CAPACITY BUILDING:

THE ROLE OF THE U.S. – EU PARTNERSHIP IN SUPPORTING GOOD GOVERNANCE

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Capacity Building:
The Role of the U.S.-EU Partnership in Supporting Good Governance

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THE ROLE OF THE U.S.-EU PARTNERSHIP IN SUPPORTING GOOD GOVERNANCE
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Executive Summary: Capacity Building, Total Report

The United States and its allies have a vested interest in promoting stability and good governance in unstable regions of the world. To this end, the U.S. plays an active role in providing financial, military, and diplomatic resources to volatile regions and countries of strategic interest.

U.S.-EU RELATIONSHIP: The U.S.-EU partnership is an essential component of U.S. foreign policy. The EU’s collective military, human, economic, and regional power provides the U.S. with greater influence and capability. By working with the EU to advance its objectives, the United States is able to extend its influence. The U.S. has a strong interest in supporting the goals of its allies, combatting trans-national terrorist networks, and maintaining security and stability in its geographic region. For these reasons, the U.S. is committed to supporting and assisting with the stabilization of governance, rule of law, and economic development in Mali, Afghanistan, and Latin America.

MALIAN CRISIS: In Mali, the United States works with the EU to address the myriad issues existing in the region following the 2012 coup d’état and subsequent French intervention. The fractured Malian state, competing religious and ethnic groups, upcoming elections, and an exacerbated humanitarian crisis all warrant international and U.S. attention. A Mali free from religious extremism, terrorist cells, and extreme hunger, which all contribute to regional instability, is in the interest of the United States and European Union.

POST-NATO AFGHANISTAN: Following the 2001 terrorist attack on the U.S., the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan to combat the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda and its safeguard, the Taliban. Despite NATO troop withdrawal in 2014, the U.S. and EU remain committed to developing a stable Afghanistan. Stabilization efforts in a post-NATO Afghanistan include establishing governmental legitimacy and transparency, economic development, women’s rights, and security reforms.
LATIN AMERICAN DRUG TRADE: Latin America is a major supplier of drugs to the United States. Inter-cartel violence in Mexico threatens the economic interests of U.S. and EU firms located along the U.S.-Mexico border. The U.S. and EU have key interests in mitigating the flow of illicit drugs to prevent spillover of Mexican inter-cartel violence and ensuring political and social stability for economic development. European Union and Latin American interests align closely with those of the U.S. on this issue, which allows for cooperation in combatting the drug trade.

This comprehensive report provides detailed policy recommendations on these varied issues. While examining these three key issues from a U.S.-EU approach, we suggest policies that aim to advance the mutual interests of both. Failure to address these issues could further cripple struggling economies, create harbors for terrorist cells, exacerbate humanitarian crises, and foster illicit drug activity. A multilateral approach is requisite if the U.S. hopes to support good governance.
Glossary of Terms: Mali

AFISMA: Africa-led International Support Mission to Mali
AU: African Union
AQIM: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CAP: Mali Consolidated Appeals Process
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
EU: European Union
FNLA: The National Liberation Front of Azawad
IMA: The Islamic Movement for Azawad
IOM: International Organization on Migration
TSCTP: Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
MDSF: Malian Defense and Security Forces
MINUSMA: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MNLA: National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MUJAO: Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
NRCM: The Northern Reconciliation Council for Mali
OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNICEF: United Nations Children’s Fund
WFP: World Food Program
Executive Summary: Mali

United States and European Union (EU) cooperation in Mali will reduce the risk of a fractured Malian state falling victim to violent extremist groups, and an intensified humanitarian crisis. However, the United States is constrained by laws forbidding aid to countries whose democratically elected governments are deposed by military coups.

This section focuses on elections, scheduled for July 28, 2013, with recommendations toward U.S.-EU cooperation on: immediate measures to ensure secure, free, fair, and credible elections; intermediate measures to strengthen the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) to target and eliminate Al-Qaeda cells across the region; and long-term measures to a) Establish the Northern Reconciliation Council and b) Support the Mali Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) in increasing funding for UN agencies, regional NGOs, and other international actors.

To implement these recommendations, we propose a U.S.-Mali Financial Aid Package for FY 2013/2014. Indeed, the United States has already allocated $119.3 million over the past year for humanitarian aid to Mali. This package will include:

1. **$70 million** in increased logistical, surveillance, and personnel assistance to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

2. **$5 million** in funding TSCTP efforts to:
   a. Increase Malian border control
   b. Strengthen the Malian, French, and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) military capabilities
   c. Support social programs aimed at preventing Islamist extremist recruitment of at-risk youth
   d. Pressure the EU to stiffen its ransom negotiation procedures to favor non-negotiation

3. **$20 million** for technical assistance, training, staffing reconstruction experts, and economic aid to Mali

4. **$45 million** in support of the Mali CAP, totaling **$140 million**.
In the short run, ensuring free and fair elections is essential for establishing credible civilian rule in Mali. In recent years, Mali’s democratic tradition has been threatened not only by Captain Amadou Sonogo’s military coup in 2012, but also by the alignment of Tuareg and other Northern rebels with the military government and terrorist organizations such as MNLA, MUJAO, AQIM, Signed in Blood Battalion, and Ansar al-Dine. Hence, it essential that the U.S. and EU strengthen the TSCTP, enabling its regional allies to target and eliminate Al-Qaeda cells. Finally, in the long term, U.S. partnership with the EU to establish The Northern Reconciliation Council will provide an opportunity to address the long-standing grievances expressed by Northern Malians, especially the Tuareg. Additionally, as the humanitarian crisis in Mali worsens, The U.S. and EU must partner to meet the needs of internally displaced Malians and forestall spillover across the Sahel. To this end, U.S. and EU support for the Malian Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), UN agencies, and regional actors will ensure Malians’ continued access to humanitarian aid.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Immediate**
1. **Support** ECOWAS, NGOs, and independent observers in monitoring the election in Bamako scheduled for July 28, 2013. **Intensify** logistical, surveillance, and personnel assistance to France, regional bodies, and MINUSMA to deter terrorist activities.

**Intermediate**
2. **Strengthen** the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) by increasing technical support and providing intelligence, training, and education to MDSF, ECOWAS, and the AU, enabling U.S. regional partners to target and eliminate al-Qaeda cells.

