), and poor treatment by shelter staff.

An inspection report published by the National Urban Livelihood Mission found that, “even the basic facilities, i.e. provision of sufficient lockers, sufficient lights, sufficient beds/space for an individual, cleaning of blankets, sheets are not managed well.” Quality deficiencies undermine both willing utilization of shelters (many homeless prefer to sleep on the streets) and compromise the function of shelters as a temporary and transitory housing solution. Without attention to life skills and other training, many homeless persons fail to graduate into an independent and self-sustaining life. This heterogeneity in the provision of public services at night shelters exacerbates the aforementioned market failures—underscoring the need to systematize public service provision in night shelters.

Quality standardization for basic services and targeted service upgrades would improve current shelter services utilization and better support homelessness graduation. Such improvements are also economically justified, as increasing shelter utilization will make existing shelter investments more efficient. The following pages discuss current unmet needs in homeless shelters and proposes low cost strategies for improvement.

MAP 4: NIGHT SHELTER CAPACITY & TYPE BY POPULATION DENSITY

Evidence suggests that permanent, high-capacity shelters are not built in Delhi where needs are greatest. Using the geographical data on 183 night shelters (out of a total 266 night shelters) in Delhi, we see that the shelters on the outskirts of Delhi have larger capacity and are more likely to be permanent buildings; however, these are the less dense parts of Delhi with lower population and demand for night shelters.
The concern that high-capacity shelters are not built where needs are greatest is substantiated when examining the average occupancy of night shelters, as Map 5 depicts:

MAP 5: NIGHT SHELTERS BY AVERAGE OCCUPANCY

The average occupancy rates of the shelters (for 2016) show that shelters on the outskirts of Delhi see lower occupancy rates. Despite the fact that they offer less space, the homeless prefer to use the shelters in the central part of the city.

2.21 UNMET NEED: HEALTH & SANITATION

Some shelters provide patrons with a clean and secure place to rest at night. For other night shelters, unhygienic conditions contribute to poor utilization rates and a counter-productive environment for homeless persons seeking to build a stable and independent life. Shelter occupants complain of contracting fleas and respiratory illnesses that impact their ability to work during the day. Poorly ventilated shelters create environments that are unpleasant for sleeping and conducive to the spread of disease. Spending the night in a homeless shelter becomes a hindrance to the pursuit of stable livelihoods.

Negative public perceptions of the homeless are particularly problematic for social reintegration. Such perceptions stem from judgements based on the unclean appearances or poor health of the homeless. Negative perceptions of the homeless may be partly mitigated by access to bathing, washing and toilet facilities. However, homeless persons may further benefit from instruction in good hygiene practices. Providing basic instruction in personal hygiene practices will improve the efficiency of existing investments in washing and toilet facilities at shelters.

STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING SHELTER SANITATION:

1. Enforce minimum cleanliness standards, including regular washing of blankets, beds, floors and toilet facilities.
2. Ensure shelters have adequate ventilation to prevent the spread of disease.
3. Offer basic instruction in good personal hygiene habits.
2.22 UNMET NEED: SAFETY

Homeless persons noted theft by residents and by shelter staff during the night. Some shelters, however, provide cubbies or lockers for personal belongings. Lockers should be extended to all shelters within the minimum service package. Many homeless persons work during the day as rickshaw drivers, rag-pickers, and construction workers. These persons need safe spaces to store vending inventories, bags for rag picking, and tools used in construction. These items are small, but are fundamental to the livelihoods of homeless persons. By offering a secure place to keep belongings, shelters would better promote successful livelihoods of homeless persons. Homeless persons often report losing sleep over worry for the safety of their belongings—keeping one eye open to watch for theft—which impacts quality of sleep and ability to work effectively during the day, particularly for those engaged in manual labor.

