

**Policy Analysis: Military Force Planning and Decision Making**  
**WWS 594c, Spring 2004**  
**Instructor: Michael J. Meese**

**For details and assignments concerning the course see the course website at:**  
<http://blackboard.Princeton.EDU/> and then WWS 594c and pick “WWS594\_S2004.”

**Course Description:** WWS 594c introduces important issues of conventional force planning and military decision making. It includes discussion of service cultures, doctrines, capabilities, and limitations. The course broadly covers strategy, planning, readiness, force projection, employment, and logistics throughout the spectrum of conflict. Through theoretical and doctrinal readings and examination of selected case studies, the course provides background essential for those involved in the study and practice of national security decision making.

**Content:** This half-semester course consists of 6 three-hour class meetings, each of which will concentrate on a different aspect of military force planning and decision making, as described in the syllabus below. The objectives of the course are for students to:

- Understand fundamental concepts, terminology, and practices involved in the planning, budgeting, and employment of military forces.
- Understand how military force planning and decision-making methods influence the analysis of issues and options presented in response to national security challenges.
- Apply that understanding in the analysis of cases of military force employment during the past decade.

This course assumes a general familiarity with the national security structure and strategy of the United States (such as that discussed in WWS 549), although there are no specific prerequisites for this course.

**Requirements:**

a. **Seminar Participation.** Students should be complete assigned readings before each class and be prepared to discuss them at length and in depth.

b. **Analytical Papers.** Each student will prepare two short (4-7 page, double-spaced) analytical papers that address one (or more) of the questions that focus discussion of each lesson. Those papers will augment and will help shape seminar discussion. Therefore, it is essential that they be submitted (via email to [mjmeese@princeton.edu](mailto:mjmeese@princeton.edu)) prior to midnight on the evening before class. If you do not receive an acknowledgement from me that I received the paper (which in nearly all cases you will), please turn in a “backup copy” by 12 p.m. on the day of class to Renee Weist in Robertson Hall, room 220. These papers are analytical papers, primarily based on the readings for the class and do not require research beyond the readings assigned. The intent is to provide analysis and evaluation of the subject assigned in a concise, coherent essay. Students will sign up for and be assigned specific lessons and questions during the first class meeting.

**Readings:** Although a quick glance at the syllabus may lead you to conclude that there are excessive readings for the course, nearly all of the readings are short and a diversity of articles are assigned to provide a diverse perspective on the topics being covered. **Nearly all of the readings will be accessible on the course webpage** available through blackboard and will be posted by lesson, on the “Course Documents” page. Any that are not on blackboard will be on reserve in the Woodrow Wilson School library. To guide you in your readings, there are a couple of brief sentences after each reading that explains why it is included and what you should focus on as you read it.

The only book for the course that is probably worth purchasing is Dana Priest’s *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military* (New York: Norton, 2003). The book is written by one Washington Post’s military correspondents and provides useful illustrations that may be worth discussing in class.

The first readings listed in each lesson are required for each lesson. Some lessons also contain optional, background readings that may be of interest in preparation of papers or for future reference.

**Course Documents on CD:** At the conclusion of the course, each student will receive a copy of all course documents (readings, courses presentations, lecture slides, and, with the permission of the students, course papers) to have as a reference and personal record of the course.

Lesson One, Tuesday, February 3, 2004  
War, the Sociology of War, and Civil-Military Relations

Basic Question: How is preparation for and execution of war fundamentally different from other human or bureaucratic endeavors? How does that difference influence different perceptions of civilian and military leaders.

**Readings: (readings with \* are available on blackboard and the course readings disk)**

1.\* George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: White House, September 2002), pp. 1-2, 29-31. (5 pages)

It is essential to understand the view from the commander-in-chief, who, as the **first** of his powers enumerated in the U.S. Constitution, “shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.” Note that relatively few pages concern specific guidance for the military.

2.\* Edward J. Villacres and Christopher Bassford, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity,” *Parameters*, Autumn 95, pp. 9-19. (11 pages).

