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This is the final report of a 2018 policy workshop, the capstone project of the Master in Public Affairs program at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Under the direction of Drs. Leon Sigal and Frank von Hippel, 10 graduate students spent several months researching U.S.-North Korea nuclear negotiations and regional dynamics to present U.S. policymakers with recommendations about managing the U.S.-North Korea relationship as it enters a new phase. They consulted current and former officials and scholars in China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States.

All authors participated in the preparation of this report. As a collaborative project, the report does not represent the views of Princeton University, Drs. von Hippel and Sigal, anyone interviewed for this workshop, or any individual student.

We would like to thank Dean Cecilia E. Rouse, Associate Dean Karen McGuinness, Associate Director of Finance and Administration Jeffrey Oakman, and everyone at the Woodrow Wilson School who helped make this workshop possible. We would also like to thank the many who shared their expertise and opinions with us in Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo.
This report assesses ongoing nuclear negotiations between the United States and North Korea. Although the Trump administration has demonstrated a renewed commitment to finding a diplomatic solution to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, the United States and North Korea are at odds regarding the sequencing of the denuclearization process. However, if the United States adjusts its policy, substantial progress toward denuclearization by the end of President Trump’s first term is possible.

This report makes four concrete recommendations that can put U.S.-North Korea nuclear negotiations on the right track. Specifically, to take advantage of this rare but rapidly closing window of opportunity, the report presents recommendations on how to approach the Trump-Kim summit planned for early 2019 and further negotiations to reach a written agreement by the end of 2019.

First, the United States should adopt a reciprocal approach to negotiating with North Korea that confers concessions in exchange for corresponding steps toward denuclearization. This negotiating method is more likely to succeed, given that North Korea has responded to a reciprocal, action-for-action approach in the past but has not made concessions in response to pressure alone. In addition, this method would build confidence and trust, thus helping to manage risk as the process moves forward.

Second, throughout negotiations with North Korea, the United States should abide by the following three principles: freeze only what can be verified, make clearly defined commitments, and move quickly to lock in progress. These principles are based on lessons from past negotiations and aim to limit ambiguity and create a sustainable process.

Third, at the next Trump-Kim summit, which is tentatively planned for early 2019, the two sides should make commitments that build confidence while making concrete steps toward denuclearization. The United States should seek an immediate freeze of fissile material production at both Yongbyon and North Korea’s undeclared enrichment site(s), as well as uranium milling and mining, all to be verified within 90 days of shutdown. The United States should also seek a written commitment to continue the moratorium on nuclear and missile testing, as well as the disablement of fissile material production facilities and dismantlement of centrifuges at Yongbyon by the end of 2019. In return, the United States could commit to concluding a peace declaration, scaling back future military exercises, and allowing the resumption of humanitarian assistance.

Finally, the United States and North Korea should complete a written agreement by the end of 2019 that outlines concrete actions each side will take towards denuclearization and normalization of relations. At this stage, the United States should seek an agreement regarding the declaration of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs; dismantlement of Yongbyon; a production halt on medium-, intermediate-, and long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles; and the establishment of verification procedures. As corresponding measures, the United States could publicly endorse rollbacks of South Korean unilateral sanctions, take initial political normalization steps, and begin to ease some U.S. unilateral sanctions.
After nearly 70 years of hostility, U.S.-North Korea relations are at a crossroads. Tensions rose throughout 2017 as North Korea tested missiles and advanced its nuclear program at a rapid pace and President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un traded barbs and threats. Yet in early 2018, a series of diplomatic overtures orchestrated by South Korean President Moon Jae In led to North Korea’s participation in the PyeongChang Olympics, sustained inter-Korean dialogue, and President Trump’s agreeing to meet with Kim.

The historic U.S.-North Korea summit took place in Singapore on June 12, 2018 and produced a joint statement in which “President Trump committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK, and Chairman Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The Singapore summit decreased tensions and provided both governments with a mandate to work toward denuclearization and a new bilateral relationship. Since the summit, North Korea has maintained a voluntary moratorium on missile and nuclear testing; inter-Korean engagement has proceeded at a steady pace; and North Korea has returned the remains of some American soldiers. However, as of December 2018, negotiations appear to have slowed due to disagreements about the sequencing and pace of denuclearization.

This state of affairs is all too familiar for the U.S.-North Korea relationship. Since the 1990s, the United States and other members of the international community have sought to negotiate an end to North Korea’s nuclear program. Mutual distrust; failure—or perceived failure—to uphold commitments; and ongoing hostility have undermined both nuclear negotiations and implementation of agreements. If the United States and North Korea are to negotiate successfully, the two sides must break free from this decades-old pattern of behavior.

FORGING A PATH FORWARD WITH NORTH KOREA

SINGAPORE SUMMIT COMMITMENTS

1. The United States and the DPRK commit to establish new U.S.–DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity.

2. The United States and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

3. Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

4. The United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.

Caption: President Trump and Kim Jong Un shake hands at the Singapore Summit. Image Credit: The Evening Standard
An historic opportunity?

Fortunately, several factors contribute to an environment that is potentially favorable to negotiations.

First, the presidents of both South Korea and the United States support negotiating with North Korea. While South Korea and the United States may disagree about tactics, having the two allies on the same strategic page removes a major potential source of friction in negotiations. South Korean President Moon Jae In’s campaign platform included a promise to revive a pro-engagement strategy toward North Korea, which draws upon tenets of the turn-of-the-century Sunshine Policy of his progressive predecessor Kim Dae Jung. Since assuming office in mid-2017, Moon has made inter-Korean rapprochement efforts and parallel U.S.-North Korea negotiations a centerpiece of his presidency and has dedicated significant political capital and resources to facilitating both. Likewise, President Trump, the first sitting U.S. president to meet with a North Korean leader, represents a break from the past. Since the Singapore summit, President Trump has reiterated his belief that negotiations are the correct strategic approach to the North Korean challenge.

Second, the ascent of Kim Jong Un could mark a new North Korean approach to relations with the United States and the international community. In 2013, Kim chose to abandon his father’s “military-first” policy in favor of byungjin, a dual-track approach of economic growth and development of a nuclear program. In April 2018, Kim revised his policy further, stating that, having achieved its nuclear goals, North Korea would henceforth focus solely on economic growth. At both the inter-Korean summit in April 2018 and the U.S.-North Korea summit in June 2018, Kim claimed that North Korea was willing to work toward the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. While some experts question the sincerity of Kim’s stated willingness to denuclearize, his apparent desire to normalize North Korea’s diplomatic and economic status, combined with rising expectations for economic growth within the North Korean population, may have created incentives for North Korea to negotiate.

On the other hand, longstanding obstacles to successful nuclear negotiations remain. These constraints include delicate intraregional dynamics and historic tension between China, Japan, and South Korea. Internal pressures, particularly in Japan, South Korea, and the

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United States, limit leaders’ ability to engage with North Korea independently of domestic politics and public opinion.