Personal safety is a major issue in shelters, particularly for women and children. Many women report mistreatment at the hands of other shelter occupants or shelter staff, including taunting and sexual harassment. Ensuring safety of persons staying at homeless shelters is of paramount importance. Mistreatment by shelter caretakers can cause homeless persons to feel further disenfranchised by society and fall further to the ills that root much homelessness in Delhi. Current operational guidelines for women’s shelters require only one out of three caretakers to be female. However, given that caretakers rotate throughout the night, this guideline falls short of protecting women from unwanted male attention. Women’s shelters should be staffed by women only.

Consumption of drugs and alcohol is associated with disorderly behavior, and shelter managers’ report feeling powerless to prevent this behavior inside the shelter. Some shelter managers have suggested that police walk-throughs of the shelter at unannounced times would discourage occupants from drinking or taking drugs.

STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING SHELTER SAFETY:

1. Provide lockers for night storage of personal belongings as a part of minimum service provision. Lockers should be secure from theft, but easily accessed by owning occupants.
2. Installation of CCTV systems and security lighting.
3. Establish working partnerships with police to make regular visits at shelters.
4. Revise guidelines to only allow female caretakers to work at women’s shelters.

2.23 UNMET NEED: DIGNIFIED TREATMENT BY SHELTER STAFF

The best night shelters have reputations for treating occupants with love and kindness. At Sarai Kale Khan, occupants report much kindness at the hands of shelter staff. Other occupants noted feeling the shelter is the first time they have had a loving family. In other cases, shelter occupants report disrespectful behavior from shelter staff, who are often untrained and poorly motivated. In some of the worst instances, homeless women have reported sexual harassment and drunken behavior at the hands of shelter staff. Homeless persons have little meaningful opportunity to report poor treatment by shelter staff through formal channels.

It is easy to underestimate the importance of treating the homeless in dignified ways. Poor treatment by shelter staff can increase depression, feelings of social disenfranchisement, and prevent homeless persons from building confidence and social skills necessary to secure employment and build an independent life. Shelter staff should serve as models for the dignified and respectful treatment of other persons.
Training for shelter staff is currently undertaken by the operating NGO. DUSIB should convene a working group to develop standard trainings for staff who will be working in direct contact with the homeless. Shelter staff should be required to undergo a minimum standard training, with emphasis on interpersonal skills and dealing with individuals from different parts of the country, of different class, and different education. Homeless persons may bristle from years of discrimination and social disenfranchisement, and shelter staff should be instructed in kind and dignified methods for responding to agitated homeless occupants.

**STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING DIGNIFIED TREATMENT BY SHELTER STAFF:**

1. Convene a working group to develop standard training for shelter staff.
2. Mandate shelter staff undergo minimal training with special attention to interpersonal skills and dealing with people with diverse backgrounds. Staff should also be trained to address disorderly behavior from occupants. Where possible, staff persons with psychological counseling experience to shelters.
3. Provide formal channels for homeless persons to confidentially report mistreatment by shelter staff. Feedback should be provided directly to DUSIB or third party to avoid conflict of interest with reporting directly to operating NGO.

**2.24 UNMET NEED: JOB SEARCH GUIDANCE TO ACCOMPANY SKILLS TRAINING**

Skills training classes, such as in sewing and electrical work, have been piloted in ten of Delhi’s homeless shelters. Shelter occupants appreciate access to skill development, but often struggle to translate new skills into meaningful employment. Many homeless persons have spent years as social outcasts, and the path from learning a productive skill to employment may not be clear. Many homeless individuals would benefit greatly from basic guidance on how to solicit employment, in addition to skills training.

Assistance for job placement would increase the benefit of the government’s current investments in skills training classes. Homeless residents we spoke with noted their gratitude for access to skills training, but did not receive guidance on how to find or approach employers and how to present their skills. This proved a major barrier to securing employment. After several months looking for work, many people have become discouraged from job seeking and have remained homeless. Shelters offering basic assistance for job placement (e.g. MARHAM saw shelter residents successfully graduated into employment. Job placement assistance will improve the return on DUSIB’s existing investment in skills training, by increasing the rate of graduation out of homelessness.

