

UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY WITH PAKISTAN FOLLOWING 9/11

A CASE STUDY IN COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

by

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Introduction

After the attacks on 9/11, the United States quickly determined that Al Qaida was responsible and was destined for a war in Afghanistan where Al Qaida was located under the protection of Afghan's Taliban government. Given the geopolitical landscape; the U.S. badly needed Pakistan's support for the war, but on the eve of 9/11, the U.S. and Pakistan were far from allies. In fact, other than being the target of multiple sanctions, Pakistan had little in the way of international relations with the U.S. Despite this estranged relationship, the U.S. was able to gain Pakistan's support for the war in mere days though a combination of credible threats and incentives. This case study will analyze U.S. diplomacy in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and show how the U.S. successfully employed coercive diplomacy to gain Pakistan's support.

I start the analysis with a brief history of U.S.-Pakistani cooperation. This is necessary because it shows the episodic and discontinuous relationship between the two countries over the past 60 years: a relationship driven on the American side by a larger strategic calculation and on the Pakistani side by the desire to acquire resources and political support for its contest with India.¹ Next, I depict Pakistan's situation on the eve of 9/11: a country in shambles following a recent coup in desperate need of economic assistance. Then, I present the negotiations that took place between the two countries and the results of those negotiations. Subsequently, I analyze the diplomacy as a case of coercive diplomacy and describe why the U.S. was successful. Finally, I present lessons learned from this example that would be useful for future diplomacy.

A brief history of US-PK relationship

In order to properly understand the diplomacy that the U.S. chose following 9/11, it is necessary to understand the relationship between the two countries over the past 60 years. While many nations' bilateral relationship with the U.S. resembles a sine curve with periodic highs and lows, Pakistan has experienced the most extreme periodic highs and lows. Historically, close ties were single issue engagements of limited or uncertain duration between the military or military dominated government of Pakistan and Washington policy largely in hands of the White House, the Pentagon and the CIA.²

In the 1950's Pakistan was "America's most allied ally" in the Cold War to contain Soviet expansion.³ Washington turned to Pakistan to stop Communist expansion following India's choice of non-alignment. However, cooperation deteriorated throughout the 1960's, especially after the U.S. backed India in a war with China while Pakistan turned to China for assistance. Cooperation briefly revived in 1970-71 after Pakistan helped the U.S. open its

¹ Stephen Philip Cohen, "America and Pakistan: Is the Worst Case Avoidable?" *Current History*, March 2005, p. 132.

² Touqir Hussain, *U.S.-Pakistan Engagement: The War on Terrorism and Beyond*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, Autumn 2005, p. 2.

³ Robert G. Wirsing, "Precarious Partnership: Pakistan's Response to U.S. Security Policies," *Asian Affairs, an American Review*, Summer 2003, p. 70.

Embassy in Beijing, but it was short lived. The relationship hit a low point again in 1977 when mobs burned the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and several information centers while the Pakistani government stood by. The relationship remained strained through the end of the decade when the Carter administration introduced sanctions and terminated U.S. economic and military aid in 1979 following Pakistan's development of its nuclear program.⁴

Despite this extreme low, the relationship quickly rebounded in the early 1980s following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December of 1979 and the second U.S.-Pakistan alliance took shape. The U.S. became Pakistan's partner in Pakistan's proxy war in Afghanistan.⁵ The U.S. chose Afghan religious extremists as its allies who were trained by Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI) and the CIA and given U.S. military assistance.⁶ Despite the U.S. having various interests with Pakistan including containing the Pakistani nuclear program, edging Pakistan towards a more democratic order, averting an India-Pakistan crisis, and stopping the narcotics flow, the war against the Soviet Union trumped these other issues. Besides cooperation for the war, the only other success the U.S. achieved during the 1980's was curbing the drug trade emanating from Pakistan.⁷ During this second alliance the U.S. ignored Pakistan's uneven economic development, crumbling education system and growing Islamic radicalism.⁸ The Reagan administration was not worried about the consequences of radical Islamists because they were the best fighters in Afghanistan (which the U.S. saw as a threat to the U.S.S.R. but not to the U.S.).