Of all of the military theorists to study, Clausewitz is probably the best and an entire course could be devoted to military theory, or just Clausewitz. These 11 pages by Edward Villacres and Chris Bassford (Chris is one the best modern Clausewitz scholars and the manager of [www.clausewitz.com](http://www.clausewitz.com)) comprise a concise way to get a flavor of what the theory of war is all about.

3.\* Suzanne C. Nielsen, “Rules of the Game? The Weinberger Doctrine and the American Use of Force.” In *The Future of the Army Profession*, Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins, Edited by Lloyd J. Matthews (New York: McGraw-Hill Primus, 2002), especially pp. 6-22. (16 pages)

Suzi Nielson’s chapter is particularly good as it illustrates how military officers should (and many do) approach issues of civil-military relations, especially concerning how and when to recommend the use of force. Her integration of Clausewitz in her explanation is an added bonus.

4.\* James L. Locher, “Goldwater-Nichols: Fighting the Decisive Battle,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Summer 2002), 38-47. (10 pages)

This article is excerpted from Jim Locher’s excellent book, which catalogues the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It is a fascinating story of congressional-executive relations, which dramatically illustrate the importance, at certain times, of Congress forcing change—in spite of the direct opposition of OSD and the leaders of the military services. While the entire story is great, you can get the sense of the conflict between the Senate and the service leaders by reading just pp. 38-42. The sections that begin with “Death by Amendment” describe the congressional process in detail, which is interesting but not germane to our discussion.

5.\* Eliot A. Cohen, “Supreme Command in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Summer 2002), 48-54. (6 pages)

Eliot Cohen (Professor at the Nitze School at Johns Hopkins SAIS) wrote *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*. This article captures much of his argument and argues that civilian and military decision makers must understand the importance dialog and, indeed, tension as civilian political leaders are involved in military decisions. It is noteworthy that the book was researched and written primarily during the end of the Clinton Administration. At the outset of the Bush Administration, Secretary Rumsfeld significantly argued that reestablishing civilian control over the military would be an important facet of his Administration.

6.\* Short Review Essays on both Elliot Cohen’s *Supreme Command* and Jim Locher’s *Victory on the Potomac*, specifically, Suzanne Nielsen, “The Craft of Strategic Leadership,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn 2002), 136-137 and Russell Howard, “Reorganizing Defense,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn 2002), 137-138. (3 pages)

These happened to be adjoining articles and give a good perspective on how defense intellectuals regard two important recent books on the topic of civil-military relations, featuring the authors of readings 4 and 5.

7.\* “RUMSFELD'S MEMO: 'Are We Winning or Losing the ... War on Terror?,'” *Los Angeles Times*, October 23, 2003, page A-15; Doyle McManus, “Pentagon Reform Is His Battle Cry: Donald H. Rumsfeld, with new political clout won in Iraq and Afghanistan, intensifies his war on the military establishment,” *Los Angeles Times*, p. 1.; Rowan Scarborough, “Rumsfeld Criticizes Top Staff” *Washington Times*, January 24, 2003, p.1; “Rumsfeld makes no apology

for style” *Washington Times*, January 30, 2003, p. 1; and Vernon Loeb and Thomas E. Ricks, “Rumsfeld’s Style, Goals Strain Ties In Pentagon,” *Washington Post*, 15 October 2002, pp. 1. (15 pages).

This series of newspaper articles gives a sense of the relationship between the current Secretary of Defense and the senior military and civilian leaders in the Pentagon. You can skim through these and get a good idea of Rumsfeld’s style if you have not been following it in the papers.

8. Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military*. Skim pp. 11-16, Read pages 21-34, skim pp. 35-40.

These pages open the book and the course with “A Different Kind of World,” which is the area of military force planning and decision making that we will be discussing.

**Case Study—Civil-Military and Cultural Gap**—Our discussion will concentrate on the impact of the “Gap” on different perspectives on military decision making (as opposed to an evaluation of the extent to which the gap actually exists).