Disagreements about the technical elements of the denuclearization process also remain unresolved. North Korea is reluctant to declare the number and locations of its nuclear facilities or to provide an inventory of its fissile material and nuclear warheads, while the United States insists on a declaration early in the process. The logistics and sequencing of denuclearization, including which actors will be involved in each step of the process and when each step will take place, are all unsettled. Varying levels of concern about North Korea’s human rights record and disagreements among the international community regarding the pace of sanctions relief also have the potential to cause problems in the negotiations.

Each of these factors has the capacity to stall or derail negotiations. Delays would give Kim the opportunity to further grow and develop his nuclear stockpile. Increases in North Korea’s nuclear capabilities would likely lead in turn to rising regional tensions and, in the worst-case scenario, war. In other words, failure to overcome the current impasse could make ever more remote the possibility of an agreement that would denuclearize North Korea and fundamentally transform the security environment in Northeast Asia.

The scope and objectives of this report

Given a potentially historic opportunity but myriad obstacles, how should the United States move ahead? This report identifies a path forward that is within the current U.S. strategy of negotiating with North Korea; would put North Korea on a path toward denuclearization by the end of 2019; and is in the United States’ interest regardless of North Korea’s true intentions.

A great deal of ink has been spilled questioning whether bilateral negotiations are prudent at this point. However, for the time being, President Trump appears committed to negotiating with North Korea. As such, the recommendations in this report aim to advance this process and increase the chances that negotiations lead to substantive denuclearization.

This report’s recommendations also identify potential steps that the United States could take within a limited time horizon (that is, before the end of 2019). The window of opportunity described above is real, but it is rapidly closing. Within the United States, skeptics of the negotiations contend that North Korea has not yet taken any meaningful steps toward denuclearization and demand that the next Trump-Kim summit, tentatively scheduled for early 2019, yield more concrete results than the Singapore summit. Public support for a diplomatic approach to North Korea is high in the United States, but it could
wane should substantial denuclearization steps not be forthcoming.\textsuperscript{7} In addition, the 2020 presidential election will likely divert attention away from a number of issues, including negotiations with North Korea.

Further afield, China and South Korea are eager to begin easing sanctions on North Korea, which would undermine the U.S.-led maximum pressure campaign that many credit with bringing North Korea to the negotiating table. In addition, an economic downturn in South Korea may dampen public enthusiasm for President Moon's engagement policy.\textsuperscript{8}

Given these constraints, this report provides a roadmap for negotiations over the next year, with the objective of putting North Korea on a path toward denuclearization before the window of opportunity closes. This approach aims to both capitalize on the current political momentum, as well as to lay a foundation for future negotiations that will necessarily be longer and more complex.

Finally, this report identifies steps that are in the United States’ interest regardless of the Kim regime’s willingness to denuclearize. As discussed below, North Korea’s true intentions are unknown. As a result, this report’s recommendations are not predicated on any particular North Korean strategy. Rather, they allow the United States to guard its own interests while continuing to negotiate in good faith. Should North Korea be willing to denuclearize, then the process, as recommended below, will build confidence and lay the foundation for a sustainable, long-term denuclearization process. Should North Korea be unwilling to denuclearize, then the recommendations of this report will allow the United States to preserve its options and reverse course should the need arise. In addition, the recommendations are structured to provide the United States with the opportunity to probe the regime’s true intentions.


The remainder of this report proceeds as follows:

- **What does North Korea want?** A discussion of the various interpretations of North Korea’s motivations and strategy
- **Regional dynamics:** A brief overview of the interests and current policies of the main regional actors
- **Recommendations:** Four concrete recommendations for the United States that can put U.S.-North Korea nuclear negotiations on the right track
Understanding North Korea's posture in negotiations—in particular, what its ultimate aims are—is critical to choosing the appropriate policy levers to achieve denuclearization. As outlined above, there has been an apparent shift in how Kim Jong Un approaches the goal of regime survival, which requires a renewed analysis of the government’s long-term objectives.

Irrespective of any shift in strategy, there is broad consensus that Kim’s foremost priority is preserving the current regime—that is, maintaining a sovereign state under the control of the Kim dynasty. All other objectives of the regime, such as nuclear armament and economic development, serve to fulfill that goal. However, there remain significant disagreements as to how North Korea is likely to balance competing priorities. In particular, there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the fundamental question in the current negotiations: is North Korea willing to give up its nuclear weapons program?

Considering the inherent uncertainty around the regime’s strategic calculus, the following presents the spectrum of prevailing views of North Korean interests on key subjects germane to the negotiations. This section does not attempt to divine Kim’s true intentions so much as to document that competing narratives and uncertainty exist.

**Nuclear capacity**

There are two primary opinions regarding how North Korea views its nuclear weapons program: as a means to an end or as an end in itself.

Those who believe that North Korea’s nuclear program is a means to an end argue that the Kim regime’s aim in acquiring nuclear weapons is to use those weapons as a bargaining chip to seek improved relations with hostile states. This interpretation of North Korea’s motivations maintains that Kim is willing to denuclearize in exchange for a fundamentally changed strategic relationship with the United States and concrete security assurances.

On the other hand, some argue that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is an end in itself and that the regime sees possession of nuclear weapons as essential to regime security. According to this view, Kim has no intention or incentive to denuclearize. Rather, he is using negotiations to extract concessions from the international community while buying time for further weapons development.
Missiles

North Korea increased missile testing throughout 2017, but there is little consensus regarding why. Some contend that North Korea sought to perfect its missile technology to strengthen its nuclear deterrent and demonstrate power domestically. Others believe that Kim’s decision to increase missile testing was aimed at the United States for one of two reasons. One possibility is that Kim hoped to capture U.S. attention and compel the United States to the negotiating table; another possibility is that Kim hoped to prove to the new administration the strength and advanced nature of his deterrent capacity.

Given the above, North Korea’s willingness to reduce its missile stockpile is unclear. North Korea has historically relied on missile technology exports as an important revenue source and

in past negotiations has demanded compensation for lost revenue. However, North Korea’s current, self-imposed freeze on missile testing and its dismantlement of a test site imply that Kim recognizes the salience of these issues and is ready to engage in talks.

**Peace declaration**

North Korea has publicly called for a peace declaration that would symbolically end the Korean War. It may be the case that a peace declaration is part of North Korea’s strategy to address the presence of U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula. Their presence is a legacy of the Korean War and the continued threat posed by North Korea and supports the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea alliances. As such, skeptics contend that North Korea, in seeking a peace declaration, hopes to build a case for removing U.S. troops from South Korea.

Alternatively, North Korea may simply desire improved bilateral relations with the United States and South Korea. According to this viewpoint, a peace declaration would be an important step toward reducing tension and building trust.

**U.S. troop presence**

How does North Korea view the approximately 28,000 U.S. troops in South Korea? The answer to this question depends on the regime’s perception of regional power dynamics. If the regime sees the presence of U.S. troops as a threat to its stability, it would seek troop withdrawal as part of any negotiations.

However, North Korea may consider the continued presence of U.S. troops on the peninsula as a check on Chinese power. China’s historical interference in North Korea and its expanded military activities might be seen as threats to the Kim regime’s sovereignty in the absence of U.S. troops. In this case, North Korea may prefer that U.S. troops remain on the Korean peninsula—provided that negotiations lead to a significantly improved U.S.-North Korea relationship.