The U.S. no longer considered that it had a strategic interest in the region after the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989. The fact that U.S.-Soviet relations were improving under Mikhail Gorbachev only reinforced this belief. Thus, the relationship with Pakistan quickly deteriorated since the Soviets were the only reason the two countries came together in the first place. Sanctions started in August of 1990 with the Pressler Amendment. This legislation, enacted in 1985, required the U.S. President to certify that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons; without certification, Pakistan would lose most of its military and economic assistance from the United States. In 1990 the President refused to certify Pakistan, not coincidentally the first year that the U.S. no longer needed the Pakistani cooperation.⁹

In May 1998, the U.S. enacted a second set of sanctions following a series of nuclear tests by invoking the 1994 Glenn Amendment which authorizes sanctions on non-nuclear weapon states that detonate nuclear explosions and the Symington Amendment which prohibits military and economic assistance to any country that delivers and/or receives nuclear assistance.¹⁰

Finally the "Democracy Sanctions" were enacted in October 1999 following Musharraf's military takeover of the government. The U.S. invoked Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance

⁴ Cohen, p. 131.

⁵ Samina Ahmed, "The United States and Terrorism in Southwest Asia: September 11 and Beyond," *International Security*, Winter 2001/2, p. 80.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Cohen, p. 132.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Hussain, p. 5.

¹⁰ Ibid.

Act which prohibited all U.S. economic and military aid to Pakistan.¹¹ Unfortunately, these sanctions were too weak to be effective at influencing Pakistan's actions, but strong enough to be seen as an affront.¹² At the same time, the U.S. offered Pakistan no incentive to change. Without U.S. economic aid, Pakistan's institutions deteriorated, it accumulated huge debt and the cultivation of radical Islamic groups continued.¹³

In Afghanistan, a struggle for power followed the Soviet withdrawal with the Taliban emerging victorious in 1996. Osama bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia in 1989 and following the Gulf War in 1991, launched his "jihad" against Saudi Arabia and its U.S. supports. Bin Laden was forced to flee and went to Sudan, from where he was expelled in 1996 as a result of U.S. pressure. From there he went to Afghanistan where he established a close relationship with the Taliban.¹⁴ Pakistan continued to meddle in Afghan affairs long after the U.S. left. As a result, they had established a cordial relationship with the Taliban and were one of only three countries to recognize the Taliban as the legal government of Afghanistan.

The US-Pakistani Relationship on the eve of 9/11

On the eve of 9/11, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship was extremely low. U.S. and Pakistani relations strained over a number of issues including Pakistan's support for the Taliban in Afghanistan.¹⁵ Pakistan was being subjected to a wide range of U.S. sanctions under the Pressler, Glenn and Symington Amendments and the "Democracy Sanction" that limited all economic and military aid to Pakistan.¹⁶ To make matters worse, the U.S. was in the process of forging close diplomatic and strategic ties with India, Pakistan's most hated enemy.¹⁷

Pakistan's domestic situation was in shambles. It had a weak institutional architecture, a stillborn political process following a recent coup, an underdeveloped economy, a poor educational system, and internal tension with Islamist extremism on the rise. According to the World Bank, Pakistan was in a "position of extreme vulnerability" due to its immense debt and struggling economy and its emaciated public education system resulting in a 44% literacy rate which helped spur the rise of Islamic extremism.¹⁸

U.S. Diplomacy following 9/11

On 11 September 2001, al-Qaida operatives hijacked four airplanes crashing two into the World Trade Towers and a third into the Pentagon with the fourth forced down in a Pennsylvania

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Hussain, p. 5.

¹³ Cohen, p. 132.

¹⁴ Ahmed, pp. 80-1.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 83.

¹⁶ Hussain, p. 5.

¹⁷ Ahmed, p. 83.