CS # 1.\* Richard Kohn, “The Erosion of Civilian Control in the United States Today,” *Naval War College Review*, Summer 2002.

This extensive article provides a balanced summary and application of the two comprehensive studies that were completed in the late 1990s. To use Kohn’s words while he does “not see any crisis, [he is] convinced that civilian control has diminished to the point where it could alter the character of American government and undermine national defense.” If you are interested in more details concerning the basis of his conclusions, read the summaries of the studies which are listed below as optional readings (CS #2 and CS #3).

**Optional/Additional:** (There is no requirement to read these, but if you have more interest they are available and in most cases posted to Blackboard)

\*Donald Rumsfeld, “Introduction,” in *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, (Washington: Department of Defense, 2003), pp 1-10.

The Bush/Rumsfeld administration has not published a National Military Strategy to complement their new National Security Strategy (reading 1). This introduction by Secretary Rumsfeld is the latest unclassified view of the Pentagon’s approach toward transforming the Department while continuing to fight the global war on terrorism on several fronts.

\*Don Snider, John Nagl, Tony Pfaff, “Army Professionalism, The Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century,” (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999).

This article by Don Snider, John Nagl, and Tony Pfaff was one of the first to start and reintroduce the concept of officership in the Army and is useful background.

\*CS# 2\* Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, Triangle Institute for Security Studies, “Digest of Finding and Studies: The Conference on the Military and Civilian Society.” (14 pages) also

[http://www.poli.duke.edu/civmil/summary\\_digest.pdf](http://www.poli.duke.edu/civmil/summary_digest.pdf)

This provides some the detailed conclusions upon which Richard Kohn’s article (listed above as CS#1) is based.

\*CS #3.\* Center for Strategic and International Studies, *American Military Culture* (Washington, DC: CSIS, January 2000), (9 pages).

This report is the executive summary of a CSIS report that describes the problems that existed in 2000 within American military culture. Some would argue that these problems, to the extent that they existed then, have been exacerbated by the GWOT, even if fighting the war has subordinated an effective examination of the challenge of military culture.

Lesson Two, Tuesday, February 10, 2004  
Service Capabilities

Basic Question: What are the capabilities, limitations, and perspectives that each of the services brings to U.S. national military capability today and how are they transforming for the future?

