Five WWS graduate students traveled to Sri Lanka in Fall 2009 for 10 days to examine management of elections in post-conflict areas. They interviewed Elections Commissioner Dayananda Dissanayake, opposition leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, parliamentarians from several political parties, including the Tamil National Alliance, civil society members, international organization representatives, journalists, and others. Their research culminated in a report, “Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories,” which analyzes the political context, examines challenges, proposes electoral scenarios, and makes recommendations about how to advance peace by fostering an inclusive political environment in Sri Lanka.

The sixth presidential election of Sri Lanka was held on January 26, 2010. The Graduate Policy workshop comments below on the results of the elections and implications for the future.

Sri Lankans by the thousands poured into their local polling stations on January 26 to vote in the first election after the end of the 26-year civil war, which concluded in May 2009 with the military defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Riding high on a wave of popular support, the Sri Lankan president, Mahinda Rajapaksa of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), decided to call early presidential elections. Parliamentary elections are to follow soon; they are required by the constitution to be held before May 2010. In calling early elections, Rajapaksa was aiming to capitalize on his popularity to both lengthen his term and gain enough seats in parliament to obtain a two-thirds majority. This would permit him to amend the constitution, abolish the executive presidency, and put into place an executive prime minister without term limits.

What Rajapaksa hadn’t anticipated was competition from a close associate. General Sarath Fonseka, the Sri Lanka Army leader who led the campaign that ultimately defeated the LTTE, was chosen as the “common candidate” for the opposition against Rajapaksa. Fonseka was endorsed by a number of opposition parties, including the United National Party, the Marxist JVP party, and the Tamil National Alliance —not necessarily because they agreed with his politics, but because he was not Rajapaksa. Rajapaksa has long been viewed by opposition groups as power-hungry, placing his brothers in top positions in the government, intimidating political dissenters, restricting freedom of speech, exploiting public resources for personal gain, and obstructing the independent media.

Meanwhile, the Sri Lankan Tamils, which make up an estimated 15 percent of the population, have long sought a political solution. Both candidates understood that they would split the majority Sinhalese vote, and the Tamils and other minorities could end up swinging the election. Fonseka told the Tamils he would consider a political solution. Rajapaksa made no such overture. With long-term peace and reconciliation on the line, and with the possibility of a new government, much was at stake in this election.

Rajapaksa won re-election, receving approximately 58% of the vote. Fonseka is contesting the results, citing a faulty vote count. Sadly, as the report predicted, there was flagrant and unchecked exploitation of state resources by Rajapaksa’s ruling party, with the state-run media providing continuous messaging about his campaign. Military forces were stationed outside of Fonseka’s hotel as a means of intimidation, and many feared a possible military coup if Fonseka had won. There was some electoral violence, with isolated attacks in the north and some interparty incidents. Most notably, only a small fraction of the 300,000 internally displaced Tamils were able to register to vote, and it is unclear how many actually did. In the northern city of Jaffna, once an LTTE stronghold, only 25% of registered voters went to the polls, compared with over 70% nationwide. This may or may not have been influenced by the heavy presence of the Sri Lanka Army and Police in that area.

There is a real risk of violence in the near term among opposition groups rejecting the electoral results. Tension was already high through the election, as Fonseka supporters complained of the authoritarian stance of Rajapaksa, intimidation, and the limitations imposed on freedom of speech and the media. Should people take to the streets in protest, clashes with the Sri Lankan security forces could escalate very quickly. This could have a profound effect on the parliamentary elections.

The electoral rules were so overtly violated in this election that the Elections Commissioner has submitted his resignation. It is now unclear how the upcoming Parliamentary elections will be held. There is no independent Elections Commission, despite the fact that the constitution calls for one; it has not been established for political reasons. The Elections Commissioner, who is universally trusted by all political parties for his neutrality, had been ordered by the Supreme Court to remain in office until an Elections Commission is established. With Rajapaksa continuing as the executive, this is unlikely to happen. Indeed, the resignation of the Elections Commissioner could provide an opportunity for Rajapaksa to fill that critical office with a political ally.

The biggest loser of this presidential election was not Fonseka—it was the Sri Lankan Tamils. Fonseka, despite his past inflammatory Sinhalese nationalist statements, has made an effort to encourage Tamils to trust him, building a political coalition. Rajapaksa, in response, accused Fonseka of working with terrorists. Now that Rajapaksa has been re-elected, it is an open question what his next steps will be. If Rajapaksa makes weak efforts to address Tamil grievances, resentment could rise, and the civil war could flare up again.

This was only the first of two important elections in Sri Lanka, and the problems encountered are a harbinger of what could come. The results of the presidential elections have served to highlight the divisions in Sri Lanka, and how far the country must go before sustainable peace can be achieved. It is now even more critical that the Sri Lankan government builds trust across all groups—particularly through democratic reform—and undertakes efforts to build a more inclusive society. With the defeat of the LTTE, Rajapaksa seems to think the hard part is over. In fact, it has only just begun.

Morgan Courtney is in her second year of the Woodrow Wilson School’s Master’s in Public Affairs program. Prior to her graduate studies, she worked in post-conflict reconstruction and development in Africa and Central Asia. She was a member of the team of students who authored the Sri Lanka section of the report “Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories,” (Princeton University, January 2010), along with Eric Melancon, Lena Hull, Arian Sharifi, and Sehar Tariq.

To read the Graduate Policy Report, “Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories,” in its entirety, please go to: http://wws.princeton.edu/research/pwreports_f09/591c_2010.pdf