¹⁸ Christine Fair, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India*, Washington: RAND Corporation, 2004, pp. 57-8; by comparison according to the World Bank, the literacy rate in countries with similar per capita income is 64%.

field before it could complete its mission. This attack represented the single largest terrorist attack in history and the largest attack ever on U.S. soil. It did not take long for the U.S. to determine that al-Qaida was to blame. The U.S. pressured the Taliban to turn over bin Laden. When they refused, the U.S. started planning for the invasion.

Since Afghanistan is a landlocked country, the U.S. required the airspace, bases, and logistical support of neighboring countries to conduct the invasion. The U.S. was negotiating with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan for support, but the U.S. desperately needed Pakistan's support. Most of the fighter aircraft and many of the troops and supplies came from ships in the Indian Ocean and other than Iran, which was not considered a viable ally, Pakistan was the only other country that bordered both the Indian Ocean and Afghanistan. Thus, given Pakistan's close relationship with the Taliban and its strained relationship with the U.S., the Bush administration sought to gain Pakistan's support through coercive diplomacy.

The U.S. immediately set out to build an international coalition. Within the first 24 hours, the U.S. received a UN Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force, and NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history. The U.S. had a large coalition, but still required Pakistan's support to mount the invasion. The U.S. wanted to invade Afghanistan quickly to prevent bin Laden and other al Qaida and Taliban leaders from escaping or going into hiding. Thus, the U.S. wanted Pakistani support as soon as possible.

The official diplomacy was conducted through multiple channels. In Pakistan, the U.S. Ambassador, Wendy Chamberlain, was responsible for most of the negotiations with President Musharraf and the government of Pakistan.¹⁹ In Washington, the U.S. government primarily interacted with the Pakistani Embassy. Finally the negotiations were characterized by several phone calls between President Bush or Secretary of State Colin Powell and President Musharraf. The U.S., through all three methods described above, made it clear to Pakistan that it wanted intelligence support, the use of Pakistan's airspace, and logistical support.²⁰ Although the U.S. never directly threatened the use of force, U.S. officials threatened to add Pakistan to a State Department list of seven terrorist-sponsoring nations which would portend the possibility of U.S. force.²¹ According to one high-ranking official at U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, President Musharraf was told to either abandon support of Taliban or be prepared to be treated like the Taliban.²²

In Washington the diplomacy was being conducted primarily between Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and the Pakistan Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi and his ISI chief Mahmoud Ahmed. They met on a daily basis starting on 12 September and during the initial meetings, Armitage presented the U.S. list of demands which included the full use of airspace, Pakistan's closing its borders with Afghanistan, and use of its territory as a staging base.²³ In Islamabad, Ambassador Chamberlain was presenting the same demands. According to one

¹⁹ Burns, John F. "A Nation Challenged: The Ambassador; U.S. Envoy to Pakistan Thrust into Limelight," *The New York Times*, 24 November 2001.

²⁰ From "Address by the President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf to the Nation on 19 September 2001."

²¹ Barbara Slavin and Bill Nichols, "U.S. pressures Pakistan's leaders to help bring in bin Laden," *USA Today*, 14 September 2001, p. A4.

²² Fair, p. 17.

²³ Slavin, p. A4.

source, Armitage was blunt and said that the U.S. was building a coalition and “clearly there was a worldwide momentum right now to stand up and be counted. Are you with us or not?”²⁴

On 13 September, Secretary Powell telephoned Musharraf to seek what he said was “a specific list of things we think would be useful for them to work on with us.”²⁵ Despite potential Pakistani domestic pressure against joining the coalition, the American pressure worked and on 16 September, Pakistan announced that it would join the global coalition against terrorism and offered immediate tangible aid to include military bases.²⁶ Thus, in a matter of days, the U.S. received Pakistan’s support, but the extent of Pakistan’s commitment had yet to be determined.