**Readings: (readings with \* are available on blackboard and the course readings disk)**

- 1.\* Hugh Shelton, *Joint Vision 2020*, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense) esp. pages 6-11, 20-30 (15 pages)  
This is a bit dated—it was completed as the Bush Administration was coming to office—but provides the overarching framework and approach that Joint Forces were taking as the military adopted to the GWOT. It still remains the official vision for the integration of forces in DoD.
- 2.\* *Transformation Planning Guidance*, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 2003), pp. 1, 3-11.  
This is the Rumsfeld DoD's guidance for the transformation of the department and the services. It was published in the midst of the war in Iraq and explains the future direction for the entire national security apparatus. It makes statements about other parts of government (e.g. the intelligence agencies) but principally pertains to DoD.
- 3.\* William A. Owens, "The Once and Future Revolution in Military Affairs," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Summer 2002) 55-61 (6 pages)  
Admiral Owens was the Vice Chairman of the CJCS in the 1990s and was a leading proponent of the "Revolution in Military Affairs," which was a form of transformation that took place in the 1990s. **Skimming this article** will provide the opportunity to discuss contrasts with the DoD Transformation Guidance.
- 4.\* Andrew F. Krepinevich, "The Army and Land Warfare: Transforming the Legions," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Summer 2002) 76-82 (6 pages)  
Andy Krepinevich provides an explanation of how the Army "was" transforming, under the concepts of its previous chief of staff, GEN Shinseki. One of the points, which we will discuss, is how the Army had adopted its 1999 version of transformation to fit the Rumsfeld/DoD Transformation guidance. Just **skimming the article** is sufficient to get the gist of the challenges that the Army faces.
- 5.\* GEN Peter Schoomaker, "U.S. Army: The Way Ahead," (Washington: Department of the Army, 2003), pp. 1-19.  
This is the new official word from the Army's new Chief of Staff and was written in Fall 2003. As is the case with all of the service doctrines it is worth **reading**, recognizing that much of it is service propaganda. The key value of this document is that it was published since Operation Iraqi Freedom by the person recalled from retirement by Secretary Rumsfeld to lead the Army.
- 6.\* *Air Force Vision* (Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force). (3 pages)  
This is the Air Force's equivalent, with just 8 pages, lots of pictures, and just 3 pages of text. You should be able to **read it quickly** and get the gist of it.
- 7.\* Admiral Vern Clark, USN, "Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities," Proceedings, October 2002, pp. 1-24 (It is actually only about 12 pages of text).  
This is the new Navy Chief of Naval Operation's vision for the Navy. Interestingly, it was published in their professional journal—on line—rather than in an official Pentagon "vision book." The entire document is on Blackboard, but you can click on any link and it will take you to the Naval Institutes *Proceedings* page, which describes in more detail the details of the Navy's strategy.
- 8.\* *Marine Corps Strategy 21* (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 3 November 2000) (12 pages, 3 of text)  
Again, the Marine Corps Official Doctrine, which is very dated, now being over 3 years old. Read quickly, preferably while doing push ups!
- 9.\* James Kitfield, "Defense - Stress Fractures," *National Journal*, 6 September 2003. (9 pages)  
This provides a good, contemporary look at the challenges within all of the services—in this case looking specifically at the Army—in how to continue to fight a war, while transforming, and recovering all at the same time.

10. Carl Builder, *The Masks of War* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1989), pp. 17-38; 67-94 (48 pages). Available in Stokes library.

Although this is 15 years old, it provides a useful look into each of the services. Unfortunately it is not available electronically, but is worth the trip to the Stokes library to pick up and read. The key is to understand the contrasts between the service cultures.

#### Case Study: Capabilities and Limitations in Kosovo

CS#1. Dana Priest, *The Mission*, pp. 247-250, 264-274 which is based, in part on:

CS#2.\* Dana Priest, Kosovo Series: Dana Priest, "A Decisive Battle That Never Was," *Washington Post*, 19 September 1999, "Bombing by Committee," *Washington Post*, 20 September 1999; "The Battle Inside Headquarters," *Washington Post*, 21 September 1999.

Both CS#1 and CS#2 describe the internal challenges of decision making both within an alliance, between the NATO Commander and the Pentagon, and between Army and Air Force decision makers. It also provides insights into the background of General, and now presidential candidate, Wes Clark.

CS#3.\* Bruce R. Nardulli, Walter L. Perry, Bruce Pirnie, John Gordon IV, John G. McGinn, *Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), Read summary, chapter 1 (Introduction), and chapter 6 (Conclusions), (24 pages).

This after action review of the war in Kosovo, which was commissioned by the Army, provides a useful critique of the war and the interaction of the services.

CS#2.\* Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Lessons from the War in Kosovo," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Spring 2002), 12-19. (7 pages)

Lambeth provides an effective critique of the problems with the use of airpower in Kosovo which stem more from the strategic and operational choices of how to use airpower rather than any inherent technical limitations. His article provides a useful perspective on Kosovo, as well as on civil-military relations, the role of integration of ground forces in coordination with air forces, and on lessons to learn before the next air-ground operation in Afghanistan.

**Optional/Additional:** (There is no requirement to read these, but if you have more interest they are available and in most cases posted to Blackboard)

\* Peter J. Boyer, "A Different War: Is the Army Becoming Irrelevant?" *New Yorker*, 1 July 2002, pp. 54 ff.

