

**PRINCETON UNIVERSITY  
WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL  
OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS  
SPRING TERM 2006 – Second Session**

**The North Korean Nuclear Program and the U.S. Policy  
Response: DRAFT Syllabus**

Public Affairs WWS594b (half-term course)  
Thursday, 7-10 pm

Christopher Chyba

Email: [cchyba@princeton.edu](mailto:cchyba@princeton.edu)

Office: 216 Bendheim

Tel: (609) 258-5633

Office Hours: TBD

*Reading Note:* Please come to the first session prepared to discuss (at least) the readings listed under Week 1. You will need to pick one of these up in hardcopy from me prior to Week 1. (I will provide details as we approach the start of the course.)

***Course Description***

This course weighs options available to U.S. decision-makers for responding to the nuclear program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The model it adopts for comparing the different options available—broadly, waiting the DPRK out, pursuing regime change or military action, or negotiating an end to the DPRK nuclear program—is that of the “Solarium Project” used by President Eisenhower to weigh options for addressing the Soviet challenge early in the Cold War.

The course endeavors to highlight the U.S. relationship with the Republic of Korea (ROK), and how that relationship shapes U.S. options.

The course begins with an overview of nuclear weapons production for the non-scientist. It then, similarly, summarizes the nature of the DPRK nuclear program. These “technical” (in the sense that they concern the science and technology; they will be given at a level appropriate for the non-scientist) discussions ground the remainder of the course.

Weeks 3-5 are spend critiquing policy options, again with an effort to ground all discussions in what is known about DPRK behavior, capabilities, and intentions. The roles of uncertainty and misunderstanding will not be neglected.

Finally, in week 6, students will, by analogy to the Solarium Project, argue for a variety of policy approaches to the ongoing crisis. Your role here is to be an advocate for a particular approach to the problem. We will then make an effort to reach consensus on a way forward., having heard the best arguments for each approach.

### ***Course Requirements***

All seminar members will be expected to participate in weekly discussions. Performance will be evaluated on the basis of class participation, an in-class presentation (week 6 unless enrollment is especially large) and a paper at the end of the seminar. Participation will count for 20%; your presentations will count for 30% (two presentations for 10% and 20%, respectively); and the final paper will count for 50% of the grade. If you will be unable to attend a session for any reason, please contact the instructor ahead of time.

One or two students (depending on the size of the seminar) will be asked to make short presentations in weeks 3, 4 and 5. These will consist of a summary and analysis of a key article or articles assigned for that week. The objective of the presentations is to present a thoughtful and critical reading of the material to the class and to generate questions for discussion that were raised by your understanding of the material in light of the course as a whole. These presentations will count for 10% of your grade; your week 6 presentation will count for 20%.

The goal of the papers is for students to synthesize the approaches discussed in class and present an argument for how the U.S. should proceed with respect to the DPRK nuclear program. I will have more to say about expectations for this paper by week two of the course. **The paper is due toward the end of the spring term examination period; I will give you an exact date by our first class meeting.**

### ***Course Materials***

I intend to have all the readings for the course either on reserve or available electronically. (I will provide further details as the course approaches.) In a few cases readings will only be available in hard copy, from the instructor. I urge you to buy your own copies of the following book for the course; we will read it in its entirety. Other books you may wish to buy are those by Alexander George and Henry Sokolski, though these are primarily optional readings.

Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (New York: Basic Books, 2001).

## *Course Outline*

### **Session 1**

#### **Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Primer, History of the Nonproliferation Regime, and the Last Half Century on the Korean Peninsula**

This first week sets much of the stage needed for the remainder of this course. These readings, with the exception of (1) below and the optional readings, should be completed by the time we meet for session 1.

(1) Unless you are already familiar with the past half-century of Korean political history, by our third session you should have read the following in its entirety:

Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (New York: Basic Books, 2001).

This is a well-regarded book by a journalist with extensive experience in the Republic of Korea and in covering Korean affairs. It is not a scholarly work, but the point here is for everyone to be familiar with the sweep of events on the Peninsula in the past half decade.

