January 20^th marked the one-year anniversary of the inauguration of President Barack Obama. Last year, WWS faculty offered letters to the new administration on some of the key policy challenges facing the nation. 

As Obama quietly marked one year in office, Woodrow Wilson School faculty reflect on the past year and offer insight for the future.

Last year I identified four information technology policy challenges facing the incoming Obama Administration: improving cybersecurity, making government more transparent, bringing the benefits of technology to all, and bridging the culture gap between techies and policymakers.    On these issues, the Administration's first-year record has been mixed.   Hopes were high that the most tech-savvy presidential campaign in history would lead to an equally transformational approach to governing, but bold plans were ground down by the friction of Washington. 

Cybersecurity :   The Administration created a new national cybersecurity coordinator (or "czar") position but then struggled to fill it.   Infighting over the job description -- reflecting differences over how to reconcile security with other economic goals -- left the czar relatively powerless.    Cyberattacks on U.S. interests increased as the Adminstration struggled to get its policy off the ground.

Government transparency : This has been a bright spot.   The White House pushed executive branch agencies to publish more data about their operations, and created rules for detailed public reporting of stimulus spending.   Progress has been slow -- transparency requires not just technology but also cultural changes within government -- but the ship of state is moving in the right direction, as the public gets more and better data about government, and finds new ways to use that data to improve public life.

Bringing technology to all: On the goal of universal access to technology, it's too early to tell.   The FCC is developing a national broadband plan, in hopes of bringing high-speed Internet to more Americans, but this has proven to be a long and politically difficult process. Obama's hand-picked FCC chair, Julius Genachowski, inherited a troubled organization but has done much to stabilize it.    The broadband plan will be his greatest challenge, with lobbyists on all sides angling for advantage as our national network expands.

Closing the culture gap : The culture gap between techies and policymakers persists.   In economic policy debates, health care and the economic crisis have understandably taken center stage, but there seems to be little room even at the periphery for the innovation agenda that many techies had hoped for.  The tech policy discussion seems to be dominated by lawyers and management consultants, as in past Administrations. Too often, policymakers still see techies as irrelevant, and techies still see policymakers as clueless.

In recent days, creative thinking on technology has emerged from an unlikely source: the State Department.   On the heels of Google's surprising decision to back away from the Chinese market, Secretary of State Clinton made a rousing speech declaring Internet freedom and universal access to information as important goals of U.S. foreign policy.   This will lead to friction with the Chinese and other authoritarian governments, but our principles are worth defending.   The Internet can a powerful force for transparency and democratization, around the world and at home.

Mother Nature is an effective bioterrorist. The Obama Administration learned this lesson when the H1N1 “swine” influenza virus emerged in Mexico during spring 2009.   Mexico’s initial reports of high death rates likely contributed to global fears of a new killer virus as governments scrambled to respond to the threat.   Fortunately, the virus turned out to be not as deadly as people feared, and it provided a useful test of the nation’s public health system that, despite glitches in delayed vaccine production, rose to the occasion.

One year ago, I wrote that the Obama administration could do much to address biological threats from nature and terrorists by paying more attention to diseases in animal populations since many of the newly emerging diseases and agents of bioterrorism are pathogens of animals that can infect humans. The H1N1 influenza virus, containing re-assorted avian, swine, and human genes, had been circulating in swine since 1998, but received little attention until after the human outbreak began. This example is only one of many illustrating the need to integrate the efforts of scientists who understand human and animal diseases.

There has been movement in the right direction. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is supporting new disease surveillance projects in wildlife in developing countries. A One Health Commission has been established to promote multi-disciplinary, collaborative activities, especially those linking the veterinary medical and medical professions. The Obama administration should support efforts to integrate clinical care, disease surveillance, and biomedical research with human, animal, and ecosystem health. This comprehensive approach would benefit national and international health. (http://www.onehealthinitiative.com)