This was an extremely insightful article at the nadir of the Army in the Summer of 2002. This was written in the midst of Afghanistan, after Crusader had been cancelled, after Rumsfeld had made GEN Shinseki a "lame duck" with over a year left in his term as Chief of Staff of the Army. The Army's problems still persist and are discussed in more detail in the Kitfield piece that is required above, but this is interesting reading for the time that it was written.

\* *The Army, Field Manual 1* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army, 14 June 2001),

This is the Army's basic field manual, which was written prior to September 11, but is valuable for basic information. Especially chapter 1 and 4 are worth skimming.

\* *Navy Vision* (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy, 2002), pp. 10-23 (13 pages).

The entire document is 186 pages long and includes nearly every possible weapons system. It is useful background information but interestingly, the most current statement of Navy operations is in their professional journal—listed above—not in this document, which is their official vision statement.

\* Air Force Handbook 108<sup>th</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session.

Every detail you would ever want to know about the Air Force, its people, its programs, and its weapon systems. The vision document provides more context, but this has details and some pretty cool pictures. Unsurprisingly, it is prepared for Congress each year!

Lesson Three, Tuesday, February 17, 2004

Matching Missions to Capabilities/CINCs and Joint Command Structure

Basic Question: How are the capabilities of the armed forces integrated into a unified DoD and joint command structure in the planning phases—in preparation for war or operations other than war?

Readings: (readings with \* are available on blackboard and will be on the course readings disk)

1.\* W. Spenser Johnson, “New Challenges for the Unified Command Plan,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Summer 2002) 62-70. (8 pages)

Johnson’s article provides a good explanation of the recent changes in the Unified Command Plan and articulates why it is so important to military decision making and the structure of forces and thinking about those forces.

2. Dana Priest, *The Mission*, pp. 61-118 and 216-243. which is based on:

\*Dana Priest, “A Four-Star Foreign Policy? U.S. Commanders Wield Rising Clout, Autonomy,” *Washington Post*, 3 part series, 28-30 September 2000. (16 pages).

An extremely insightful account of the Combatant Commanders and their important roles in American foreign policy. The part in the mission is an expanded version that provides more insights than the series that appeared in the *Post* (and is available on Blackboard).

3.\* Skim Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Abizaid of Arabia,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, December 2003.

An interesting, current perspective on the current CENTCOM commander.

4.\* Damanj McCarthy and Susana Medlin, “Two Hats for the Joint Force Commander,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Summer 2000), pp. 91-98 (7 pages).

This is an important article as it discusses the details of command relationships and how they can affect the outcome of battles. It will also apply as we look at the case study of Desert Storm in lesson 4.

5.\* John E. Campbell, “Sub-Saharan Africa and the Unified Command Plan,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn-Winter 2001-2002), 72-75. (barely 3 pages)

Campbell discusses (and dismisses) the possibility of enhancing the role of Africa in U.S. national security strategy by creating greater emphasis by combatant commanders. The article is interesting only to see his discussion of emphasis and resources that a combatant commander brings to a region or a national security area and how command structures affect—and in some cases determine—U.S. security policy.

6.\* Douglas A. MacGregor, “The Joint Force: A Decade, No Progress.” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Winter 2000-01) 18-23. (5 pages)

As one of the most outspoken critics of the lack of jointness in the military and one who has assisted in Secretary Rumsfeld’s assault on conventional wisdom in the Pentagon, Colonel Doug MacGregor describes many of the problems of services working together on the battlefield. He is also the author of a new book, *Transformation Under Fire : Revolutionizing How America Fights*.

7.\* Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 July 2001); Read Executive Summary. (11 pages)

This is the military doctrinal publication that explains how joint forces are organized and commanded in operations. After reading the executive summary, quickly skim through the rest of the publication, just so you have an idea of how joint doctrine publications are written.

Mini-Case Study: Command Structure and Khobar Towers

CS#1.\* Extract from Downing Report on the Bombing at Khobar Towers.

Skim the report, but read especially, recommendations 3 and 4 at the end of this document. It emphasizes the importance of command structures and relationships as they affect military success and, potentially, military failure.