**Long-Term**
3. **Collaborate** with the EU to establish The Northern Reconciliation Council, based in Bamako, which will work to address economic and political grievances of Northern Malian citizens, to promote stability and undermine the influence of extremist Islamist actors within the region. This recommendation is contingent on successful democratic elections scheduled for July 28, 2013.
4. **Increase** support for the Mali CAP to provide funding for UN agencies, regional NGOs and other international actors, and to ensure access to humanitarian aid.
Detailed Recommendations: Mali

Immediate Concerns

**Recommendation 1:**

*Support* ECOWAS, NGOs, and independent observers in monitoring the election in Bamako scheduled for July 28, 2013. *Intensify* logistical, surveillance, and personnel assistance to France, regional bodies, and MINUSMA to deter terrorist activities.

Background

In March 2012, Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo organized a coup that ousted President Amadou Toumani Touré from power. In the ensuing months, Tuareg and extremist rebel groups, including MNLA, MUJAO, AQIM, Signed in Blood Battalion, and Ansar al-Dine, seized control of the northern half of Mali. The political instability preceding the coup led to the near cessation of economic activity and the flow of 400,000 refugees from Northern Mali. Shortly after the coup, ECOWAS representative Blaise Compaoré negotiated the installment of a transitional government led by speaker of parliament Dioncounda Traoré. However, troops aligned with former President Touré besieged M. Traoré’s government, such that he delegated his presidential responsibilities to Prime Minister Cheik Modibo Diarra. In December 2012, the army deposed Diarra, replacing him with mediator Django Sissoko. The transitional government, which has the support of France and regional allies, now vies for control of Mali with the army, under the leadership of Captain Sanogo.

Proposal & Implementation

The Africa-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), France, and regional forces have successfully collaborated to realign Tuareg rebels from terrorist organizations and the military to the government by retaking Northern Mali. To this end, MINUSMA will double the number of current French and Malian troops to 12,600 to safeguard the July 28th elections. The United States allocated $119.3 million in humanitarian aid over the past year for displaced Malians. The United States should provide an additional $70 million to be used in ensuring the integrity of the elections through increased logistical, surveillance, and personnel assistance to MINUSMA.
Challenges & Costs

Seventy million dollars in additional aid for MINUSMA is a sizeable financial cost that will be difficult to sell to the American people in a period of high unemployment and economic recession. Although this represents less than 0.01 percent of the U.S. federal budget, this money would be better spent in Mali than elsewhere, internationally or domestically, because of the American interests at stake.

The proposed support is also politically costly. Congressional opposition may claim that the federal government is misallocating funding on issues in which the United States has no stake. However, this support for MINUSMA remains critical for U.S. security interests because it lays the groundwork for a legitimate constitutional government in Bamako that can deter insurgent groups and mitigate refugee flows. A credible Malian government that is inclusive of civil society will not only accommodate Tuareg grievances but also stave off corruption by professionalizing Malian civil service.
Intermediate Concerns

**Recommendation 2:**

*Strengthen* the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) by increasing technical support and providing intelligence, training, and education to MDSF, ECOWAS, and the AU, enabling U.S. regional partners to target and eliminate al-Qaeda cells.

**Background**

Following twenty years of political and economic progress, radical Islamist extremism and consequent instability found their way into Mali. Since the 1990s, fundamental Islamists have infiltrated into the Malian state from North Africa and the Sahel, exacerbating pre-existing ethnic tensions and sowing seeds for al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). Five key players have established safe havens in Northern Mali. These extremist groups include Ansar al-Dine, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), AQIM, Signed-in-Blood Battalion, and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). The aftermath of the Libyan civil war created a power vacuum that has supplied these Islamist groups with an influx of arms. Ransom money from kidnappings and the drug trade have financed terrorist activity, much of which has been used to purchase weapons.

U.S.-backed French intervention in January 2013 quelled the Islamist threat in Northern Mali, though it has not been entirely eliminated. A formal ceasefire between Tuareg rebels and the Malian state was signed this past June. The U.S. State Department has expressed commitment to helping implement the accord. Continued negotiations with the Tuareg will become the responsibility of the winner of the upcoming election.

**Proposal & Implementation**

Once democratic processes are restored through elections, the U.S. should resume TSCTP aid and support programs in Mali to regain stability and contain terrorist groups. The U.S. government has already committed $96 million to the African-led UN mission in Mali. In addition, the U.S. should increase its past foreign aid from $3 million to $5 million to further fund TSCTP efforts.
These funds will accomplish the following:

1.) Training and educating security and military forces to reinforce border control, enhance interdiction of illicit goods, and prevent terrorist groups from entering the country.
2.) Providing enhanced logistical and intelligence technology, including weapons, surveillance equipment, and aerial defenses to strengthen the Malian, French, and ECOWAS military capabilities.
3.) Provide education, networking, and technical skill training programs aimed at preventing Islamist extremist recruitment and influence of at-risk youth. Investment in community centers that provide access to these programs will help develop leaders and integrate the youth into society, discouraging them from engaging with extremist groups.

The U.S. should regulate the use of the funds and monitor its effects to ensure the success of the program. The U.S. should not become directly engaged in the conflict and should instead further assist the French, EU, UN, MDSF, ECOWAS, and AU troops in their efforts. Public opinion of the U.S. in Mali would decline from direct and open engagement in the country. We recommended that the U.S. put pressure on EU member states to seek non-negotiation strategies with extremist groups. This is specifically in reference to hostage payments, which almost fully fund AQIM’s operations.

**Challenges & Costs**

Successful counterterrorism efforts in Mali are dependent upon the outcome of the upcoming election. The Tuareg and other northern ethnic groups are underrepresented among the candidates and the voting population, which creates the potential for unrepresentative election results and increased tensions. A hurried electoral process and over two dozen candidates makes it unclear who will come to power and what their stance on U.S. involvement in Mali will be. To the extent that increased use of U.S. drones in the Sahel and Maghreb compromises Malian and regional public support for U.S. counterterrorism efforts, American drone activity should be limited to strictly surveillance operations. Lastly, if non-negotiation strategies are pursued, European embassies may require increased security to prevent backlash from extremist groups.
Long-Term Concerns

**Recommendation 3:**

*Collaborate* with the EU to establish The Northern Reconciliation Council, based in Bamako, which will work to address economic and political grievances of Northern Malian citizens, to promote stability and undermine the influence of extremist Islamist actors within the region. This is contingent on successful democratic elections scheduled for July 28, 2013.

**Background**

Dissatisfaction with underrepresentation in government and cultural differences has fueled Northern Malian grievances against the South since independence in 1960. In an attempt to assert the North’s identity, the Tuareg have long fought to establish a separate state. This conflict has never been resolved entirely, which has resulted in a fragmented state. In the 1990s, the Tuareg led a rebellion against the government under the MPLA. This rebellion allowed other groups to emerge and for extremist groups to infiltrate the region. Negotiations were launched to rectify the situation, but the solution was short lived.