Operational plans for implementing skills building schemes have been developed under the National Urban Livelihoods Mission, including Employment through Skills Training & Placement, Support to Urban Street Vendors, and Self Employment Programme. Linkages between these initiatives and Delhi’s homeless shelters would reinforce path dependency from skills building to employment.

**LOW-COST STRATEGIES FOR JOB PLACEMENT INCLUDE:**

1. Provide basic guidance on how to approach employers.
2. Teach social skills to make a favorable introduction and describe one’s training.
3. Allow homeless persons to use a contact number and address of the shelter when soliciting employment.
4. Make linkages with organizations that have ongoing need for low-skill workers.
5. Make linkages with existing NULM schemes for skills building.
2.25 UNMET NEED: DRUG AND ALCOHOL ADDICTION

Many of Delhi’s homeless suffer from drug and alcohol addiction. Homeless persons may take to consumption of drugs and alcohol out of desperation, loneliness, and inability to find work. Designated homeless shelters should be equipped to provide de-addiction services, including access to psychological support. On paper, the Department of Social Welfare claims 32 drug de-addiction centers are operating in Delhi. However, a report by Shahri Adhikar Manch: Begharon Ke Saath, a group of NGOs advocating for the rights of homeless in Delhi, reveals that only three de-addiction centers are currently operational. The homeless are often turned away from these centers. DUSIB reports two night shelters currently providing de-addiction services.

Addressing substance abuse and addiction is a critical step before graduation from homelessness is possible. However, it is equally important to assist such persons in building productive livelihoods. Without skills and life training, homeless persons recovering from addiction are at serious risk of relapsing into addictive behaviors. Skills building and job placement opportunities should be integrated into shelters for persons with drug and alcohol addiction.

STRATEGIES FOR ADDICTION SERVICES INCLUDE:

1. Designated shelters should be equipped to provide rehabilitation services to homeless persons suffering from drug and alcohol addiction.
2. Rehabilitation shelters should provide skills training and job finding assistance. Offering addiction rehabilitation services in combination with employment assistance will vastly increase likelihood of graduation from homelessness.
3. Integrate case management approach with de-addiction services.
2.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING HOMELESS SHELTER SERVICES

Policy recommendations for DUSIB to improve its strategies for addressing homelessness range from focusing on institutional recommendations, to implementing better measurement techniques, to improving shelter management and service delivery across shelters.

2.3.1 CLARIFY DUSIB’S LEADING ROLE IN ADDRESSING HOMELESSNESS

1. ADOPT AN ORGANIZATIONAL MANDATE ON HOMELESSNESS:

This recommendation sets the framework and mission that underpins DUSIB’s role in implementing the rest of the recommendations in this section.

DUSIB is currently building and servicing homeless shelters—a role not specifically in their “mandate.” While it could be useful for the Legislative Assembly or Supreme Court to hand DUSIB a clear mandate on homelessness, we think there is also room for DUSIB to take a more proactive role by explicitly addressing homelessness. In the background section, we identified DUSIB’s engineering expertise and connections with NGOs that work with the homeless population as core reasons for leading the government effort to address homelessness.

Our team previously identified several categories of homeless people, some that should graduate out of homeless shelters and other that simply need a safe place to sleep at night. With these categories in mind, we developed a separate Homeless Policy Mission Statement for DUSIB. Such a Mission Statement clearly outlines DUSIB’s goals for addressing homelessness.

RECOMMENDATION FOR DUSIB TO ENACT THE FOLLOWING HOMELESSNESS MISSION STATEMENT:

“Our mission is to promote the successful social, psychological, and economic reintegration of homeless persons into society. We are committed to continuously enhancing the provision of shelters, as well as access to basic services and amenities, health care, social welfare benefits, and skills training both in the present and future.”