Realizing that a tentative agreement had been reached, but the details had yet to be determined, Musharraf sought to position himself for follow-on negotiations. On 19 September, Musharraf addressed his nation talking about “wrong decisions” in the country’s moment of crisis (by which he implied declining to join the coalition against terrorism).²⁷ During his speech, Musharraf identified four critical concerns: Pakistan’s security and stability from an external threat, the revival of the economy, its strategic nuclear and missile assets and the Kashmir cause. He said that “Pakistan comes first, everything else is secondary.”²⁸

Musharraf’s speech was well timed, for only a day later, President Bush gave his famous “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” speech to a joint session of Congress and the American people.²⁹ This was an informal threat by the U.S. to Pakistan that if Pakistan refused to cooperate, it would be treated like the terrorists. As the details of support had yet to be determined, this public diplomacy was meant to ensure Pakistan’s support would be genuine.

On 22 September, the U.S. lifted the economic and military sanctions that had been imposed against Pakistan under the Pressler, Glenn, and Symington Amendments and Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act. All were waived by Bush under the authority of Brownback II.³⁰

Pakistan’s cooperation for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) continued to take shape on 24 September when a combined Task Force from the Department of Defense and Department of State negotiated with the government of Pakistan on a broad set of agreements. Pakistan agreed to provide blanket flyover and landing rights, access to naval and air bases, and critical petrol supplies. Much of the logistical support was initially provided without any of the formal agreements or user fees that are normally required for such privileges; thus demonstrating Pakistan’s full support.³¹

On 7 October, the U.S. commenced OEF and by 12 November Kabul had fallen. Pakistan’s support was critical to the unequivocal success of the allied invasion. Ambassador

²⁴ Aziz Haniffa, “U.S. will count on Pakistan for strikes against bin Laden,” *India Abroad*, 21 September 2001, p. 1.

²⁵ Haniffa, p. 1.

²⁶ Wirsing, p. 71.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

²⁸ From “Address by the President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf to the Nation on 19 September 2001.”

²⁹ From President Bush’s “Address to Joint Session of Congress and the American People” on 20 September 2001.

³⁰ Hussain, p. 5.

³¹ Fair, p. 15.

Chamberlain said that Pakistan provided “unstinting support” throughout the war.³² One U.S. Central Command officer said that “Pakistan has provided more support, captured more terrorists and committed more troops than any other nation in the Global Counterterrorism Force.”³³

Pakistan followed through with its agreement for military and intelligence support. In the first five months of the war, over 28,000 sorties overflew Pakistani airspace from carriers in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan provided the U.S. access to numerous military bases and helped establish a number of facilities including Intermediate Staging Bases at Jacobabad, Pasni, Dalbandin and Shamsi; Predator basing at Jacobabad and Shamsi, and access to other bases used by over 50 aircraft and 2,000 coalition military personnel that bedded down at these locals. Pakistan provided fuel to aircraft, averaging 100,000 gallons per day, initially without any established repayment mechanism. Pakistan provided over 35,000 troops to protect these coalition bases and increased border security that resulted in the reportedly capture of 420 high-value Taliban and Al-Qaida fugitives. Finally, Pakistan provided intelligence support to coalition forces, most notably human intelligence which coalition forces desperately needed to complement its technical intelligence.³⁴

The U.S. also followed through with its commitments. Shortly after sanctions were lifted, the U.S. started to provide economic and military support to Pakistan. In the first three years, the U.S. extended \$1 billion in grants, wrote off \$1 billion in debt, provided \$1.2 billion in arms-sales, reinstated a military training program, and provided \$3 billion for economic aid and security assistance.³⁵

Analysis of U.S. diplomacy

The diplomacy between the U.S. and Pakistan is a case of coercive diplomacy. Prior to analyzing why the U.S. successfully executed coercive diplomacy, I will present a theoretical description of coercive diplomacy to distinguish it from its often-confused cousin: deterrence.