As the Obama administration enters its second year, the slow-moving policy shift in Afghanistan is taking hold, with many not convinced it will be sufficient to win the war and/or enable Western forces to withdraw. The President’s new Afghanistan policy announced last spring seemed not all that new and to have more of a military than civilian component, although mention was made of the civilian side. Gen. McChrystal’s later iteration called for a troop surge, fairly predictable from the outset that led to weeks of careful White House deliberations. No sooner was the decision finally announced than questions began to arise as to the final choice of numbers, the logistical difficulties involved and the impact of the target date for beginning the process of withdrawal. Would the Taliban just wait us out? Could we just leave like that? Amb. Holbrooke and military figures are now busy providing commentary and reassurances to governmental interlocutors and the public that although this is the plan, all of this is still in process and circumstances will determine ultimate realities. The arrival of the new troops seems already to be falling behind schedule, as logistical problems trump political expectations.

It is clear that the commitment to Afghanistan will require assistance and input for a number of years, even if the 2011 date for the beginning of withdrawal of troops is honored in fact. The recent decision to increase the number of Afghan troops trained will help to bring this about. Not answered as yet is the question of who is going to pay for the increased Afghan forces. President Karzai’s statement that Afghanistan would need assistance for this for many years to come may have been unwelcome, but it is accurate.

The civilian side of the equation remained mostly in the shadows. The State Department finally released its vastly overdue civilian strategy on January 21 detailing, inter alia, how hundreds of new civilian employees will bring about the development change and particularly agricultural improvements in a civilian-military cooperative program calibrated to help Afghanistan create a self-sustaining economy. They will also work with government ministries, local governments and in many other places. The report, overlooked by the media, goes a long way to answering many of the problems of governance and development which have plagued the effort in Afghanistan from the beginning. Funding is available for the several billion dollar cost for this year, according to the report, but Congress will need to fund these programs on a multiyear basis. Implementation remains to be seen. The Afghanistan conference to be held in London January 28 is expected to bring the announcement of a high level civilian figure to NATO, probably the current UK Ambassador in Kabul who will coordinate the civilian side of Afghan operations as General McChesney does for the military side. The position is designed to supplement and perhaps sometimes supplant the executive inadequacies of the Kabul government as well as bring a higher profile to the non-military side of operations in Afghanistan.

Work is also slowly going forward on developing Afghanistan’s energy potential, and the Chinese have begun work on the development of the $80 billion Aynak copper mine, the largest investment so far in Afghanistan. The administration would be wise to work more closely with Central Asian countries to deal with the transport and energy issues related to Afghanistan. They are interrelated and a single-minded approach that seeks only to use Afghanistan’s northern neighbors as an expensive transit corridor for war material overlooks the strategic, political and economic centrality of this region for this century. The administration needs to develop and express a policy to take advantage of this major opportunity.

Relations with the Kabul government have reflected the uncertainties of where the Afghan project is going. The Afghan Presidential election, characterized by widespread and openly predicted fraud, was an embarrassment both for Karzai and the international community. The Administration sent Sen. Kerry to soft talk Karzai into accepting a second round which he won nolo contendere when Dr. Abdullah, the second runner, withdrew in the face of the obvious. Since then, the Afghan parliament feistily rejected most of two rounds of cabinet nominees mainly characterized by their political utility to the President than their competence to run the ministries for which they had been nominated. As the last round of ministers was taking their oaths of office January 19, the Taliban made a shocking mid-day raid into central Kabul that brought them near the palace itself. It could have been worse, as Afghan forces responded well and eliminated the attackers in several hours of fighting.

Things don’t look so good. So where do we go from here and what are the good signs? 

For one, the Pakistanis have finally, reluctantly and still unwillingly got down from the fence and waged major military operations to prevent the Taliban takeover that threatened the country last year. President Zerdari seems to be less wobbly in office than a few months back and the shock of domestic terrorism seems to have energized Pakistan, still blaming the U.S., to take steps to clean up its own house. This does not mean that the problem is solved, not at all, but at least things are moving in the right direction. The questions of who actually rules Pakistan, what will be done with the increased U.S. aid and whether the current questionable government can stay in office or be replaced by one that might be much more sympathetic to aspects of militant Islam remain wide open. While Pakistanis regards domestic Taliban power grabs as a threat, they take a different view of what happens in Afghanistan, and many see the U.S./NATO increase in Afghanistan as something that will increase their own problems as Taliban fighters come across the porous border. For the same reason, they don’t want us to lose either.