Case Study: Planning and Execution in Bosnia

CS#2.\* Larry Wentz, *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience*, (Washington, DC: National Defense University  
Read chapter 3, especially as it describes the command relationships as they were developed in Bosnia. Skim  
Chapters 1, 2 and the first part of chapter 4.

CS#3.\* Curtis M. Scaparrotti, "The Blue Falcons In Bosnia," in *Warriors In Peace Operations*, edited by Douglas V.  
Johnson II (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, January 1999), chapter 3, pp. 31-71.

This paper is written by one of the first commanders as he initiated operations in one of the first major  
peacekeeping operations of the 1990s. It gives a first person perspective on the kind of operations and relationships that  
are involved, from a battalion commander's perspective. It is a very quick read!

**Optional/Additional:** (There is no requirement to read these, but if you have more interest they are available and  
in most cases posted to Blackboard)

\* Richard Lechowich, "Crossing Boundaries Commanders in Chief and Areas of Interest," *Joint Forces Quarterly*  
(Spring 2000) 34-41 (7 pages)

This article reinforces the points that are made in more depth in the article by Johnson above (#1). It emphasizes  
the need for coordination on the seams between Combatant Commanders.

\* Joint Publication 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February  
1995); Read Executive Summary (8 pages). Skim chapters 1 and 3 (37 pages).

This is dated and under revision, but is the latest published U.S. military guidance on planning joint operations.

#### Lesson Four, Tuesday, February 24, 2004

#### Deployment, Logistical Support, and two Conventional Wars in Iraq

Basic Question: How do military forces plan for and execute deployments and logistical support of deployed forces? How do military forces plan and fight major conventional war? Is the “old kind of warfare” just nostalgia or does quantity and weight have a quality in and of itself.

Readings: (readings with \* are available on blackboard and will be on the course readings disk)

1.\* Gary H. Mears and Ted Kim, “Logistics: The Way Ahead,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Spring 1994), pp. 38-44. (6 pages).

Mears and Kim give a quick picture of the challenges of logistics shortly after Desert Storm. This thinking led primarily to improvements in logistics rather than a fundamental reassessment of how the U.S. military should fight.

2.\* Joint Publication 4-0, *Logistics* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 6 April 2000), Read executive summary, chapters 1 & 2 (33 pages).

This is the military’s fundamental manual on how it does logistics. We will discuss the various aspects and commodities that are provided, but reviewing even the basic manual gives you an idea of the complexity of the task.

3.\* Richard Hooker, “Joint Campaigning in 2010,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 1998-99).

Rich Hooker discusses the challenges of putting all of the joint forces together—as was played out in Kosovo and, eventually, in Iraq.

4.\* Joint Publication 1-0, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 14 November 2000); read Executive Summary and chapter 3 (25 pages).

This is the military’s capstone manual that explains how the military fights together. While some of the observations may seem obvious, recognized that they form the foundational underpinnings of the U.S. military.

5.\* Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 September 2001). Read Executive Summary, chapter 1, and chapter 4 (40 pages).

This is the military’s operational manual that explains how it integrates operations to accomplish national missions. As you read it think about the way that it relates theory and principles to practice and implementation.

#### Case Study: Operation Desert Storm and Desert Shield

CS#1. William G. Pagonis, *Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War*, (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), pp. 63-149. (86 pages). [not available electronically; available from Stokes library]

With the glitz and glamour of “shock and awe” and the embedded reporters, it is critical to understand the literally monumental logistics effort that is required to support a major military operation. It is essential so that such an effort can be supported if required or so that it can be obviated if the defense structure can transform sufficiently (as we will discuss in lesson 5). Pagonis’s book is an easy, fun read that conveys the essence and scope of logistics.

CS#2.\* Barry McCaffrey, “Lessons of Dessert Storm,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Winter 2000-01), pp. 12-17 (5 pages).

GEN Barry McCaffrey’s observations based on Dessert Storm at the outset of the Bush administration provide a useful backdrop against which we can compare Operation Iraqi Freedom and think about the extent to which either principles or circumstances may have changed.