In January 2012, the Tuareg rebellion resurfaced their grievances concerning the lack of economic development in the North. Subsequently in March, a military coup yielded consequences similar to those of the 1990 rebellion. The Tuareg have aligned themselves with extreme Islamists groups such as Ansar al-Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Signed in Blood Battalion, the Islamic Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, and Islamic Movement for Azawad in hopes of having their grievances addressed.

**Proposal & Implementation**

The U.S. and EU should use the Northern Reconciliation Council for Mali (NRCM) to provide technical assistance and training to Northern Malian citizens, thereby promoting sustainable economic development in the region. The Northern economy is based primarily on livestock and herding. Unsustainable farming practices, drought, and the intensifying desertification of the Sahel challenge this way of life. The U.S. should provide the NRCM with the innovative tools necessary to improve living standards in the North, including food security and sustainable
development. To determine the most effective tools, the U.S. should partner with the EU to create a joint team of climate and agriculture specialists.

The NRCM should create a framework for distributing aid. In May 2013, The Donors Conference pledged to donate $4.2 billion to Mali over two years to promote governance, balanced regional development, decentralization, private and social sector support, and inclusivity. The U.S. and EU can use the NRCM as a monitoring mechanism to ensure equal distribution of the funds between the North and South.

The NRCM should include members from the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA), the National Liberation Front of Azawad (FNLA), Bamako government representatives, and Northern citizens who have not aligned with the previous factions listed, such as traditional chiefs, leaders, and elders.

**Challenges & Costs**

The United States will incur costs in providing technical assistance, training, post conflict reconstruction expertise, and economic aid to Mali. The U.S. can expect to contribute $20 million to meet these costs. This amount excludes monetary aid pledged to ECOWAS development, the Mali Consolidated Appeal Process, and military aid.

This council intentionally excludes leaders from extremist Islamist groups such as AQIM, Ansar Al Dine, Mujao, and Signed in Blood Battalion to address the root of Tuareg grievances, which concern autonomy rather than religious extremism. This is a challenge to the success of a reconciliation council because extremist groups currently have a strong foothold in the North. Assuaging Tuareg grievances will play a vital role in undermining terrorist support in the Sahel.
Background

Food security is a consistent issue in Mali. A food crisis peaked in 2012 due to increased world food prices, systemic drought, and a decline in remittances from migrants caused by the global economic slowdown. Instability in Mali has further aggravated its food security problems. Since the coup, 353,455 Malians have been displaced and 174,394 have sought refugee status in neighboring countries. More than 3.5 million have experienced decreased access to food because of the situation and 1.4 million need immediate food assistance. Forty-percent of those in immediate need of food are located in Northern Mali.

Vast distances, poor infrastructure, and political-military insecurity limit access to Northern Mali. International humanitarian actors, such as the United Nations Organization for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the International Organization for Migration, the World Food Program, the United Nations Children Fund, and other non-governmental organizations are unable to provide aid in Northern Mali because of banditry, terrorism, and rebel activities. Insecurity and instability are most evident in the three northern Mali regions of Boni, Mopti and Kayes, and threaten the ability of international actors to implement aid programs. Without improvements in the security of northern cities and sufficient funding from donors, the situation in northern Mali could deteriorate further.

Proposal & Implementation

The U.S. should lobby the EU and other governments to directly fund the OCHA sponsored Consolidated Appeals Process instead of contracting out humanitarian projects. The Mali CAP has received $136 million, or 29 percent of the total $476 million requested of the international community. A conference of countries pledged nearly $4.2 billion in support to Mali’s government, but most of it has not yet been delivered. The aid that they have disbursed has been directed through channels other than the Mali CAP. The CAP is the most effective measure for channeling aid, however, since it utilizes existing and credible international actors and

Recommendation 4:
Increase support for the Mali CAP to provide funding for UN agencies, regional NGOs and other international actors, and to ensure access to humanitarian aid.
organizations in the country, such as UNICEF, OCHA, WFP, and IOM. The U.S. should advocate against disbursing aid directly to the Malian government, since it may invite corruption, and instead funnel it through the Mali CAP.

Of the $140 million for which this report advocates, the U.S. should use $45 million to directly contribute to the Mali CAP. Forty-five million dollars represents roughly 10 percent of the $476 million OCHA requested. With this U.S. contribution, the Mali CAP will reach 37 percent of its goal.

The U.S. should pressure MINUSMA to have a stronger presence in the Boni, Mopti, and Kayes regions of Northern Mali. In terms of security concerns, MINUSMA was already mandated to have a presence in Northern Mali and to contribute to the creation of a secure environment. However, it is imperative that the U.S. facilitates these security goals and ensures that non-state actors can safely operate in Northern Mali. The U.S. should request that MINUSMA protect aid agencies and ensure distribution of humanitarian aid without hindrance. A strong and clear presence of non-state actors in Northern Mali will promote feelings of security and comfort in returning to continue aid work.

**Challenges & Costs**

The most difficult challenge is procuring more aid money from donor countries for the Mali CAP. Since countries pledged such a large amount of aid in May, it will be difficult to persuade those same countries to contribute further. Furthermore, it will be difficult in a cash-strapped economy to convince Congress to donate another $45 million. Implementing our security goals will be of special difficulty since it will require coordination between the U.S., EU, UN agencies, NGOs, and MINUSMA.
**Glossary of Terms: Afghanistan**

**ANP**: Afghan National Police  
**EU**: European Union  
**EVAW**: Elimination of Violence against Women  
**FINCA**: private consulting firm—not an acronym  
**GDP**: Gross Domestic Product  
**IMF**: International Monetary Fund  
**ISAF**: International Security Assistance Force  
**NATO**: North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
**NSR**: New Silk Road  
**NGO**: Non-Governmental Organization  
**SME**: Small Medium Enterprise  
**UN**: United Nations  
**USAID**: United States Agency for International Development
Executive Summary: Afghanistan

Cooperation between the United States and European Union (EU) on the stabilization of post-NATO Afghanistan would defuse the risk of a failed state, alleviate human rights abuses, contribute to U.S. counter-terrorism efforts by preventing a Taliban takeover, and increase regional stability.

This section focuses on the democratic, economic, security, and humanitarian stabilization efforts needed in Afghanistan with recommendations for U.S. and EU cooperation on 1) transparency and accountability of Afghan elections 2) promoting foreign direct investment and regional economic integration 3) accelerating domestic economic reforms 4) initiating sustainable security through small-medium enterprises (SMEs) and a strong police force 5) and increasing women’s participation in the labor force.