The Mission Document of the NULM served as a guide in the development of our proposal. Like the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, we also view homelessness and poverty as multidimensional continuous process of occupational, residential and social marginalization. Any solution to addressing such problems must be both comprehensive and integrated so as to target vulnerable communities and ensure their reintegration into society.

A critical component of this Homelessness Mission Statement is its emphasis on shifting the focus away from outputs to concentrating on outcomes. More precisely, to properly address issues of homelessness, DUSIB must focus on the graduation of homeless persons from their shelters into society, not solely on the number of shelters built.
RELEVANT ACTORS:

- **State level political leaders**, including the Aam Aadmi Party. If there is lingering uncertainty about DUSIB’s role as a leader in homelessness policy, it could be up to the political leaders to deliver a clear mandate.

- **The Supreme Court of India**. The Supreme Court of India has issued several orders with respect to homelessness. They have required DUSIB to construct shelters and could play a role in establishing DUSIB as the lead agency to address homelessness.

### 2.32 IMPROVE POPULATION MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES

1. **ADOPT A BIMODAL DEFINITION OF HOMELESSNESS TO IMPROVE COUNTING AND MEASUREMENT**

A formal definition is important not only because it reveals the magnitude of the homelessness problem but also because it provides longitudinal data to measure progress. Further, a formal definition would provide DUSIB with the numbers to back up funding requests made to the state government.

But the policy debate around the definition of “homeless” hinges on whether the end goal is to simply get people under a roof or whether it is to graduate people into self-sufficiency. It is also difficult to know where to draw the line between the merely inadequately housed and the homeless. Because DUSIB’s homeless shelters house both those who are temporarily and indefinitely homeless, the agency should have two definitions. The purpose of having two definitions is to track housing progress toward both assisting those without a roof and toward the loftier goal of “graduating” people out of homelessness.

So what should these definitions be? The Indian census defines the homeless as people who do not live in a “census house,” which is a “structure with a roof.” This definition can also be useful for measuring the first group: those who simply need a roof or safe place to sleep.

The definition falls short, however, when it comes to assessing graduation from homelessness. If the restrictive definition alone is used, then DUSIB’s homeless count would be limited to only those on the streets, leading to both an underestimation of the homelessness problem and of the resources needed for graduation efforts such as skills training. For a broader definition of homelessness that includes more than just the roofless, DUSIB should adopt a definition along the lines of that used in the state of Karnataka. (See box page 34)

**RECOMMENDATION FOR DUSIB TO ADOPT TWO DEFINITIONS OF HOMELESSNESS:**

**Restrictive definition to count “shelterless” people** that includes only those who are living out in the open, i.e. not in homeless shelters and is in line with the Census definition. This allows DUSIB to monitor its progress in providing basic shelters.

**Holistic definition to count “homeless” people that includes those living in temporary shelters.** (See definition from the State of Karnataka for model.) This allows DUSIB to monitor progress integrating people into society.
2. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SHELTER SERVICES

2.3 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SHELTER SERVICES

RELEVANT ACTORS:

- India Homeless Resource Network (IHRN). This is an open-access consortium that curates research on areas of homelessness. They have published articles on the need for a set definition of homeless and the plight of India’s homeless. They would be helpful in guiding the formal adoption of a homelessness definitions.

2. IMPLEMENT A COMPREHENSIVE CITYWIDE SURVEY ON HOMELESSNESS

Once a clear set of definitions is agreed on, measurement should occur. In conducting background research on homelessness, data on the demographic breakdown was limited. Existing data is not clearly representative or scientifically gathered or is outdated. To this end, it behooves DUSIB to implement a comprehensive survey to truly understand the homeless and their needs. This should include a separate count for “shelterless” people and for “homeless” people. This will provide the basis for funding requests and for tailoring skills training programs.

Once developed, the survey should be instituted regularly, on an annual basis if feasible, or at a minimum every five years. Asking the same questions and using consistent definitions will provide tracking and measurement information to improve DUSIB’s service delivery.