Corruption, according to UN surveys, is still the number one problem in the eyes of Afghans. After the scandal of the elections, President Karzai, reacting to strong pressures, announced a commission to investigate corruption and several ministers past and present have become subject to inquiry. The U.S. must keep up the pressure on Karzai and his government to deal with this problem. Amb. Eikenberry’s leaked message to Washington underlined the importance of dealing with this and other governmental problems in Kabul. Washington’s announcements that there will no longer be a blank check for Kabul make good news bites, but Washington needs to do some housekeeping of its own to deal with the contracting, oversight and overrun problems that contribute to both the cost of running the Afghanistan project and the perception on the part of Afghans that we are part of the corruption problem. Washington and USAID must work on this seriously. The new Regional Stabilization Strategy takes a number of firm steps in the right direction, moving away from large contractors and guaranteeing Afghan participation. Its implementation should be quick and highly visible. It is the corruption and venality of the Kabul government and local officials identified with it that make alternate Taliban governmental channels appealing to Afghans in the countryside. It is a critically important issue for the long-term success in Afghanistan.  

Afghans, according to the latest BBC poll, are far more enthusiastic about their government, the U.S. involvement and the future of their country than a year ago. 71 percent think things will be better in 12 months, versus 51 percent last year, 90 percent say they want the current government, with all its problems, and only six percent said they want a Taliban administration. The figures are radically higher than last year and even if one builds in a little bias on the part of respondents who wanted to please, it is still impressive. But it could change. The Taliban attack in Kabul and others like it will help persuade people to think that the current regime and the foreign troops are ineffectual and, in any event, impermanent. Taliban shadow governments now exist in almost all of Afghanistan, whispering to the people that they are back and using milder techniques than last time to try to win their adherence. So, for example, the attackers in the market in Kabul shot their way in and told the people to leave, unlike Taliban in Pakistan who have killed significant numbers of innocents in similar attacks.

It has been a difficult year in Afghanistan for the U.S. The numbers of soldiers and civilians killed is increasing. Public support for this enduring and difficult war is waning. President Obama has renewed the U.S. commitment, at the same time as President Karzai and others are reaching out to try to attract tribal leaders and individual fighters to put down their arms and join the government side. A significant factor in the fighting is the economic one. Increased pay and economic advantages offered to Taliban fighters who need to support their families can play a role, but perceptions on the part of the Taliban that they are winning diminish the efficacy of the approach. Revenge is still a strong factor in Afghan society and each person’s daily actions are calibrated against the scale of long-range effects. This is as true for President Karzai in his palace maneuvers as for the villager who must accommodate the government by day and the Taliban by night. In both cases, they know they are operating in the very places where those before them were killed.

The administration has now set in place a focused plan for Afghanistan, one that includes greater participation in both civilian and military aspects by our allies. Slow improvements in the struggle against opium production, health issues and education take place against the backdrop of individual events and battles that grab headlines. The administration must maintain its deep and steady commitment as the many vectors in Afghanistan continue to change, and keep working to change those vectors in the right direction. It will be a difficult job.

Julian Zelizer Huffingtonpost.com editoral, "Learn From History Mr. President: Articulate Your National Security Vision Or Pay the Political Price."

President George H.W. Bush once admitted that he was not good at the "Vision Thing." He was not able to convey a broader agenda that outlined the direction in which he wanted to move the country.

President Obama has suffered from the vision thing as well, both on national security and domestic policy. One of the distinguishing characteristics about the current Commander-in-Chief has been a reluctance to put forth arguments that explain what his White House is all about. As numerous commentators have observed, President Obama is a pragmatist, a politician who responds to events and works within the limits imposed by institutions rather than trying to shape and transform them.

This has certainly been the case with national security. This is ironic, given that Obama's campaign during the Democratic primaries centered on his opposition to the War in Iraq and to key components of the war on terrorism, such as the use of torture. Obama successfully contrasted himself to Senator Hillary Clinton, who his campaign said waffled on issues rather than taking firm stands. Obama claimed to offer clarity while his opponent only provided centrism and inconsistency. Some Obama supporters charged that Clinton was nothing more than "Bush-lite" when it came to national security.