Legitimacy of the Afghan government is the foundation for success in stabilization efforts. A strong sense of sovereignty can be established through support of free and fair elections and visibility of public officials. A stable and prosperous Afghan economy is crucial to its political and civil stability. Increased trust in the Afghan government will allow for a renewed formation of the Kabul Central Bank, thereby promoting a stable financial market and creating an avenue for foreign investment, innovative monetary policy, and a comprehensive labor force. Furthermore, Afghanistan must decrease its reliance on foreign aid and move towards a self-sustaining market economy. Improving and building upon existing transportation energy and natural resources will enhance regional trade, bolster Afghanistan’s regional alliances, and promote a more stable U.S. and EU partnership with the region.

Economic development policies are an effective tool in countering drug trade issues, enhancing security, and addressing women’s human rights concerns. Promotion of SMEs will create sustainable, organic job growth that will compete with the economic incentives of illegal activities. Moreover, implementation of small arms policies and competitive Afghan National Police compensation would increase security of civilians, especially women. Support for female entrepreneurship will increase women’s participation in the labor force and effectively combat issues such as low literacy rates, domestic violence, and inadequate civil representation. The U.S.
and EU must cooperate to increase civic engagement and economic opportunities through non-profit leadership training and guidance.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Democratic Governance**

1. *Facilitate* legitimization of Afghan institutions to encourage accountability, increase visibility, and foster a sentiment of political efficacy among the civilian population.

**Economic Development**

2. *Promote* regional economic integration to facilitate Afghanistan’s economic transition from an aid-dependent to a self-reliant economy.

3. *Decrease* Afghan dependency on foreign aid by working with the World Bank and IMF to promote foreign direct investment.

**Security**

4. *Strengthen* the Afghan National Police (ANP) through compensation reforms and literacy initiatives to improve security services. *Promote* small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and rural development to provide viable economic alternatives to the drug trade.

**Women’s Human Rights**

5. *Increase* women’s participation in the labor force to raise women’s literacy rates, increase civic representation, and combat domestic violence.
Detailed Recommendations: Afghanistan

Democratic Governance

**Recommendation 1:**
*Facilitate* legitimization of Afghan institutions to encourage accountability, increase visibility, and foster a sentiment of political efficacy among the civilian population.

**Background**

In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. In response, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the U.S., and Al-Qaeda armed the Mujahideen rebel groups against the Soviet-backed regime. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. lost interest and abandoned Afghanistan, which created a power vacuum that led to civil war among Afghan warlords. This struggle led to the emergence of the Taliban, a religiously motivated extremist group of young men seeking to re-establish stability in the country. By 1996, with the help of Al-Qaeda mercenaries, the Taliban had taken control of Kabul and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Consequently, Al-Qaeda-Taliban relations remained strong and the Taliban continued to shelter Al-Qaeda operatives despite the U.S. calls for their surrender. Less than one month after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. launched its War on Terror in Afghanistan to dismantle Al-Qaeda and its safeguard, the Taliban.

The U.S. brought Afghan leaders together in December of that year to recreate the state of Afghanistan through the Bonn Agreement under the auspices of the UN. This process recreated Afghan institutions such as the Supreme Court and Constitution Commission, and served as the prelude to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). ISAF has worked to train the Afghan National Security Forces, rebuild institutions, and fight insurgents.

ISAF’s goal is to remove all combat troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. On June 18th, 2013, all security control was handed over to Afghan forces. However, faith in the Afghan military as well as the stability and accountability of government institutions remains low.

**Proposal & Implementation**

First, it is crucial for the U.S. to harness the full political and diplomatic capacity of its relationship with the EU. To do so, the U.S. must underscore EU interests in Afghanistan, which
include the protection of European civilians and military personnel currently on the ground and gaining a stable ally and trading partner in the region. The U.S. must gain EU cooperation to support Afghan non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other non-state actors that can bolster governmental institutions. Specifically, the U.S. must provide funding and resources to monitor and secure elections. Along with NGO-led efforts, the U.S. must provide assistance to the Independent Election Commission and the Electoral Complaints Commission in pre-screening candidates, establishing and enforcing election rules, and monitoring security. This will be the first step in ensuring election fairness. Free and fair elections will foster respect for rule of law, reduced corruption, and more accountability.

Second, the U.S. must encourage civilian resources to carry out free and fair elections. This can be achieved through discouraging excessive visibility of military personnel and by training and employing Afghan civil servants — both male and female — at polling stations to create a welcoming environment for voters.

Finally, the U.S. must collaborate with EU envoys and Afghan NGOs to encourage transparent governance through civic engagement efforts. This can include visibility of newly elected public officials by participation in civil projects and through speeches to the public. Given that the EU has a well-developed public diplomacy framework, the U.S. can encourage European assistance in developing a similar model in Afghanistan. Additionally, governmental goals and projects can be made public to encourage accountability and make citizens aware of the government’s work.

**Challenges & Costs**

Afghan citizens are skeptical of international actors as well as the current Afghan government. Previous elections have been fraught with charges of fraud and corruption. Therefore, the results of the 2014 presidential election will serve as a “litmus test” for both perceived and actual political legitimacy moving forward.

The U.S. and EU will have to generate funding to support these processes. However, funds currently used to support troops can be reallocated towards this effort, should congressional appropriations prove difficult.
Economic Development

**Recommendation 2:**
*Promote* regional economic integration to facilitate Afghanistan’s economic transition from an aid-dependent to a self-reliant economy.

**Background**
Facilitating sustainable economic development is crucial to Afghanistan’s stability after 2014 as donors are likely to reduce their financial commitment and military involvement in the country. The World Bank warned that such a foreign aid decline could result in major macroeconomic instability and socioeconomic consequences. Afghanistan currently remains an aid-dependent state with foreign aid accounting for more than 95 percent of the GDP. Given Afghanistan’s current account deficit of 45 percent of GDP, the IMF postponed the outlook of “fiscal sustainability” until after 2032. At the Tokyo conference in July 2012, the international community committed $16 billion in aid to Afghanistan through 2015. However, Afghanistan requires an estimated amount of $120 billion in aid through 2025. To prevent a severe economic downturn, the U.S. must continue exploring domestic avenues for revenue generation through trade and foreign investment to ensure a sustainable economy in Afghanistan.

**Proposal & Implementation**
The New Silk Road (NSR) initiative that former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton promulgated in 2011 creates an international network of economic and transit connections. This initiative promotes intraregional trade and cooperation within Central and South Asian regions alongside intensive development initiatives throughout Afghanistan. We must ensure that the NSR translates into substantial economic benefits for Afghans throughout the transformation period (2014 to 2024). Foreign investment, regional trade, and transit potential can consolidate Afghanistan's role as a land bridge and commercial hub in a mutually interdependent regional framework. Such a network would accelerate Afghanistan’s private sector growth and customs revenue receipts.