#### Case Study: Operation Iraqi Freedom

CS#3.\* William R. Hawkins, “Iraq: Heavy Forces and Decisive Warfare,” " by William R. Hawkins *Parameters*, Autumn 2003, pp. 62-67

Hawkins examines the lessons of Operation Iraqi Freedom and defense the efficacy of Heavy Forces, such as M1 Tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles in a future, transformed, Army.

Additional Readings TBA

Optional/Background:

\*Joint Publication 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 April 2000).

Lesson Five, Tuesday, March 2, 2004  
Military Operations, Doctrine, and the Future of Warfare

Basic Question: How are military forces employed in battle?

Readings: (readings with \* are available on blackboard and will be on the course readings disk)

1. Dana Priest, *The Mission*, pp. 121-174 “Inside the Wire with the Special Forces,” and “A-Teams in Afghanistan.”  
An close up examination of special operations forces and their potential role in the future of warfare.
- 2.\* Peter Boyer, “The New War Machine,” *New Yorker*, June 30, 2003, pp. 54-74.  
Boyer’s article transcends the last five lessons. It discusses civil-military relations, the roles of the services, the role of the commanders, the operations in Afghanistan, the operations in Operation Irai Freedom, and the transformation of the Defense Department. It will provide a great basis for discussion.
- 3.\* Max Boot, “The New American Way of War,” *Foreign Affairs*, July-August 2003, pp. 41-58  
Boot’s article also looks at the transformational nature of the new American way of war as reflecting, especially in the contrast between the previous Gulf War in 1990-91 and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
- 4.\* Jeffrey Record, “Collapsed Countries, Casualty Dread, and the New American Way of War,” *Parameters*, Summer 2002, pp. 4-23.  
Record’s article was written after Afghanistan and before OIF. It discusses several phenomena that are both technological (increasing lethality and significance of airpower) and cultural (American “perceived” casualty aversion and need to change regimes, thereby imposing order on ungoverned spaces).
- 5.\* Michael Evans, “From Kadesh to Kandahar: Military Theory and the Future of War,” *Naval War College Review*, Summer 2003, pp. 1-15.  
Evans looks at warfare through the end of Afghanistan and posits tentative conclusions about where war is going in the future. His article is, essentially, a “bookend” from lesson one that ties back in many of the discussions that we had concerning civil-military relations and military theory and looks forward, given our recent experience.
- 6.\* Michael P. Noonan and John Hillen, “The New Protracted Conflict: The Promise of Decisive Action,” *Orbis*, Spring 2002, pp. 229-246.  
Noonan and John Hillen also link the actions of forces as seen through the period of Afghanistan and looks toward how this could and indeed should affect the transformation of the military.

Case Study: Afghanistan

CS#1.\* Stephen Biddle, *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for the Army and Defense Policy* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002)

Steve Biddle spent significant time “on the ground” in Afghanistan and cataloged in significant detail the lessons that should—and should not—be learned from that war.

CS#2.\* William R. Hawkins, “What Not to Learn from Afghanistan,” *Parameters*, Summer 2002, pp. 24-32.

Hawkins cautions at overdrawing some of the lessons from the war in Afghanistan as we look toward future wars.

Optional/Background:

\* Jeffrey Record, *Bounding the Global War on Terrorism*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, December 2003)

This article by Jeff Record was very controversial earlier this year because it was critical of the Administration. He observed “that the war on terrorism —as opposed to the campaign against al-Qaeda —lacks strategic clarity, embraces unrealistic objectives, and may not be sustainable over the long haul. He calls for down-sizing the scope of the war on terrorism to reflect concrete U.S. security interests and the limits of American military power.” Although it is more appropriate for a WWS 549 reading, because it does not directly address military force planning and decision making, I thought that it would be worth making available.

Lesson Six, Tuesday, March 9, 2004  
Operations Other Than War

Basic Question: How does military decision making and force planning change for peacetime operations? What impact does this have on national security policy?