(2) A substantial part of our first meeting will be a lecture by the instructor on the basics of nuclear weapons production for the non-scientist—how weapons work, how high-enriched uranium and plutonium are produced, and the challenges of each approach. In preparation, read:

Anonymous, *Nuclear Proliferation Tutorial*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (1992). Unpublished; available from the instructor. Read chapters 1 through 6. This is 78 large-format, copiously illustrated pages. Note the glossary in the back; this may come in handy throughout the course.

(3) We also need an introduction to the nonproliferation regime. How did we get to (almost) where we are now?

Henry D. Sokolski, *Best of Intentions: America's Campaign Against Strategic Weapons Proliferation* (Wesport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2001). Read chapters 4 & 5. Sokolski believes in the nonproliferation regime, but also believes that too often Washington has *meant* well but not *done* well.

*Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons*. You can find this reprinted as Appendix III in Sokolski, or readily available on the web. It is short, but read it carefully. You should be able to refer to Articles I through VI and Article X readily and know the fundamentals of each. We will discuss the three bargains (two explicit, one implicit) of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in class.

Ariel Levite, "Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited," *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 59-88.

(4) Oberdorfer spends very little time with the Korean War, an epochal event for both Koreas, China, and the United States. For our purposes, the negotiations among the U.S., ROK, China and the DPRK over the termination of the war are particularly relevant.

Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: MacMillan, 1973). Read pp. 91-107.

(5) Finally, as an introduction to where things stand with the 6-party talks, read:

Bong-Geun Jun, "North Korean Nuclear Crises: An End in Sight?" *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Jan/Feb 2006), pp. 6-10. Jun is at the ROK's Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security.

Aaron Friedberg, "Only Continued Pressure, Combined with Inducements, Can Bring End to North Korean Nuclear Program," Council on Foreign Relations Interview, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9915/friedberg.html>. Friedberg served as deputy national security advisor to Vice President Cheney from 2003 to 2005.

(6) **Optional:** Read all of Chapter 3, "The Test of Korea," in Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: MacMillan, 1973).

This course can hardly review the vast literature on why countries choose to pursue nuclear weapons, yet clearly that literature is relevant. Besides the required Levite piece above, read one of the classics in the field:

Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 54-86.

For a history of the nuclear nonproliferation regime that will provide context for this entire debate, read chapters 1-3 of Sokolski, *Best of Intentions*.

Finally, for a much more thorough account of the effect of the Korean war on both the North and the South, see Bruce Cummings, *North Korea* (New York: New Press, 2004).

**Session 2**  
**The DPRK Nuclear Weapons Program and the “Solarium Project” as a Model for U.S. Government Policy-Making**

Last time we acquired an understanding of nuclear weapons program. This time we devote first to understanding the North Korean nuclear weapons program in particular—how they did it and what they may have. Then, we focus on the Solarium Project, the model for national-security decision-making that we will employ in this course. I will give a review lecture on the Korean program, but you should read the items below prior to arriving in class. Come prepared to discuss decision-making in the face of uncertainty, and to discuss the Solarium model.

(1) How did we get to where we are today?

Michael May, ed. *Verifying the Agreed Framework* CGSR-CISAC report (Stanford, Calif: Center for Global Security Research and Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, April 2001), <http://cisac.stanford.edu/publications/12020/>; read Chapter 1, “A Brief History of the DPRK Nuclear Weapons-Related Efforts” (pp. 15-21).

Ashton B. Carter, “Three Crises with North Korea,” Testimony Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, February 4, 2003. Available at <http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2003/CarterTestimony030204.pdf>

(2) Elements of the North’s program have allegedly benefited from trade with Pakistan. For a summary, read:

Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004), pp. 5-49. Read pp. 5-14.

(2) What is, in fact, the status of the DPRK’s program?

Sharon A. Squassoni, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: How Soon an Arsenal?” *CRS Report For Congress* RS29391, Updated August 1, 2005.

Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” *CRS Issue Brief* IB91141, Updated October 6, 2005.