RELEVANT ACTORS:

- Shelter Management Agencies (SMAs). Given their proximity to the homeless population, they could easily support the implementation of a comprehensive survey of Delhi’s homeless population.

2.33 ENHANCE SHELTER MANAGEMENT AND SERVICE DELIVERY

1. ENFORCE MINIMUM QUALITY STANDARDS AT HOMELESS SHELTERS BY UPGRADING DUSIB’S CONTRACT MONITORING SYSTEM

Delhi’s night shelters should enforce minimum quality standards that ensure homeless residents have access to a clean, safe and dignified option for shelter during the night. Given that night shelters are operated by contracted NGOs, quality issues in service provision may be best addressed with implementation of a contract monitoring system, as described below. This will also help ensure that when the end goal for the individual is simply a safe place to sleep, they have access to quality services at shelters.

An effective contract monitoring process will help ensure that NGOs operating the homeless shelters adequately perform contracted services, as well as reduce issues around quality and variability in service delivery. Below we suggest some best practices for improving existing contract monitoring systems between DUSIB and NGOs operating shelters.

DUSIB is already monitoring its contracts, including collecting data on performing onsite visits; however, DUSIB can do more to improve service delivery and ensure standardization across shelters by adopting innovative strategies for assessing the current contract monitoring systems.
RECOMMENDED STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE CURRENT CONTRACT MONITORING SYSTEM:

Use incentives to encourage good performance. Performance reinforcements, such as incentives and consequences for poor performance, promote high performance from the operating NGO. Financial incentives can be an effective method for inducing high quality service delivery. Describing consequences for poor performance in the contract will allow DUSIB to pursue disciplinary action if a NGO fails to adequately deliver in accordance with the contract terms.

Collect feedback from homeless occupants. Measuring satisfaction among homeless occupants will improve NGO performance when feedback is used (1) to alert the NGO to specific aspects of the contract that are not being fulfilled, and (2) as a source of past performance information for subsequent contract awards.

Develop a “Shelters Dashboard Report.” This would be useful internally for DUSIB to have an immediate point of comparison between shelters and to identify which shelters are doing well and which need improvement. To the extent feasible, the Shelters Dashboard should be available online to independent observers, including NGOs and SMAs. SMAs could assess their own performance compared to other shelters and outside NGOs could provide additional accountability.

RELEVANT ACTORS:

- **Shahri Adhikar Manch: Begharon Ke Saath.** This is a group of NGOs advocating for the rights of homeless in Delhi. The forum includes homeless people themselves and works on issues related to adequate housing, food, health, work/livelihood, security and political participation. They have played an active role in providing support and information to the High Court of Delhi on a case brought against the MCD for demolishing a temporary shelter in 2010. This group could provide accountability and support for implementing recommendations outlined in this report.

- **Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation.** As previously mentioned, this is a federal level entity charged with addressing poverty, housing, and employment. It published “operational guidelines” for homeless shelters in India, and could be an important resource when designing specific shelter services.

2. IMPROVE SHELTER SERVICES TO PROMOTE DIGNITY AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY BY IMPLEMENTING A CASE MANAGEMENT APPROACH

Current night shelters offer basic services that fill only part of the support needed to assist homeless people in building stable lives off the streets. A long-term vision for Delhi’s homeless shelters should include a wider range of services that promote graduation from destitution and homelessness, when appropriate or feasible. Upgrades to shelter services may include job and therapeutic counseling, job placement assistance, life skills training, treatment for addiction, dignity and personal hygiene items, referral for medical services, advanced security including CCTV, and other services that promote long-term graduation from homelessness. A case management approach may be particularly useful in this context.
2.3 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SHELTER SERVICES

Because the causes of homelessness and the needs of the homeless population are varied, a case management approach could be useful. Case management for homelessness can increase access, efficiency, coordination, and accountability of services, and better meet the complex needs of individuals experiencing homelessness. Case management is typically more resource intensive than a unified approach to homelessness, although outcomes may be more reliable. Studies of the case management approach have found improved housing stability, reduced substance use, and reduced employment barriers for substance users. Because the homelessness in Delhi’s homelessness varies from person to person, the detailed and involved approach of case management can be an important strategy to addressing individual needs.

