News
New Salman Ahmed paper, "Seven Deadly Sins" of peace-making
Two senior U.N. officials have written a new paper outlining the “seven deadly sins” international mediators should avoid when attempting to implement peace agreements in pre-or post-conflict settings.
The paper, “In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation,” (will open a .pdf) is based on a chapter of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008 and co-authored by Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Special Adviser to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Salman Ahmed, on sabbatical from the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and now a visiting professor at the Woodrow Wilson School, as well as a visiting research scholar at the School’s Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination. Brahimi and Ahmed identify “ignorance; arrogance; partiality; impotence; haste; inflexibility; and false promises,” as mistakes an international mediator can make that may have “fatal consequences” for the peace process in which a peacekeeping operation is embedded.
The authors note that while the role a mediator may play can be described in various ways, such as “diplomatic efforts, mediation, peace-making, political facilitation, political process management or, simply, as the ‘political role’ of the operation,” the process is a difficult one, “where success is difficult to achieve, but mistakes come easily.” Committing one or more of the seven deadly sins may arise in different contexts, “from diplomatic efforts to prevent an initial outbreak of fighting to the negotiations that seek to stop a conflict that is underway. The need for effective mediation is also required after the conclusion of a peace agreement and the deployment of a peace operation.”
Brahimi and Ahmed write: “The circumstances will vary, but one thing remains constant across peace operations: the political role is vital. It manifests itself at many levels, from the high politics to conclude formal agreements, to low-key engagement with those parties that might rethink the wisdom of the concessions they have made.”
The authors point out that under the auspices of the U.N. the political role may be entrusted to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), who also serves as the civilian head of the peace operation on the ground. However, in many other cases, these responsibilities are divided among several individuals and organizations, as evidenced in Lebanon, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Kosovo.
The Seven Deadly Sins
“Each conflict is unique but at the same time,” Brahimi and Ahmed write, “based on bitter personal experience in the management of several political processes and close observation of the work of others, there do appear to be certain recurrent traps that materialize in many different situations, across the spectrum of crisis response, and regardless if the mediator is operating with a small team or heading an operation comprised of thousands of personnel.”
Seven traps Brahimi and Ahmed urge international mediators to avoid are:
Ignorance: In order to be in a position to help the parties identify and reach solutions to their political problems, the SRSG obviously must have a basic understanding of the country in all its facets, from the history and culture to the economy and social structure.
Arrogance: The first step in alleviating ignorance is for one to openly acknowledge that “I do not know enough” and to ask for help. Many SRSGs and other international mediators are keenly aware of their ignorance and the need to seek the view of others, particularly the people of the country themselves. To compound matters further, the temptation is great to conclude that: “I have seen this all before;” the problems in this country are “just like x” (where one happened to have served previously); and/or “there is no point exploring all these options because the donors and implementing agencies have other priorities.”
Partiality: One of the mediator’s indispensable contributions to the political process depends on whether the substance of the message is informed by a sophisticated understanding of the issues. The deftness of the diplomacy plays a part: how, where and when something is said matters as much as what is being said. Perhaps most of all, the parties’ perception of the messenger and his or her motivations can be decisive.
Impotence: A well-informed, honest and impartial broker plays an indispensable role in the political process, but within limits. Parties that believe they are 100 percent right do not opt for a negotiated solution because they are inclined to make painful concessions, but rather because circumstances might have left them no other choice. The SRSG or other international mediator is entirely reliant on the relevant members of the international community to make the negotiated option more attractive to the parties relative to the alternatives. Thus, an honest broker can be an irrelevant broker as well if she or he does not carefully manage his or her relations with the relevant members of the international community.
Haste: In order to obtain a clear picture of the political map, gain the confidence of the parties, and identify common ground among domestic and relevant external actors, the international mediator will need to consult with hundreds of actors, over and over again. Even if working at the pace normally demanded of mediators, and depending on the number of parties involved, this may require several months of effort. No matter how sound a mediator’s proposals might be, they risk being rejected if they have not emanated from a process that enjoys the confidence of all the parties to the conflict and is considered legitimate in the eyes of the population at large. The process matters and it takes time.