In his book *Force and Statecraft*, Alexander George describes coercive diplomacy as diplomacy that “attempts to reverse actions that are already occurring or have been undertaken by an adversary.”³⁶ He distinguishes this from deterrence “which attempts to dissuade an opponent from undertaking action that has yet been initiated.”³⁷ Deterrence “tries to *inhibit* behavior by fear of the consequences” while coercive diplomacy “tries to *initiate* behavior by fear of the consequences.”³⁸ In this case, it is clear that the U.S. is trying to initiate a change in Pakistan’s behavior: the U.S. is trying to convince the Pakistan to stop its support for the Taliban and support the U.S. war against them. George goes on to further describe coercive diplomacy

³² Fair, p. 15.

³³ Ibid., p. 27.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 28-32.

³⁵ Cohen, p. 132 and Hussein, p. 6.

³⁶ Alexander George et al., *Force and Statecraft*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 200.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

as “essentially a diplomatic strategy backed by the threat of force.”³⁹ Clearly there was a threat of force from the U.S; thus, this is clearly a case of coercive diplomacy rather than deterrence.

According to George, there are five areas of critical importance for successful coercive diplomacy: (1) “the coercing power must convey that it is more highly motivated to achieve its stated demands than the adversary is to oppose them,” (2) careful attention must be paid to “what is demanded of an opponent,” (3) the threat must be both “credible and sufficiently potent,” (4) it should include the “offer of positive incentives” with “carrots” or incentives combined with “sticks” of threats, and (5) decide “how much of a sense of urgency to create in the adversary’s mind to achieve compliance with the demands.”⁴⁰ I will now analyze the diplomacy through each of these critical areas.

First, “the coercing power must convey that it is more highly motivated to achieve its stated demands than the adversary is to oppose them,” in other words, it must portray an “asymmetry of motivation.”⁴¹ Roger Fisher’s concept of BATNA, or Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement, is a useful concept when discussing this point.⁴² If a (quick) agreement could not be reached, the U.S.’s BATNA was to wage war on both Pakistan and Afghanistan; this would have been extremely costly (much more so than direct aid) and much more difficult. Pakistan’s BATNA was to refuse to support the U.S. which would lead to a U.S. invasion and to Musharraf’s loss of power.

Thus, neither side had a viable BATNA and U.S. diplomacy worked to ensure that Pakistan did not improve its position to create a viable BATNA. Despite the lack of viable BATNAs and the desire of both parties to reach a mutual agreement, the asymmetry of motivation still favored the U.S. because both the U.S. and Pakistan favored an agreement (Pakistani support) to no agreement (war with Pakistan). Thus, there was a fairly large “win set” and negotiating room for each party to try to achieve as much as possible from an agreement.

The second component of coercive diplomacy is that careful attention must be paid to “what is demanded of an opponent.”⁴³ Its two critical components are that demands must be well thought out by the coercing power and then clearly transmitted to the coerced power. In this case the demand was fairly simple: the U.S. demanded Pakistan’s support for the war in Afghanistan. The U.S. sufficiently narrowed what it required of Pakistan and did not try to include other demands involving nuclear weapons or the Kashmir that would have unnecessarily complicated the negotiations. The demands were successfully transmitted in Washington through the Pakistani Embassy, in Islamabad through the U.S. Embassy and in phone calls between government leaders. President Bush’s “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” speech was one method used to send the demand publically.

The U.S. also successfully accomplished the second component: the U.S. transmitted a clear message that was correctly interpreted by the government of Pakistan. Despite using

³⁹ George, p. 200.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 201-3.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 201

⁴² See Roger Fisher, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, New York: Penguin Books, 1983.

⁴³ George, p. 202.

multiple communication channels, all U.S. “messengers,” or officials, carried the same message and reinforced one another rather than confuse the situation. Ultimately there were few, and more importantly, no major mutual misperceptions which is critical for effective coercive diplomacy.