A former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory was allowed to visit the Yongbyon site in January 2004. His meetings and observations are among the most important for judging the status of the North’s nuclear weapons program. Read:

Siegfried S. Hecker, “Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea,” Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 21, 2004.

Alexander Montgomery thinks that the number of nuclear weapons possessed by the North has been exaggerated via worst-case scenarios:

Alexander H. Montgomery, “Ringling in Proliferation: How to Dismantle an Atomic Bomb Network,” *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 153-187. Read pp. 157-169. Don’t miss the footnotes.

(3) It should not be forgotten that the ROK apparently pursued nuclear weapons in the 1970s; a history of this program and largely successful U.S. efforts to terminate it can be found in:

Jonathan D. Pollack and Mitchell B. Reiss, “South Korea: The Tyranny of Geography and the Vexations of History,” in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., *The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 254-292.

Brian Lee, “Nuclear Agency Chief Goes Easy on Seoul,” *Joong Ang Daily*, October 7, 2004. Available from instructor.

(4) Finally, this course will adopt as its model for crucial foreign policy decision-making one drawn from the successful “Solarium Project” conducted by President Eisenhower—and, peculiarly, never reproduced. To understand Solarium in detail, and to compare it with other approaches to decision-making, read:

Christopher Preble, “The Uses of Threat Assessment in Historical Perspective: Perception, Misperception and Political Will,” available at <http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/groups/ThreatAssessment/index.html>

Preble, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, wrote this historical study for the Relative Threat Assessment Working Group of the Princeton Project on National Security.

(5)**Optional**: The classic technical reference for the DPRK program and its facilities is David Albright and Kevin O’Neill, eds., *Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle* (Washington D.C.: The Institute for Science and International Security, 2000).

For another account of DPRK-Pakistan nuclear and missile trade, see:

Sharon A. Squassoni, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan,” *CRS Report for Congress* RL31900, updated March 11, 2004.

A thorough timeline of the crisis is available in:

Mark E. Manyn, Emma Chanlett-Avery, and Helene Marchart, "North Korea: A Chronology of Events, October 2002 to December 2004," *CRS Report for Congress*, RL32743, January 24, 2005.

We will mention the Agreed Framework over and over again; at some point you should actually read it! It is available, e.g., in Appendix B of Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, *Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).

### Session 3

#### Why Not Just Wait for the Regime to Change?

This week we consider whether or not “time is on our side” on the Korean Peninsula. Across the political spectrum, it’s been said that it is not. But why not just wait for regime change in the DPRK, rather than force a crisis? In what sense is time not on our side, and how important is this?

(1) Begin with an overview of U.S. options in this report written by former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry when he served as U.S. North Korea Policy Coordinator in 1999:

William J. Perry, “Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations,” available at [http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/991012\\_northkorea\\_rpt.html](http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/991012_northkorea_rpt.html)

(2) One argument for why “time isn’t on our side” is the assertion that the DPRK is willing to sell anything to anybody—witness the putative missile deals with Pakistan, and the DPRK’s role in drug trafficking, counterfeiting, and product counterfeiting and smuggling. The most comprehensive account of these activities in the open literature is:

Sheena E. Chestnut, “The ‘Sopranos State’? North Korean Involvement in Criminal Activity and Implications for International Security,” Honors Program for International Security Studies, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 20 May 2005. Unpublished. Available from the instructor with the permission of Ms. Chestnut. Not to be further copied or distributed.

Also see the more recent:

Martin Fackler, “North Korean Counterfeiting Complicates Nuclear Crisis,” *New York Times*, January 29, 2006.

(3) It is sometimes said casually that North Korea will “sell anything,” but the ROK estimates that the DPRK has an extensive chemical arsenal—yet I know of no evidence that the DPRK has ever attempted to sell chemical weapons internationally. Does this suggest that concerns over nuclear weapons sales/trades are overblown, or is it off point? Read:

Nuclear Threat Initiative, “North Korea Profile: Chemical Overview,” [http://www.nti.org/e\\_research/profiles/NK/Chemical/](http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Chemical/)

(4) Francis Gavin makes the point that the United States has previously faced nuclear-armed regimes that it initially thought were not deterrable; i.e., he argues, it’s a myth to claim that deterrence was straightforward in the Cold War but now everything has changed:

Francis J. Gavin, "Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s," *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 100-135.