**Economic development & sanctions**

To foster economic development, North Korea must, to some extent, integrate into the global economy for trade and bilateral investment. The main hindrance to this is the diverse and extensive set of sanctions currently placed on it by the United Nations, the United

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States, and South Korea. One of the regime’s top priorities is to receive sanctions relief in exchange for denuclearization steps.

According to experts on North Korea interviewed in Seoul, the Kim regime has several specific economic objectives. In the near term, the regime hopes to reopen and expand the Kaesong Industrial Complex, while resuming South Korean tours to Mount Kumgang and cultural exchanges. This would allow North Korea to earn foreign currency, as well as foster inter-Korean cooperation. North Korea also seeks immediate South Korean sanctions relief on maritime transportation. And finally, North Korea has emphatically demanded it receive at least some sanctions relief in the near-term, rather than as a delayed reward for denuclearization.

Aside from these immediate steps, North Korea’s medium- to long-term goals include complete sanctions removal; reparations from Japan for its 35-year occupation of the Korean peninsula; and foreign investment.

This section outlines the interests of the four most important regional actors to the conflict: South Korea, China, Japan and Russia. While this report focuses on the negotiations between the United States and North Korea, each of the four countries has an important stake in their outcome. While the short-term scope of this report inhibits a full incorporation of regional priorities into the recommendations, being cognizant of these dimensions is critical for the United States in developing a long-term strategy for the region.

**South Korea**

South Korea’s current government seeks to end enmity with North Korea. While it sees the nuclear threat as significant and favors denuclearization, South Korea’s geographic proximity also makes conventional, as well as biological and chemical weapons, important security concerns. South Korea also wants to reduce cross-border skirmishes, as demonstrated through its willingness to disarm the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom, while seeking the reduction of medium- and long-range missiles in the region.

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Moreover, South Korea sees moving quickly as critical. The current moment is a rare opportunity where the United States, South Korea, and North Korea are simultaneously willing to negotiate, while conservative domestic opposition is limited. South Korea is seeking to promote inter-Korean dialogue and economic integration alongside the denuclearization agenda to assure concrete change. To that end, South Korea appears willing to relax its unilateral sanctions against North

Caption: Kim Jong Un and South Korean President Moon Jae In shake hands at the DMZ to mark the signing of the Panmunjom Declaration. Image Credit: mainichi.jp
Korea while also supporting a peace declaration symbolically ending the Korean War. These steps are seen as both directly reducing the threat from North Korea, while also serving as important confidence-building measures in the negotiations.

**China**

China’s main goal is stability on the Korean peninsula. It wants North Korea to exist to maintain the buffer between it and the U.S. troops in South Korea. China also fears the negative impact on Chinese domestic cohesion of any destabilization of North Korea (such as through an influx of refugees). However, China also supports denuclearization, given it would lessen the threat of a U.S. attack, while also limiting the likelihood that South Korea and Japan would seek to acquire nuclear weapons.

While China has broadly enforced the UN sanctions regime, it wants the United States to begin to ease sanctions in response to North Korean concessions (e.g. stopping missile and nuclear tests) and to address North Korea’s underlying insecurity. To that end, China also supports a peace declaration, steps towards political normalization, and reducing military tension.

**Japan**

Interviews with former government officials and academics familiar with the current Abe administration revealed that Japan’s primary goal is regional stability and guarding against a rising China. While Japan felt it was blindsided by the “Trump shock”—President Trump’s accepting a summit with Kim—it is cautiously supportive of the negotiations to the extent to which they ease regional tensions. Japanese officials expressed their strong desire for full denuclearization as the only acceptable outcome of this process. They noted their belief that their homeland—specifically U.S. bases on Honshu—would be North Korea’s primary target in a first-strike scenario. In a point of potential divergence from the United States, Japan also views North Korean conventional weapons as a serious threat and will push for any final deal to include all such missiles.

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22 Japan’s core policy relative to North Korea is commonly formulated as seeking “a resolution of the abduction,
Japan views a peace declaration as a major U.S. concession that should be reserved until North Korea takes concrete steps that reduce the nuclear threat. It was suggested that if a peace declaration is delivered, Japan would likely seek reaffirmation of the Japan-U.S. alliance and assurance that it remained under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella.” Finally, Prime Minister Abe has built his political career on addressing the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea, and achieving some sort of resolution to the abductee issue is likely to be a prerequisite for the eventual disbursement of reparations to North Korea.

Russia

Russia’s primary interest in rapprochement with North Korea is economic, specifically increasing its exports of the vast energy reserves of Russian Siberia and the Far East to the high demand markets of East Asia. Similarly to China, Russia has supported the UN sanctions regime but does not want long-term North Korean isolation given its future trading potential. It is supportive of inter-Korean peace as well as denuclearization since it would promote stability and provide less justification for a U.S. security presence in the region.

If the United States, North Korea, and a majority of regional actors support nuclear negotiations, then why does the process appear to have stalled? The answer is that the United States and North Korea are at odds regarding the sequencing of negotiations and the extent to which steps taken by one side deserve a corresponding concession from the other.

**Sequencing**

The overarching disagreement between the United States and North Korea is over the sequencing of the denuclearization process. The U.S. position is that North Korea must first take concrete steps toward denuclearization, such as providing an inventory of its nuclear program, allowing inspections of production sites, and/or dismantling these facilities. Only then, the United States argues, will the international community be able to trust that North Korea is committed to denuclearization. Providing sanctions relief, economic aid, security assurances, and signing a peace declaration before North Korea has taken any such steps would reward North Korea for mainly symbolic actions.27

North Korea, on the other hand, insists that it will not proceed with denuclearization unless each North Korean action is met with a corresponding U.S. action. Minister of Foreign Affairs Ri Yong-Ho alluded to this during his speech at the General Assembly of the United Nations when he said successful denuclearization will occur “under the principle of simultaneous actions, step by step... giving priority to trust-building.”28 This position is consistent with North Korea’s position in past negotiations: the country has always pushed for an action-for-action, reciprocal approach to negotiations, rather than acquiescing to demands that it make concessions up front and settle for delayed gratification.

Furthermore, North Korea argues that some steps that the United States is holding out as “rewards” for denuclearization, particularly a peace declaration and sanctions relief, are in fact necessary preconditions for successful negotiations.29 According to North Korea, given the United States’ longstanding “hostile policy,” the United States is responsible for making North Korea feel secure enough to denuclearize.30

27  U.S. government officials interviewed have defined “symbolic steps” as those that do not reduce the nuclear threat, but ostensibly demonstrate good will from North Korea.
Disagreements regarding specific steps in the process

At a more granular level, disagreements regarding the timing and sequencing of several key steps have stalled the negotiations. The most significant of these include declarations detailing North Korea’s nuclear program, sanctions relief, and a peace declaration.