Inflexibility: Constantly evolving developments can create new opportunities to be exploited or new formidable obstacles to be overcome. The SRSG or other international mediator does not have the luxury of being indifferent to the change in context, simply because she or he has invested too much time already in a process conceived in different set of circumstances. Inflexibilty to adjust course in response to major changes in the political map or on the international scene can lead a peace process down a dead-end or away from new avenues to take it forward.
False promises: The international mediator commits the seventh and final deadly sin when they fails to counter false expectations or promises that a peaceful and prosperous democracy will emerge relatively quickly from the ashes of war, even where it never existed previously, simply because the peace operation has appeared on the scene.
Brahimi and Ahmed argue that given the unprecedented numbers of peacekeepers now deployed throughout the globe in volatile areas, “the role of effective mediation in peacekeeping contexts needs to be given more attention, urgently. It is becoming considerably more complicated to manage these political problems—before and after peacekeepers arrive—due to evolutions on the geo-political landscape and in the practice of peacekeeping.”
Avoiding these seven deadly sins is important, they assert, because “The effective exercise of the political role of SRSGs and other international mediators is acutely needed now in several conflict areas where over 160,000 peacekeepers are already on the ground under the flag of the UN, the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU) and NATO.” In addition, fundamental political problems, “be they disputes over power, territory, resources or spheres of influence – in Lebanon, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Eritrea/Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire, Georgia/Abkhazia, Somalia, Chad, Nepal, Afghanistan and Kosovo have yet to be fully addressed,” and the parties involved require a third party to help mediate these conflicts.
In concluding, Brahimi and Ahmed caution, “Even if the mediator can avoid the deadly sins mentioned in this essay, there is no guarantee of success. Failure is inevitable, however, when we throw peacekeepers at conflicts or cast stones at the mediator, as a substitute for facing the painful political compromises still to be made by all sides to achieve a sustainable peace.”
The paper, “In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation,” (will open a .pdf) is based on a chapter of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008 and co-authored by Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Special Adviser to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Salman Ahmed, on sabbatical from the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and now a visiting professor at the Woodrow Wilson School, as well as a visiting research scholar at the School’s Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination. Brahimi and Ahmed identify “ignorance; arrogance; partiality; impotence; haste; inflexibility; and false promises,” as mistakes an international mediator can make that may have “fatal consequences” for the peace process in which a peacekeeping operation is embedded.
The authors note that while the role a mediator may play can be described in various ways, such as “diplomatic efforts, mediation, peace-making, political facilitation, political process management or, simply, as the ‘political role’ of the operation,” the process is a difficult one, “where success is difficult to achieve, but mistakes come easily.” Committing one or more of the seven deadly sins may arise in different contexts, “from diplomatic efforts to prevent an initial outbreak of fighting to the negotiations that seek to stop a conflict that is underway. The need for effective mediation is also required after the conclusion of a peace agreement and the deployment of a peace operation.”
Brahimi and Ahmed write: “The circumstances will vary, but one thing remains constant across peace operations: the political role is vital. It manifests itself at many levels, from the high politics to conclude formal agreements, to low-key engagement with those parties that might rethink the wisdom of the concessions they have made.”
The authors point out that under the auspices of the U.N. the political role may be entrusted to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), who also serves as the civilian head of the peace operation on the ground. However, in many other cases, these responsibilities are divided among several individuals and organizations, as evidenced in Lebanon, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Kosovo.
The Seven Deadly Sins
“Each conflict is unique but at the same time,” Brahimi and Ahmed write, “based on bitter personal experience in the management of several political processes and close observation of the work of others, there do appear to be certain recurrent traps that materialize in many different situations, across the spectrum of crisis response, and regardless if the mediator is operating with a small team or heading an operation comprised of thousands of personnel.”