The NSR initiative requires building transportation infrastructure such as railroads, highways, and an energy pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. The U.S.
must focus on improving Afghanistan's infrastructure to reflect its economic potential as a land bridge and commercial hub connecting South Asia, Central Asia, Eurasia and the Middle East. Building upon Afghanistan's existing transportation and natural resources will enhance investment, trade, and transit corridors enabling Afghanistan’s full integration in the region.

Public and private investment is a critical component of the NSR strategy. The U.S. must upgrade facilities at border crossings and harmonize customs unions by removing bureaucratic barriers to the free flow of goods. Efforts for economic reform must link the prospect of Afghanistan’s self-reliant economic future to its resource potential. The discovery of huge reserves of minerals and natural gas has raised hopes of possible revenue generation, foreign investment, and employment opportunities. The sectors most likely to produce exports and economic growth are oil, gas, and mineral mining.

The U.S. must strengthen Afghanistan’s economic regional partnerships to build confidence and facilitate its security, stability, and future economic growth. Given the growing market access requirements, Afghanistan’s neighboring regional mega-economies can fuel Afghan economic growth while driving private sector investment, job growth, and public revenue.

**Challenges & Costs**

Afghanistan’s ability to build a sustainable economic foundation through regional economic integration and connectivity faces serious challenges from weak rule of law, corruption, patronage networks, and political dissonance in the region. Efforts to reform the Afghan economy require a level of political stability that allows construction and extraction of its regulatory framework. Investor confidence must be restored to effectively tackle corruption and ensure incoming revenues to contribute to Afghanistan’s sustainable economic future. Most importantly, the success of the NSR in post-transition Afghanistan is contingent upon the cooperation of Afghanistan’s neighbors in Central and South Asia.
Recommendation 3: 
*Decrease* Afghan dependency on foreign aid by working with the World Bank and IMF to promote foreign direct investment.

**Background**
Afghanistan’s economy has remained dependent on foreign aid since the fall of the Taliban. International aid accounts for 95 percent of its GDP. The international community seeks development in sectors such as mining, banking, and construction as the main focus of reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan.

**Proposal & Implementation**
The U.S. and EU must implement fiscal transparency policies that distinguish between government and commercial activities, facilitate open budget processes, and publicize data in Afghanistan. These pressuring efforts must be channeled through regional diplomatic means and shareholder leverage at the World Bank and IMF. These reforms must create an adequate economic atmosphere that will interest future foreign direct investment.

The U.S. must encourage Afghanistan to pursue technical assistance from the IMF on monetary and fiscal policies to increase its prospects of receiving future foreign direct investment. Having a stable central bank is a positive economic signal for international investors as it indicates financial stability and strengthens international legitimacy. Responsible monetary policy controls for inflation, harmonizes financial markets, and fosters creation of a comprehensive labor force. Failing to create a stable financial atmosphere will impede economic growth.
Challenges & Costs
Time and coordination are the most crucial challenges to applying this recommendation. Despite Afghanistan’s time-sensitive need for these economic reforms, implementation requires careful, strategic planning. Although the U.S. and EU have large shareholding leverage with the World Bank and IMF, policy application will be costly and require firm trust of the Afghan government. If economic reform policies are not developed, the state of Afghanistan will likely collapse into a state of disorder to be exploited once again by the Taliban — ultimately undermining the U.S. and EU’s human and economic investments in the last ten years.
Security

**Recommendation 4:**

*Strengthen* the Afghan National Police (ANP) security services through compensation reforms and literacy initiatives. *Promote* small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and rural development to provide viable economic alternatives to the drug trade.

**Background**

Drug trade is inextricably tied to the majority of security issues in Afghanistan. Enhancement of security as a means to diffuse drug trade requires a multifaceted approach. The narcotics industry in Afghanistan accounted for four percent of GDP in 2012, while aid made up close to 95 percent. Policy makers must promote small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and rural development, small arms for security forces, and police compensation reforms to effectively counter drug trade and ensure sustained security in Afghanistan.

**Proposal & Implementation**

*Recommendation 4.1: ANP Reforms*

ANP training reform will improve efficiency of security services. Providing specialized courses on prevalent rural crimes such as domestic abuse and land disputes will improve ANP service delivery. Illiteracy is another pervasive issue among the ANP and is an impediment to efficient service. Establishing literacy training will enable ANP members to effectively communicate with one another and interact with local populations. Implementing salary reforms within the ANP will counter retention obstacles as the organization fails to attract high-achieving individuals. Conversely, drug traders offer new recruits salaries well above levels offered by the ANP. Drug trade offers opportunities for promotion and bonuses that encourage performance. Therefore, the ANP must include incentives and promotions for officers with successful track records in securing local regions.

*Recommendation 4.2: SME & Rural Development*

SME development, tailored to the specific needs of the Afghan population, is a viable vehicle to curb the influence and danger of the drug trade. Traditional and Islamic microfinance along with entrepreneurial empowerment will create sustainable, organic job growth that will compete with the financial incentives of drug trade.
USAID funded a highly successful Islamic microfinance program through FINCA International, a U.S.-based consulting firm in Afghanistan. This program utilized the “Murabaha” Islamic microfinance model and was able to serve over 15,000 in rural areas with a 99.8 percent on-time repayment rate. This project won a Pro-Poor Innovation Challenge award as it served vulnerable groups who are often the targets of the drug trade in Afghanistan.

U.S. and EU cooperation will play a vital role towards securing rural Afghan regions susceptible to drug trafficking. EU support in the development of rural Afghanistan aligns with its policy interests. In Somalia, the EU promoted sustainable development in rural regions overcome by illicit economic activities. More specifically, the EU helped prevent the impact of droughts, provide basic sanitation, and protect livestock. Similar support in providing rural, social, and economic safety nets will lead to an effective result.

**Challenges & Costs**

Prohibition of loan interest rates will be a challenge for the sustainability of Islamic microfinance models. However, this can be countered with high repayment rates among borrowers. There may also be obstacles to replicating EU rural development success from Somalia. Success in Somalia was due to region-specific policies, so it is imperative for the EU to adapt models compliant with Afghan society before implementation. Rural development programs in Afghanistan must address high levels of debt, frequent droughts, and a lack of irrigation while providing security. ANP reforms will require both funding and civil society expertise that must come from the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan as it has established precedent with ANP and understands its dynamics.
Women’s Human Rights

**Recommendation 5:**

*Increase* women’s participation in the labor force to raise women’s literacy rates, increase civic representation, and combat domestic violence.