Nuclear declarations

Throughout 2018, the United States called on North Korea to provide a comprehensive inventory of its nuclear program, including all sites related to fissile materials, nuclear warheads, and their delivery vehicles. The Trump administration maintained that a declaration would signal North Korea’s commitment to denuclearization and allow negotiators to hammer out agreements regarding inspections, dismantlement, and verification.

North Korea, however, is reluctant to provide a full nuclear declaration up front. Kim has reportedly said that he fears that providing a full declaration at this stage—that is, before the two sides have built the requisite amount of trust—would essentially provide the United States with a target list.31

According to some experts, North Korea also worries that even a list provided in good faith may not satisfy the international community. A list may be incomplete due to human error or perceived as incomplete by actors who do not trust North Korea.32 In either case, disputes over a nuclear declaration could very well derail negotiations.33 (Of course, skeptics contend that North Korea is reluctant to provide an inventory of its nuclear program not because of security or process concerns, but rather because Kim has no interest in denuclearizing.)

In November 2018, the Trump administration dropped its demand that North Korea provide a full declaration prior to the next summit meeting between Trump and Kim, but Vice President Mike Pence warned that “it will be absolutely imperative in this next summit that we come away with

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a plan for identifying all of the weapons in question, identifying all the development sites..."\(^{34}\) In other words, the Trump administration appears to have kicked the can down the road rather than changed its position.

**Sanctions relief**

As mentioned above, the United States has refused to offer meaningful sanctions relief until North Korea makes significant progress on denuclearization. This position is consistent with the Trump administration’s belief that international sanctions were key in bringing North Korea to the negotiating table. Letting up pressure now, the argument goes, would surrender leverage that is necessary to lock North Korea into a denuclearization process.\(^{35}\)

Unsurprisingly, North Korea rejects this assessment and has adamantly maintained that it will not respond to sanctions-related pressure. North Korea’s calls for sanctions relief have grown increasingly strident in recent months.\(^{36}\) In November 2018, several North Korean statements warned that North Korea may return to its *byungjin* policy of concurrent nuclear and economic development should the United States refuse to consider sanctions relief and/or a reciprocal approach to negotiations.\(^{37}\)

**Peace declaration**

Finally, a peace declaration formally ending the Korean war has become a sticking point. Although President Trump reportedly promised Kim that he was willing to sign a peace declaration, the Trump administration appeared to backtrack in the months following the summit.\(^{38}\) As with sanctions relief, the United States’ official position is that a peace declaration is a significant concession that should not be awarded until North Korea proves its commitment to denuclearization.\(^{39}\)

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North Korea has stated that the first two of the four points in the Singapore summit’s joint statement refer to establishing a new bilateral relationship and building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula—objectives, the North Koreans claim, that can only be achieved by first declaring an end to the war.⁴⁰

While the impediments to progress outlined above are substantial, they are not insuperable. If the United States adjusts its policy, substantial progress toward denuclearization by the end of President Trump’s first term is possible.

This report makes four concrete recommendations that can put U.S.-North Korea nuclear negotiations on the right track. The first two recommendations address the United States’ overall approach to negotiations. First, the United States should adopt a reciprocal, action-for-action approach to negotiating with North Korea that confers concessions in exchange for corresponding steps on denuclearization. Second, the negotiations should be guided by principles, discussed in detail below, that are based on lessons from past negotiations and aim to limit ambiguity and create a sustainable process.

Given the rapidly closing window of opportunity discussed above, the third and fourth recommendations provide a roadmap for the next year of negotiations. Specifically, the third recommendation outlines options for a written agreement to be reached at the tentatively planned early 2019 summit. The fourth recommendation identifies options that may be included in a written agreement finalized by the end of 2019. The steps identified in these two recommendations are incremental and limited to allow the two sides to build confidence while still requiring North Korea to take substantive steps toward denuclearization.

**Recommendation 1: The United States should adopt a reciprocal, action-for-action approach to negotiating with North Korea that confers concessions in exchange for corresponding steps on denuclearization**

The current U.S. stance—that North Korea must take substantial steps toward denuclearization before the United States makes concessions—is unlikely to succeed. As a result, the United States should adopt a negotiating approach that involves linking incremental steps toward denuclearization with benefits to North Korea and proceeding in a phased fashion. Referred to here as the “reciprocal approach,” this method would build confidence and trust in the process, thus helping to manage risk as the process moves forward.

Historically, North Korea has not responded to ultimatums or pressure once nuclear negotiations have begun. True to form, since the Singapore summit, North Korea has rejected demands that it take significant steps toward denuclearization prior to receiving any benefits. Instead, North
Korea’s negotiating position has been that each step taken toward denuclearization must be met with a corresponding step from its negotiating partners.

Past negotiations demonstrate that North Korea does respond to negotiations conducted in this manner. The 1994 Agreed Framework, the longest-lasting agreement regarding North Korea’s nuclear program, embodied a reciprocal approach by laying out North Korean and U.S. commitments in advance. In the Agreed Framework, which was implemented step-by-step, North Korea agreed to freeze and dismantle its plutonium production program in exchange for improved political and economic relations, as well as economic and energy assistance.\(^{41}\) Pressure from the United States and other parties, on the other hand, has backfired in numerous instances, leading North Korea to either pull out of talks or resort to provocations. For example, at the end of the Six Party talks in 2009, North Korea withdrew from negotiations after Japan and South Korea issued an ultimatum regarding verification methods.\(^{42}\) Most recently, North Korea increased its missile testing and military provocations throughout the Obama administration’s policy of pressure without negotiations.

North Korea’s rationale for insisting on action-for-action is a subject of debate. North Korea maintains that it has legitimate fears regarding the United States’ denuclearization-up-front approach. These include North Korea’s belief that nuclear declarations would amount to a target list, as well as the possibility that the United States will renege on its commitments regarding sanctions relief and improved bilateral relations. In the absence of trust, North Korea may have valid misgivings about giving up a current or future nuclear deterrent too early in the process. Other possible explanations for North Korea’s insistence on a reciprocal approach include Kim’s desire to be treated as a legitimate member of the international community, as well as his need for vindication in the eyes of North Koreans.

On the other hand, some observers argue that North Korea’s recalcitrance stems from Kim’s intent not to denuclearize. In advocating a reciprocal approach to negotiations, Kim hopes to extract as many concessions and benefits as possible at the beginning of the process. Having done so, Kim will continue to produce fissile material for warheads at Yongbyon and other sites, either openly or secretly. In other words, adopting a reciprocal approach, which would entail providing benefits in exchange for steps less than complete denuclearization, would play into Kim’s hands.


Regardless of Kim’s rationale, North Korea’s historic stubbornness in the face of ultimatums and pressure, combined with its defiant current posture, provides strong evidence that Kim will not yield to U.S. demands for upfront denuclearization. In fact, even assuming that North Korea is susceptible to pressure, the United States is poised to lose leverage as linchpins of the maximum pressure campaign turn towards engagement. South Korea’s inter-Korean process is moving along at a rapid pace, and both South Korea and China are eager to relieve sanctions. The United States can choose to relieve pressure on its own terms—that is, as part of a reciprocal approach in which it shapes the pace and extent of benefits given to North Korea—or it can stand by and watch the sanctions regime unravel.