(5) There are other reasons why it may be unwise to wait. One could be that a nuclear DPRK pushes Japan toward a decision that it will need nuclear weapons as well. For an understanding of Japanese nuclear capabilities, read:

Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, "Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable," in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., *The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 218-253.

(6) Meanwhile, what is happening in U.S.-ROK relations, and how does that affect U.S. options? For a quick overview, read:

Mark E. Manyin, "South Korean Politics and Rising 'Anti-Americanism': Implications for U.S. Policy Toward North Korea," *CRS Report for Congress* RL31906, May 6, 2003.

(7) **Optional:** The concerns expressed about Japan above might also be made about Taiwan. For an account of Taiwan's nuclear capabilities, see:

Derek J. Mitchell, "Taiwan's Hsin Chu Program: Deterrence, Abandonment, and Honor," in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., *The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 293-313.

#### Session 4 Why Not Regime Change or Military Action?

This week we look at more aggressive options for addressing the DPRK nuclear program, from outright military options to trying to speed regime change. A further option is for the U.S. to withdraw but to encourage a nuclear ROK and Japan. Come prepared to discuss pros and cons of each of these approaches.

(1) The overall military and economic comparison between the two Koreas appears not to be in favor of the DPRK. This argument is made quantitatively in:

Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2003). Read Chapters 1 through 4.

(2) Should the U.S. choose not to just “wait,” but rather work actively for regime change? Read:

Henry S. Rowen, “On Dealing with a Hard Case: North Korea,” in Philip Yun and Gi-Wook Shin, eds., *North Korea: 2005 and Beyond* (Stanford: Shorenstein APARC, 2006), pp. 197-210.

For an argument that regime change won’t work, read:

Philip W. Yun, “The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program: Why Regime Change Through Coercion Won’t Work,” in Philip Yun and Gi-Wook Shin, eds., *North Korea: 2005 and Beyond* (Stanford: Shorenstein APARC, 2006), p. 211ff.

(3) What about military action? The Congressional Research Service has summarized the situation:

Edward F. Bruner, “North Korean Crisis: Possible Military Options,” *CRS Report for Congress* RS21582, July 29, 2003.

Another examination of what war might look like is in an account of a brief non-governmental wargame held on the issue:

Scott Stossel, “North Korea: The War Game,” *The Atlantic*, Vol. 296, No. 1 (July/August 2005), p. 66ff.

One frequently mentioned deterrent to military action is DPRK artillery that can reach Seoul. For an ROK view of how bad this would be, read:

Kim Min-seok and Chae Byung-gun, “Defense Gurus Downplay Risk of North’s Guns,” *Joong Ang Daily*, October 6, 2004. Available from instructor.

How might DPRK nuclear weapons affect these calculations, and for that matter, U.S. behavior in East Asia? Think about whether there are analogies to be drawn from the Iraq case:

Barry Posen, "U.S. Security Policy in a Nuclear-Armed World, Or: What if Iraq Had Had Nuclear Weapons?" *Security Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1997), pp. 1-31.

(4)After a regime collapse from whatever cause, the victors would face a potential "loose nukes" issue with the DPRK's arsenal. For how the victors might deal with this problem, see:

Michael O'Hanlon, "Dealing with the Collapse of a Nuclear-Armed State: The Cases of North Korea and Pakistan," available at <http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/papers/ohanlon.pdf>

O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, wrote this study for the Princeton Project on National Security.

(5)Ted Galen Carpenter argues that the United States shouldn't go to war, but should instead encourage Japan and the ROK to develop their own nuclear deterrent while the United States pulls back from East Asia. You will have seen a variant of this perspective in the *Atlantic* wargame argued by Lieutenant General (ret.) Thomas McInerney.