**Background**

Women’s rights in Afghanistan have been central focus of U.S. humanitarian relief efforts. Despite aid initiatives in building schools and promoting female education, Afghan women continue to face critical concerns in literacy rates, domestic violence, and inadequate civil representation. Currently, female literacy in Afghanistan is 12 percent while male literacy is 43 percent. Furthermore, 87 percent of women experience physical, psychological, or sexual violence. Afghanistan’s weak central state and cultural traditions constrain women from participating as full citizens.

U.S. strategic initiatives in addressing major women’s rights concerns have not had their intended effects in spite of the decade-long occupation period. The Afghan constitution, as ratified in 2004, protects the right of women and girls to education, yet a great majority of women are still illiterate. Efforts to build schools for girls and promote female teachers have faced Taliban bombings. Moreover, the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs receives only one percent of the national budget. Despite large investments to stabilize social order in Afghanistan, the country continues to be one of the most dangerous places for women to live.

**Proposal & Implementation**

The U.S. and EU must encourage women’s participation in the labor force to address issues such as female illiteracy, domestic violence, and political engagement. Women’s economic participation has a significant influence in increasing women’s roles in the household as well as involvement in civil responsibility. Studies show that when families know that girls will be able to earn their own income and contribute to the household, they will invest more in their health and education. As women work together, they share information, establish networks, and learn to negotiate with men. Women are also more likely to participate in politics and elect female representatives when they have established identities outside the household.
Support for female entrepreneurship is the most effective strategy to increasing women’s involvement in the labor force. The U.S. and EU must continue to support technical and leadership training, mentoring, internships, and loans through grassroots organizations through 2024. These measures will allow Afghan women to understand their functioning role in society, capitalize on skills in demand, and lead their own community development initiatives. The Afghan society will recognize women as contributing members to the economy and as drivers of productive change.

Challenges & Costs
The main challenges to women’s participation in the labor force moving forward will include the drawback of U.S. military and humanitarian aid, Afghan opposition to Western influence, and pushback from conservative Afghan parliamentarians. As the Obama administration gradually reduces the number of soldiers in Afghanistan, many fear women’s rights will not be given adequate attention and will face reduced protection. Advocacy groups are calling on key allies to continue to support women’s rights through non-profit funding.

The Afghan people are largely opposed to Western influence in shaping future changes. The large-scale loss of life associated with the occupation has led to a weakened trust of Western powers. It will be a challenge for Western NGO workers to train Afghan women with the widespread anti-Western sentiment.

Conservative Afghan parliamentarians also pose as a challenge to women’s rights. In May 2013, conservative representatives lashed out against the Elimination of Violence against Women (EVAW) decree, signed by the President in 2009. They claimed the EVAW law does not represent the fundamental tenets of Islamic law and is imposed on Afghan women by Western countries. The law is considered to be one of the country’s biggest accomplishments for women as it criminalizes 22 acts of violence against women, including marital rape and child marriage.
Glossary of Terms: Latin America

PRI: Institutional Revolutionary Party
EU: European Union
U.S.: United States
CBSI: Caribbean Basin Security Initiative
OCT: Overseas countries and Territories
CARICOM: the Caribbean Community: an organization of 15 Caribbean nations and dependencies that promote economic integration and cooperation among its members
EUCAP NESTOR: European Union Regional Maritime Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean
DTOs: drug trafficking organizations
CARSI: Central America Regional Security Initiative
Executive Summary: Latin America
Producers of illegal drugs in South American countries smuggle their products through Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean, into the United States. The Caribbean also serves as a hub for drugs en route to West Africa, the intermediary between producers in South America and Western Europe. Once inside of the European Union (EU), drugs move easily because of lax border patrols. Stopping the flow of drugs in Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean, is a key U.S. policy objective.

Major U.S. interests in mitigating flow of illicit drugs include: preventing spillover of Mexican inter-cartel violence, ensuring political and social stability for economic development in areas most affected by the drug trade, and spending money efficiently and effectively in the War on Drugs. The drug trade has led to a war within Mexico between the government and the various drug cartels, notably the Sinaloa, Golfo, and Zetas cartels. This war, which has taken the lives of over 60,000 Mexican citizens since 2006, is mainly centered along the U.S.-Mexico border, in cities such as Nuevo Laredo, Tijuana, and Juarez. An escalation of conflict could spill over the border and become a security threat to the United States.

Instability and the possibility of government breakdown in Mexico threaten U.S. and EU economic interests. It is expected that by 2018 most imports to the U.S. will come from Mexico. The welfare of our closest neighbors is therefore good for our security and economy. Since we are dealing with organized crime, our recommendations seek to prevent the trade via land, sea, and air through various military and diplomatic efforts. EU and Latin American interests align closely with those of the United States. Therefore, cooperation on these issues is possible. We propose the following recommendations to end the drug trade in Latin America.
### RECOMMENDATIONS

**Rule of Law & Good Governance**

1. **Pressure** the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) diplomatically and economically to fight corruption amongst party members and public servants.

2. **Intensify** border control against gun trafficking in Texas, Arizona, and California. **Create** an international surveillance body to monitor the security of weapons stocks in Central America.

**Maritime Security**

3. **Expand** the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) by **partnering** with EU member states with strong ties to Caribbean nations and OCTs.

4. **Strengthen** the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) by **consulting** with the EU on successful anti-piracy military and justice practices from the Gulf of Aden.

5. **Promote** the creation of coast guards in Central American states.

**Airspace Security**

6. **Assist** Central American governments in setting up radar systems to track aircrafts potentially carrying drugs.
Detailed Recommendations: Latin America

Rule of Law & Good Governance

**Recommendation 1:**

*Pressure* the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) diplomatically and economically to fight corruption amongst party members and public servants.

**Background**

With Chinese labor costs increasing since 2001, many U.S. and EU firms have relocated their operations to the U.S.-Mexico border, the *Maquiladora* zone, where the violent drug cartel conflict is centered. This conflict threatens the multi-million dollar investments of U.S. firms, such as GM, Wal-Mart, Dupont, Coca-cola, etc. Secondly, the possibility of the conflict spilling over the U.S. border is high, especially if corruption within the government weakens control over the conflict. It is in the interest of the U.S. and EU that corruption in Mexico be addressed to effectively neutralize the drug cartels and stabilize the nation.

There are three main political parties in Mexico: the right-wing National Action Party (PAN), the left-wing Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), and the center-left Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). PRI candidate Enrique Peña Nieto won the presidency in 2012. The PRI ruled Mexico for more than 70 years before they were ousted in 2000. A key reason the PRI lost in 2000 was its corrupt behavior, including its alleged dealings with drug cartels.