As a result, the United States should adopt a reciprocal approach to negotiations. Even in the worst-case scenario—one in which North Korea has no intention of denuclearizing and eventually reneges on its commitments—a reciprocal approach would be preferable to the status quo. Conferring some benefits to North Korea does not necessarily entail giving something for nothing; the United States can still require substantive steps related to denuclearization early in the process. Production freezes and a shutdown and dismantlement of Yongbyon, even if not permanent, would be an improvement over North Korea’s current unfettered ability to produce fissile material.

Recommendation 2: The United States should abide by three principles throughout the negotiation process

While adopting a reciprocal approach is critical in pushing North Korea towards denuclearization, such a strategy must be informed by the lessons of past negotiations. Particularly given the experience of the North Korean negotiating team,

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incorporating the following three principles will aid the United States in finalizing an agreement that maximizes the chances of success.

1) Any production freeze must be verifiable

Building trust is essential to any long-term negotiation process, but especially one taking place in the context of a relationship fraught with longstanding perceived (and actual) reneging on past deals. As such, any hint of not abiding by a given agreement is treated especially harshly by hardliners on both sides. This is especially relevant regarding agreements on freezes on fissile material or weapons production that cannot be verified and are therefore particularly vulnerable to misinterpretation. Therefore, a general principle of the upcoming negotiations should be for the United States to only push for freezes on aspects of North Korea’s nuclear program that can be confidently verified.

While aiming for a “comprehensive” freeze might be naturally appealing, the superior strategy is to adopt a phased approach whereby limited freezes are first agreed to and then are expanded over time. As confidence builds and access to more sensitive facilities is allowed, the corresponding freezes in North Korea can be expanded. (Sensitive facilities would include military sites, production facilities, and test sites that the U.S. intelligence community may be unaware of.)

As argued further below, a freeze on plutonium production and on uranium enrichment at Yongbyon is a good first step, as there is historical precedent for such an agreement being fully verified within several months. Continuing further into negotiations in this vein—aiming to agree only to verifiable freezes—will provide the best avenue for trust-building and limit the likelihood of misperception.

2) Make clearly defined commitments

This principle builds off the necessity of building confidence in the process and limiting the scope for disagreements over the implementation of any agreement. North Korea has historically considered itself bound only to that to which
it agrees in writing. A good example of this was the 2012 Leap Day Deal, which did not yield a joint written statement explicitly specifying that the agreed-to moratorium on missile testing extended to satellite launches. According to interviews, when North Korea subsequently launched a satellite, it argued it was not in contravention of the agreement, even though the United States had warned that a satellite launch would be a deal-breaker. The lack of specific language in the agreement could have been an important cause of renewed mistrust between the two parties.44

A similar dynamic is occurring over the Singapore summit statement. North Korea is arguing that the United States is not living up to its promise of building “new relations” given the U.S. insistence on maintaining sanctions until denuclearization. While it is important to set out aspirational goals, the United States should attempt to avoid language that allows for multiple interpretations and thus divergent perceptions about adherence to an agreement. Such an outcome ultimately benefits neither side.

3) Move quickly to lock in progress

As has been outlined, the current moment is a propitious one for fruitful negotiations with North Korea. Not only do the presidents of both South Korea and the United States support the process (with limited domestic opposition), but each of the key regional actors—Japan, China and Russia—are in favor of the overriding U.S. objective of North Korean denuclearization. This same set of facts also underscores the urgency of making progress quickly.

For one, the current period of muted domestic opposition is unlikely to last. The incoming Democratic majority in the House of Representatives may not be eager to facilitate a “win” by President Trump, while members of both parties are increasingly looking for more substantive actions from North Korea.45 Congressional action will be necessary to implement potential future concessions to North Korea, particularly sanctions relief and economic assistance.46 An increase in domestic opposition might inhibit the United States from delivering on promises. This occurred during the implementation of the Agreed Framework: congressional opposition led to delays in delivering energy aid to North Korea, fostering distrust between the two countries.47

44 Additionally, there was no agreed upon texts, and both sides issued slightly different versions of the deal via press statements. For more information, see; Sigal, L. (2016). What Have Twenty-Five Years of Nuclear Diplomacy Achieved?. Center for Korean Legal Studies. Retrieved from https://www.ssrc.org/publications/view/0E66A31F-7741-E711-80C5-005056AB0BD9
In South Korea, President Moon initially enjoyed an extended “honeymoon” phase of high public approval for his actions on North Korea, while also benefiting from a weak conservative opposition. However, the current impasse in negotiations combined with a weakening economy suggests that public favor toward Moon’s approach could soon dissipate. Historically, the South Korean public has had little tolerance for provocations from the North (such as the shooting of a South Korean tourist at Mount Kumgang in 2008). Similarly, hints of a divide between South Korea and the United States further weaken public support for the Moon administration’s North Korea policy. To ensure domestic support for Moon’s negotiating position, tangible progress is needed soon.

Moreover, locking in progress before any potential change in administration is paramount. In particular, the parties should ensure there is sufficient time for implementation of major steps in an agreement before key U.S. and South Korean negotiators change. An agreement will be harder to reverse by a subsequent government if concrete steps have already been enacted, and not simply agreed to. Moreover, successful implementation (rather than

Caption: The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea
Image credit: Xiquinosilva via Flickr (2012), CC-Sharealike

the agreement itself) is what builds confidence in the process, which should further push
the parties to allow space for sufficient follow-through before any potential change in
government.

**RECOMMENDATION 3:** At the next Trump-Kim summit
meeting, the United States and North Korea should
commit to substantive steps toward denuclearization
and corresponding U.S. steps to decrease hostility

The United States and North Korea are reportedly working to determine the details of a
second Trump-Kim summit, to take place in early 2019. At their next summit meeting,
Trump and Kim should commit to taking substantive steps toward denuclearization while
recognizing that confidence building is paramount. To build confidence in the process,
the deliverables agreed to at the summit should be limited in scope and relatively easy to
implement within a year. Specifically, the United States should seek that North Korea take
some significant steps to limit fissile material production while offering corresponding
measures in return. The two leaders should also commit to completing a more extensive
agreement by the end of 2019.

The following are several options that each side could commit to taking in the months after
the summit. It is important to keep in mind that the give-and-take of a reciprocal approach
means that it is impossible to determine in advance which steps will be palatable to each
side at any given point. As such, this list is meant to serve as a menu of options from which
negotiators could draw prior to and during the summit in early 2019. Through negotiations,
each side will need to probe what the other side sees as corresponding measures. For
example, some options discussed in the fourth recommendation may be offered at the early
2019 summit.

**Options for the United States**

At the next summit, the United States could offer to commit to taking the following steps:

**a) A peace declaration**

The United States could commit to concluding a peace declaration within several months
of the summit. Such a declaration, which would be negotiated by the United States, North
Korea, and South Korea, would include a declaration of the end of the Korean War, military
certainty-building measures, and provisions addressing an eventual treaty.