Despite being the coerced power, Pakistan also made its own demands using the same official channels as well as publically. When Musharraf spoke to his country on 19 September, he made it clear that he wanted aid to revive the economy and he made it clear that its strategic nuclear and missile assets and the Kashmir cause were not open for negotiation. By making this public statement, he was intentionally narrowing the win set. By doing this he ran the risk of losing public support if he had to go back on his word had the U.S. pressed either issue, but Musharraf correctly calculated that support for the war was the top issue for the U.S. Thus Musharraf correctly used public diplomacy to gain a better negotiated agreement.

The third component of coercive diplomacy is the threat must be both “credible and sufficiently potent;” in other words, the coercing power must demonstrate both the “ability or capability” and the “will or resolution.”⁴⁴ The U.S. clearly demonstrated a credible threat. After the first Gulf War, no one doubted the U.S. capability. While the will or resolution could have been doubted following the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia or the type of campaign it waged during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, the U.S. conducted several actions that helped demonstrate its commitment. First, it received UN Security Council approved the use of Force with UN Security Council Resolution 1368 which called on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the terrorist attacks.⁴⁵ Second, it received NATO approval for the use of force through Article 5.⁴⁶ And third, a joint resolution by Congress unanimously approved the use of force against those responsible for the 9/11 attacks.⁴⁷ Together these demonstrated the will of the U.S. Additionally, the large international coalition put additional pressure on Pakistan. Without these international endorsements, it is possible, as witnessed by Saddam Hussein in 2003, that Pakistan could have misjudged U.S. resolution by assuming the U.S. threat was not credible because it lacked international approval. This international coalition thus served to demonstrate credibility for the U.S.

The fourth component of coercive diplomacy is that it should include both “carrots” and “sticks.”⁴⁸ Sticks are only helpful if they are credible. In this case, the stick used by the U.S. was the threat of war. As discussed in the previous paragraph, this was a credible threat. However, coercive diplomacy often requires the use of carrots to be successful. The threat of invasion was powerful enough that the U.S. could have chosen to ignore incentives. However, the U.S. was ultimately more successful by offering incentives which helped offset domestic criticism in Pakistan and improved Musharraf’s “win-set.”

Carrots offered by the U.S. included economic and military aid and debt relief. Additionally, the U.S. decided not to pressure Pakistan on its nuclear program or the Kashmir.

⁴⁴ George, p. 202.

⁴⁵ See UN Security Council Resolution 1368, 12 September 2001.

⁴⁶ Edgar Buckley, “Invoking Article 5,” *NATO Review*, Summer 2006.

⁴⁷ Public Law 107-40 from the 107th Congress on 18 September 2001.

⁴⁸ George, p. 202.

Providing these incentives likely resulted in greater cooperation from Pakistan. In the early stages of the war Pakistan provided millions of gallons of fuel and other support without a formal repayment system established; this support likely would have suffered without U.S. incentives as Pakistan would have likely withheld support until official agreements were signed. Additionally, failing to use carrots would have likely hurt future relationships. If the government and people of Pakistan saw themselves bullied into an agreement as opposed to being in a cooperative partnership in which they were gaining, the U.S. would have a substantially lesser ability to leverage other issues in the future. With incentives in place, the U.S. now has the ability to influence actions with the threat of pulling economic aid. Without incentives, the U.S. has little ability to influence Pakistan now that the threat of invasion is no longer credible. The failure to offer any incentives is was one of the reasons that the U.S. was unable to influence Pakistan in the late 1990s.

The fifth and final component of coercive diplomacy is the coercing power must decide “how much of a sense of urgency to create in the adversary’s mind to achieve compliance with the demands.”⁴⁹ Through official channels the U.S. made it clear that time was of the essence, although it is unknown if the U.S. actually issued a deadline for a decision. Additionally, gaining the UN Security Council Resolution and NATO invoking Article 5 within 24 hours publicly demonstrated the urgency felt by the U.S. and demonstrated that Pakistan had little time to make a decision.