But in his first year as president, Obama lost much of his campaign clarity in terms of what he hopes to accomplish on national security. To be sure, there are exceptions to this pattern. Obama has attempted to launch multilateral dialogues and he has announced an end to the use of torture by counterterrorism officials. Obama has also engaged in diplomacy to try to cool down key hot spots around the globe.

Yet in many other respects there has been more continuity than change. With the war in Iraq, President Obama has essentially followed the plan that was laid out by the Bush administration for withdrawing troops. Most the counterterrorism program from the post 9/11 period remains in place. Though he had announced that Guantanamo would be closed, the facility remains open. When the president announced that he would increase the number of troops in Afghanistan, Obama expanded on one of the key policies from the Bush years.

While President Bush championed preemptive war, regime change, aggressive interrogation techniques and unilateralism in the fight against terrorism, it is thus far much harder to discern Obama's overriding strategy on national security.

Playing defense on national security can quickly turn into a huge political liability for presidents. One of the worst cases was President Lyndon Johnson, who took office in November 1963 following the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Johnson entered the White House as a product of 1950s America. He was haunted by fears of the Republican Right--a cohort in the GOP who had spent the 1950s attacking Democrats for having "lost" China to communism in 1949, for failing to pursue alleged communist spies within the U.S., and for getting the U.S. bogged down in a military stalemate in Korea. These Republicans had undermined the political advantage achieved by FDR on national security in WWII, taking control of the White House and Congress in 1952 after raising the question of whether Democrats were weak on defense. Johnson's primary response was to prove that he and Democrats were equally tough against foreign adversaries. In the process, he accelerated America's involvement in Vietnam. In the end, the move did little to protect him from conservatives, who continued to attack him for not doing enough in Vietnam while he also lost the support of liberals.

Another president who failed to communicate his vision on national security was President Jimmy Carter. In contrast to Johnson, Carter began his presidency by advancing a strong set of arguments about changing the direction of foreign policy: institutionalizing human rights policy, diminishing tensions in Latin America with the Panama Canal Treaties and supporting diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East. Following the midterm elections of 1978, however, when conservatives increased their numbers in both chambers, Carter increasingly tried to mimic the arguments of the right by calling for higher levels of defense spending and adopting a more adversarial posture toward the Soviet Union. Carter's agenda became blurred and it was increasingly difficult to tell what he actually stood for. The posture did not protect him from attacks either. Conservatives called him a dove; liberals charged he was a hawk. By 1980, Ronald Reagan was able to challenge Carter through a campaign that centered on a strong anti-communist argument with the promise to focus on increasing defense spending in order to achieve "peace through strength."

Presidents who have offered the nation a clear sense of vision on national security have often benefited politically. During the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, President Kennedy started to move away from his hawkish campaign rhetoric of 1960 by emphasizing the centrality of negotiation with the Soviet Union. He resisted political pressure from hawks and Republicans to use force against Cuba and, despite strong conservative resistance, pushed for the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Similarly, Reagan continued to champion his vision of peace through strength throughout his presidency. While his arguments did not insulate him from political opposition, his reputation among the public gave him some political room to maneuver when he accepted an opportunity to negotiate with Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986 and 1987 over arms reduction, a move that many conservatives strongly opposed.

The ways in which presidents have handled the politics of national security is one of the central issues in my new book, "Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security--From World War II to the War on Terrorism". While my history of how politics never stopped at the water's edge reveals many dimensions to the challenges that politicians have faced when dealing with these questions and does not provide any single path toward political success, one thing is clear: presidents who don't articulate some kind of distinct national security agenda leave themselves open to continual attack from their opponents and often fall into a defensive posture while trying to formulate their policies.  By trying to avoid angering everyone, they often end up pleasing no one. These presidents don't create the political conditions that are needed to pursue major policy breakthroughs in how America interacts with the world.

Julian E. Zelizer's new book is "Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security -- From World War II to the War on Terrorism" published by Basic Books.