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50 Chavez, N. (2018, December 03). President Trump says next meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un
likely in early 2019. CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/02/politics/trump-kim-jong-un-meeting-
summit/index.html
By committing to negotiating a peace declaration early in the process, the United States would signal that it understands and is responsive to North Korea’s priorities, which include securing assurances of non-hostile intent from the United States. However, it is worth noting that declaring an end to the Korean War would not necessarily require that the United States make any immediate changes to troop levels in South Korea. In short, a peace declaration would represent a concession that is meaningful to North Korea but nonetheless preserves U.S. autonomy.

**b) Scale back future military exercises**

In November 2018, then-Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis announced that a large-scale joint U.S.-South Korea military exercise scheduled for spring 2019 would be “reduced in scope” in order to “to keep it at a level that will not be harmful to diplomacy.” The announcement follows several suspensions of military exercises throughout 2018.

To reduce the perception of hostility, the United States could commit to scaling back future military exercises, with the option to suspend exercises depending on progress in nuclear negotiations. Specific commitments could include limiting the number of troops involved in ground exercises; defining a stand-off distance from the Northern Limit Line for maritime exercises; or no overflights of the Korean peninsula with strategic air assets.

As with a peace declaration, continued scaling back of military exercises would signal U.S. responsiveness to oft-vocalized North Korean concerns, in this case regarding military exercises. While these commitments are easily reversible and would have little impact on U.S.-South Korea military readiness, they would demonstrate a commitment to confidence-building steps and reducing tension early in the process.

**c) Allow resumption of humanitarian assistance**

In recent months, the State Department has prevented American humanitarian workers from traveling to North Korea, and concerns have arisen regarding the Treasury Department’s stepped-up enforcement of UN sanctions, which has rendered provision of humanitarian assistance to North Korea virtually impossible.

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The United States should once again issue humanitarian exemptions to allow U.S. citizens to travel to North Korea and should streamline the licensing process for humanitarian organizations. Effectively prohibiting U.S. groups from providing assistance to North Korea unnecessarily politicizes humanitarian assistance, harms North Korea’s most vulnerable citizens, and undermines efforts to construct a new, more productive relationship with North Korea.

**Asks of North Korea**

At the next summit, the United States should seek commitments from North Korea to take one or more of the following steps:

**a) An immediate freeze of fissile material production as well as uranium milling and mining, to be verified by inspectors within 90 days of shutdown**

A crucial first step in the denuclearization process is halting North Korea’s known fissile material production. As a result, the United States should seek an immediate freeze of fissile material production at Yongbyon. In addition, recent press and intelligence reports have indicated the likely existence of a covert enrichment site. U.S. negotiators should press North Korea to disclose and include this site in the production freeze.

Kim has offered to dismantle the Yongbyon complex. However, negotiating the second site’s inclusion in an immediate freeze will be more difficult due to North Korea’s lack of public acknowledgement of the site’s existence. As a result, U.S. diplomats should pursue the second site’s inclusion but be prepared to address a freeze at that site at a later date.

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In addition to shutting down Yongbyon (and potentially the second production site), the United States should seek a freeze on uranium mining and milling at Pyongsan and other known uranium mining/milling sites. This will prevent North Korea from acquiring raw materials for further production of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons and will cap its uranium stockpile at current levels. This freeze could be verified to a first approximation unilaterally via U.S. satellite capabilities.

In the context of the Agreed Framework, the agreement mandated that the freeze on operations and construction of North Korea’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities would be fully implemented within a month, with IAEA monitoring throughout the period. Thus, there is precedent for asking for on-site inspection access at Yongbyon. Allowing verification by U.S. inspectors would be a credible signal that North Korea is genuinely interested in pursuing denuclearization, as well as its commitment to fulfilling corresponding steps desired by the United States.

For the second enrichment site and uranium mining and milling facilities, it will be more difficult for the United States to secure on-site access due to lack of precedent for North Korean acceptance of a wider scope of inspections. However, the United States should not interpret this reluctance as necessarily signaling that North Korea is backtracking on its stated commitment to denuclearization, but rather consider that these decisions may be driven by valid security concerns.

**b) Written commitment to continue moratorium on nuclear and missile testing**

North Korea should reaffirm, in writing, that it will continue its moratorium on nuclear and missile testing. Given that in past negotiations North Korea has only felt bound to what it agreed to in writing, it is especially important to achieve a written commitment to a testing moratorium. The cessation of nuclear and missile testing has been a key factor in reducing tensions. Locking North Korea into the moratorium would build confidence in the process and help keep tensions low as negotiations proceed. Even if negotiations took a turn for the worse, a written commitment not to carry out nuclear and missile tests could preclude North Korea from doing so and, in turn, preserve the option to return to negotiations.

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North Korea could commit to disabling the Yongbyon fissile material production facilities by the end of 2019. North Korea has offered “permanent dismantlement of its main Yongbyon nuclear facility,” which has been understood to mean its 5 MWe reactor. However, dismantlement is undesirable because it is in the United States’ interest to take samples from the centrifuge facility, the reactors and the reprocessing plant before their dismantlement.59


Source: The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), updated as of September 2017

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FORGING A PATH FORWARD WITH NORTH KOREA
Immediate dismantlement of Yongbyon would eliminate an opportunity for the United States to check future declarations. Leveraging nuclear archaeology techniques, the United States can bound the uncertainty around how much fissile material North Korea has produced at the site. Disablement, on the other hand, would restrict fissile material production while allowing critical analysis to take place.

In an effort to make quick progress, North Korea could commit to disablement actions at its main Yongbyon fissile material production facilities by the end of 2019. Disablement would make it difficult—although not impossible—to restart fissile material production. Disablement would include the removal and storage of major components at the fuel fabrication facility, the 5 MWe reactor, the reprocessing facility and the enrichment facility. Following the storage of these components and materials, monitoring would be conducted by IAEA and U.S. inspectors.

It should be noted that the current offer to dismantle Yongbyon does not include its experimental light-water reactor (ELWR), so it should not be assumed that an agreement to disablement would include the ELWR. As such, it is important to clearly define the parameters for the ELWR’s further construction and potential operation, particularly with respect to fuel supply. One option is to follow past examples and require a third party to provide the fuel for the reactor so that North Korea does not have a reason to keep enrichment capacity, as well as export the spent fuel so that they are not tempted to separate their plutonium.

d) Dismantlement of centrifuges at the end of 2019

As a constructive step toward demonstrating their commitment to the eventual full dismantlement of Yongbyon, North Korea could begin by dismantling centrifuges at Yongbyon. Inspectors who are monitoring disablement steps would oversee and verify the dismantlement of centrifuges at Yongbyon.

Recommendation 4: By the end of 2019, reach an agreement that will outline significant long-term steps towards denuclearization and a normalization of the U.S.-North Korean relationship

By the end of 2019, a written long-term agreement should be reached between the United States and North Korea, outlining concrete actions each side will take towards denuclearization and normalization of relations. While longer-term in scope, it would

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continue to emphasize short-term steps that are significant in measure to ensure continued confidence building. As discussed earlier, abiding by this timeframe is important to allow implementation to occur before possible changes in government in the United States and South Korea.