Seven traps Brahimi and Ahmed urge international mediators to avoid are:
Ignorance: In order to be in a position to help the parties identify and reach solutions to their political problems, the SRSG obviously must have a basic understanding of the country in all its facets, from the history and culture to the economy and social structure.
Arrogance: The first step in alleviating ignorance is for one to openly acknowledge that “I do not know enough” and to ask for help. Many SRSGs and other international mediators are keenly aware of their ignorance and the need to seek the view of others, particularly the people of the country themselves. To compound matters further, the temptation is great to conclude that: “I have seen this all before;” the problems in this country are “just like x” (where one happened to have served previously); and/or “there is no point exploring all these options because the donors and implementing agencies have other priorities.”
Partiality: One of the mediator’s indispensable contributions to the political process depends on whether the substance of the message is informed by a sophisticated understanding of the issues. The deftness of the diplomacy plays a part: how, where and when something is said matters as much as what is being said. Perhaps most of all, the parties’ perception of the messenger and his or her motivations can be decisive.
Impotence: A well-informed, honest and impartial broker plays an indispensable role in the political process, but within limits. Parties that believe they are 100 percent right do not opt for a negotiated solution because they are inclined to make painful concessions, but rather because circumstances might have left them no other choice. The SRSG or other international mediator is entirely reliant on the relevant members of the international community to make the negotiated option more attractive to the parties relative to the alternatives. Thus, an honest broker can be an irrelevant broker as well if she or he does not carefully manage his or her relations with the relevant members of the international community.
Haste: In order to obtain a clear picture of the political map, gain the confidence of the parties, and identify common ground among domestic and relevant external actors, the international mediator will need to consult with hundreds of actors, over and over again. Even if working at the pace normally demanded of mediators, and depending on the number of parties involved, this may require several months of effort. No matter how sound a mediator’s proposals might be, they risk being rejected if they have not emanated from a process that enjoys the confidence of all the parties to the conflict and is considered legitimate in the eyes of the population at large. The process matters and it takes time.
Inflexibility: Constantly evolving developments can create new opportunities to be exploited or new formidable obstacles to be overcome. The SRSG or other international mediator does not have the luxury of being indifferent to the change in context, simply because she or he has invested too much time already in a process conceived in different set of circumstances. Inflexibilty to adjust course in response to major changes in the political map or on the international scene can lead a peace process down a dead-end or away from new avenues to take it forward.
False promises: The international mediator commits the seventh and final deadly sin when they fails to counter false expectations or promises that a peaceful and prosperous democracy will emerge relatively quickly from the ashes of war, even where it never existed previously, simply because the peace operation has appeared on the scene.
Brahimi and Ahmed argue that given the unprecedented numbers of peacekeepers now deployed throughout the globe in volatile areas, “the role of effective mediation in peacekeeping contexts needs to be given more attention, urgently. It is becoming considerably more complicated to manage these political problems—before and after peacekeepers arrive—due to evolutions on the geo-political landscape and in the practice of peacekeeping.”
Avoiding these seven deadly sins is important, they assert, because “The effective exercise of the political role of SRSGs and other international mediators is acutely needed now in several conflict areas where over 160,000 peacekeepers are already on the ground under the flag of the UN, the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU) and NATO.” In addition, fundamental political problems, “be they disputes over power, territory, resources or spheres of influence – in Lebanon, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Eritrea/Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire, Georgia/Abkhazia, Somalia, Chad, Nepal, Afghanistan and Kosovo have yet to be fully addressed,” and the parties involved require a third party to help mediate these conflicts.
In concluding, Brahimi and Ahmed caution, “Even if the mediator can avoid the deadly sins mentioned in this essay, there is no guarantee of success. Failure is inevitable, however, when we throw peacekeepers at conflicts or cast stones at the mediator, as a substitute for facing the painful political compromises still to be made by all sides to achieve a sustainable peace.”