Case management has been implemented in the United States since the 1980s, and has been a key feature in health care delivery to address issues of homelessness. Canada relies on a case management system to assist its homeless population as well. While various definitions of case management exist, the primary goal of the approach is to increase access, efficiency, coordination, and accountability of services. The basic components of case management include intake of homeless persons, assessment of needs, linkage to services, and ongoing monitoring and advocacy. Case management can increase access to medical and psychosocial services, and may include other services such as emotional support, education, and skill building.

The approach involves both short term and long term interventions. Long term interventions require intensive case management involving actors from multidisciplinary fields to not only provide critical services but re-engage individuals into society. Short term interventions such as ‘Critical Time Interventions’ are designed to prevent recurring homelessness through “strengthening the individual’s long-term ties to services, family, and friends; and by providing emotional and practical support during the critical time of transition. An important aspect of CTI is that post-discharge services are delivered by workers who have established relationships with patients during their institutional stay.”

While studies continue to research the effectiveness of various case management approaches in different contexts, there is an overall wide range of positive outcomes observed:

FIGURE 4: REPORTED POSITIVE OUTCOMES OF CASE MANAGEMENT

- Reduced use of drugs and alcohol
- Reduced psychiatric symptoms
- Reduced social isolation
- Increased use of Hep A & B vaccines
- Reduced ED visits
- Reduced length of hospital stay
- Increase access to substance use disorder treatment
- Increased insurance coverage
- Increased housing stability
- Reduced time spent homeless
- Success of homeless prevention and rapid re-housing programs
- Reduced hospital cost
- Reduced cost associated with shelter services
- Suggested to alleviate or offset economic impact of homelessness

RELEVANT ACTORS:

- **The Aam Aadmi Party** has been vocal supporters of policies to address homeless beyond provision of shelters and basic services. They could be a key ally expanding services to the homeless and making shelters and self-sufficiency programs a priority.

- **The National Skill Development Agency (NSDA).** This is an autonomous body under the Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship that coordinates skill development.

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efforts across the country. It will be important for any skills training conducted at Delhi’s homeless shelters to connect with this ministry to ensure best practices and promote knowledge sharing. DUSIB could seek NSDA’s input on its skills development program and how it’s connecting job seekers to employers.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING HOMELESSNESS

INSTITUTIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Clarify the role of DUSIB in homelessness policy by adopting an organizational mandate
- Implement a bimodal definition of homelessness, and
- Conduct a comprehensive citywide survey.

SHELTER MANAGEMENT & SERVICE DELIVERY RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Enforce minimum quality standards at homeless shelters by upgrading DUSIB’s current contract monitoring practices, and
- Improve the services available at homeless shelters by implementing a new case management system.
## 2.4 IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