**Proposal & Implementation**

We propose that the U.S. engage with the EU to diplomatically and economically pressure President Peña’s government to combat corruption. Mr. Peña seems less willing to use military force than his predecessor, and has even considered drawing down naval and military deployments. We must pressure his government against this. The U.S. and EU should work with these countries to pressure jointly the Mexican government for zero-tolerance measures against any PRI party member or civil servant who engages in corrupt behavior. A U.S. Special Envoy for the Drug Trade should be established to work with the Mexican government in its efforts to eradicate corruption and end the drug war. The special envoy could motivate lobbying efforts among U.S. firms, and help raise support among EU firms and partners.
The U.S. should remind Mexico that the U.S. firm Citigroup owns the airline company Aeroméxico and one of its largest banks Banamex. EU members also have large investments in Mexico. The German owned Volkswagen now accounts for a decent share Mexican GDP. A Belgian firm now owns the Mexican beer companies Modelo and Corona. The Dutch firm ING Group now owns the country’s largest insurance company. And multiple British and Spanish companies own many of Mexico’s financial institutions. These firms can directly lobby and donate to the electoral campaigns of PRI party members. In exchange for jobs in their home states and electoral support, firms can then persuade these leaders to support anti-corruption initiatives and oust corrupt party members.

**Challenges & Costs**

Establishing the U.S. Special Envoy for the Drug Trade would increase expenditures, such as the pay for the envoy, travel, and office space. Although minimal, these costs may be met with opposition from members of Congress who do not want to meddle in the drug war. This opposition can be overcome by enlisting the large numbers of U.S. firms that have financial stakes in Mexico to lobby Congress vigorously for support. They should especially lobby members from border-states and those on the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees that are soon up for re-election. Corporate leaders should donate to their campaigns and explain the negative economic and national security repercussions that increased PRI party corruption could have for the United States. The EU will also have trouble getting every member state to agree, but the same lobbying approach by individual firms inside the member states can be used to gain support within the EU. We urge the Obama Administration to push the EU and selected EU member states to support this initiative by holding Mexico/EU/U.S. economic summits to highlight the importance of a stable Mexico. We can also leverage our economic Foreign Service Officers in Europe to coordinate lobbying efforts among corporate leaders towards EU leaders.
Recommendation 2:

*Intensify* border control against gun trafficking in Texas, Arizona, and California. Create an international surveillance body to monitor the security of weapons stocks in Central America.

**Background**

Seventy percent of the guns seized in Mexico come from the United States. Traffickers sell about 20,000 arms from the U.S. to Mexico annually for revenue of $20 million. Drug cartels acquire guns in the U.S. through two primary means: from gun shows and by using “straw buyers”—citizens with clean records sent to buy weapons for those who could not purchase them on their own. This process is facilitated by complicit retailers’ willing blindness. A very small number of retailers are responsible for a very large share of the traceable weapons that are used in crime. Texas, California, and Arizona account for 39, 20, and 10 percent of American firearms that are seized in Mexico, respectively. Moreover, stocks of military guns in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua are poorly monitored. Drug cartels often acquire guns from these stocks through robbery or bribery. The most common way of importing firearms is through *hormiga* (ant) trafficking from the United States. Ant traffickers are cross border smugglers who drive very small batches of weapons across the border concealed in private vehicles.

**Proposal & Implementation**

The U.S. government should increase the number of border personnel in Texas, California, and Arizona, aiming to prevent “ant” trafficking, as border security generally seizes small quantities of arms shipments from private vehicles entering Mexico.

The U.S. and the EU should create an international observer body to monitor and protect the stocks of guns, which are poorly protected and vulnerable to be stolen or acquired via bribery. Drug cartels appear to be using military arms left over from the civil wars in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and from corrupt military elements in these countries.
Challenges & Costs
One of the biggest costs lies in procuring funding to increase border patrol. Relative legal impunity of arms dealers in Texas, California, and Arizona also poses a challenge for surveillance and investigations of the dealers. Creation of an international observer body will be logistically difficult.
Maritime Security

Recommendation 3: Expand the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) to include the Gulf of Mexico by partnering with EU member states to disperse costs.

Background
Numerous EU states have strong legal ties to 26 overseas countries and territories (OCTs) in the Caribbean and in South America. These are small nations with varied degrees of autonomy that share similar economic, geographic, and social challenges. Due to their associate status to particular EU member states, OCTs benefit from special trade, development, and security agreements, which include the Joint Caribbean-EU Partnership Strategy (2010). EU and Caribbean governments have emphasized economic cooperation, but the security aspect of this partnership can be strengthened. Other Caribbean nations could benefit from new EU partnerships as well.

Proposal & Implementation
Partnering with EU member states on CBSI can disperse the program’s financial burden and allow it to cover a wider geographic area. The U.S. should first target EU states with OCTs and close allies in the Caribbean and Latin America to cooperate in CBSI. By involving EU naval assistance in the short term, Caribbean states can focus on internal capacity-building in accordance with the three core objectives of CBSI, which are to reduce illicit trafficking, increase public safety and security, and promote social justice. The U.S. should work most closely with France, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the Netherlands.

Large quantities of drugs arrive by water to major coastal cities in Mexico and Central America. CBSI can further stem drug flows if expanded to these areas. Sharing the costs of CBSI with the EU will allow the U.S. to expand it to include the Gulf region. The U.S. will have to assume much of the initial responsibility for patrolling waters there because of these countries’ limited maritime capabilities. The U.S. should insist that EU involvement be designed with the ultimate goal of building the coastal enforcement capacity of regional states in the long term. EU naval assistance is thus primarily a short-term undertaking. This naval enforcement will also allow
regional governments to focus on land trafficking in the short term, while building improved naval capacity and justice systems in the long term.

**Challenges & Costs**

The U.S. will need to convince CARICOM countries, around which CBSI centers, that they will not lose focus if CBSI is expanded. This is a real fear of the union. It is evinced in that CARICOM has refused membership of the Dominican Republic because of its outsized economic and political power. The Department of State will need to assure CARICOM that CBSI’s expansion will not diffuse their gains from CBSI.

Similarly, CBSI is multifaceted - it is important that its other aspects do not lose attention by scaling up naval assistance for Central American states and Mexico. The U.S. must constantly keep in mind the long-term goals of CBSI while it provides its greatest assistance in the shorter term. Finally, the U.S. will have to cede some amount of influence in the Caribbean and Latin America to allow the EU to engage in CBSI. Public and/or congressional opposition may be diffused by highlighting the cost off-setting benefits of pulling in relevant EU states.
Recommendation 4: **Strengthen** the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) by consulting with the EU on successful anti-piracy military and justice practices from the Gulf of Aden.