Readings: (readings with \* are available on blackboard and will be on the course readings disk)

1. Pamela Aall, Lt. Col. Daniel Miltenberger, and Thomas G. Weiss, *Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations*, pp xviii-xxiv, fig 1.1 and 1.2, 219-230. [Not available electronically; in Stokes library or can be ordered from <http://www.usip.org/pubs/catalog/igos.html>]

As I will show in class, this is a useful handbook and guide that is a great “pocket” guide that is worth getting if you are going to be participating in peace operations.

2.\* John Eisenhower and Edward Marks, “Herding Cats: Overcoming Obstacles in Civil-Military Operations” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Summer 1999) 86-90.

A great description of the military’s perceived challenge in civil-military operations and the importance of cooperation as peace operations are conducted.

3.\* Richard B. Lovelock, “The Evolution of Peace Operations Doctrine,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Spring 2002), 67-73 (6 pages).

Using examples from the Balkans and his experience with the British peacekeeping operations, Lovelock explains some of the lessons that can help U.S. and other forces as they conduct peace operations. This was written at the outset of the operation in Afghanistan.

4.\* Kimberly C. Field and Robert M. Perito, “Creating a Force for Peace Operations: Ensuring Stability with Justice,” *Parameters* (Winter 2003-03), pp. 77-87. (10 pages)

Perito and Kim Field take a good look at the kind of operations that the military gets involved in as it conducts peace operations and observes the need for a stability force that would include a significantly larger police and justice component. The article is prescient with respect to Iraq, but it is also useful as it identifies and describe the role of forces required in peace operations.

5.\* Patrick N. Kelleher, “Crossing Boundaries: Interagency Cooperation and the Military,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn 2002) 104-110.

Kelleher describes, from the perspective of both the military and humanitarian aid workers—primarily through this work at USAID’s OFDA—the challenges and potential solutions to providing humanitarian aid. This was written during postwar operations in Afghanistan and prior to Iraq.

Case Study: Postwar Operations in Iraq

CS#1.\* Peter Maass, Professor Nagl’s War, *New York Times Magazine*, 11 January 2004, pp 23 ff.

An insightful, current perspective on peacekeeping operations in Iraq

CS#2.\* Anthony H. Cordesman, “What Went Wrong: The Iraq War and the Lessons of Conflict Termination, Peacemaking, and Nation Building,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, (Spring 2003), (internet edition), pp. 1-10.

Cordesman describes a “flash assessment” of some of the most important lessons thus far in postwar operations in Iraq.

CS#3.\* James Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, January/February 2004

Fallows provides the best, insightful conclusions on the civilian and military decision making process that led up to the current structure that is now providing security in postwar Iraq.

Optional/Background:

*Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 1997); Read Executive Summary, chapter 1, 2, and 10. [on disk]

Joint Publication 3-7, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 1995); Read Executive Summary, chapter 1 through 3. [on disk]

Joint Publication 3-8 v.1, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 1996); [on disk]

Joint Publication 3-8 v.2, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume II* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 1996); [on disk]

\* James Kitfield, "Peacekeepers' Progress," *National Journal*, 23 December 2000. (5 pages)

Interestingly, Kitfield observed that after a decade of being forced into peacekeeping duty, the military actually started to get good at it and accept it as a legitimate mission.

Optional Case Study: Haiti (and East Timor)

CS#1.\* Robert C. Shaw, "Integrating Conventional and Special Operations Forces," *Military Review* Jul-Aug 97

CS#2.\* Robert F. Baumann, Operation Uphold Democracy: Power Under Control, *Military Review*, Jul-Aug 97

CS#3.\* John T. Fishel, Operation Uphold Democracy: Old Principles, New Realities, *Military Review*, Jul-Aug 97

CS#4.\* Craig A. Collier, "A New Way to Wage Peace: US Support to *Operation Stabilise*" *Military Review* (January/February 2001), 2-9.