To successfully implement the NULM guidelines and the recommendations above, we recommend the launch of a **Dedicated Task Force for Homelessness**. The task force should manage the three following teams: Management Team; Monitoring and Audit Team; and Case Management Team. The following table recommends roles, responsibilities and stakeholders for the various teams addressing homelessness:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEAM</th>
<th>OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>ROLES &amp; RESPONSIBILITIES</th>
<th>STAKEHOLDERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| DEDICATED TASK FORCE FOR HOMELESSNESS     | Oversee management, monitoring and audit, case management team. | • Set the vision and mission for taskforce  
• Hold regular meetings with management team to improve programming  
• Hold meetings to monitor service provision and grievance redressal in shelters  
• Hold meetings to engage with various civil society organizations  
• Liaise with researchers to better understand Delhi’s homeless populations  
• Manage media  
• Creating linkages with other relevant social services/government bodies. | • DUSIB  
• Social Welfare Department  
• Department of Health  
• Shahri Adhikar Manch: Begharon Ke Saath (Civil Society)  
• Delhi School of Social Work (Academic community)  
• MLA (political party) |
| MANAGEMENT TEAM                           | Ensuring high quality service provision.       | • Liaise with NGOs to create infrastructure for services (beds, bathrooms, lockers)  
• Hiring and training caretakers  
• Managing salaries, quality of hires  
• Oversight of contracting with NGOs operating shelters | • NGOs  
• Advisory board on management |
| MONITORING AND AUDIT TEAM                 |                                               | • Set up monitoring structures to ensure quality of services  
• Set up grievance redressal system and follow up  
• Report findings to the board | • Monitoring, Evaluation and Audit Team |
| CASE MANAGEMENT TEAM                      | Ensuring integration of the homeless into society. | • Recommend new services or better management strategy of services to the dedicated task force  
• Provide first-response to new members of the shelter  
• Recommend and connect services outside of shelter if needed  
• Follow up on progress | • Psychologists  
• Doctors, nurses |
TIMELINE

DUSIB’s strategy to address homelessness must include short- and long-term components. Employing a multidimensional solution to homelessness cannot be accomplished in the immediate. Rather, it will require the sophisticated coordination between DUSIB and other government and nongovernmental bodies to develop a strategy over time. Only once this minimum basket of services has been systemized throughout all shelters can DUSIB begin to scale up operations and offer additional services.

IN THE IMMEDIATE, DUSIB SHOULD:
1. Adopt a Homelessness Policy Mission Statement;
2. Adopt formal definitions of homelessness;
3. Deploy a new, more comprehensive survey to better estimate the demographics of the homeless population and build shelters according to identified needs.
4. Ensure each shelter is equipped with the basic services and amenities they were charged with providing by the Supreme Court.

IN THE LONG TERM, DUSIB MUST:
1. Build partnerships with stakeholders and strategize on how best to meet the needs of the homeless.
3.0 CONCLUSION AND OVERALL RECOMMENDATIONS

DUSIB has a challenging but important role to play as the primary agency of the Delhi State government that addresses housing and shelter issues for the city’s urban poor. This project aimed to explore both slum rehabilitation and homelessness policy and to provide DUSIB and the Aam Aadmi party with an analysis from an outside perspective.

There are several higher-level considerations we want to emphasize for DUSIB and the Aam Aadmi Party:

- **DUSIB, together with the Aam Aadmi Party, should establish a more evidence-based approach for enhanced monitoring and evaluation of programs.** This would increase DUSIB’s accountability and transparency. Such a system should focus on higher-level outcomes rather than on merely generating outputs. While the agency’s work to date is laudable, we think that more can be done to address the needs of both the homeless community and slum dwellers in Delhi. Beyond the mechanical construction of additional housing units or shelters, future investments and plans should consider whether previous structures/shelter management schemes improved the living conditions and upward social mobility of slum dwellers/the homeless.

- **DUSIB should consider hiring additional staff with backgrounds in social services to diversify the agency’s expertise beyond engineering.** There is no doubt that DUSIB’s engineers provide invaluable technical skills. However, upgrading slums and coordinating shelter services hinge on in-depth knowledge of the human and social implications of any technical change for ultimate success.

- **DUSIB should develop specific task forces to advise on the implementation of this report’s recommendations.** Interagency and inter-organizational knowledge should be leveraged for DUSIB’s efforts in slum redevelopment and attending to the homeless for optimal outcomes. The Aam Aadmi party could be an ally in bringing together the disparate departments and stakeholders together in service to Delhi’s urban poor.
Towards a new urban future in Delhi

Responding to Census Data Should Inform Homeless Policy in India.


TOWARDS A NEW URBAN FUTURE IN DELHI

4.0 REFERENCES