Ted Galen Carpenter, "Options for Dealing with North Korea," *Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing* No. 73, January 6, 2003.

(6)Finally, discussions of military action need to be embedded in some understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in the world today, and in particular, the nuclear use doctrines of the nuclear powers, and the United States in particular. To get this overview, read:

Christopher F. Chyba and Karthika Sasikumar, "A New World of Risk: The Current Environment for U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy," in George Bunn and Christopher F. Chyba, eds., *U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Confronting Today's Risks* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006). Available in draft from the instructor.

(7)**Optional:** For thoughts on possible lessons from the Iraq conflict to the Korean situation, read:

Robert L. Jervis, "The Confrontation between Iraq and the US: Implications for the Theory and Practice of Deterrence," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2003), pp. 315-337.

## Session 5 Why Not Negotiations?

Negotiations are ongoing. This week we review what has gone before, and prospects for a negotiated solution. We also consider negotiating pitfalls. Come prepared to debate the pros and cons of various negotiating approaches.

(1) Where are we in the negotiations, and how did we get here? For a summary from the point of view of the negotiators of the Agreed Framework, along with their recommendations on how to proceed, read:

Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, *Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). Read Chapter 12, "The Land of Counterpane."

To bring us up to (almost) the present, see:

"Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, September 19, 2005," <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm>

(2) The U.S. and the ROK are not necessarily aligned in their outlook. Read:

Scott Snyder, "A Comparison of U.S. and South Korean National Security Strategies: Implications for Alliance Coordination Toward North Korea," in Philip Yun and Gi-Wook Shin, eds., *North Korea: 2005 and Beyond* (Stanford: Shorenstein APARC, 2006), pp.149-166.

(3) What has the DPRK said that it wants?

Li Gun, "Requisites for Solving the Nuclear Issue," *Center for National Policy*, December 2003.

Ambassador Li Gun is, inter alia, the DPRK's Deputy Chief Representative to the Six Party Talks.

(4) What might the United States have to offer? For one view, see:

Peter Hayes, "Enemy to Friend: Providing Security Assurances to North Korea," Nautilus Institute, February 11, 2004.  
<http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/multilateralTalks/PHEnemytoFriend.html>

(5) Negotiations with the DPRK present challenges for U.S. negotiators. For an analysis of the difficulties of seeing the DPRK clearly, read:

Daniel A. Pinkston and Phillip C. Saunders, "Seeing North Korea Clearly," *Survival*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Autumn 2003), pp. 79-102.

There has been a great deal written about what it's like negotiating with the DPRK, and how to do so more effectively. For a summary of this literature, read:

Richard Saccone, *To the Brink and Back: Negotiating with North Korea* (Elizabeth, NJ: Hollym, 2003). Read Chapter 1, "Popular Characterizations of North Korean Behavior."

**(6) Optional:** It is interesting to consider the quality of information available to senior leadership in the DPRK and United States in resolving these issues. The latter was, in a sense, the point of the Pinkston and Saunders article in (5). The former is very speculative. There *may* be some insights to be gained from the documentation available on decision-making in:

Zachary Shore, *What Hitler Knew: The Battle for Information in Nazi Foreign Policy* (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 2003).

## **Session 6**

### **Weighing the Policy Alternatives**

This session will be dominated by student presentations on the various alternatives discussed in sessions 3, 4 and 5, following the Solarium approach discussed at the outset of the course. Each of you will make a presentation arguing for a specific approach, and we will weigh the alternatives.

(1) You should, however, think about the requisites for coercive diplomacy. Here I ask you to read a recent study that reviews this literature rapidly, applies it to the Libyan case, and asks what lessons might be drawn for Korea:

Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, "Who 'Won' Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy," *International Security* Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 47-86.

**(2) Optional:** One of the classic texts on the topic of coercive diplomacy is by Alexander George (84 pages). Read:

Alexander I. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991).

Beginning on p.75, George lists seven conditions that favor coercive diplomacy. Which of these are met with respect to U.S. coercion against the DPRK over its nuclear program?

For one view of how to approach the current crisis, read:

Michael O'Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, *Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).