Ultimately, the negotiation was a success for both the U.S. and Pakistan. The U.S. was able to achieve Pakistani support through coercive diplomacy. The U.S. clearly demonstrated and communicated its motivation, its demand, a credible threat and its urgency to Pakistan. Additionally, its flexible strategy of employing carrots and sticks, not only allowed Pakistan to quickly concede to the U.S. demands, but the carrots allowed the government to “sell” the agreement to a population that was relatively anti-American following years of sanctions. The end result was that Pakistan provided “unequivocal support” and in return received billions of dollars in aid and debt relief.

Lessons Learned

This was a clear success for the U.S. so there are some lessons that can be taken and applied to future negotiations. However, despite this success, there is some cause for concern that merit attention and must be considered for future negotiations as well.

Single issue (narrow negotiation). By focusing on a single issue, the U.S. was able to keep the win set as large as possible and it helped the U.S. obtain a quick agreement. If the U.S. tried to include democratization or nuclear issues in the agreement, it is certain that Pakistan would have taken longer to agree and possible they would have risked war with the U.S. and refused any agreement. Thus, when a rapid decision is required, the negotiations should focus on only the most relevant issues; but there is a trade-off.

Other priorities. The trade-off of focusing on a single issue is that other issues, that could be a top priority in the near future, could be sacrificed. The U.S. was able to accomplish

⁴⁹ George, pp. 202-3.

its short term goal of support for the war, but potentially sacrificed an opportunity to influence Pakistan's nuclear program or democratization. However, a counterargument could be made that the U.S. had no influence on these issues over the past decade and could only influence these issues by engagement with Pakistan. Zartman notes that 'ripe moments' for resolving long-standing issues 'tend to come before or after but not usually during a crisis.'⁵⁰ Thus, there is little the U.S. could have done to use the crisis to influence these other priorities in September of 2001, but these long-standing issues could be addressed later, once the engagement has started.

Overly focused on the present. Another concern of crisis negotiation is that it is too focused on the present crisis. It can be argued that the U.S. was short sighted when it sought to use jihadists to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. Decades later, we are now paying for it with a war against extremist groups. Even at the peak of the Cold War, there was little to fear from a direct attack from the Soviets on the U.S. mainland. It is possible that by concerning itself only with Pakistan's support for the war, the U.S. is ignoring other issues that may prove to be more devastating in the long run such as democratization, a successful Kashmir resolution or nuclear proliferation. Helping to prop up Musharraf, the U.S. may be sowing the seeds for future conflict.

Two-level game. This case serves as a reminder that negotiations are often a two-level game. President Musharraf's speech on 19 September clearly demonstrated his need to justify his actions to the public to gain its support. Additionally, he used this two-level game to influence his win set. By declaring publically that Pakistan's nuclear weapons and the Kashmir were not on the negotiating table, he prevented the U.S. from addressing these issues. Finally, he publically acknowledged which carrots he was seeking from the U.S. (economic assistance). The lesson for future negotiations is that negotiations are not a single set of negotiations between governments; it is often a negotiation between a government and its people as well and must be considered throughout the course of negotiations.

Conclusion

The U.S. achieved Pakistan's full support following 9/11 because it successfully incorporated the five major components of coercive diplomacy: it conveyed an asymmetry of motivation, it narrowly defined what it demanded and clearly transmitted this demand, it presented a credible threat, it offered carrots as well as sticks and it ensured that Pakistan understood the urgency for a quick decision.

Despite this success and many of the positive lessons of diplomacy that were demonstrated, it should be with caution that we think that this same strategy would lead to success anywhere or anytime. The U.S. used more or less the same coercive diplomacy with the Taliban (though arguably with less carrots) and the Taliban chose war over agreement. Also, the U.S. and Pakistan have a history of an on-again off-again relationship, so the U.S. and Pakistan only had to dust off their play book from 1980 rather than develop a completely new strategy—this same play book probably would not work in Iran. Thus, while this was a case of successful diplomacy, we should be cautious about applying it to similar situations in the future.

⁵⁰ Richardson, p. 367.

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