Below are options that both sides could commit to in such an agreement. As with the prior agreement, this is meant to serve as a menu of options given the uncertainty around what each side perceives as corresponding measures.

**Options for the United States**

*a)* Publicly endorse the rollback of unilateral South Korean sanctions that exceed the UN sanctions level

Some sanctions easing at this stage would be critical for North Korea to feel it is receiving some form of compensation for its concessions. Given the current posture of the South Korean government, South Korean sanctions are likely the best candidate since they could be fairly easily re-imposed (unlike the UN sanctions regime) and because the political cost of doing so is lower (versus the United States, where the public would likely be less supportive). Easing such sanctions would have the added benefit of deepening inter-Korean ties, which could have important direct consequences, such as resuming separated family visits, while also furthering trust, making the possibility of returning to hostility more remote.

*b)* Take initial political normalization steps

This might entail establishing liaison offices within North Korea, starting educational exchanges, and fully lifting the travel ban on U.S. citizens travelling to North Korea. The ultimate normalization of relations is important to North Korea, and such steps would foster trust and more communication between the two sides.

*c)* Begin to ease U.S. unilateral sanctions

While the United States should maintain economic pressure on North Korea until more concrete denuclearization activity occurs, lifting some symbolic sanctions would still represent an important U.S. concession and should be considered at this stage. While unilateral U.S. sanctions do little direct harm to the North Korean economy (given the previously low level of trade between the two) they still represent U.S. hostility and thus are a good candidate for removal. However, doing so might entail a significant political cost. As such, sanctions that are solely the prerogative of the executive would be easiest to lift.

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Asks of North Korea

a) Agreement on how to approach declaration of nuclear and missile programs

Full, location-specific declarations of weapons and fissile material are a long-term objective. Below, we outline a phased approach to declarations consisting of four primary components:

- Identify sites necessary to conduct nuclear archaeology for reconstructing historic production of plutonium and enriched uranium, and other aspects of the nuclear program.63
- Plan to identify the remainder of fissile material and warhead and missile development and production sites (that is, those that have not yet been identified during the first summit) and to inspect such sites
- Declare total stocks of plutonium and HEU, including material contained in the current warhead stockpile and that were consumed in previous nuclear tests
- Agreement to make future plans regarding dismantlement of enrichment and missile production and deployment sites.

This approach is a substitute for an up-front and complete declaration of all materials, weapons, and sites. With nuclear archaeology, it is possible to establish an approximate upper limit on the uncertainty about the amount of fissile material North Korea has produced historically. In the longer term, subsequent phased declarations of warheads and verified elimination of materials can be checked against this estimate. This phased declaration approach, which begins with the source materials for the fissile material production process, would contribute to the overall confidence regarding the accuracy of North Korea’s full declaration. Throughout this process, some of the freezes, such as halts to uranium mining and operation of the uranium mines and mills, could be verified via imaging satellites.

b) Dismantlement at Yongbyon

Agreeing to dismantle Yongbyon would be another important step, but any such measure could only be taken after the disablement process (as described above) and nuclear archaeology efforts conclude.64 After the United States has had the opportunity to conduct

64 Current nuclear archaeological methods allow for making measurement-based estimates of historic plutonium production have both high prospective accuracy and technical feasibility, with overall uncertainty levels as low as 1%. In addition, nuclear archaeology could be applied to stored depleted and reprocessed uranium. Wood, T. W., Reid, B. D., Toomey, C. M., Krishnaswami, K., Burns, K. A., Casazza, L. O., Daly, D. S., & Duckworth, L. L. (2014). The Future of Nuclear Archaeology: Reducing Legacy Risks of Weapons Fissile Material.
nuclear archaeology and environmental sampling, the dismantlement process of Yongbyon could begin. This process could culminate in the pouring of concrete in the reactor and reprocessing facilities, which would make it more difficult to reconstitute fissile material production capacity without detection.

**c) Production halt on medium-range, intermediate-range, and long-range, intercontinental ballistic missiles and verification procedures**

To address the direct threat of North Korea’s nuclear program, an end of 2019 deal should include a missile production halt and a non-location specific inventory declaration. This halt should specifically define the two components of greatest concern: nuclear warheads and delivery systems for medium-range, intermediate-range, long-range, and intercontinental ballistic missiles. These production halts should be verified by U.S. inspectors.

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**Source:** The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), updated as of September 2018
It is unknown to what extent North Korea maintains an indigenous delivery system production capability. Due to this uncertainty, a commitment from the Kim regime to halt production is necessary. If North Korea does have the capability, this may be a difficult concession to receive because these systems are not necessarily linked to nuclear-only warheads. If it does not have the capability, this could represent an “easier” concession and a tangible “win” for U.S. negotiators.

Finally, getting a better understanding of the current inventory will help planners understand North Korea’s capability to “reach out and touch” others. A numbers only declaration of warheads and nuclear delivery systems, both produced and tested, is important for understanding North Korea’s current capability and bound uncertainty regarding fissile material production.
The above recommendations represent a realistic, concrete, short-term strategy for the United States. They are anchored in the concept of a reciprocal approach: commensurate U.S. steps should occur in tandem with those by North Korea. They draw on lessons of past negotiations, namely that the United States should pursue short-term specific commitments that can be confidently verified. Such a strategy would induce confidence from both parties, allowing for more substantial action to be taken in the future.

While the recommendations outline several possible U.S. concessions, there are numerous other options that can be considered. For instance, U.S. food aid was offered as part of the Leap Day Deal, as was energy assistance in both the Agreed Framework and the Six Party Talks. Related offers could be expanded upon in future negotiations, say, through the promotion of energy grid integration, which would provide economic benefits throughout the region. North Korea’s human rights record will likely persist as an important issue, and progress on it might be the clearest signal possible of a truly new approach towards the world by Kim Jong Un.

These are a few of the many unresolved issues that will remain even if the above recommendations are fully implemented. Despite these challenges, adopting a reciprocal approach, while abiding by the three principles, will ensure a strong U.S.-North Korean relationship, and offer the best opportunity for the United States to achieve its goal of denuclearizing North Korea.
History of Negotiations

Korean Armistice Agreement
July 1953
Ends open hostility and establishes the DMZ

Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
Jan 1992
SK and NK agree not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons

Six Party Talks Joint Statement
Sept 2005
US-SK-Japan-NK-China-Russia
NK commits to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and return to the NPT

Panmunjom Declaration
April 2018
SK-NK
Confirms the common goal of realizing through complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

Pyongyang Joint Declaration
June 2018
SK-NK
NK commits to dismantle Dongchang-ri

North Korea signs Nuclear Proliferation Treaty
Dec 1985
NK subsequently withdraws from NPT in Jan 2003

Agreed Framework
Oct 1994
US-NK
NK agreed to freeze and ultimate dismantlement of nuclear reactors in exchange for two light water reactors and heavy fuel oil shipments