**Background**

Piracy and drug trafficking are similar in that they are illicit enterprises. Successful anti-piracy and anti-drug trafficking operations will therefore share characteristics. Through Operation Atalanta and EUCAP Nestor, the EU has reduced successful pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden from 47 in 2010 to 4 in 2012. The EU has seen considerable success in not only mitigating piracy, but also in bringing pirates to justice through multilateral agreements.

**Proposal & Implementation**

The U.S. should consult with the EU about successful naval patrol practices to determine how to best enhance the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). The EU has taken a two-pronged approach to combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Operation Atalanta is the military component, consisting of 27 countries, approximately 2,000 personnel, four to seven surface vessels, and two to three Maritime Patrol Aircrafts. EUCAP Nestor is the civilian element focused on assisting Somalia, Djibouti, Seychelles, and Kenya to develop their Coastal Police Force. The mission is carried out by 15 EU member states. EUCAP Nestor is meant to serve as an exit strategy for Operation Atalanta, gradually returning coastal security responsibilities back to the local authorities. The U.S. should adopt a similar approach in the Caribbean and Central America.

Furthermore, the U.S. should also take steps to strengthen multilateral agreements with Latin American and Caribbean countries to facilitate trials for apprehended drug traffickers. The EU experience in the Gulf of Aden can serve as grounds for inspiration. The EU has worked closely with the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crimes, which has dedicated $10 million dollars to upgrade judicial systems in the Gulf of Aden. Because Somali piracy does not discriminate in selecting its targets, the UN granted universal jurisdiction in the prosecution of pirates. The transnational nature of the drug trade also warrants universal jurisdiction.

In addition, the UN should hold the international treaties to provide jurisdiction bases for nations to prosecute drug crimes domestically. These treaties can be modeled after the United Nations

**Challenges & Costs**

The high cost of conducting CBSI’s naval exercises is a potential challenge. Operation Atalanta provides a gauge for the costs associated with the deployment and maintenance of a military presence in the Caribbean and Central America. Since 2010, the EU has spent on average $11 million per year to maintain its modest military force in the Gulf of Aden. Because of the extent and sophistication of the drug cartels, military operations in the Americas will necessarily be larger in scope and more costly. The new CBSI strategy will be more effective than its previous “War on Drugs” brute force methods because it includes preventive strategies as well as the “stop gap”.

Finally, the U.S. should be aware of cartel influence on the governments of countries in which they operate. Cartels have extensive funds to lobby, buy, and coerce public officials at all levels. While cartel influence at the highest level of government is currently not significant, this influence will need to be kept in mind.
Recommendation 5:
*Promote* the creation of coast guards in Central American states.

**Background**
Well-financed drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), along with transnational gangs and other criminal groups, threaten the stability of Central American governments. Although the U.S. has collaborated with countries in the region in implementing and improving security efforts, various political parties at times oppose any partnership with the United States. The insecurity in Central America poses a potential threat to the U.S. because of the drugs that are shipped to our country.

**Proposal & Implementation**
The U.S. needs to develop and strengthen collaborative partnerships throughout the hemisphere. The U.S. should further increase funding to the Central America Regional Security Initiative (Carsi), which is part of the Mexican counter-narcotics and anti-crime assistance package known as the Mérida Initiative. The CarSi program should be expanded to include training and assistance in the development of Central American Coast Guards and perform joint naval patrol throughout the region.

**Challenges & Costs**
Congress appropriated $496.5 million for Central America through Mérida/CarSi. Although CarSi funding for 2013 is currently unclear, the Obama Administration has requested $161.5 million from Congress for FY 2014. Many political players in Central America do not want to collaborate with the United States. An example is Costa Rica’s Legislative Assembly, which is currently blocking a Joint Patrol Agreement that would allow U.S. Navy vessels to enter Costa Rican waters. Our embassies should engage the local authorities, the public, and the media, and pressure political players who oppose the agreement to work with the U.S. to promote strong regional coast guards to prevent the transport of drugs to the U.S. and other regions of the world.
Airspace Security

**Recommendation 6:**
*Assist* Central American governments in setting up radar systems to track aircrafts carrying drugs.

**Background**

Drug traffickers increasingly use aircrafts to transport drugs from South America into Central America. Central America has an abundance of rainforests that are uninhabited and un-policied. Traffickers covertly transport drugs by landing single-engine aircrafts in these jungles. After landing, these drugs are typically transported by boats.

Drug traffickers have successfully maintained this system by employing locals to keep runways clear for deliveries. Traffickers distribute their cargo to Mexican drug cartels to transport across the U.S.-Mexico border. Upon completing their delivery, planes are routinely burned to destroy evidence of the activity. It has been exceptionally difficult for Central American governments to impede the movement of this cargo due to limited financial and technical resources.

**Proposal & Implementation**

We propose the U.S. assist Central American governments in constructing and maintaining radar systems to track drug trafficking aircrafts. Radar systems will allow Central American states to survey their airspaces, locate clandestine landing strips in the jungles, and arrest drug traffickers. At present, Central American states do not have the capacity to do this. Costa Rica dismantled its military in 1948, and Guatemala reduced the size of its military by two-thirds following the end of its guerrilla war in 1996. Most other Central American militaries are poorly trained.

Installment of these systems would additionally serve as a deterrent for trafficking aircrafts. Assistance from the U.S. will benefit both the U.S. and Central American governments. For instance, the largest drug seizures in Costa Rica and in Honduras have been conducted in conjunction with the United States. Similar radar operations were successful in 2011, when a U.S. radar system detected a plane near the Honduran coast and helicopters with night vision gear pinpointed its location.
Challenges & Costs
In 2011, Honduran officials requested assistance to combat drug trafficking aircrafts. They estimated that an effective radar system would cost approximately $30 million, in addition to the cost of other necessary equipment such as helicopters. The cost of installing radar systems in the other Central American states would likely be comparable. The U.S. would incur the cost of training Central American militaries to use the technology effectively and apprehend traffickers once located.
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**Latin America**


Appendix

Figure 1: Humanitarian Crisis in Mali
Figure 2: ISAF Troops in Afghanistan, by Nationality
Figure 3: Drug Smuggling Routes: Latin America

Figure 4: West African Drug Routes
Appendix Sources


"Mexican Cartels Spread Violence To Central America."


"Why West Africa Needs Saving from South American Drug Barons."