Leap Day Deal
Feb 2012
US-NK
NK agrees to implement a moratorium on long-range missile launches, nuclear tests, and nuclear activities at Yongbyon

Singapore Summit
June 2018
US-NK
NK agrees to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Field Interviews

Members of Organizations in China
- BBC
- Tsinghua University
- Fudan University
- U.S. Embassy in Beijing
- China Academy of Engineering Physics
- Chinese Arms Control and Disarmament Association
- New York Times
- Peking University

Members of Organizations in Japan
- Keio University
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
- Kyodo News
- Institute for International Study of the Japan Research Institute
- Takushoku University
- United States Embassy in Tokyo
- Kanda University of International Studies

Members of Organizations in South Korea
- Handong University
- New York Times
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea
- Institute for Far Eastern Studies
- Science & Technology Policy Institute
- Korea Transport Institute
- Nuclear Safety and Security Commission
- Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control
- Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute
- Kyunghee University
- Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security
Workshop Participant Biographies

Students

**Lindsey Andersen** is a Master in Public Affairs student focused on the intersection of technology policy, international relations, and human rights. Prior to starting graduate school, she worked on technology-related projects at the D.C.-based organization Internews, and on Latin America projects at Freedom House. She also received a Fulbright research fellowship in Brazil where she focused on transitional justice movements. She received her BA in International Studies and Political Science from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.

**Logan Coleman** is a Master in Public Affairs student focused on international relations. From 2016 to 2018, Logan served the U.S. Department of State in several offices as a fellow in the Scholars in the Nation’s Service Initiative program. She worked at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations on Security Council portfolios, including human rights in North Korea. She also served in the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration working on the U.S. response to the crisis in Venezuela. Most recently, Logan served as Assistant Regional Refugee Coordinator at U.S. Embassy Bogota, managing the U.S. response to Venezuelan migrants and refugees throughout Latin America. She received her bachelor’s degree in Politics and Latin American studies from Princeton in 2015.

**Harrison Diamond Pollock** is a second-year Master in Public Affairs student, born and raised in Montreal, Canada. Before coming to Princeton, he worked for five years in Uganda, Kenya and the U.S. with Innovations for Poverty Action. Harrison’s work spanned from helping to promote open data and research transparency to managing evaluations of election debates, anti-vote buying campaigns and vaccination tracking apps. He has also interned with GiveDirectly and volunteered extensively with Engineers without Borders Canada.

**John Falcone**, a Master in Public Affairs student, currently serves as a surface warfare officer in the United States Navy. After graduating from Yale University in 2011, he became an investment banker in Barclays Capital’s Financial Institutions Group. John earned his commission as a Naval officer in 2013. He has deployed to the Mediterranean Sea, Horn of Africa and Western Pacific onboard the USS GONZALEZ (DDG 66) and the USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) in support of the Global War on Terror, Freedom of Navigation Operations, and Ballistic Missile Defense. As a U.S. Navy Fleet Scholar Education Program fellow, John will return to an operational sea-going command after his studies at Princeton.
Elijah Kimani is a second-year Master in Public Affairs student focused on economics and public policy. He is a former employee of the International Monetary Fund in Washington, D.C., where he conducted research on fiscal policy and was involved in the publication of several books and IMF working papers and in supporting missions across Africa. He has previously worked for J.P. Morgan and Morgan Stanley in New York City and the Australian Stock Report in Melbourne, Australia. Elijah attended Drexel University where he graduated with a B.A. in mathematics and a B.S. in economics.

Geesu Lee is a Master of Public Affairs student focused on international relations. Prior to entering the Woodrow Wilson School, he served in the Republic of Korea Army and was deployed to Lebanon for UN peacekeeping operations. After his military career, Geesu interned at the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Geesu received his undergraduate degree in economics from Middlebury College.

Anne Ressler is a Master in Public Affairs student focused on energy policy issues. Prior to graduate school, Anne worked at the Science and Technology Policy Institute (STPI), a federally funded research center that supports the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. Her work at STPI focused on critical infrastructure security and resilience, and federal efforts to monitor and characterize methane emissions. Most recently, Anne worked as a graduate intern in the Department of Energy’s Office of Policy, analyzing federal programs that help electricity sector stakeholders improve their hurricane resilience. She has prior experience interning with the U.S. Department of State in the economic section of the Berlin Embassy. Anne received her undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering from Dartmouth College.

Macklin Scheldrup is a second-year Master in Public Affairs student focused on international relations and conflict. Before studying at Princeton, Macklin lived in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While working for monitoring and evaluation firms conducting research for aid agencies and NGOs including USAID, the Department of State, DFID, Oxfam and the Asia Foundation. There he worked on a variety of topics, particularly implementing quantitative and quasi-experimental empirical approaches to conflict and stabilization research. This past summer, he was a graduate fellow at USAID’s Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs. Macklin received his B.A. in international affairs and political science from the University of Colorado-Boulder.

Ana Sorrentino is a second-year Master in Public Affairs student focused on international relations. Prior to studying at Princeton, she worked on foreign policy and international trade issues in the U.S. House of Representatives. During the summer of 2018, she worked as a Research
Assistant in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service. She has also worked on U.S.-Latin America relations at the Washington Office on Latin America, an international human rights organization. She received a BA in political science and Latin American studies from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Henrietta Toivanen is a second-year Ph.D. student at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, with a concentration on Science, Technology, and Environmental Policy (STEP). Her research focuses particularly on nuclear arms control, non- and counterproliferation, and other nuclear policy issues, but she is also more broadly interested in security and foreign policy issues related to science and technology. The cases she has focused on most include historical U.S.-Soviet/Russian arms control engagement, nonproliferation negotiations with Iran, and discussions with North Korea over its nuclear program.

Faculty Advisors

Dr. Frank von Hippel is a Senior Research Physicist and Professor of Public and International Affairs, Emeritus and Co-founder of the Program on Science and Global Affairs at Princeton University. His areas of policy research include nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, energy, and checks and balances in policymaking for technology. Prior to coming to Princeton, he worked for ten years in the field of elementary-particle theoretical physics. He has written extensively on the technical basis for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament initiatives, the future of nuclear energy, and improved automobile fuel economy. He won a 1993 MacArthur fellowship in recognition of his outstanding contributions to his fields of research. During 1993-1994, he served as assistant director for national security in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.

Dr. Leon V. Sigal is director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York. His book, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea, published by Princeton University Press, was one of five nominees for the Lionel Gelber Prize as the most outstanding book in international relations for 1997-98 and was named the 1998 book of distinction by the American Academy of Diplomacy. Sigal was a member of the editorial board of The New York Times from 1989 to 1995. He served in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs at the U.S. Department of State in 1979 as an International Affairs Fellow and in 1980 as Special Assistant to the Director. He was a Rockefeller Younger Scholar in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution from 1972-1974 and a guest scholar there in 1981-1984. From 1974 to 1989 he was a professor of government at Wesleyan University. He was an adjunct professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs from 1985 to 1989 and from 1996 to 2000, and a visiting lecturer at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School in 1988 and 2000 and 2018.